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AEGEAN GREECE
IN THE
FOURTH CENTURY BC



John Buckler

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AEGEAN GREECE IN THE FOURTH CENTURY BC

BY

JOHN BUCKLER



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To Julian Deahl

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PREFACE

“When you set out for Ithaka, pray that your way be long”. With all due apologies for this plebeian translation of Cavafy’s beautiful poetry, his lines aptly describe the way of this book with its various difficulties and many delights. It unrepentantly takes its place among other treatments of traditional political, diplomatic, and military history. It does so because so much work in these areas yet needs to be done. The effort is long overdue for several reasons. Despite the able efforts of the scholars who created the second edition of the *Cambridge Ancient History* in 1994, no single historian since K.J. Beloch in 1922–1923 has written a coherent history of this period. In scope this work concentrates on the Greek Aegean with only slight notice given to the Greeks of the west and the non-Greeks in the peripheral areas of Asia Minor and Egypt.

Discoveries and advances in several fields also demand a new and comprehensive study of this time. Quite important among them include the numerous inscriptions found since the publication of Beloch’s monumental work. Of interest in themselves their unique importance as historical sources can best be felt when combined with other material, notably the new research on literary sources and the ever-growing number of archaeological discoveries. Historical studies have likewise kept pace. Topographical investigations have also proven vital to the understanding of these events. “What historians need is not more sources but stouter boots”. Being innately selfish, I should like both. A.L. Rowse’s lengthier advice on the value of topographical investigation inspired my aphorism but the idea really needs no defense. The regions under study are still lands of mountains, valleys, plains, rivers, and the sea. Not even good maps, which are few, can adequately substitute for personal investigation of the terrain itself. Therefore, since 1970 the lands of Greece and Turkey have provided my routine haunts. Likewise, T.R. Holmes in his magisterial treatment of Caesar’s campaigns in Gaul wrote that “It is of no use to visit battlefields, unless it is certain that battles were fought upon them”. Consequently, no military operations receive detailed treatment here without personal inspection of the land upon which they were fought.

In his *Jerusalem* (lines 55–56) William Blake wrote that “He who would do good to another must do it in Minute Particulars”, a particularly pleasant duty to fulfill now. Many and various thanks go gladly to Professors E. Badian, Mortimer Chambers, A. Schachter, and W.M. Calder III for advice and knowledge freely and cordially given. Further thanks are owed to Dr. Hans Beck, whose work on federalism has been as original and sound as it is refreshing. Professor C.J. Tuplin has shared ideas on Xenophon in particular and also on broader historical questions as well. Dr. Nurten Sevinç, Director of the Archaeological Museum at Çanakkale, Turkey, very kindly helped me to locate the sites of Kebren, Skepsis, and Gergis. Her advice, erudition, and graciousness proved as inestimable as they are appreciated. Professor Nicolas Yalouris, former General Inspector of Antiquities, most kindly took time from his work at Elis to provide a tour of the site and to discuss his many findings. Professor P.J. Rhodes generously allowed me to cite Professor R. Osborne’s and his numeration of the inscriptions included in their forthcoming edition of *Greek Historical Inscriptions* (Oxford 2003). Professor Dr. J. Knauss generously discussed the topography and geology of Tegyra and the Kopaic Basin, adding an aspect of scholarship beyond my competence. The late Professor G. Szemler and Dr. W. Cherf patiently discussed with me aspects of the terrain of Thermopylai and the Dhema Pass. My thanks to Miss Linda Simon, Director of the Writing Center of Harvard University for having located the passages from Rowse’s book, from which I coined my aphorism. Mr. J. Mullner deserves ample thanks for having provided cartographic resources for western Turkey. By doing so he made my topographical work there easier and less strenuous. Dr. Bruce Swann lent welcome assistance on several bibliographical matters. A very great debt of gratitude goes to Caroline Buckler for having diligently and patiently translated my typescript into something that a computer could understand. To Mr. Julian Deahl, whose patience with this project has been Homeric, I give particular thanks for his confidence in it. Mr. M.K. Swormink has likewise shown vision and patience, and Miss Tanja Cowall has carefully guided the manuscript into print. A very special expression of gratitude is owed to a great number of people who will never see this book—the many Greeks and Turks who helped me with my topographical work and showed a stranger touch-

ing kindness along the way. Lastly, S.C. Buckler and S.C. Buckler both helped with the paperwork.

To all I offer heartfelt thanks.

Watseka, Illinois
14 December 2002

CHAPTER ONE

PRELUDE: THE END OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR (404–400 BC)

In early autumn 404 the Spartan commander Lysandros sailed his fleet into Piraeus, the harbor of Athens. He had cut the Athenians off from their vital grain supplies in the Black Sea and pared away their major maritime allies. Meanwhile, Spartan armies under Kings Agis and Pausanias had won control of Attika itself during the final, or Dekeleian, stage of the war. Defeated, isolated, and starving, the Athenians surrendered to these irresistible forces, thereby ending the Peloponnesian War. A weary Greece greeted the event with relief and enthusiasm. Even many defeated Athenians shared the sentiment. At Athens the Long Walls were pulled down with great festivity, all to the music of flute girls. Many Greeks hopefully thought that the end of the war would bring the beginning of freedom to them. That desire would prove to be an abiding yearning of the fourth-century Greeks. Their inability to realize it would equally prove to be their gravest political failure. Moreover, the war had left a predictable, bitter legacy. In short, victory had not brought peace. Rather, it caused as many problems as it had supposedly solved. The basic difficulty was that the Spartans, like many other conquerors, found it easier to defeat the enemy than to win the peace. The fault lay in the several factors that they lacked in some degree sustained experience in broader Aegean affairs, suffered from the insularity of their institutions, and lacked a corps of officers capable of effectively administering an empire. The sources of external trouble also numbered three. First and perhaps most perilous for them was their disagreements with their Greek allies, who expected rewards for their considerable efforts during the war. Second, the Spartans confronted serious internal problems in Athens itself. Defeat sparked among the Athenians a crisis that shook the very foundations of their democracy. Oligarch clashed with democrat in a conflict that the Spartans must either exploit or resolve. The last and equally intransigent quandry was their need to honor their treaty obligations to the Persians, whose decisive help had enabled them to defeat



1. Greece and Asia Minor, adapted from J.P. McKay, B.D. Hill, and J. Buckler, *A History of Western Society* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 2003), by courtesy of Houghton Mifflin.

Athens. The Spartans faced the additional challenge that all of these problems were concurrent, a disagreeable lesson in the rigors of hegemony. They must without hesitation deal immediately with those they considered most pressing.¹

The first confrontation rose not from the vanquished but from some of the victors. Corinth, Thebes, and many other states demanded the destruction of Athens. Their reasons are obvious, if ignoble. Before the war the Corinthians had clashed with the Athenians over Kerkyra, Poteidaia, and Megara; and during it had fought them both in the Corinthian Gulf and at Syracuse. The Thebans had sturdily confronted the Athenians, and had repulsed their invasion at Delion in 424. Not even their plundering of Dekeleia in the latter stages of the war had assuaged their anger. Throughout the entire war Athens was an immediately more dangerous threat to these states than it was to Sparta itself. Yet more than revenge urged their demand. An Athens destroyed would serve as easy prey to the Corinthians and Thebans, even to the point of their enjoying the prospect of dividing Attika between them, just as the Athenians had during the war appropriated conquered territory for their own uses. That is precisely what the Athenians had feared, when they learned that the war was lost. Nevertheless, despite a generation of relentless warfare, the Spartans refused to destroy the city that had so ably defended Greece from the Persians. More realistically, the Spartans needed Athens to thwart the ambitions of these two allies. Although the two honored the Spartan decision, this event was the first sign of division and discontent among the allies.²

The Thebans and Corinthians next surprised the Spartans, when they demanded a tithe of the spoils of victory. Feeling that they had borne a heavy burden in the war, they felt equally entitled to reward.

¹ Dekeleian War and Athenians fears: Thuc. 7.19.1; *Hell. Ox.* 17.3–5; 20.3–4; Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.7–10; 3.3; Diod. 13.107.4–5; Justin 5.7.4–12; Surrender: Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.21–22; Lys. 13.13–16; Diod. 14.3.2; Plut. *Lys.* 14.5–15.2; Justin 5.8. Freedom of the Greeks: Thuc. 1.124.3; Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.23. For general accounts of the period, see K.J. Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte* III².1 (Berlin and Leipzig 1922) 1–17; C. Mossé, *Athens in Decline, 404–86 B.C.* (London and Boston 1973) 5–20; E. Meyer, *Geschichte des Altertums* IV⁶.2 (Darmstadt 1975) 358–366; V⁶ (1975) 1–40; C.D. Hamilton, *Sparta's Bitter Victories* (Ithaca 1979) 26–40; D.M. Lewis *et al.*, *The Cambridge Ancient History* VI² (Cambridge 1994) 24–40. See also W.G. Hardy, *CP* 21 (1926) 346–355; Th.A. Arvanitopoulos, *ΔΕΚΕΛΕΙΑ* (Athens 1958) 15–22; R.J. Buck, *Boiotia and the Boiotian League* (Alberta 1994) 23–24.

² Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.19; Isok. 14.31. H.D. Westlake, *Historia* 35 (1986) 405–426.

Since no other ally asked for such consideration, it appears that again these two states had become further disenchanted with Spartan leadership. The case of the Thebans is nothing more than one of simple greed. They had already profitted hugely from booty seized during the Dekeleian War. The Corinthians, who had contributed greatly to the naval war effort, had, however, better reason to expect some compensation, especially given the inherent expense of naval warfare. Nonetheless, the Spartans rejected both demands, and Agis subsequently dedicated a tithe to Apollo at Delphi. Such dedications were customary and in this case quite appropriate. Before the war Apollo had promised that the Spartans would enjoy his support during the hostilities, whether or not they appealed for his help. The real significance of this incident is not so much the booty as another indication of a severe rift opening between the Spartans and two of their most powerful allies. The question became whether the alliance that had won the war could survive the peace. The answer came quickly. When the Spartans ordered their allies to march against some Athenians still occupying Piraeus, both states refused to obey. As so often in history, the victors had already begun to turn against one another.³

Fragile also was the situation in defeated Athens. Given the horrors of the war, the Spartans prescribed a reasonable peace. It stipulated that in addition to demolishing their fortifications and surrendering all but twelve of their triremes the Athenians were formally to relinquish their maritime empire. They also swore to recall their exiles. At first glance this clause seems a gesture to promote reconciliation and harmony within Athens; but since most of the exiles were oligarchs with Spartan sympathies, it also kept the voices of politically acceptable men audible in public affairs. The Athenians also agreed to have the same friends and enemies as the Spartans and to follow their leadership. They thereby accepted Spartan hegemony as a treaty obligation. To ensure compliance the Spartans soon installed a garrison in the city. The Spartans allowed the defeated to retain control of Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros, vital links along

³ Thuc. 1.118.3; *Hell. Ox.* 20.4–5; Xen. *Hell.* 3.3.1, 5.5; Dem. 24.128–129; schol. 258b; Plut. *Lys.* 27.4; Justin 5.10.12; H.W. Parke, *JHS* 52 (1932) 42–46; W.K. Pritchett, *The Greek State at War* V (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1991) 373–374; G.L. Cawkwell, *CQ* 70 (1976) 270–277; R.J. Buck, *Thrasylbulus and the Athenian Democracy* (Stuttgart 1993) 68–70.

the line of their grain-route to the Black Sea. The Spartans likewise assured the legitimacy of the democratic constitution. In all, these were lenient terms. So far as the Spartan authorities were concerned, the state that had provoked the war had submitted and the matter was settled. The stipulations of the peace guaranteed that Athens had the right to exist under traditional economic, political, and social conditions. Though a subject-ally of Sparta, it remained a sovereign polis, limited only by the terms of the peace treaty.⁴

The treaty withal, it did not bring peace to Athens, which continued to seethe with internal rancor and fierce rivalry. Moreover, some Spartans preyed upon the discord. The details of these events, though interesting in themselves, belong more properly to the local history of Athens than to a larger study of Greece. A succinct account of them, however, merits attention because of their lingering repercussions on Athenian policy throughout the fourth century. The Athenian legacy from the war was human suffering, destruction of property, and guilt for various and numerous atrocities. Defeat shook Athenian confidence in democratic government, and many Athenians now saw oligarchy as a more responsible form of government, while some extremists even looked to tyranny by committee. In September 404 thirty men, soon to become known as the Thirty Tyrants, assumed control of Athens. They owed their position to a combination of intimidation exerted by Lysandros and supported by the Spartan garrison and by some ambitious and disgruntled Athenian aristocrats. Lysandros claimed that the Athenians had broken the peace agreement because they had not dismantled their walls within the stipulated time. He thus felt justified to dissolve the present government. Under duress the Athenians elected the thirty men to re-establish the constitution along traditional, ancestral lines. They instead instigated a reign of terror during which they killed some influential men and exiled many more. These refugees often found shelter in nearby Thebes, Megara, and Argos. In support of the Thirty the Spartan government decreed that all states that sheltered the opponents of the new regime must return them to Athens. Any state that refused would automatically become an enemy of Sparta. This

⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.20; Andok. 3.11–12; Lys. 6.38–39; Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 34.3; Isok 18.29; Plut. *Lys.* 14.7–10; H. Bengtson, *Die Staatsverträge des Altertums* II² (Munich 1975) no. 211; Hamilton, *SBV*, 48–55; P.J. Rhodes, *CJ* 75 (1979/80) 305–323.

proclamation caused repercussions beyond Attika and Lakonia. In a spirit mixed of gallantry, defiance, and self-interest, the Thebans voted that every house and polis in Boiotia was to be a place of refuge to every Athenian who needed shelter. Any Boiotian who refused to help a fugitive was subject to a heavy fine. The Thebans further decreed that if any Boiotian should see people carrying arms against the tyrants, he should let the episode pass unnoticed and unmentioned. The Thebans justified their position by declaring that the Athenians had not broken their treaty. Thebes itself became a haven for the Athenians and a base of operations for Thrasybulos, the most eminent enemy of the Thirty, and his followers. Megara likewise harbored many Athenian refugees, thus joining Thebes in defiance of Spartan policy. By doing so, both states declared themselves enemies of Sparta.⁵

The Argives, not surprisingly, also protected Athenian fugitives in defiance of the Spartan decree. The sources often attribute this support to their humaneness and generosity, the response of a people who professed horror at the cruelty of the Spartans. A more cynical explanation of Argive concern better explains their motives. Throughout most of their history and certainly during the latter part of the fifth century, the Argives had striven to become the *hegemones* of the Peloponnesos but without becoming isolated, should they fail. Cautious and calculated, their policy was based on a widespread system of alliances. In 421 they made an alliance with Mantinea, Elis, Corinth, and the Chalkidians and in the following year another with Sparta. In that same year they concluded an alliance to last for one hundred years with Athens, Mantinea, and Elis. In 418 they renewed their alliance with the Spartans, the Chalkidians, and the Macedonian King Perdikkas. The reason for this seemingly bewildering flurry of alliances is obvious. The Argives thereby maintained their official peace with Sparta, while legally building a basis of support among states suspicious or openly hostile to Sparta. Seen in this light, Argive support of Theban and Megarian opposition to Sparta was logical.

⁵ Date: Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.4; F. Boll, *RE* 6 (1909) 2355; Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.1–2; Lys. fr. 78.2; Diod. 14.6.3, 32.1; Plut. *Pel.* 6.5; Lys. 27.4–8. D. Lotze, *Lysander und der Peloponnesische Krieg* (Berlin 1964) 87–98; J.-F. Bommelaer, *Lysandre de Sparte* (Paris 1981) 134–151; J. Seibert, *Die politischen Flüchtlinge und Verbannten in der griechischen Geschichte I* (Darmstadt 1979) 92–93; P. Krentz, *The Thirty at Athens* (Ithaca 1982) 44–70; Buck, *Thrasybulus*, 64–68.



2. Attika and the Peloponnesos, adapted from R.F. Treharne and H. Fullard, *Muir's Historical Atlas* (New York: Barnes and Noble 1963), by courtesy of Barnes and Noble.

A powerful, wilful, and proximate friend like Thebes would provide them at once with greater security and an additional means of pursuing their policy. An agreeable Megara simplified communications with both Thebes and Athens. Argos and Thebes at least shared various concerns. Neither cared idly to watch Sparta take control of an unpopular Athenian government. That situation would constitute a new and unwelcome Spartan presence in the region. A free and weak Athens was a much more suitable neighbor. In the process of events a new political pattern was forming in the northern Peloponnesos and central Greece. Thebes, Megara, Corinth, Argos, and potentially Athens came to realize a community of interest against Spartan ambitions. Sympathy of purpose had not yet coalesced into alliance, but a new pattern of politics had begun to form.⁶

Thrasyboulos brought matters to a head, when in 404/3 he marched from Thebes to seize the fort at Phyle in Attika. It is a strong, elevated position enjoying good communications between Thebes and Athens. The forces of the Thirty with Spartan support failed to dislodge Thrasyboulos' men, after which the Tyrants occupied Eleusis. Ere long, Thrasyboulos led his men by night to Piraeus, and again the Thirty and now the Spartan garrison moved to thwart them, again without success. Having retired to Eleusis, the Tyrants appealed direct to Sparta for relief. Lysandros responded gladly by arranging to have himself serve as harmost by land and his brother Libys as naval commander. He further provided the Athenian oligarchs with a sum of 100 talents. He next advanced onto Piraeus to suppress Thrasyboulos' supporters. King Pausanias quickly put an end to the crisis. He led the Spartan and allied field army, lacking only the Boiotian and Corinthian contingents, to Athens to restore order. Although accused of acting through jealousy of Lysandros' previous successes, Pausanias and the home government clearly considered more important the resolution of the Athenian civil war. They had nothing to gain by furthering unrest in Athens. Nor did they welcome the growing discontent of two major allies. A genuine peace in Athens was Pausanias' goal. Another was doubtless to curb Lysandros' adventurous ambitions, which threatened the traditional

⁶ Thuc. 5.28; Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.30; Diod. 14.6.2, 32.2–6; Bengtson, H. and R. Werner, *Die Staatsverträge des Altertums II*² (Munich 1975) 190, 192–194, 196. Seibert, *Flüchtlinge*, I.94–96.

lines of authority within the Spartan government. Pausanias assumed command of Lysandros' troops, and then made a demonstration against Thrasyboulos' forces. After desultory fighting, Pausanias arranged for a settlement of Athenian affairs that led to the restoration of the democracy. That accomplished, he withdrew and disbanded his men. A general amnesty followed that permitted the erection of a new democracy. These acts mark the true end of the Peloponnesian War.⁷

The nature and significance of the new democracy has been and still are so intensely debated that accounts of them can readily be found elsewhere. More important here are the broader horizons now open to the Athenians. Despite the welcome restoration of political order and social harmony, the Athenians had no reason for gratitude to the Spartans, who had supported the tyrants and oligarchs until the last moment of the crisis. Although they certainly had little cause to trust the Spartans, they continued for the moment to honor their oaths. For that matter neither could they quite trust their new Theban friends. In 402, after having come to terms with the Spartans and one another, the Athenians watched the Thebans occupy Oropos. The Thebans had done so on the invitation of some Oropian exiles. The fact that they had appealed to Thebes rather than Athens reflects the latter's weakness and Oropian discontent under its authority. The history of the troubled city was already long and turbulent. It and the region it commanded geographically belonged to Boiotia. Lying in the upper valley of the Asopos river, Oropos commanded a major route into northeastern Attika. The Athenians may have gained control of it as early as 507, and it was certainly in Athenian hands at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War. In 412 it fell to the Thebans with the co-operation of the Eretrians and some Oropians themselves. The Thebans seem afterwards to have left Oropos independent, for by 402 the Athenians had regained control of it. Once the Thebans recovered the city in 402, they resettled the inhabitants

⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.28–43; Dem. 20.48; Diod. 14.32.2–33.6; see also 14.13.5. A.E. Raubitschek, *Hesperia* 10 (1941) 284–295; Buck, *Thrasyboulus*, 7–82, with earlier bibliography. Phyle: personal observations of 12 February 1971, revealed that only the northern and eastern sides of the hill were fortified with walls and towers, but steep cliffs protected the southern and western sides. The fort was strong enough to dominate the pass below. See also F.E. Winter, *Greek Fortification* (Toronto 1971) 43; A.W. Lawrence, *Greek Aims in Fortification* (Oxford 1979) 175–176; J. Ober, *Fortress Attica* (Leiden 1985) 146–147.

to a site a bit more than a kilometer from the sea. They originally allowed the city its freedom, but later gave its inhabitants Boiotian citizenship. The incident and its timing are alike puzzling. Though more powerful than Athens at the time, the Thebans had no serious reason to antagonize a state that it had just protected. Given the long and tangled tale, the Oropians seem simply to have preferred assimilation with the Boiotians to Athenian administration. Whereas the latter had never incorporated them into the traditional system of demes, the Thebans provided them with a legal place within the Boiotian Confederacy. The Oropians actually enjoyed greater rights as Boiotians than as Athenians. The whole episode may well have amounted to a local affair in which the Oropians chose their own friends. Whatever the details, the Athenians could not have relished the thought of losing this vital region, even to a much-needed supporter. For their part, the Thebans were perhaps indifferent to the feelings of a state that badly needed their help and whose claim to Oropos was dubious. Another indication of this attitude comes from the incident in which the Thebans made reprisals because the Athenians could not repay a debt of two talents. Yet so long as the Spartan threat persisted, Atheno-Theban amity endured, but was in many respects little more than a marriage of convenience. These incidents for the moment seemed minor, when contrasted to the more serious and pressing Spartan menace, but Oropos would henceforth hang like a cloud over the two states for the rest of the fourth century.⁸

By 400 Greece finally enjoyed peace, but the question and the challenge was whether it could endure. The problems were many

⁸ Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.39–43; Andok. 1.96; Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 42; Diod. 14.33.6. A sampling of general accounts: P. Cloché, *Le démocratie athénienne* (Paris 1951); R.K. Sinclair, *Democracy and Participation in Athens* (Cambridge 1988); J. Ober, *Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens* (Princeton 1989); D. Stockton, *The Classical Athenian Democracy* (Oxford 1990); W. Eder, ed., *Die athenische Demokratie im 4. Jahrhundert v. Chr.* (Stuttgart 1995); M.H. Hansen, *The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes*² (Norman, Okla. 1999); K.-W. Welwei, *Athen. Machtpolitik und Demokratie in klassischer Zeit* (Darmstadt 1999). Oropos: in 402: Diod. 14.17.3; Theopompos, *FGrH* 115 F12. Geography: Ephoros, *FGrH* 70 F119; Diod. 13.47.1–2; Strabo 9.1.22; Paus. 1.34.1. C. Bursian, *Geographie von Griechenland I* (Leipzig 1862) 219–221. History: in 507: Hdt. 5.77; 6.101; Peloponnesian War: Thuc. 2.23; 4.99; in 412: Thuc. 8.60; Theban reprisals: Lys. 30.21–22. See also G.D. Rocchi, *Frontiera e confini nella Grecia antica* (Milan 1988) 183–186; C. Bearzot in H. Beister and J. Buckler, eds, *BOIOTIKA* (Munich 1989) 113–122; Buck, *Boiotia*, 123–124.

and the political situation decidedly turbulent. The years between the surrender of Athens and the re-establishment of its democracy had seen an increasingly confident, successful, and independent block of powerful states that had either defied or resisted Spartan ambitions in a strategically crucial region. Thebes, Corinth, Megara, and of course Argos had demonstrated their intention of not becoming parts of an empire under Spartan domination. Internal allied tensions notwithstanding, a common front was forming against Sparta.⁹

⁹ A little appreciated Spartan success during these years was the winning of the support of Dionysios, the new tyrant of Syracuse, in 404. During the final stages of the Peloponnesian War, the Syracusan fleet under Hermokrates had played a vital role in the destruction of Athenian power. Thus, it was sound policy to preserve good relations with Syracuse, one that later paid good dividends at little risk. See Diod. 14.10.2, 62.1, 70.3; Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.20–22, and in general K.F. Stroheker, *Dionysios I.* (Wiesbaden 1958); M. Sordi, *La Dynasteia in Occidente* (Padua 1992).

CHAPTER TWO

THE SPARTAN HEGEMONY (401–399 BC)

During the years immediately following the surrender of Athens, Sparta can reasonably be called the hegemon of Greece. With few exceptions, most of Greece had agreed, not necessarily enthusiastically, either to follow or at least to respect its leadership. Although this period of acknowledged Spartan supremacy proved transient, no single power at this time wished openly to challenge Sparta. That withal, in the face of Spartan imperial incompetence and myopic policies, many states began to take a more independent position regarding the victors. The fruition of this inclination lay a few years in the future, but for the moment Sparta stood as the pre-eminent power in Greece. Having dealt with defeated Athens and some recalcitrant allies, the Spartans now turned to another local problem before confronting the serious problems of their treaty obligations to the Persians.

A. THE ELEIAN WAR (401–400 BC)

The Spartans took advantage of this occasion to curtail the growing power of Elis and to settle some old grudges. The issues were several. The Eleians had in the course of the fifth century extended their power southwards to the Neda River. They had in the process subdued the strategically important city of Lepreon, a staunch Spartan ally. The site itself commands a hill overlooking a valley that leads both to the main coastal route between Pyrgos in the north and Kyparissia in the south and another between Bassai in the east and the road to the western coast. In 471 the Eleians had gathered the small cities of the region, Lepreon included, into the new city of Elis. Like the legendary synoikismos of Athens, that of Elis did not entail the destruction of Lepreon but rather a transfer of power to the new city. Yet Lepreon seems still to have enjoyed a great deal of independence. The Spartans, however, could not have been pleased either by the growth of Eleian power on their borders or the eclipse

of a loyal ally. Subsequent events are quite uncertain, but Lepreon was the focus of the problem. At some unknown date thereafter, the Lepreans had waged war on some Arkadians, probably over Triphylia. In the conflict the Arkadians so pressed the Lepreans that the latter sought help from Elis. The price for Eleian support was high. In return for an alliance, the Lepreans offered the Eleians half of their land. After the war the Eleians returned it on the stipulation that the Lepreans pay an annual contribution of one talent to Olympian Zeus. This tribute in reality went into the coffers of the Eleians, who administered Zeus' sanctuary. At the outset of the Peloponnesian War, the Lepreans refused to pay the levy, and appealed to Sparta for arbitration. Fearing that Sparta would find in favor of Lepreon, the Eleians refused arbitration, and ravaged the Leprean territory. The Spartan reaction was predictable. Having decided in favor of Lepreon and installing a garrison in the city, the Spartans ruled that Lepreon was autonomous and that the Eleians were the aggressors. The Eleians responded by accusing Lepreon to be in revolt and the Spartans in violation of the Peace of Nikias.¹

The Eleians next openly but legally defied Sparta, when they joined a larger movement with their neighbors against the Spartan hegemony of the Peloponnesos. In 421 the Eleians allied themselves with Argos, Mantinea, and Athens, this on the eve of the Olympic games of 420. When in the summer of 420 the Eleians sent heralds to announce the sacred truce, the result was anything but peaceful. The chronology is unclear, but again Lepreon lay at the heart of the problem. The Eleians refused to allow the Spartans to sacrifice at Olympia or to compete in the games, because they had violated the sacred truce. The Eleians claimed that the Spartans had attacked one of their forts and had sent hoplites to Lepreon. They imposed a fine on Sparta, but promised themselves to pay it on the condition that Sparta return Lepreon to them. There can be no question that the Eleian position was calculated to provoke Sparta. Proof comes from the military response of Elis' new allies, all of whom

¹ Elis and Lepreon: Hdt. 4.148.4; 9.28.4; Thuc. 5.31.2, 34, 47-49; Diod. 11.54.1; Strabo 8.3.30; Paus. 4.15.8, 20.1-2; 5.5.3, 10.2; 6.22.4. W.W. How and J. Wells, *A Commentary on Herodotus*, I (Oxford 1912) 350; A.W. Gomme *et al.*, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides*, IV (Oxford 1970) 26-29; J.G. Frazer, *Pausanias's Description of Greece*, III (London 1898) 473-476; S. Lauffer, ed., *Griechenland* (Munich 1989) 381-382.

sent troops to Olympia. Although the Spartans sacrificed at home rather than at the sanctuary of Zeus, their distinguished countryman Lichas entered his chariot in the Olympic race. Upon its victory, the judges announced that the team and chariot had won in the name of the Boiotians. Yet when Lichas came to the course to crown the charioteer, the judges beat the old man before the spectators on the grounds that as a Spartan, he had no right to compete in the games. Ostensibly a small event, the insult long rankled in Spartan breasts. The situation further deteriorated, when in 418 the Eleians and Mantineians supported Sparta's arch-enemy Argos. The Eleians originally planned to join their allies at Mantinea to fight the Spartans in open battle, but withdrew their forces, when their allies decided not to use the combined army to conquer Lepreon. Nevertheless, they reinforced Argos later in 418/7 in its dispute with Epidaurus. At some later point, the Eleians on specious grounds forbade King Agis from sacrificing to Zeus. By 401 Elis and Sparta shared nearly a century of hostility and bitterness, much of it at the expense of Spartan pride.²

The year 401 proved the moment for Spartan vengeance. Now at peace with the Greeks in Europe, the Spartans turned their full attention to Elis. They could hardly ignore the many public affronts suffered at the hands of the Eleians. The insults to Lichas in his private capacity and then to Agis, who had travelled to Olympia on official business, were not simply humiliations to these individuals but to Sparta itself. A last consideration was probably word that Elis had entered into alliance with the Aitolians. This alliance indicates that anti-Spartan stirrings had begun not only in Elis and among some Spartan allies but also farther north on the mainland. Events would also later prove that a movement of considerable gravity there was already in progress. These factors touched all Spartans, and a united Sparta now sought its revenge against a bold Elis that had become uncomfortably powerful. The Spartans met in assembly and

² Alliance of 421: Thuc. 5.47, 50.3; *IG* I³ 83; Bengtson, *SdA* II².190. See also M. Clark, in R. Mellor and L. Tritle, eds., *Text and Tradition* (Claremont 1999) 115–131. Olympian truce: Thuc. 5.49.1–50.1; Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.21–22; Diod. 12.77.1. See also Gomme, *HCT*. IV.64–67. Lichas: Thuc. 5.50.3–4; Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.21. P. Poralla, *Prosopographie der Lakedaimonier*² (Chicago 1985) 86, 183; T. Lenschau – H. Nachod, *RE* 13 (1926) 211–212. 418: Thuc. 5.58, 62, 75. J. Roy, *Klio* 80 (1998) 360–368. Agis: Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.21–22; Thuc. 1.1444; Diod. 14.17.4. G.E. Underhill, *A Commentary on the Hellenica of Xenophon* (Oxford 1900) 94–95.

piously voted to bring the Eleians to their senses. They accordingly sent ambassadors to Elis demanding that the Eleians leave Lepreon and other outlying cities autonomous. The cry for autonomy was little more than a long echo from the beginning of the Peloponnesian War. Perikles had first scornfully proposed it to the Spartans themselves before its outbreak. During the fourth century it became a prime political concept. All Greek states applauded it, but few wished to share it with others. Constant abuse of it would leave it a threadbare political slogan rather than a reality. The Spartans would consistently use it to weaken their adversaries. The Spartan demand in this case was obviously specious, for it aimed at nothing less than the elimination of Elis as a significant power on the doorstep. Had the Spartans limited their demand to the disputed status of Lepreon, they would at least have had a legitimate diplomatic point. They lacked however, any treaty obligations to the other cities in Elis, so their demand was nugatory. The Eleians refused to comply on the grounds that they commanded the cities by right of conquest. Like Perikles earlier, they promised to grant their neighboring cities autonomy, when the Spartans did theirs. They thus asserted their right to do in Elis what the Spartans themselves had done in Lakonia and Messenia. They also by implication challenged the Spartan claim to the hegemony of the Peloponnesos. The Spartans aired a further grievance, when they insisted that the Eleians pay their share of the expenses owed to finance the conduct of the Peloponnesian War. Given the treatment of Thebes and Corinth in the matter of the tithe, the Spartan position was ridiculous. For their part, the Eleians accused the Spartans of having enslaved the Greeks. This biting statement was true. Not only had Lysandros tried to turn Athens into a puppet-state, but the Spartans had also already sold out the liberty of the Asian Greeks in return for Persian aid. Few in Sparta could have listened to these words with pride and equanimity.³

The Eleian rejection of their demands led the Spartans to mobilize their army, its commander King Agis receiving the orders to plunder enemy territory. Agis led his troops through Arkadia until

³ Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.23; Diod. 14.17.5–6; Paus. 3.8.5; see also Thuc. 1.144.2. Aitolio-Eleian alliance: Diod. 14.79.9. F. Kiechle, *RhM* 103 (1960) 336–366; P. Siewart, in L. Aigner Foresti *et al.*, eds., *Federazione e le federalismo nell'Europa Antica* (Milan 1994) 257–264; T.H. Nielsen, in T.H. Nielsen, ed., *Yet More Studies in the Ancient Greek Polis* (Stuttgart 1997) 137–138.

he reached the Larisos river, which formed the border between Achaia and Elis. There, somewhere north of the modern village of Apideon, only some thirty-one kilometers north of the city of Elis, his men began their work of devastation. While marching through the river valley, they were confronted by an earthquake. Although it did them no harm, Agis interpreted it as a sign of divine disapproval of the invasion. He accordingly retreated and disbanded his army. Although some saw his decision as nothing more than an excuse to spare the Eleians, the Spartans, like many other Greeks, also considered such events to be divine portents and even warnings. It was hardly unusual for matters of state policy to be suspended or abandoned on such occasions. Nor had Agis any personal reasons for sparing the people who had publicly humiliated him. Whatever his motives, Agis did nothing unc customary, and was not criticized for his decision. Much emboldened, the Eleians sent embassies to all of Sparta's known enemies, not without some success, to urge opposition to Sparta's foreign policy.⁴

Later in the same summer, the ephors ordered Agis again to invade Elis. The response of Sparta's allies is indicative of the recent erosion of Spartan authority. The Thebans and Corinthians refused to participate, as at the outset did the Arkadians and Achaians. Athens, however, dutifully sent its forces. Sparta had not witnessed such defiance during the Peloponnesian War. His army assembled, Agis attacked through Messene, marching along the valley of the Pamisos river to the sea, whence he swung northwards along the coastal road through the narrow defile of Aulon north of the modern town of Kyparissia. The route lay along the line of the modern railway. Having crossed the Neda river, he advanced across the rich coastal plain of southern Elis. Once there, Agis was met by the Lepreans and many others from the area. He refrained for obvious reasons from devastating the lands of his new friends. Continuing along the coastal road without opposition, he turned eastwards along the Alpheios river to Olympia. There he sacrificed to Zeus without

⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.23; Diod. 14.17.4–6; Strabo 9.5.19; Paus. 3.8.5; 6.26.10; 7.17.3. H. Hitzig and H. Blümner, *Pausaniae Graeciae Descriptio*, II.2 (Leipzig 1904) 676. After having been named the Mana, Stimana, and the Riolitko river, the Nomos map (sheet 6) restores its ancient toponym. Personal observations of 12 July 1995. Importance of earthquakes: Thuc. 3.89.1; 5.50.5; 6.95; Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.24; Plut. *Alk.* 23.9.

interruption. While there he neither disturbed the sanctuary nor plundered its wealth. His enemy was Elis, not Zeus. That done, he continued northwards to the city of Elis in a campaign of rapine. From Olympia to Elis he could choose between two routes, one skirting the lower slopes to the east. There the terrain becomes somewhat hilly but never difficult. He doubtless decided instead to return to the coastal route, which opened to him a flat, rich, and open area through which he encountered no natural impediments. His army was soon joined by the tardy Arkadians and Achaians, who were not too late to claim a share of the spoils. Agis' army systematically used axe and fire to ravage the countryside, seized numerous slaves and cattle until Elis became "the larder of the Peloponnesos".⁵

Arrived at the city of Elis, Agis met his first feeble resistance. He easily broke into the residential area of the city, but met with some opposition from the Eleians and 1000 elite Aitolian troops at the gymnasium. Agis took the place after a minor skirmish, but made no attempt on the city itself. For the moment he withdrew northwestwards through land that is virtually flat until one reaches the hills above the sea. As before, he ravaged the fertile fields until he reached the Elean harbor of Kyllene. His invasion achieved the added effect of sparking a civil war in Elis. The details of the ensuing events are reasonably clear, but not so their interpretation. Although Elis had long enjoyed peace and prosperity under its democratic constitution, a number of wealthy men sought oligarchy at home and closer ties with Sparta abroad. Their leader was Xenias, who had inherited a fortune from his father. Not simply oligarchical in temperament, he wanted to receive the credit for bringing Elis back into the Spartan camp. He was not surprisingly a guest-friend of Agis and the *proxenos* of the Spartans. His primary enemy was Thrasydaios, the foremost leader of the people. Xenias and his followers unsuccessfully tried to murder Thrasydaios, only to rally the democrats to his protection. The proposed victim and his supporters drove Xenias and his men to Agis' camp. Although Agis and other Spartans surely

⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.23–26; Diod. 14.17.8; Strabo 8.3.25; Paus. 4.36.7; Polyain. 2.14.1; Steph. Byz. *s.v.* *Aulon*. W.M. Leake, *Travels in the Morea I* (London 1830) 194; G. Lolling in K. Baedeker, *Griechenland*⁴ (Leipzig 1904) 397; E. Oberhummer, *RE* 2 (1896) 2413. C. Faulkner, *Phoenix* 50 (1996) 17–25. Personal observations of 13–14 July 1995 revealed that the distance from the Neda river to ancient Epitalion is nearly thirty-six kilometers.

knew of the political tensions within Elis, Xenias' incompetent attempt to kill Thrasydaios proves that the two had planned no plot ahead of time. Nor did Agis push his attack into unvalled Elis to support Xenias. The internal discord was spontaneous. Nonetheless, Agis' attack and its disruption seriously upset the Eleian government. There was no longer a united front against Sparta.⁶

Agis resumed his depredations, as he retired to Lakonia. When he crossed the Alpheios river, he left Lysippos as *harmost* with a garrison at Epitalion on the southern bank. Located at a point where the Alpheios reaches the Ionian Sea, Epitalion commanded a secure position, protected by the sea on the west and not easily outflanked from the east. The northern bank of the river is quite low, whereas the south enjoys a steep rise of some two to three meters. In this strong and ample lodgment Agis settled Xenias and his followers. Together with the Spartan garrison these men spent the rest of the summer and winter plundering the countryside with impunity.⁷

In the following summer of 400 Thrasydaios sent an embassy to Sparta agreeing to dismantle the walls of various towns and leaving them all autonomous. Of chief importance were Lepreon, Kyllene, Epitalion, and the towns of Triphylia. Lasion, claimed by the Arkadians, the Eleians also left autonomous. The Spartans had in effect disarmed all of Elis, leaving the entire region defenseless and subject to their domination. The Eleians also surrendered their navy, further reducing their capacity to pose any threat to Messene. Their sweeping capitulation meant that the Eleians were virtually confined to their own city in the Peneios valley. They were no longer a major power. They did, however, retain their presidency of the sanctuary of Zeus at Olympia, but expressly allowed the Spartans the right to offer sacrifices and to compete in the Olympic games. The Spartans

⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.26–27; for the meaning of the polis to refer to the akropolis, see *IG* I³ 23, 40, 156, etc.; Diod. 14.17.9–10; Paus. 3.8.4; 5.4.8; 6.2.3. Kyllene: W.M. Leake, *On Some Disputed Questions of Ancient Geography* (London 1857) 18–23; personal observations of 14–15 July 1995. Diodoros has seriously confused the course of events. He avers that Pausanias, not Agis, led the Spartan army north to Arkadia and thence westwards through Akroreia, while Xenophon states that Agis took the southern route past Aulon. Xenophon's contemporary testimony, and that of one who had lived in the Peloponnesos is to be preferred.

⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.29; Diod. 14.17.12; Paus. 3.8.5; Epitalion: Polyb. 4.80.13; Strabo 8.3.12, 24; Steph. Byz. *s.v.* *Epitalion*; Quint. Smyrn. 2.241. Leake, *Travels in the Morea* II.200; A. Philippon, *RE* 6 (1907) 218; personal observations of 13 July 1995. Seibert, *Flüchtlinge*, I 101–102.

may also, but not certainly, have demanded the installation of an oligarchic government in Elis. If so, the decision marks another step in securing for Sparta a dependable and sympathetic neighboring government. On these terms the two states concluded peace and alliance, thus ending for the Spartans decades of annoying opposition by a rich and powerful neighbor. Now diplomatically isolated and politically weakened, Elis had been bludgeoned back into the Spartan fold.⁸

With peace established, Agis journeyed to Delphi, where he dedicated a tithe of the spoils to Apollo. The choice of Delphi over Olympia was an obvious affront to the Eleians. On his return to Sparta the king fell ill at Heraia, and died shortly thereafter in Sparta. The Eleian war had claimed its most illustrious casualty. He was not, however, the last. His countrymen now took advantage of their victory to avenge themselves on the Messenians who had settled on Kephallenia, Zakynthos, and at Naupaktos. These places sat astride strategic sealanes between the western Gulf of Corinth and the Ionian Sea. Naupaktos could bar Corinthian commerce to the west. Those on the islands enjoyed an excellent position both further to block this maritime trade and also serve as bases for raids on Kyllene. In 456 the Athenian Tolmides had seized all three places, and upon them established the Messenians who had left the Peloponnesos under truce with Sparta. The Spartans chose this moment, contrary to previous agreements, to reduce them. Though possibly a part of previous plans, it is more likely that the Spartans simply seized the opportunity to do what they had long desired. Having received the surrender of the Eleian fleet, they could readily use it against these maritime targets. Success would mean their domination of the entire western Peloponnesos and adjacent areas. Having overrun all three Messenian settlements they returned that on Kephallenia and doubtless the one on Zakynthos to their original inhabitants. Naupaktos they gave to the Hesperian Lokrians, its founders. The Spartans thereby expelled a worrisome enemy from their shores, and sharply diminished Athenian influence in the region. By their convenient

⁸ Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.30–31; Diod. 14.17.12, 34.1; Plut. *Mor.* 835F; Paus. 3.8.5; Polyain. 6.36, if one accepts Woefflin-Melber's improbable emendation unsupported by the manuscripts of *Ξενίαν* for *Θεννίαν*; Bengtson, *SdA* II².217. See also Hdt. 2.160; Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.15; Diod. 11.54; Paus. 5.9.4; 6.22.2. Beloch, *GG* III².1.18–19. F. Schachermeyr, *RE* 6A (1936) 577; K. Wichert, *RE* 9A (1967) 1440.

generosity they also won the loyalty of the western Lokrians. For all that, Naupaktos would thenceforth be troublesome. The Aitolians had long laid claim to it. The Spartan grant of it to the Lokrians was the price the Aitolians paid for their recent alliance with Elis. At some later period the Achaians gained control of it. These problems then lay in the future. At the time, however, the Spartans considered Naupaktos in good and proper hands. Some Messenians fled westwards to Sicily, where they became mercenaries, while about 3000 others sailed to Kyrene. They would return. For the Spartans in the meantime any danger of an uprising in Messene supported by their fugitive kinsmen was over.⁹

The significance of the Eleian war was manifold. First, it re-established Sparta's predominant position within the Peloponnesos. The elimination of Elis as a major threat left a political void there that only Sparta filled. No one south of Arkadia and Argos could gain-say Sparta's dictates or contest its exploitation of fertile land. Indeed, the Eleian campaign showed Arkadia the benefits of co-operation with Sparta. With the exception of Corinth and the ever refractory Argos, the other Peloponnesians again followed Sparta's lead, and from the plundering of Elis many had gained substantially. The war also revealed a ruthless Spartan use of force within the Peloponnesos, which for the moment quelled the growing unrest among the Arkadians and others. The Peloponnesians may not have enjoyed Spartan hegemony, but they accepted it, albeit with quiet resentment.

In a similar exercise of power the Spartans intervened at Herakleia Trachinia in central Greece. This campaign is unfortunately little noticed or appreciated. Unlike the operations in Elis, it appears that here the Spartans fortuitously responded to an unexpected opportunity. The Spartans had in 426 founded a colony at the Trachinian cliffs near an existing site. They both stood immediately west of Thermopylai and the Spartans considered the new settlement a base well suited to wage war against Athenian shipping. It also held the key to a road that ran southwards past the upper reaches of the Kephisos valley and on to the Corinthian Gulf. In 399 civil strife

⁹ Agis: Xen. *Hell.* 3.3.1; Paus. 3.8.8. Messenians: Diod. 14.78.5. See also Diod. 11.84.7; 14.34.2–5; 15.66.5; Thuc. 1.103.3; R. Meiggs and D. Lewis, *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions*² (Oxford 1988) nos. 20, 74; Paus. 2.24.7–26.2; 4.24.7–26.2. Claims: Xen. *Hell.* 4.6.4; Diod. 15.75.2. M. Sordi, *Avenum* 65 (1991–2) 289–297; H. Beck, *ZPE* 124 (1999) 53–62.

disrupted the city, and the Spartans sent Herippidas and a force to restore order. That he did with draconian efficiency by executing those whom he considered trouble-makers. He next dealt with neighboring Oite, located to the south, whose inhabitants had revolted. The Spartans could not tolerate any disruption of this all-weather route across central Greece. Herippidas overwhelmed the Oitians, and expelled them from their land. The Spartans had thereby re-asserted their strength along these strategic routes. Herakleia Trachinia could again be used as a naval base against Athenian commerce, and it together with Oite secured an easy route into the Kephisos valley through Doris and Phokis into western Boiotia. Herippidas' successes gave both Athens and the recalcitrant Thebans things to worry about.¹⁰

By 399, then, Sparta had secured a commanding position on mainland Greece. Elis was no longer a factor, and Messene was ever more isolated. Thebes and Athens remained frustrated but quiet. Argos waited. Spartan sway of Kephallenia, Zakynthos, and especially Naupaktos threatened vital Corinthian interests and reduced Athenian influence in the west. Spartan success at Herakleia Trachinia and Oite menaced Thebes and Athens alike. The Spartans were now in a far better position to apply force against potential enemies and reluctant allies than before their victory over the Eleians. The years between 404 and 399 marked the consolidation of Spartan power after the Peloponnesian War.

B. TURMOIL IN SPARTA

Both before and immediately after the Eleian War Sparta contended with the problem of Lysandros and his large ambitions. At issue was whether the Spartans should return to their traditional policy of maintaining their ascendancy in Greece—as they recently had with their truant allies, Athens, and Elis—or consolidate their newly-won

¹⁰ Diod. 14.38.4–5; See also Hdt. 7.198–199; Thuc. 3.92–93; *IG IX 2*, 1; Diod. 12.59.3–5; Strabo 9.4.13, 17; Pliny *NH* 4.7.28; Paus. 10.22.1, 5. Y. Béquignon, *La Vallée de Spercheios des origines au IV^e siècle* (Paris 1937) 158–167; Gomme, *HCT* II.394–399; E.W. Kase *et al.*, *The Great Isthmus Corridor Route*, I (Dubuque 1991) 118–119; personal observations of 19 October 1999; 12 August 2000. A fuller description of this site will be found on pp. 79–80, where its significance becomes clearer.

position in the Aegean, with its concomitant fruits and dangers. These issues were complex and discussion heated. Yet few details of the debates over them have survived. Nor is there any evidence that opinions on any topic were ever unanimous or consistent. Furthermore, nothing suggests that these questions were mutually exclusive. As it happened, the Spartans pursued both but with unequal success.

In 399 two major figures can be taken as representatives of the mainland and Aegean policies. King Pausanias, like the late Agis, staunchly favored maintaining Sparta's primacy in Greece proper, while Lysandros unabashedly championed retaining Sparta's maritime gains. Yet the king did not necessarily oppose limited ventures abroad. He and Agis had liberated Delos from Athenian rule, and afterwards around 403 made an alliance with the Delians. Even this action aimed primarily at reducing Athenian maritime and ceremonial influence. That, moreover, was as far as their direct interest in the Aegean went. They had resolved to defeat Athens in the Peloponnesian War. That done, Pausanias now strove to eliminate Lysandros' arrogation of authority in Sparta. His motives were both personal and institutional, with little to do with foreign policy. He and other Spartans genuinely distrusted Lysandros' nearly imperial position, one that had no place within the constitution. As seen above (p. 8), the home government had sent Pausanias to Athens explicitly to squelch Lysandros' support of the Thirty. Pausanias and the authorities distrusted Lysandros' designs and the threat that they posed to the kingship and other time-honored political institutions. They were especially suspicious of the network of private political associations that he had established in the Aegean. They also feared that he would thereby carve out his own empire there. They stood in the shadow of such a precedent. After victory in the Persian Wars, their forebears had taken alarm at the then King Pausanias' activities at Byzantium, which they interpreted as an attempt to establish a tyranny there. These traditionalists had no desire to see Lysandros succeed where Pausanias had failed. Their fears were further strengthened by the exploits of Klearchos, who surpassed the alleged crimes of the elder Pausanias by seizing Byzantium as a private domain. The Spartans were forced to sent an expedition to force their own officer from his assigned post. Klearchos stands as another example of the Spartan inability efficiently to govern an Aegean empire.¹¹

¹¹ Agis' and Pausanias' opposition to Lysandros: *Lysias* 18.10–12; see 18.22,

In this political thicket Lysandros stood in a very delicate position. Without a magistracy he was as subject to the laws as any other citizen. The kings especially but also many ephors ranged against him. The board of ephors admittedly changed annually, but nothing indicates that the citizenry preferred him to the lawful kings. Pausanias and they had thwarted him at Athens and still stood against his aspirations. Nor did he enjoy any basis of power in the Peloponnesos. In reality he possessed authority but not power. He had also sullied his own reputation by his arrogance and vanity. He had diverted some of the spoils of war to erect at Delphi a grand monument that held bronze statues of gods, himself, and his admirals, the remains of which can be seen today. He himself was portrayed being crowned by Poseidon. He further adorned the monument with a dedicatory epigram which proclaimed that by his victory at Aigospotamoi he had crowned Sparta, the akropolis of Greece. He likewise dedicated there golden stars to the Dioskouroi and a trireme made of gold and ivory, a gift of Cyrus the Younger, a Persian who would shortly leave his mark on history. The sheer size and voluptuousness of Lysandros' offerings were meant to impress. They were hardly the gift of an ordinary citizen. More politically ominous to the Spartans were the honors granted him by the eastern Greeks, who erected altars to him and sacrificed as though he were a god. One paeon sings of him as the general of Greece. These honors provide abundant and unmistakable evidence of the loyalty of the political bodies that he had established in the East, and whose loyalties could be interpreted as more his than Sparta's. The Spartans had good reason to dread the arrival of a new Pausanias.¹²

Another source of controversy surrounding Lysandros and the topic of wealth was his alleged introduction of coinage into the economy. The problem is complicated by late and often hostile sources, the surprising complexity of the Spartan economy, and by factors more

58–60; Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.7–20, 4.29–39; Arist. *Pol.* 5.1.5; *Ath. Pol.* 38.4; Nepos *Thrasylbulus* 3; Diod. 14.33.5–6 Paus. 3.5.1–2; Justin 5.1–6–11. *Hetaireiai* of Lysandros: Xen. *Lak. Pol.* 14.2; Plut. *Lys.* 19.1; 20.8–21.7. Pausanias and Byzantion: Thuc. 1.94–96. Klearchos: Xen. *Anab.* 2.6.2–6; Diod. 14.12.2–7. O. Lendle, *Kommentar zu Xenophons Anabasis* (Bücher 1–7), (Darmstadt 1995) 133.

¹² Plut. *Lys.* 17; 18.5; *Mor.* 395F; Cicero *de divinatione* 1.34.75; Paus. 10.9.7. Delphian monument: Meiggs-Lewis, *GHT*². 95; Frazer, *Pausanias* V.263–264; personal observations of 3 October 1970. Although Lysandros was considered to have created a *hetaireia* in Sparta, Plutarch (*Ages.* 20.3) states that he did so only after his return from Asia. See also Arist. *Pol.* 5.1.5, 6.2.

political and social than economic. Modern scholarship has sometimes contributed to the confusion. Ancient tradition held that Lykourgos, the traditional founder of the Spartan state, forbade the possession and thus the circulation of gold and silver currency, decreeing instead the use of iron spits for the purpose. He expected to protect his society from the lust for wealth and the social corruption that it entailed. He hoped thereby to preserve Sparta's pristine morals. After his victory at Aigospotamoi, however, Lysandros sent Gylippos, famous for his victory at Syracuse during the Peloponnesian War, to Sparta with some 1000 or 1500 talents. Of this enormous sum Gylippos stole thirty or so. When the ephors discovered the theft, Gylippos fled into exile. Shortly thereafter, the ephors learned that Lysandros' friend and fellow-commander Thorax privately possessed silver, and ordered his death. Reputation held that Lysandros himself enjoyed immense riches. Modern wealth was tarnishing ancient virtue. Alarmed by these developments that they considered ominous, many eminent Spartans censured Lysandros, whom they distrusted, and publicly urged the ephors officially to ban the use of silver and gold. Never one to remain on the defensive, Lysandros doggedly fought back. He publicly attacked and humiliated Naukleidas, ephor in 404, ostensibly because of the man's obesity and his failure to lead a purely Spartan life. That withal, Naukleidas had stoutly and successfully supported Pausanias' efforts to thwart Lysandros' designs in Athens. Nothing further is heard of the incident. Naukleidas went unpunished, but he vanished from public notice. Yet Lysandros' victory did not demonstrably enhance his own position. Many Spartans, whatever their political views, must have felt embarrassment and anger to see the erstwhile ephor humiliated in such a shameful fashion. After all, unlike Gylippos and Thorax, he had stolen nothing from the state, and the attack upon him was of the lowest political order. The incident may have damaged Pausanias' position, but it certainly did not enhance public admiration of Lysandros. His conduct seems to have led many Spartans further to suspect that Lysandros was reckless and self-serving, a person whose own advancement overrode the welfare of Sparta. Lysandros and his friends nonetheless so strenuously opposed the measure that the ephors compromised: they proclaimed that precious metals could be used for public, but not for private, needs. The decision was clearly a victory for Lysandros.¹³

¹³ Plut. *Lys.* 17; *Mor.* 239E; see Xen. *Lak. Pol.* 7.1–4; Isok. 11.18–20; Nikolaos

Such is the story. Of one accusation Lysandros can readily be cleared. Although he is usually credited or criticized for allowing the use of coinage for the first time in Spartan history, gold and silver in both coin and bullion had circulated in Sparta long before the end of the Peloponnesian War. Reality favored Lysandros and his followers, as the ephors admitted, when they made their compromise. The Spartans had won an empire, which they could not effectively administer without a coinage that was convenient and of generally recognized value. They had long been familiar with the Aiginetan coinage and its standard. They had also long used foreign coins in their economic transactions. The controversy over the cumbersome iron spits can be somewhat misleading. True enough, they were unimportant except as local currency; but so long as their value was particularly linked to other currencies by a determined standard, they served as a secure symbol of value. An iron spit is no more intrinsically valuable than paper currency or any other object that is equatable to another commodity. Its worth depends upon the value that society places upon it. The Spartans had in this respect linked the rate of the spits to the Aiginetan standard, which meant that a commonly understood rate of exchange existed.¹⁴

Given these economic realities, one can see this controversy as a political contest in which Lysandros stood at the center. Pausanias and his followers had less direct access to this moveable wealth than did Lysandros and his supporters. His flaunting of it brought fame abroad, apprehension at home, and envy everywhere. Even though he could claim that his wealth had come from private gifts, his conduct of the war for Sparta had blessed him bountifully.¹⁵ Repute did indeed hold Lysandros as the leading man in Greece, and he ably

Dam., *FGrH* 90 F103z. Naukleidas: Agatharchides, *FGrH* 86 F11, from whom Aelian *VH* 14.7, derived the story. Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.35–36. V. Ehrenberg, *RE* 16 (1935) 1936–1937, suggests that the anecdote need not be taken too seriously. He has obviously failed to recognize the political nature of the attack. Gylippos: Diod. 13.106.9; Plut. *Nik.* 28.4. Klearchos: Thuc. 6.93.3. S. Alessandri, in W. Haase and H. Temporini, eds., *Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt*, III.15 (Berlin-New York 1985) 1081–1093; S. Hodkinson, *Property and Wealth in Classical Sparta* (London 2000) 154–176.

¹⁴ Diod. 7.12.8; 14.10.2; Plut. *Lyk.* 9.1–3, 30.1; *Lys.* 17.1–6; *Agis* 5.1; *Mor.* 226C–D; Poseidonios, *FGrH* 87 F48c; Ps.-Plato *Eryxias* 400A–B; Polyb. 6.49. S. Hodkinson in A. Powell and S. Hodkinson, *The Shadow of Sparta* (London and New York 1994) 195–201; *idem*, in P. Carlier, *Le IV^e siècle av. J.-C.* (Paris 1996) 93–96; *idem*, *Property and Wealth in Classical Sparta*, 151–186.

¹⁵ It is instructive that Agesilaos would later go to great lengths to refuse personal gifts.

acted the part. His enemies accused him of overweening pride and harsh arrogance. Far more ominous to his Spartan enemies, however, was his alleged attempt to translate his victories in the eastern Aegean into his private principality. History records only isolated examples. At Miletos he deceitfully contrived the slaughter of some 800 democratic leaders. Elsewhere, he, acting in his public capacity, awarded lordship and tyranny to his friends and allies. These lurid accusations reflect the fear of Lysandros' unusual power, but are not entirely fair. The Spartans themselves had created the system of administration over these conquered or allied states, which Lysandros had governed so successfully. His status among them was indeed high and his conduct lofty but not disloyal. His enemies seem to have anticipated what they feared. Proof that politics, not economics, lay at the bottom of the problem comes from the conduct of the Persian satrap Pharnabazos. He had proven himself a staunch Spartan ally during the war, and at its end he sent envoys to Sparta publicly to denounce Lysandros of having wantonly pillaged his land. Lysandros could neither justify his conduct nor evade an accusation that angered the ephors, who confronted a quandary. They could ill afford to offend such a powerful friend as Pharnabazos and his master the Great King, but they could not readily replace a man of Lysandros' ability, connections, and experience. Lysandros, with his usual wile, solved the problem himself. He claimed that an omen bade him to visit the temple of Ammon, safely in Egypt. The ephors gladly agreed to this modestly suggested exile.¹⁶

The results of this political turmoil in Sparta can be simply stated: between 404 and 399 the Spartans decided to keep what they had. They had solved the problem of the Greeks on the mainland, how to finance their operations, and Lysandros had settled for them his own peculiar problem. There remained only the challenge of the maritime empire.

Fortune seemed often to smile upon Lysandros, and his exile was short. The Thirty's threat to Athenian stability allowed him to reinstate himself in the government's good graces. So things stood at the time of Agis' death, which sparked a regal crisis. The problem revolved around the right of succession to the Spartan throne. Leo-

¹⁶ Plut. *Lys.* 19. U. Kahrstedt, *RE* 13 (1927) 2505–2506; J.-F. Bommelaer, *Lysandre de Sparte* (Paris 1981) 153–171.

tychidas, the son of Agis, was the heir apparent, but rivals challenged his very legitimacy as the son of Agis. Lysandros, himself ineligible to ascend the throne, lurked at the heart of the matter with the eager connivance of Agesilaos, Agis' half-brother. They claimed that during the Peloponnesian War, when the Athenian Alkibiades was an exile in Sparta, he impregnated Agis' wife Timaiia. Alkibiades reputedly claimed that he did so because he wanted a son of his own to reign over Sparta. Some in Sparta in fact called Timaiia's fidelity into question. Agis himself refused to acknowledge Leotychidas as his son, until he lay ill at Heraia. Upon his death a bitter and sordid dispute arose over the succession. Leotychidas maintained that his mother had always acknowledged his legitimacy, but rumor spread that she had often called him "Alkibiades". Other aspects of the imperfect story are largely suspect. Yet all agree that Agis made public recognition that Leotychidas was his own son. Nor did Lysandros and Agesilaos have things entirely their own way. Many Spartans believed Agis, and distrusted Lysandros, Agesilaos, and their methods. Quite surprisingly the seer Diopeithes openly opposed Agesilaos' claim to the throne. He warned his countrymen of the danger of a lame kingship. He thus bluntly reminded them that Agesilaos had been born with a club-foot which alone had previously eliminated him from serious consideration to rule. He boldly foretold that Agesilaos, as a lame king, would lead Sparta to its downfall. Lysandros responded by arguing that lameness referred to someone not of pure royal blood and that the true king should be a genuine descendant of Herakles.¹⁷

Such is the unsavory story of these events but not necessarily the truth. The details bear the stamp of rumor, propaganda, and the vilest of political intrigue. The allegations of Leotychidas' illegitimacy were clearly convenient tools of Lysandros and Agesilaos. If Lysandros could not rule Sparta in his own right, he could rule through Agesilaos. The latter because of birth and lameness had no other avenue to the throne except through Lysandros. Agis' public recognition of Leotychidas' legitimacy stands against their guile. Nonetheless, their machinations, though ugly, proved effective. Diopeithes' prediction about the danger of a lame king seems proleptic, for future events confirmed his prophecy. The entire tale reeks more of calumny than

¹⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 3.1.1–3; Douris, *FGrH* 76 F69; Plut. *Alk.* 23.7–9; *Lys.* 22.6–13; *Ages.* 3; Paus. 3.8.7–10. D.R. Shipley, *A Commentary on Plutarch's Life of Agesilaos* (Oxford 1997) 79–95.

sober history. Whatever the truth, Agesilaos proved to be one of the most pernicious and incompetent kings in Spartan history, and he who so assumed the throne at the height of Spartan power died a state mercenary.¹⁸

So, Lysandros and Agesilaos prevailed, each achieving his goal. Although the constitution prevented Lysandros from ruling, except unofficially through Agesilaos, the new empire in the Aegean reopened familiar vistas for him. No one else could match his vision, political connections, and experience in this sphere. He saw unbounded opportunities in a domain not under the strictest control of the home government. In that respect he could hope to repeat the attempt of Pausanias after the Persian War to create his own principality. For his part, Agesilaos gained more than the throne. Along with declaring Leotychidas a bastard, he confiscated his estates, one-half of which he distributed to his poor maternal relatives. By so buying their loyalty he created for himself an independent political following that bound its existence and its primary allegiance to the success of his career. For the first time in Spartan history, Agesilaos created a non-traditional basis of power, one only marginally dependent upon the government. The early Greek tyrants had successfully used such means in their bids for power. The two men embarked upon a policy hitherto unparalleled in Spartan history.¹⁹

Just as Sparta's foreign allies were disappointed by the refusal to share the spoils of the Peloponnesian War, so were many people at home, especially among those who felt unrewarded for their efforts in the common struggle. During the war, the Spartans had frequently tapped their huge human reservoir of helots, those emancipated, and others of inferior social and political rank in their effort to defeat Athens. These were all promised an enhanced political and social position, a promise that was not always honored. The helots and others served as far afield as Sphakteria, Macedonia, Byzantium, and Sicily.

¹⁸ There are ample reasons to disbelieve the slur of Lysandros and Agesilaos. Thucydides (8.12, 45), a contemporary, says nothing of the purported incident. Xenophon was a friend of Agesilaos to whom he owed his estate and much else. Impartiality should not necessarily be expected here. Finally, both Agis and Timaios asserted Leotychidas' legitimacy; see also Xen. *Hell.* 3.3.2. C. Tuplin, *The Failings of Empire* (Stuttgart 1993) 52–54.

¹⁹ Xen. *Ages.* 4.5; 6.4; Plut. *Ages.* 4; *Lys.* 20.8; 21–1–7; *Mor.* 482D; Thuc. 1.94–96. B. Due, *C&M* 38 (1987) 53–63; Shipley, *Plutarch's Agesilaos*, 96–105.

After their service to the state, some were callously discarded, sometimes under very suspicious circumstances. Perhaps even more importantly, many full Spartan citizens, the "Equals", were losing their lands and therewith their political status. Despite the myth of equality among the citizenry, from the outset some Spartans held more land than others, and strove increasingly to gain even more. That process belongs properly to local Spartan history; but several factors, pertinent to larger issues, merit brief mention here. Contrary to common opinion, money both in bullion and coin circulated freely in Sparta. Moreover, land was alienable except by sale and purchase. As land became concentrated in fewer hands even before the Peloponnesian War, the number of full citizens accordingly declined. Especially pertinent in this connection was the increasing accumulation of land by women, another major factor in the decline in the number of male citizens. To these developments were added the effects of that long conflict, which gave a relatively small group of officers unprecedented opportunities to enrich themselves. Operations overseas especially gave commanders ready access to the spoils of war. Harmosts used their position to extort money from the governed and to receive gifts that only the cynical would call bribes. Two notorious examples come from the careers of Thorax, who made a fortune from his position as harmost, and Gylippos, who as an officer embezzled public money. They were both discovered and punished, but the full number of others is unknown. However many, they could all translate this booty into Spartan land, thereby increasing their political and social status at home. Since not all citizens shared in this wealth, the poor fell prey to the rich. By the early fourth century a combination of the accumulation of land by traditionally wealthy families and the influx of foreign bounty resulted in the greater concentration of land among the rich at the expense of the poor. More citizens lost their status as Equals, and consequently found themselves relegated to the rank of "Inferiors". These men had mastered the military training of the Equals, and had often fought honorably on the battlefield, but now found themselves deprived of their political and social position. Inferiors and emancipated helots alike considered themselves misused by an increasingly unfair system of government. Discontent naturally simmered.²⁰

²⁰ Helots: Thuc. 4.26; 5.34; 7.19; Xen. *Hell.* 1.3.15. S. Link, *Der Kosmos Sparta*

In this disagreeable atmosphere Agesilaos confronted the conspiracy of Kinadon, an incident proving that the political and social fabric of Sparta was becoming frayed. Kinadon was not one of the Equals, and forthcoming details of the episode strongly indicate that he had lost this enviable rank. He fomented a conspiracy among some similarly discontented Spartans to overthrow the prevailing order. He wanted to eliminate the class of Equals, and presumably seize their lands. Yet it is unclear whether he intended only to assume leadership of the prevailing order or to destroy it entirely. Kinadon allegedly said only that he wished to be inferior to no one else in Sparta. He is reputed to have taken a fellow conspirator into the agora and to have pointed out how few full citizens were to be seen in comparison to those of lesser political rank. He approached some of these disillusioned and frustrated people with the simple but sanguinary plan of social revolution. According to his enemies, he advocated the slaughter of the ruling elite, and opined that the Inferiors, the perioikoi, newly-enfranchised helots, and even the helots would join the uprising. An informer was Kinadon's undoing. He reported the details to the authorities, who spurred by their alarm, immediately contrived a plot against the plotter. They ordered Kinadon on a specious mission to Aulon to arrest certain suspicious people there. Although they provided him with an escort, his guards actually proved his jailors. His apprehension was easy, his fellow conspirators quickly revealed. Among them was the seer Tisamenos, whose family was of Eleian descent. The curious connection of Aulon and Tisamenos with Elis may have been coincidental, but it could also suggest that the conspiracy did not confine itself to purely local affairs. Kinadon and his followers were executed, and nothing came of their plot. The unrest was quelled for the moment, but it would simmer for decades. As shall be seen, the decline in citizen numbers owing to these internal problems would combine with combat losses in imminent wars further to cause the decrease in their ranks and to increase discontent within all levels of society. The spoils of empire insidiously infected Sparta both externally and internally.²¹

(Darmstadt 1994) 1–22; see also T. Lukas, *Lakedaimonion Politeia* (Stuttgart 1996) 50–53, 127–131, 150. Spartan landholding: E. Schütrumpf, *GRBS* 28 (1987) 441–457; *idem* in A. Powell and S. Hodkinson, eds., *The Shadow of Sparta* (London and New York 1994); S. von Reden, *JHS* 117 (1997) 154–176; S. Hodkinson, *Property and Wealth in Classical Sparta* (London 2000) 94–104, 432–441.

²¹ Xen. *Hell.* 3.3.4–11; Arist. *Pol.* 5.6.2; Polyain. 2.14.1. Although J.F. Lazenby,

C. SPARTA AND THE GREEKS OF ASIA

Having put their affairs on the Greek mainland in order and having settled their own, the Spartans next turned their attention to their grave problems in the east. During the course of the war, particularly under the leadership of Lysandros, they had gained control over most of the Aegean basin. The Greeks there had shown a general willingness to rebel against Athenian rule after the Sicilian disaster. Athenian severity thereafter sparked a fierce desire among the islanders to be free of Athenian command. Finally after Aigospotamoi every state in Greece, except Samos, abandoned the Athenian cause. Upon defeat, the Athenians agreed to withdraw from all occupied cities. Although the Spartans claimed the victory, they did so only because of the substantial help of Cyrus the Younger, the son of King Dareios of Persia, and potential heir to the throne. He held the exalted rank of *karanos*, or lord of those who mustered at the Kastolos plain, which placed him above the ordinary satraps of the region. He and Lysandros quickly became fast friends or at least convenient allies. Yet despite the urgency of the situation in Asia Minor, events of far weightier import to Cyrus unfolded in the east. Cyrus received word that his father lay on his deathbed and a summons to return to Babylon. Greek affairs were inconsiderable when compared to the possibility of ascending the Persian throne. Cyrus left Anatolia immediately, but not before leaving Lysandros with authority over all the cities under Persian control. Now only the Spartan state governed Lysandros and the Aegean empire.²²

That empire consisted of at least thirty-four cities or territories, not all of them in Asia Minor but rather scattered along the Aegean littoral. Holdings ranged from Eretria, Andros, and Paros in the western Aegean, northwards to Thrace and Thasos in the north,

Athenaeum ns 85 (1997) 437–447, attaches little importance to this incident, that fails to account for Xenophon's extended notice of it in the first place. Nor does he explain why Xenophon depicts it in such dire terms. See instead *inter alia* P.A. Cartledge, *Agessilaos and the Crisis of Sparta* (Baltimore 1987) 164–165; G. Shipley in J.M. Sanders, ed., *ΦΙΛΟΛΟΓΩΝ* (Oxford 1992) 224–225; Tuplin, *Failings of Empire*, 52; Link, *Sparta*, 11–14, 20–22; Hodkinson, *Property and Wealth*, 436–437.

²² Greek hatred of Athens: Thuc. 8.2, 64; Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.6, 10. Kastolos plain: Xen. *Hell.* 1.4.4; *Anab.* 1.1.2, 9. L. Büchner, *RE* 10 (1919) 2346; R.J.A. Talbert, ed., *Barrington Atlas of the Greek and Roman World* (Princeton 2000) 64.A4. Cyrus: Xen. *Anab.* 1.1.1–2; Diod. 13.104.4, 107.4; Plut. *Artax.* 2.5. V. Manfredi, *Senafonte Anabasi* (Milan 1980) 51–53; *La Strada dei Diecimila* (Milan 1986) 23–25; Lendle, *Anabasis*, 7–10.



3. Western Asia Minor, adapted from R.F. Treharne and H. Fullard, *Muir's Historical Atlas* (New York: Barnes and Noble 1963), by courtesy of Barnes and Noble.

eastwards to the major cities of the Propontis, and thence southwards along the entire Anatolian coast. All of the major cities of Ionia, Lydia, and Karia stood under Spartan control. The major ones in the east included Selymbria, Byzantion, and Chalkedon, all of which guarded access to the Euxine Sea. They also stood as perpetual threats to the Athenian grain route to the modern Crimea. Southwards Spartan control of Kyzikos, Lampsakos, and Abydos further tightened their hold on this vital region. Still farther south from Lesbos, past Phokaia and Chios major cities such as Kyme, Ephesos, Miletos, and Knidos gave their loyalty to Sparta. Finally Rhodes, the most important state in the southeastern Aegean, favored the Spartans. This Spartan realm also enjoyed easy lines of communication that spanned the coastline of Asia Minor. They formed a simple and strategically effective network that stretched from Byzantion in the north through Lesbos, Chios, Ephesos, Samos, Miletos, and Kos to Rhodes in the south. These places also received the support of the many friendly cities and harbors on the coast along the way. From these bases a naval power had the reasonable hope and opportunity to dominate the littoral. An additional factor in Spartan favor was the fear held by these cities of both Athens and Persia. This was the system and these the components of a nascent Spartan empire in the Aegean.²³

During the war Sparta had administered this expanse through a military system of *dekarchiai*, *harmosts*, and military garrisons. Lysandros had created this organization, and decided upon the leaders

²³ Cities and states: Paros: Xen. *Hell.* 1.4.11. Andros: Xen. *Hell.* 1.4.21–22, 5.18; Diod. 13.69.40. Eretria: Thuc. 8.95; Diod. 13.47.3–5. Oitaioi and Phthiotic Achaia: Thuc. 8.64; Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.12; Diod. 13.72.1; Nepos *Lys.* 2.3. Byzantion: Thuc. 8.80; Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.36; Plut. *Alk.* 31; see also Xen. *Hell.* 1.3.22; Diod. 13.64.3, Chalkedon: Xen. *Hell.* 1.3.4, 9; Plut. *Alk.* 29.6–30.1. Selymbria: Plut. *Alk.* 30.3–10. Kyzikos: Thuc. 8.107; Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.14, 19–40; Diod. 13.40.6, 49.6, 51.7; Plut. *Alk.* 21.4; 28.2. Lampsakos: Thuc. 8.62; Xen. *Hell.* 2.1.18; Diod. 13.66.1, 104.8; Plut. *Alk.* 36.6; *Lys.* 9.5. Abydos: Thuc. 8.62, 102, 106; Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.6, 11; Diod. 13.40.4, 45.1, 68.1. Lesbos: Plut. *Alk.* 24. Methymna: Xen. *Hell.* 1.6.14; Diod. 13.77.1. Eresos: Thuc. 8.100. Phokaia: Xen. *Hell.* 1.5.11, 6.33. Teos: Thuc. 8.16. Delphinion: Xen. *Hell.* 1.5.15; Diod. 13.76; see also Thuc. 8.38. Chios and Erythrai: Thuc. 8.6; Xen. *Hell.* 1.6.3, 33; Diod. 13.65.3–4; Plut. *Alk.* 24.1. Ephesos: Xen. *Hell.* 1.2.7–10, 5.1, 10; Diod. 13.64.1, 76.3; Plut. *Alk.* 29.2; *Lys.* 3.3. Samos: Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.6–7. Miletos: Thuc. 8.60, 62, 78; Xen. *Hell.* 1.5.1, 62; Diod. 13.38.4; Plut. *Lys.* 8. Iasos: Diod. 13.104.7. Kos: Thuc. 8.108; Xen. *Hell.* 1.5.1; Diod. 13.42.3. Knidos: Thuc. 8.109; Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.22, 24, 41, 43. Rhodes: Thuc. 8.44; Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.2, 5.1, 6.3; Diod. 13.69.5. Aiolis, Ionia, and the islands: Diod. 13.100.7.

of the various cities, thus the understandable Spartan fear of his influence over them. The *dekarchiai* formed the most sinister branch of Lysandros' power and caused the Spartans the greatest apprehension. As their name indicates, these were boards of ten with plenipotentiary powers limited only by Lysandros' wishes. They were the most potent political devices at his disposal. They were literally Lysandros' men, not necessarily Sparta's. Their number is unknown, and it remains a matter of doubt whether they pervaded the Aegean. Nonetheless, their existence proved ominous to eastern Greeks and Spartans alike. The Spartans could ill afford a semi-independent almost colonial government in the capable and unscrupulous hands of a man like Lysandros. Sometime in the years between 405 and 402 the Spartans abolished most, and perhaps all, of the *dekarchiai*. They had certainly ceased to exist by 396. Their elimination further reduced Lysandros' threat to the normal working of the state. Another incident further confounded Lysandros' dreams. While visiting the temple of Ammon, Lysandros purportedly made another attempt to gain power by bribing the priests to pronounce an oracle in his favor. They instead denounced him to his home government. The effects of his machinations led to several results, including his political eclipse and the downfall of his private domain. Another included the retention of good relations between Persia and Sparta. For the moment, neither trusted him, his influence waned, and he reverted to the position of another, but still influential, Spartan citizen. Any hope of empire that he may still have harbored was momentarily gone.²⁴

Still another reverse buffeted Lysandros' fortunes at this point. By 400 Lysandros enjoyed the support of only Cyrus the Younger, and even that pillar he would soon lose. The tale of Cyrus, swashbuckling as it is, demands only brief notice here. That notwithstanding, it echoes across the century even to the extent of inspiring the ambitions of the Macedonians Philip II and his son Alexander the Great. On his journey westwards, Cyrus had taken with him Tissaphernes, whom among the Persians few would prove superior in cunning or

²⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.2; Nepos *Lys.* 1.4–4.3; Plut. *Lys.* 19–20; 25. H.W. Parke, *JHS* 50 (1930) 37–79; Bommelaer, *Lysandre*, 179; Cartledge, *Agésilaios*, 90–91. A.G. Keen, in Cairns and Heath, eds., *Papers of the Leeds International Seminar* 9 (Leeds 1996) 285–296.

self-interest. At his father's death Cyrus learned that his elder brother, whose regal name was Artaxerxes, assumed the throne. Tissaphernes took the occasion to accuse the prince of disloyalty to the new King, but Queen Mother Parysatis successfully intervened on her younger son's behalf. Artaxerxes obligingly sent Cyrus back to his command with full honors and authority. Cyrus now had every reason to distrust Tissaphernes and perceive a grievance against the King, despite his pardon. Apparently the victim of his own high desires and vaunting ambition, he began to collect one of the most famous mercenary forces in classical Greek history. Among those enrolled was Xenophon of Athens, a friend of Sokrates and the man who wrote the first memoir in the literature of Western civilization, his *Anabasis*, or the *March Up Country*. More to the immediate point, Cyrus ordered his commanders to hire as many able Peloponnesian soldiers as possible. He recruited Klearchos, the renegade Spartan, and other Greeks who eagerly embraced the life of the mercenary. His pretext alleged that his new enemy Tissaphernes harbored hostile designs on the Greek cities of Ionia. Unaware of his real intentions, Artaxerxes supported his brother in the quarrel. Cyrus meanwhile sought further aid from the Spartans. He reminded them of his many services during the war, and now demanded their tangible thanks. The Spartans were glad to see turmoil in the area, if it furthered the designs of their ally and enhanced their own position there. Without hesitation they dispatched 800 hoplites under Cheirisophos to their admiral Samios, who commanded thirty-five triremes. He in turn placed them all at the disposal of Tamos, Cyrus' admiral, who led a force of twenty-five ships. Together this combined fleet sailed to Cilicia, where they protected Cyrus' southern flank. The Spartans had thereby unquestionably linked their fortunes to Cyrus'. Cyrus eventually mustered more than 11,000 and perhaps as many as 13,000 veteran Greek troops, whom he led into the heart of the Near East.²⁵

²⁵ Xen. *Anab.* 1.1.5–11, 2.21, 4.2.3; *Hell.* 2.1.13–15; 3.1.1–2; Ktesias, *FGrH* 688 F16; Diod. 14.19. Numbers: Xen. *Anab.* 1.2.1–3; Diod. 14.19.6. M.L.W. Laistner, *A History of the Greek World, 479 to 323 B.C.* (London 1957) 169; G.B. Nussbaum, *The Ten Thousand* (Leiden 1967). At *Anab.* 1.4.2, Xenophon gives the Spartan admiral's name as Pythagoras, which could have been an inexplicable slip, so Lendle, *Kommentar*, 34. Poralla, *Prosopographie, s.v. Pythagoras*, suggests that it is a pseudonym for Samios, or it could have been a sobriquet.

The most significant results of the ensuing campaign were not Cyrus' defeat at the battle of Kounaxa but the heroic return of the Greek mercenaries to the Aegean. This, the March of the Ten Thousand, stirred the Greek imagination with the idea that in fact the Persian Empire was not as awesome as it appeared. If some 10,000 mercenaries could march through its interior virtually at will, perhaps an organized and sustained attack could bring down the entire structure. From the time when the Greeks straggled to the coast until the day of Alexander the Great's invasion, the idea bloomed that Persia could be defeated and its vast spaces be available to provide room for Greek expansion. The necessities consisted of enough troops, good command, and an efficient system of supply. The March of the Ten Thousand inspired an entirely new political idea in Greek thought, one that not even the Athenians of the fifth century thought possible.²⁶

Tissaphernes' reaction was more pertinent and immediate. He had forewarned Artaxerxes of his brother's treachery, and had successfully championed the victorious side. Now he received his reward. He returned to Asia Minor with all of the powers of the defeated Cyrus. Aware that the throne would never be his, he determined to restore Persian authority over all of the Greek cities of the Anatolian coast. He stringently demanded that the Spartans honor their treaties with the King, all the more so now that they had supported the losing side.²⁷

CHRONOLOGICAL ANNEXE TO THE ELEIAN WAR

The chronology of the details of this war is confused and perhaps insoluble. Agis, who conducted it, died after its victorious conclusion (Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.21–3.1). Xenophon also indicates that it lasted for

²⁶ J. Rennell, *Geschichte des Feldzugs des Cyrus* (Göttingen 1823); Manfredi, *Senofonte Anabasi; La Strada*; Lendle, *Kommentar*; J. Dillery, *Xenophon and the History of His Times* (London 1995) 59–100; P. Briant, ed., *Dans les pas des Dix-Mille* (Paris 1996).

²⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 3.1.3; Diod. 14.35.1–2; see also Thuc. 8.5. From the powers granted him Tissaphernes assumed the powers of the *karanos*: Tissaphernes: Thuc. 8.5.4; Xen. *Hell.* 3.1.3; Cyrus: *Hell.* 1.4.3; *Anab.* 1.9.7; Pharnabazos subordinated to Tissaphernes: Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.12; 4.1.37; Tithraustes: Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.25. See also W. Judeich, *Kleinasiastische Studien* (Marburg 1892) 41; Underhill, *Commentary*, 81; H. Schaefer, *RE* Sup. 7 (1940) 1594; Gomme et al., *HCT* V.13–16; T. Petit, *Les Études Classiques* 51 (1983) 35–45.

two campaigning-seasons with Agis leading the Spartan forces twice in one year (*Hell.* 3.2.25: *περιόντι δὲ τῷ ἐνιαυτῷ*; see also Underhill, *Commentary*, 69). Xenophon (*Hell.* 3.3.1–4; see also Plut. *Ages.* 3.4; Paus. 3.8.8) places the sequence of events after the death of Cyrus the Younger in 401, during the Asian campaign of Derkylidas, and before Agesilaos' accession. Diodoros (14.17.4) states that Pausanias attacked Elis in 402, its surrender coming in the next year, after which the Spartans had put an end to their wars. Xenophon is surely right in placing Agis, not Pausanias, in command of the Spartan operations. Diodoros moreover contradicts Xenophon's chronology when he states that Sparta was then at peace. That is impossible if Derkylidas was already campaigning in Asia, an event that he (14.38.2) dates to 399. It is impossible to reconcile the two accounts.

The Parian Marble (*FGrH* 239A, 66) places the Greek *anabasis* of Cyrus and the death of Sokrates in the archonship of Laches (400/399). Apollodoros (*FGrH* 244 F43) places Sokrates' death in the first year of the 95th Olympiad (400/399). At F343 he dates Xenophon's participation in the *anabasis* to the archonship of Xenainetos (401/400) in the year before the death of Sokrates. Diogenes Laertius (2.39) adds that the speech against Sokrates was not authentic because it mentions Konon's rebuilding of the walls in 394/1, which did not occur until six years after Sokrates' death, or 400/399; see also *IG* II² 1656–1664.

Xenophon (*Mem.* 4.8.2) provides the last particles of information, when he relates that the verdict against Sokrates was given in the month of the Delia, which was roughly equivalent to the Attic month of Thargelion, but that for religious reasons the penalty was not carried out until the next month, which was Skirophorion: for the Delia, see P. Stengel, *RE* 4 (1901) 2433–2435. If the latter month were properly observed, it would have fallen on 20 July 400: F.K. Ginzel, *Handbuch der mathematischen und technischen Chronologie*, II (Leipzig 1911) table II. Xenophon adds (*Hell.* 3.1.1; *Anab.* 1.2.21, 4.2) that the Spartan ships sailed to Cilicia in support of Cyrus, when he supported the *anabasis*. The operations of the Spartan triremes additionally suggest the summer months for their activity.

From these bewildering bits of information a reasonable conclusion can be drawn. Both the Olympiads and the Attic years began in the summer. Hence, in the absence of knowledge whether these years were accurately observed, one cannot determine the precise

Attic years for these events. The problem, however, does not exist for Julian years. The data very strongly suggests that Agis' first two campaigns took place in 401 and that the Eleians surrendered in the following year. Agis died in the Julian summer of 400.²⁸

²⁸ For other chronological reconstructions of these events, see S. Usher, *AJP* 81 (1960) 358–372; R.K. Unz. *GRBS* 27 (1986) 29–42; M. Sordi, in E. Lanzilotta, ed., *Problemi di storia e cultura spartana* (Rome 1984) 143–158; Tuplin, *Failings of Empire*, 201–205.

CHAPTER THREE

THE SPARTAN ASCENDANCY (400–394 BC)

Although some scholars still refer to the period from 400 to 371 as the Spartan Hegemony, ascendancy is the more accurate term for it. At the end of the Peloponnesian War Sparta could still be reasonably considered a hegemon; but as already seen, during the ensuing years Thebes largely disavowed Spartan leadership, and Corinth conveniently ignored it. Rather than obey Sparta, Argos steadfastly opposed its traditional enemy. In some cases, states like those in Thessaly pursued their policies independent of Spartan wishes. The closest that Sparta subsequently again came to a position of hegemony was in the nine-year period between 386 and 377, when Thebes was prostrate and Athens on the defensive. Even then Sparta was not technically a hegemon, for many Greek states were independent of its leadership. For all these reasons, ascendancy is the proper term; for no one doubted Spartan might, nor did any lightly defy it.¹

A. THE SPARTAN WAR IN ASIA MINOR (400–394 BC)

Tissaphernes cared little about Sparta's nominal status in Greece. In 400 he returned to Asia Minor armed with Artaxerxes' charge to assume control of the entire coast. Although the Ionian cities had originally belonged to his jurisdiction, Cyrus had wrested them from him and instead installed Greek garrisons under his own command. Tissaphernes' new orders reaffirmed his authority in Ionia and increased it to include command over those who mustered in the

¹ Hegemony: N.G.L. Hammond, *A History of Greece*³ (Oxford 1986) xv; R. Sealey, *A History of the Greek City States* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1976) ix; C.D. Hamilton in L.A. Tritle, ed., *The Greek World in the Fourth Century* (London and New York 1997) 53, speaks of domination, M. Cary, VI (Cambridge 1964) xi, prefers ascendancy. Xen. *Hell.* 3.1.3 writes of the Spartans πάσης τῆς Ἑλλάδος προστάται. See also P. Karavites, *Revue internationale des droits de l'antiquité*, 31 (1984) 191; M. Jehne, *Koine Eirene* (Stuttgart 1994), 269–277.

Kastolos Plain. He was in fact and perhaps in title the new *karanos*. Inasmuch as both the Spartans and the Ionians had supported Cyrus, they could expect neither patience nor sympathy from him. He immediately demanded that Ionia be returned to him. In effect he called for the dissolution of Spartan garrisons and harmosts in Asia. All of the local satraps vowed allegiance to him. The Spartans then holding Ionia for Cyrus now had no paymaster and no idea of what response the home government would make to the crisis. They stood isolated in the midst of considerable hostile forces who intended to drive them out of Asia. Tissaphernes' proclamation and the news of his increased power spread instant alarm through the region. Matters worsened for the Spartans, when they learned that Tamos, the only satrap who refused to obey Tissaphernes, had fled to Egypt with his fleet. This desertion left them without local naval support. Tamos' fate was unpleasant and swift but of no comfort to the Spartans. The Egyptian king Psammetikos had no intention of harboring a traitor to the King of Persia. He executed Tamos and his family, and then appropriated his fleet and possessions. He thus showed himself friendly to the King, while strengthening his own naval power.²

The Greeks of Asia responded immediately to Tissaphernes' arrival by sending ambassadors direct to Sparta to ask for protection. The Spartans agreed to champion their cause, and sent an official warning to Tissaphernes admonishing him not to wage war against the Greeks. Tissaphernes rejected this ultimatum. His position was clear and lawful. Ionia belonged to Persia, and he had his orders from the King himself. To obey the Spartan demand would amount to treason. Furthermore, the Persians simply demanded that Sparta honor the pledges that it had voluntarily given during the war. In 412–411 Tissaphernes, acting as the official and recognized agent of the King, had negotiated an alliance with the Spartans in which the principal terms pertaining to Asia Minor were that all of the territory

² Xen. *Hell.* 3.1.3; *Anab.* 1.1.6, 18; Diod. 14.35.2–5. H.W. Parke, *JHS* 50 (1930) 37–97. J. Miller, *RE* 4A (1932) 2149; H. Schaefer, *RE* Sup. 7 (1940) 1579–1599. *Karanos*: Tissaphernes: Thuc. 8.5.4; Xen. *Hell.* 3.1.3; Cyrus: Xen. *Hell.* 1.4.3; *Anab.* 1.9.7; Pharnabazos subordinate to Tissaphernes: Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.12; 4.1.37; Tithraustes: Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.25; see also Gomme *et al.*, *HCT* V.13–16. In general, see C. Haebler in *Serta Indogermanica* (Innsbruck 1982) 81–90; T. Petit, *Les Études Classiques* 51 (1983) 35–45; N. Sekunda, *AMIran* 21 (1988) 74.

and cities then held by the King or by his ancestors should be his. Ere long the Spartans made another treaty, whereby they swore not to wage war or otherwise violate the territory that belonged to King Dareios or his forebears. In the spring of 411 Tissaphernes and the Spartans agreed that the King's Asian possessions were his to be governed at his pleasure. The compact further stipulated that the Spartans repay any loans that Tissaphernes advanced to them. Thus, in spurning Tissaphernes' demand in 400 the Spartans reneged on two basic treaty obligations. The gods-fearing Spartans hypocritically violated their own oaths given when swearing to their treaty-obligations. They had in effect betrayed the Persians and the gods whom they had invoked. Now they were caught in their contradictions and duplicity, a confrontation between the ideal of Greek autonomy and sworn treaty to the Persians. The Spartans preferred the ideal, and then confronted the reality of enforcing it. Tissaphernes answered by attacking Kyme at the mouth of the Xanthos river, a tributary of the Hermos. Despite his inability to seize the city, he demonstrated his determination to regain control of the Greek cities under his charge.³

The Spartans embarked upon this venture with the far-sightedness of moles. They had no preconceived plan for liberating Asia Minor. They formed neither a coherent strategy nor any effective means to implement one. They determined no priority of targets to attack nor specific objective to secure, nor made any plans for concentrating their resources to defeat Tissaphernes. As a result, they only ineffectually attempted to deal the Persians a lethal blow. The problem was admittedly complicated. With his extensive powers, which included authority over Pharnabazos, Tissaphernes governed the satrapies of Aiolis and Ionia, the boundary between them being the Hermos river, and Karia, separated from Ionia by the Maeander river. Even though the challenge was daunting, the Spartans nevertheless had long enjoyed the use of the fine harbor and city of Ephesos as their principal base on the Asian littoral. Their holdings to the north included at least nominally all of the major ports, notably Smyrna, Phokaia, Kyme, and Abydos. This wide expanse of coastline offered them several points from which they could hold the coast

³ Diod. 14.35–6–7; see also Thuc. 1.124.3; 3.31; 8.22, 31, 100; Bengtson, *SdA* II². 200–202, 206; Ephoros, *FGrH* 70 FF114, 163; Nepos *Alc.* 7.1.

and push inland. They must either wear down the Persians by attrition or confront them in decisive battle. In the event they succeeded in neither. That in turn put them at the risk of Persian counter-attack. Tissaphernes in fact enjoyed the geographical advantage, which put a number of routes at his disposal. The western coast of Asia Minor is separated from the interior by a chain of mountains penetrated by several rivers. Communications among the Greek cities along the coast were tentative and difficult, except by sea. Attack from inland, however, was quite easy, for the main river valleys allowed the Persians to respond when and where they chose. In addition, a good Persian road system greatly facilitated the movement of troops and supplies. The main artery was the great Royal Road that ran from Persepolis past Sousa and Sardes to Ephesos. Another led from Smyrna in the north, and still another westwards from Apameia. The coast was easier to counter-attack than defend. Tissaphernes could use any and all of these routes to strike along the coast and defeat the Spartans piecemeal.⁴

The Spartans likewise lacked the resources in material and men to defeat the Persians. At the end of the Peloponnesian War the revenues from the Aegean netted them more than 1000 talents, but maintenance of Spartan rule there consumed much of that. They lacked a war-chest to finance sustained operations both in terms of supplying their own troops and paying for the mercenaries needed to bolster their efforts. Unless they could successfully live off the land in Asia Minor and exact greater amounts of money from the eastern Greeks, the Spartans could not effectively operate there for long periods. The problem was especially severe regarding the mercenaries, who were notoriously unreliable, especially when their pay was in arrears. Nor could Spartan manpower sustain lengthy operations against considerable odds. The strength of the Spartan citizen-army remains a damnably difficult problem, but by 400 the Spartans could muster at least 6700 infantry and cavalry. This force, augmented by allied levies, could swell the ranks to 13,400. It was sufficient to defend Sparta and to maintain order in the Peloponnesos, but was too valuable to send far abroad on hazardous ventures. The

⁴ Hdt. 5.52–54; W. Judeich, *Kleinasiatische Studien* (Marburg 1892) 39 n. 1. A.T. Olmstead, *History of the Persian Empire* (Chicago 1948) 299–301; J.M. Cook, *The Persian Empire* (London 1983) 107–109.

expectation of further reinforcements from Asia was dubious and unpredictable. In effect, the Spartans could campaign only with a small number of citizens and allies, supplemented by some mercenaries and local eastern Greek levies, the entirety of which constituted neither a coherent nor reliable host. An additional problem was the Spartan failure to appreciate the importance of cavalry in the intended field of operations. The Spartans had long considered cavalry an inferior arm, but in the open plains of the Anatolian river valleys, lack of it prevented mobility and ease of operations. Even were a suitable army assembled, the Spartans lacked efficient commanders. Although some had held local commands, none had directed a grand campaign. In that respect they lacked the experience and vision of Lysandros. To worsen matters the Spartans frequently changed generals and sometimes sent advisors to accompany them. Thus, no one general, if indeed capable of envisioning a broad policy, was in a good position to carry it to completion. Each successive commander learned of the specific challenges confronting him only upon his arrival on the scene, without apparently having previously received much useful direction from the home government or his predecessors.⁵

Next in urgency was the weakness of Spartan seapower. Tamos' fleet was then in Egyptian hands, and Spartan finances were already problematic and strained. The Spartans needed a substantial fleet to cover any military adventures ashore, to maintain control of the Aegean, and to repulse the Persian navy. They themselves lacked the material resources to create a major navy, and perforce needed substantial external funding, which was not obviously available. It remained a hard question whether even their 1000 talents could suffice for all routine demands as well as finance a joint naval and military effort of sizeable proportions. Once again arose the question of leadership. Only Lysandros had demonstrated any ability in naval command, so it remained dubious whether the Spartans could provide officers able enough successfully to train crews and lead them

⁵ Diod. 14.10; see also J. Buckler, *Research in Economic History* 2 (1977) 264 n. 39; Xen. *Hell.* 2.1.14; *Anab.* 1.16–2.3. Cavalry: I.G. Spence, *The Cavalry of Classical Greece* (Oxford 1993) 152–158; R.E. Gaebel, *Cavalry Operations in the Ancient Greek World* (Norman 2002) 110–118. Resources: H.W. Parke, *JHS* 50 (1930) 55–57. Leadership: R.E. Smith, *CP* 43 (1948) 145–156; C.D. Hamilton, *AncW* 23 (1992) 35–50; Tuplin, *Failings*, 48–49.

to victory, especially in the face of the veterans of the Persian fleet. In sum, the Spartans lacked the unity of command, experienced officers of sufficient rank, the men, the strategy, the money and material to defeat the Persians. They had no idea of how to win this war, which they lost even before they had committed their forces to it.

To appreciate the significance of these simple facts one need only to consider the advantages enjoyed by the Persians. They possessed ample manpower on the scene that could readily be augmented and immediate superiority in cavalry. Their chain of command was clear, understood, and respected. Their supplies were proximate and abundant, and more could be drawn from the vaster resources of the empire. Persian defences were as deep as they were wide. While Spartan victory depended upon driving the Persians far inland, their enemy need only drive the invader into the sea. In that respect the situation of the Spartans repeated the difficulties that the Greeks had encountered during the Ionian Revolt. Furthermore, Tissaphernes and Pharnabazos weighed heavily in the scales. Both were consummate diplomats with credible loyalty to the King, though they naturally looked also to their own good fortunes. In that respect, fighting for the King meant fighting for themselves. Tissaphernes, though not an otherwise brilliant general, nonetheless used his cavalry with great skill. Pharnabazos was a superb naval strategist. In this gathering storm, Persian leadership, resources, and command of the theater of war all proved superior to those of the Spartans.

These problems notwithstanding, the Spartans voted to send Thibron as harmost to Ephesos. They gave him 1000 emancipated helots and 4000 other Peloponnesian troops. He also enrolled 300 Athenian cavalry who had faithfully supported the Thirty Tyrants. He sailed eastwards with not much more than 5000 soldiers. Although he raised others in Asia Minor, he accumulated little more than 7000 in all. With a force this small he could at best defend himself, but the liberation of the eastern Greeks lay beyond his power. His army was so small and weak that it could not even confront Persian cavalry on level ground. Such was the profundity of Spartan planning.⁶

Only Ephesos was well chosen and familiar, having served as the principal Spartan naval base during the latter part of the Peloponnesian

⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 3.1.46; *Anab.* 1.1.6; 7.6.1–41, 8.24; Diod. 14.36.2, 37.1. Thibron: Poralla, *Prosopographie*², 65, 181. P. Funke, *Homonoia und Arche* (Wiesbaden 1980) 37–38; Tuplin, *Failings*, 48–49.

War. Today the remains of its harbor facilities testify to its previous maritime importance, all the more instructive because the Kaystros river has over the centuries deposited so much alluvium that now the Aegean shines far from the extant remains. At its ancient acme, the city boasted ample harbor and warehouse facilities within easy reach of the city. It sits at the western foot of surrounding hills that do not cut it off from the interior. Rather it enjoys convenient communications inland both along the Kaystros and Maeander rivers. The latter was especially vital, for it led to Tralleis, the modern Aydın, a major city in the northern part of Tissaphernes' satrapy. Prosperous Ephesos opened the way to Tissaphernes' doorstep and provided an excellent position to support naval movements along the entire coast.⁷

The ephors ordered Thibron to launch an immediate attack on Tissaphernes and Pharnabazos to eliminate Persian power in Asia Minor. Only a quick strike promised success, and they understood that these two men posed the most formidable threat to their ambitions. Tissaphernes especially had promised to achieve for the King precisely what Cyrus the Younger had sought for himself. Having landed at Ephesos, Thibron duly struck eastwards at Magnesia on the Maeander, little of which can be seen today. His route took him through a flat, virtually featureless, but very rich valley to the unwallled city. It fell to his first assault, after which he penetrated deeper inland to Tralleis. Its strength baffled his siege, forcing him to retreat to Magnesia. All along the way Thibron's troops freely plundered the prosperous countryside. At Magnesia the Spartans moved to nearby Mt. Thorax, the modern Gümüş Dağı, but failed to hold it. Tissaphernes counter-attacked with a strong force of cavalry, which ranged freely over the open land, forcing Thibron to retire to the safety of Ephesos. Lack of adequate cavalry, a perennial weakness of the Spartan army, denied Thibron the possibility to operate successfully in the broad plains of western Asia. Unable to discomfit Tissaphernes, Thibron turned northwards to Aiolis against his other assigned enemy,

⁷ Ephesos as Spartan port: Thuc. 8.19, 109; Xen. *Hell.* 1.2.6–12, 5.1–16, Diod. 14.79.3. In general: L. Büchner, *RE* 5 (1905) 2773–2822, with map at 2772–2773. G.E. Bean, *Aegean Turkey* (London and New York 1966) ch. 7, provides a good brief description of the site, as does B. McDonagh, *Blue Guide, Turkey* (London and New York 1995) 195–216. Fortifications: F.E. Winter, *Greek Fortifications* (Toronto 1971) 348. Tralleis: W. Ruge, *RE* 6A (1937) 2093–2128; personal observations of 21–28 May 2001.

Pharnabazos. There he met with success because of the twin factors that the Greek cities greeted him as a liberator and Xenophon with the remnants of the Ten Thousand joined him. These veterans not only swelled his meager ranks, but they also supplied the Spartans with much needed expertise in mobile warfare. The importance of these veterans is incalculable. Hardened by their ordeal, they knew their enemy, their very survival proof of that. In addition to their experience a large number of them came from the Peloponnesos, which must have heartened Thibron's main contingent. The Greek cities provided Thibron with a welcome base of operations. Pergamon—then a small and unimportant city, not the later jewel of the Hellenistic and Roman periods—still crowns a towering peak overlooking broad, unbroken, and fertile land that stretches from Atarneus on the the coast eastwards through the Kaikos river valley past Teuthrania, thence to Halisarna and on to Gambirion. This extensive plain, rich and well-watered, gave Thibron command of the most prosperous and desirable part of Aiolis. Only Egyptian Larisa, so named because Cyrus the Elder had earlier settled loyal Egyptians there, resisted the Spartans. Standing on an isolated hill about 3.1 kilometers north of the modern village of Türkeli and some 1.1 kilometers north of the Gediz river, the city enjoyed protection on the eastern and northern sides by steep slopes strewn with large boulders. Strong walls reinforced natural advantages. The remains of at least eleven buildings on the akropolis still testify to the prosperity and strength of the settlement. Given these advantages, Larisa could readily impede Spartan communications between Pergamon and Ephesos. Although its citizens had doubtless earlier permitted free passage, they now blocked Thibron's way. Despite his energetic siege of the city, he failed to take it, which prompted the ephors at home to rebuke him. For all that, he had done a creditable job with limited resources. Unimpressed, the ephors pointedly ordered him to redirect his campaign against Tissaphernes in Karia. Their strategical view of the situation was indeed acute. Despite his gains, Thibron had failed to win control of the Maeander and Hermos valleys, which in turn meant that he had done little to protect Ephesos and nothing to harm Tissaphernes. His very success in the Kaikos plain had certainly alienated Pharnabazos, which further complicated his mission.⁸

⁸ Xen. *Hell.* 3.1.1–10; *Anab.* 7.6.1, 43; 7.7.57; 7.8.8, 24; *Kyrop.* 7.1.45; Strabo

The defeat at Larisa soon led to Thibron's dismissal. The fault can more appropriately be laid to the failings of the ephors than to their officer in the field. They, not he, bore the responsibility for an inadequate force deficient in cavalry. Despite these handicaps, Thibron had won much-needed local support. The ephors thought otherwise. In addition to his alleged inefficiency, they accepted the accusations of certain allies that he had plundered their friends. Upon his recall he was exiled, and Derkylidas sent out in his place. Reputed a clever man, Derkylidas was no stranger to the region. During the last stages of the Peloponnesian War he had served successfully in the Hellespont, where he effected the revolt of Abydos, of which he became har-mot. There he met and offended Pharnabazos, who publicly and humiliatingly disciplined him for insubordination. When the ephors sent Derkylidas back to Asia Minor, they presumably charged him, as they had Thibron, to carry the war against Tissaphernes. Instead, the two met amicably to strike a bargain. Tissaphernes agreed to cease operations against the Greeks under his authority, if Derkylidas would renew Thibron's war against Pharnabazos. The chief Spartan field-officer without orders from home had made a pact with the enemy whom he had been sent to defeat. Derkylidas thereby disregarded public duty to settle a private grudge. Furthermore, he went unpunished for it. His defenders claim that unable to defeat Tissa-phernes and Pharnabazos together, he chose to conquer them in succession. Thibron could have made the same excuse. Such was the state of Spartan foreign policy in 399. This bargain, which amounted to a truce, was very much in Tissaphernes' interest, inas-much as he could not lose. He had temporarily rid himself of an enemy, and could use the time to strengthen his forces. He was then at odds with Pharnabazos; and if Derkylidas defeated him, Tissaphernes

12.8.1–2; 13.4.2–3. Pergamon: W. Radt, *Pergamon* (Darmstadt 1999); Teuthrania: W. Ruge, *RE* 5A (1934) 1159–1161; Halisarna: L. Büchner, *RE* 7 (1912) 2270; Gryneion: W. Kroll-L. Büchner, *RE* 7 (1912) 1900–1901; Myrina: W. Ruge, *RE* Sup. 6 (1935) 615–621; Egyptian Larisa: L. Büchner, *RE* 12 (1924) 871–871; Gambirion: L. Büchner, *RE* 7 (1910) 691; personal observations of 11 June 2002. Although the location of Egyptian Larisa sometimes remains unnecessarily disputed—e.g. *Barrington Atlas* map 56—the identification of the site is secure: see K. Schefold, *Tenth International Conference of Classical Archaeology* (Ankara 1978) 549–564. On 10 June 2002 investigation of the hill in question revealed the remains of circuit walls and at least eight separate internal walls, some rubble and others coursed rectangular; the foundations of at least eleven buildings, ample sherds, including glazed and coarse ware, and roof-tiles. Finally a native stated that the place is still called Larisa.

would be free of a powerful local rival. If Pharnabazos won, he need not fight the Spartans at all. He could let his opponents do his work for him with minimal risk to himself.⁹

Derkyllidas had his own reasons for coming to an understanding with Tissaphernes, quite apart from his slight by Pharnabazos. The former had already proven himself a formidable foe, and his resources were greater than Derkyllidas', who had only some 7000 men under his command. The Spartan could expect few reinforcements from home, because Dionysios, the tyrant of Syracuse, was actively recruiting mercenaries, especially from Sparta. Furthermore, Derkyllidas could argue that even if he had not liberated the Greek cities from Tissaphernes, he had at least gained the promise of their peace and security. Derkyllidas was also more familiar with the Troas than with Ionia. To add to its allure, Thibron had already won the following of many Aiolian cities, leaving little work more in the region to do. Only in its northwestern part, that bordering Troas, was there turmoil. More familiar with this area than that to the south, his experience enabled him to take advantage of this unsettled situation. The problem there arose from Pharnabazos' custom of allowing local officials to act as local potentates so long as they paid him the usual tribute. At the death of Zenis, one of these officials, Pharnabazos appointed the man's wife, Mania, to his position. Such was her success that she captured the Greek cities of Larisa, Hamaxitos, and Kolonai, all located on the coast. Envy of her many victories and general success prompted Meidias, her son-in-law, to murder Mania and her daughter. When the assassin sent to Pharnabazos claiming the right to her position, the satrap replied that he would deal with Meidias himself. Thus, the political confusion of the region made Derkyllidas' incursion all the easier. Yet the unrest had also drawn Pharnabazos' attention to the area. The adventures of Mania and Meidias point in addition to the instability of command in the western satrapies of the Persian Empire that would culminate in a general revolt of the satraps later in the century.¹⁰

⁹ Xen. *Hell.* 3.1.6–9; Ephoros, *FGrH* 70 F71; Diod. 14.36.2–3, 38.2; see also Thuc. 8.61–62; Xen. *Hell.* 3.1.9. B. Niese, *RE* 5 (1903) 240–242; Gomme *et al.*, *HCT* V.149; Poralla, *Prosopographie*², s.v. Derkyllidas. Hamilton, *SBV*, 112–114; Funke, *Homonoia und Arche*, 42–44.

¹⁰ Xen. *Hell.* 3.1.10–16; Diod. 14.39.5, 44.2. Hamaxitos: L. Büchner, *RE* 7 (1912) 2296–2297. Kolonai: L. Büchner, *RE* 11 (1921) 1110.

This combination of self-preservation and prudent opportunism saw Derkylidas march north through friendly Aiolis and away from Tissaphernes' Karia. Once again the Spartan had earned his sobriquet "Sisyphos", an allusion to the legendary trickster. Of a free and independent spirit, one who preferred the pleasures of travel to life in Sparta, Derkylidas may very well have harbored a private ambition to carve out his own little domain in Aiolis and the Chersonesos. King Pausanias had apparently attempted something of the sort after the Persian War and Lysandros also after the defeat of Athens in 404. Derkylidas' previous contacts in the area and his exalted position certainly increased the possibility of personal success that would not necessarily come at the expense of Sparta's interests. Whatever his ultimate aims, he surely looked to his own future as assiduously as he did Sparta's. In that respect the political chaos in the north offered him numerous lucrative opportunities, thanks primarily to the mutiny of Meidias. Many Greek states there wanted freedom from Persian rule; others such as Dardanos, the home of Zeris and Mania, remained hostile to the usurper; and Pharnabazos had threatened him with death. To turn this situation to his own advantage Derkylidas must act before the satrap could reassert his authority. He began by sending envoys to the Greek cities offering them alliance and asking permission to enter their cities. The two, of course, meant Spartan military occupation of them, the combination of protection and obligation suggesting a return to the system of *harmosts*. Derkylidas began by securing the loyalty of the coastal cities of Hamaxitos, Larisa, and Kolonai, which Mania had recently subdued. He could also reasonably expect the support of Dardanos. Though none of them formidable places, they all nevertheless held considerable strategic significance. Together they commanded the entire shoreline from the modern Gölpinar to Çanakkale. Spartan possession of them worried the Athenians as much as Pharnabazos. Hamaxitos (near modern Kumbağlar) in the south stood on two low hills overlooking the Aegean. It commanded a sizeable coastal plain backed by a line of low ridges. Despite its considerable and fertile countryside, from the sea the city suffered from a rather exposed position. Nonetheless, it served as an excellent watchpost for shipping entering the approaches to the Hellespont. Larisa (the modern Tavakli Iskelesi), of which no ancient remains now exist, also enjoyed a long extent of coastline not far removed from Hamaxitos. Northwards from Larisa sat Kolonai at modern Beşik Tepe, behind which rises a small upland valley,

now well cultivated, that gave it independence from the sea. Kolonai and Larisa seem normally to have acted in unison. Whether Derkylidas included Sigia in his plans remains unknown but quite likely. Although obscure during the Classical period, Antigonos transformed it, with the amalgamation of several neighboring cities, into the brilliant Alexandria Troas. Its position alone made it too significant to ignore; and a long stretch of Classical walls, seven courses in height that overlook the harbor, still testify to its earlier importance. Lastly, Derkylidas probably won the adherence of Dardanos, the population of which harbored no love of Meidias. Located immediately south of modern Çanakkale, the site commands a good harbor, but the land between the sea and the surrounding foothills allowed the population adequate space and protection. It also occupied a position quite valuable to Abydos and its crossing to Sestos.¹¹

Derkylidas followed these gains with others in Troas, beginning with Ilion, Neandria, and Kokylion, all of which voluntarily joined him. Ilion, the famed Troy, like the other cities just mentioned, looked upon the sea, but in its case across its legendary plain. A surprisingly small place, the city commanded extensive territory on all sides. Not by nature particularly strong, and elevated only slightly above its plain, the city nonetheless stood fortified. Its wide territory provided ample sustenance for its population and for Derkylidas another strongpoint along the coast. Far different was Neandria, (modern Kayacik), a strong city astride the road between the coast and the inland cities of Kebren, Skepsis, and Gergis. Neandria on its heavily fortified akropolis dominated broad plains on all sides, the view stretching for kilometers. Its decision to join Derkylidas gave

¹¹ Xen. *Hell.* 3.1.8–16; Ephoros, *FGrH* 70 F71; Diod. 14.38.2–3; see also Thuc. 8.61–62; Plut. *Lyk.* 15.3; Strabo 13.1.26–35, 47. Hamaxitos: L. Büchner, *RE* 7 (1912) 2296–2297; W. Leaf, *Strabo on the Troad* (Cambridge 1923) 227–229; J.M. Cook, *The Troad* (Oxford 1973) 231–232; personal observations of 2 June 2002. Larisa: Vogel mistakenly prints Ἀρίσβαν at Diod. 14.38.3 instead of ms. A's Ἀρίσκων, which is probably a corruption of Λάρισσαν. Or, as so often, Diodoros may simply have gotten things wrong. Although an Arisbe existed on the Selleis river, it was remote from these immediate events; on it see G. Hirschfeld, *RE* 2 (1895) 847, and for Larisa L. Büchner, *RE* 12 (1924) 871; Leaf, *Strabo*, 223–226; personal observations of 31 May 2002. Kolonai: L. Büchner, *RE* 11 (1921) 1110; Leaf, *Strabo*, 223–225; Cook, *Troad*, 219–221; personal observations of 26, 31 May 2002. Sigia: L. Büchner, *RE* 2A (1923) 2278; see also G. Hirschfeld, *RE* 1 (1893) 1396; Leaf, *Strabo*, 240; Cook, *Troad*, 183–185; personal observations of 31 May 2002. Dardanos: L. Büchner, *RE* 4 (1901) 2163–2164; Leaf, *Strabo*, 150–152; Cook, *Troad*, 60; personal observations of 3 June 2002.

him an exceptionally rich, powerful, and strategically choice position that protected his gains on the littoral from Pharnabazos' expected counter-attack. Kokylion, located perhaps southeast of Neandria somewhere in the valley, presumably further strengthened his hold on the region. In a matter of days, Derkylidas had gained control of the entire coast and two valuable cities inland, his progress owing primarily to a combination of Greek distaste for Persian rule and Pharnabazos' inability to move quickly against him. Other factors also contributed to his success. The Greek garrison troops in these cities welcomed the Spartans and provided ready manpower against the Persians. Derkylidas thereby found willing men in place who could maintain his authority in the cities. That in turn meant that he need not dilute the strength of his field-army for auxiliary purposes. Enjoying these advantages, he could now venture into the hinterland.¹²

At this point Derkylidas encountered an unexpected obstacle. When he advanced farther eastwards through the Skamandros valley, he learned that the Greek garrison commander at Kebren, who remained loyal to Meidias, refused Derkylidas' appeal to join the Spartans. The two hoped that Pharnabazos would arrive in time to repulse the Spartans and reward them handsomely for their loyalty. Without hesitation Derkylidas marched direct on the enemy at Kebren. He took the road to modern Bayramiç, then turned south to Pinarbasi through gently rolling land to the modern Akpınar. Thence the land rises more steeply but without causing the walker undue difficulty. From this point Derkylidas caught his first sight of Kebren standing atop a steep cliff with the entire countryside spreading below. In addition to its natural strength the inhabitants had stoutly fortified it, three distinct lines of wall still being visible. The city lay naturally vulnerable only on its eastern side, but even there attack would prove difficult and costly. Despite the formidable defense of the place, Derkylidas ardently wanted to storm it before Pharnabazos could come to its defense. After repeated unfavorable sacrifices and desultory skirmishing, the Spartan watched in surprise as heralds came from the city professing their loyalty to the Greek cause. Seeing this state of things, the garrison commander also sent a herald offering

¹² Ilion: C.W. Blegen, *Troy and the Trojans* (New York and Washington 1963); E. Oguz, *Jeomorfoloji Dergisi* 4 (1972) 1–12; personal observations of 6 June 2002. Neandria: W. Ruge, *RE* 16 (1935) 2106–2108; Leaf, *Strabo*, 229–231; Cook, *Troad*, 204–208; personal observations of 1 June 2002. Kokylion: Leaf, *Strabo*, 232–233; Cook, *Troad*, 322.

his surrender. By a singular coincidence on that very day the omens proved favorable to the Spartan cause, allowing Derkylidas to garrison the city that he could not easily have stormed. The event proved both the discretion of the commander and the genuine desire of the population to be rid of Persian rule. Kebren gave Derkylidas the key to the city in the upper Skamandros valley while opening the way to the lower. With it he also forged a link to the coastal cities that he had just acquired.¹³

From Kebren Derkylidas next led his army against neighboring Skepsis and Gergis farther inland. As the home of Meidias and the seat of his power, Skepsis proved the more important target. From Bayramiç to Skepsis the land begins by rolling through a spacious plain before climbing steadily to low hills. At modern Kurşunlu the akropolis of Skepsis rises well above a narrow valley bordered on its western side by high bluffs. The position of the city, like that of Kebren, if well defended, presented a formidable obstacle; but once again Derkylidas preferred diplomacy to force. The strength of Skepsis notwithstanding, the fall of Kebren shook Meidias' resolve. No longer confident that Pharnabazos would arrive in time to reward him for his loyalty, Meidias also dismissed the loyalty of his fellow citizens, who showed distinct signs of following the example of the Kebrenians. He perforce agreed to surrender Skepsis to Derkylidas in return for assurances of his own safety. Only Gergis in the north remained. From Skepsis Derkylidas took the route past modern Yigitler, which rises through fir forests until it reaches Asarlik Tepesi, the site of Gergis. This strongpoint, located immediately south of the village of Karincalik, covers a steep hill strongly fortified and commanding the entire valley that spreads below it. For the third time Derkylidas confronted a daunting position, and yet again he relied on guile instead of force to win it. He ordered Meidias, now his hostage, to order the citizens of the city to open the gates to the Spartans so that Derkylidas could sacrifice to Athena there. The defenders obeyed, and the Spartan made his sacrifice, kept the city, and took Meidias' troops into his own service. The heart of Troas was his.¹⁴

¹³ Xen. *Hell.* 3.1.17–19. Kebren: L. Büchner, *RE* 11 (1921) 105–106; Leaf, *Strabo*, 171–173; Cook, *Troad*, 327–344; personal observations of 20 May 2002. No one need doubt Xenophon's story of Derkylidas' frustration over the unfavorable sacrifices, something that Xenophon himself had experienced: *Anab.* 6.4.12–5.2.

¹⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 3.1.19–28; Polyain. 2.6; *Excerpts* 39.2; Leo 21.3. Skepsis: L. Büchner, *RE* 3A (1927) 445–446; Leaf, *Strabo*, 268–275; Cook, *Troad*, 345–347; personal

In a brilliant campaign that witnessed very little fighting Derkylidas had taken nine cities in eight days, all the while collecting enough loot to finance an army of 8000 men for an entire year. This campaign, together with the modest success of Thibron, gave the Spartans the foreshore of Asia Minor from Dardanos in the north to Ephesos in the south. They also held the Skamandros, Kaikos, and probably Hermos valleys together with the littoral of the Maeander. The only exceptions to their sway were Atarneus, then held by Chian exiles, and Egyptian Larisa, neither likely to pose serious problems. Moreover, Derkylidas' rapid and unexpected advance threatened Pharnabazos' seat in Phrygia, for which he was always regardful. The strategical position between the Spartans and Persians having changed, it remained to be seen how Derkylidas would use his success and how Pharnabazos would respond to it.¹⁵

Despite the vaunted pay for 8000 soldiers, Derkylidas refused to use these resources against Pharnabazos. Nothing suggests that at least some of it paid garrison-troops in the newly-gained cities. Derkylidas certainly led his own troops to believe that they would receive it. Nor did he harbor self-serving motives. Instead, the advancing winter, the awkwardness of quartering his troops in friendly territory, and the fear of Pharnabazos' superior cavalry led him to conclude an eight-month truce with the Persians. The Spartans thereupon moved into Bithynian Thrace, the area in northwestern Asia Minor opposite Byzantion, so called because some Thracians from Europe had settled there. Derkylidas' conduct clearly illustrates how poorly prepared the Spartans were for sustained warfare. The home government had no concept of a coherent, comprehensive strategy for liberating the Greek cities, nor had it made any plans for supplying and maintaining its expeditionary force. Derkylidas had no realistic alternative but to act as a freebooter to feed his army. In the broader scheme of things his interlude in Bithynia contributed nothing to the liberation of the Greek cities. His troops instead spent much of the winter plundering the Bithynians and living off their booty. In the fighting the Spartans suffered heavy casualties that they could ill afford. In effect, Derkylidas worked for Pharnabazos by

observations of 29 May 2002. Gergis: L. Büchner, *RE* 7 (1910) 1248–1249; Leaf, *Strabo*, 102–106; Cook, *Troad*, 347–351; personal observations of 30 May 2002.

¹⁵ *Xen. Hell.* 3.2.1; see also *Anab.* 6.4.24. Derkylidas also held Sestos and Abydos: *Xen. Hell.* 4.8.3–6.

taking a toll on the Persian's enemy, while reducing his own meager strength.¹⁶

Pharnabazos was neither pusillanimously avoiding Derkylidas nor simply using him to harry unruly and unwelcome neighbors. A veteran of the Peloponnesian War, he instead determined to inflict a decisive defeat on the Spartans, one that would drive them out of Asia. For that, however, he needed time, and the truce with Derkylidas was only the beginning. He next went to the King with his plan to prepare a large fleet to be placed under the tactical command of the Athenian Konon. He had several reasons for choosing Konon for the position. The Athenian had demonstrated diligence, intelligence, and valor during the war, which made him knowledgeable about the military, political, and diplomatic demands of the theater of operations. Konon was then in a self-imposed exile with King Euagoras in Cyprus, who was himself a recalcitrant vassal of Artaxerxes. Konon's antipathy to Sparta was obvious, and thus his credibility among the Greeks secure. His obedience, if not his absolute loyalty, to the King was at least expedient. An Athenian in command of a Persian fleet manned primarily by Greeks would give a semblance of its being a friendly force, not an instrument of the barbarian. All that Pharnabazos needed was time and the King's money.¹⁷

Pharnabazos took his plan to Artaxerxes, who enthusiastically welcomed it. For far too long had the Spartans refused to honor their part of the bargain with him, and had waged war against his satraps. This was the time and the opportunity appropriately to deal with them. He gave Pharnabazos 500 talents for the new fleet. Persian strategy was simple—to find and destroy the Spartan navy. All that was left were the details of command, including agreement on Konon's position in the chain of command. Euagoras too must be taken into consideration, and his loyalty to the King made certain. The King and Euagoras were then at odds over a local matter in Cyprus and Euagoras' refusal to pay tribute, but the Cyprian eagerly solved both, and sponsored a willing Konon for the position as vice-admiral of the Persian fleet. After an exchange of letters and envoys between

¹⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.1–5; Diod. 14.38.3.

¹⁷ Diod. 14.39.1; Isok. 9.53, who predicably but erroneously ascribes the plan to Euagoras and Konon; Nepos *Con.* 2.2; 3.2; Justin 6.1.2–9. Orosius is not cited here as having no value independent of Justin. Pharnabazos in the Peloponnesian War: Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.11–22, 24–26; 1.3.5; 4.7. D.A. March, *Historia* 46 (1997) 257–269.

Euagoras and Konon on the one hand and Artaxerxes and Ktesias—the famous court physician and historian—on the other, the King ordered Euagoras, the Phoenicians, and the Cilicians to fit out 100 triremes for active service in the following year. Pharnabazos served as commander-in-chief, which included control of the purse-strings, and Konon held the rank of admiral. In Cyprus Pharnabazos, Konon, and Euagoras discussed the details of the campaign to defeat the Spartans and put the Persians in control of the Aegean. Euagoras and Konon, of course, had their own designs, but the arrangement was beneficial for them all. The King needed Euagoras' help against both the Spartans and the Egyptians, who had rebelled against him. In return, Euagoras would gain Cyprus as his fief and Konon enhanced power for Athens. His efforts could lead to the greater independence of his city, including the renunciation of its peace-agreement with Sparta. He himself could expect a triumphant homecoming. The crown of their cooperation, to be proleptic, would be their victory over the Spartans at Knidos in 394. Pharnabazos' success in building the fleet was merely one part of a much larger and brilliant plan fully to destroy Spartan power in Asia, the Aegean, and on the mainland itself. As will be seen in due course, his next step would be to incite a general war between the major powers in Greece and the Spartans. For the moment, however, Konon in 397 led forty ships that had already been fitted out to Cilicia for further preparations. In the following year, he moved his fleet to Kaunos, the most famous city of the Rhodian Peraia, where he established his base of operations.¹⁸

In the following spring of 398 Derkylidas marched to Lampsakos along the northwestern coast of Asia Minor. The site enjoys a wide, but rather open, harbor, behind the center of which rises a low ridge that is too low to be defensible. Yet the ample space between shore and hill, and Lampsakos' position northeast of Abydos, made it a good base for operations farther along the coast to the east. Derkylidas' movement against the city surely indicates that he now intended to move against Pharnabazos in Phrygia itself. Before he could act,

¹⁸ Ktesias, *FGrH* F30, 32; Isok. 9.55–56; *Hell. Ox.* 12.1; Diod. 14.39.2–4; Nepos *Con.* 3.2.4, 4; Plut. *Artax.* 21.1.1–2; *Alk.* 37.4; Justin 6.1.2–9. Egypt: Diod. 14.35.3, 79.4; Justin 6.2.1. Judeich, *Kleinasiatische Studien*, 49–52; B. Weicker, *RE* 11 (1921) 85–88; G. Barbieri, *Conone* (Rome 1955) 79–89; F.A. Costa, Jr., *Historia* 23 (1974) 47–50.

however, he received a small delegation from the Spartan government. Their mission included observing for themselves the situation in the area and determining whether Derkylidas' command should be extended for another year. This seemingly ordinary incident presents several oddities. No one apparently discussed Derkylidas' plans against Pharnabazos, Tissaphernes went unmentioned, and no discussion of how further to pursue the war against them arose. The truce between Sparta and Persia had held and that apparently sufficed for the moment. Again nothing indicates that the Spartan authorities had even a vague idea of how to liberate all of the Greek cities. Instead, one of the officials mentioned that ambassadors from the Chersonesos had arrived in Sparta with complaints of Thracians pillaging their land. The Chersonesian ambassadors also made an alluring proposal: if the Spartans would build a wall from sea to sea across the peninsula, a span of some seven kilometers, there would be abundant, fertile land for Spartan settlers. This proposal would certainly appeal to many of Derkylidas' soldiers, thus providing the Chersonesos with a much-needed band of defenders and perhaps a little political enclave for Derkylidas himself. His immediate response was two-fold. First, he saw the legates off to Ephesos, knowing quite well that they would find the Greek cities there prosperous and at peace. Next, he made another truce with Pharnabazos. The satrap had once again defended his land, or at least spared it from further depredation without lifting a finger, all the while gaining time for his counter-stroke. In the strictest terms Derkylidas fulfilled his duty by obeying the orders of his superiors. His goal was not necessarily to wage war against Pharnabazos and Tissaphernes but to liberate the Greek cities. Yet he could not free the Greeks without eliminating the Persian threat. Any other policy entailed the avoidance of this obvious fact, but Derkylidas did not shape grand strategy, and the Spartan government proved incapable of doing so. Time and again the home government only responded to external stimuli that it seemed imperfectly to have understood. That withal, Derkylidas led his army to the Chersonesos, where he spent the winter, built his wall, and returned to Asia Minor in the summer of 397. He thereupon inspected the status of the Greek cities and found a problem only in Atarneus (modern Dikili), a strong and fertile place that Chian exiles had seized and used as a base for launching piratical raids against the Ionians. The akropolis of Atarneus stood on two tall hills separated from each other by a deep saddle backed by a

lower hill. Located four kilometers from the sea, they served as a stout haven in the event of a maritime attack. The harbor itself, now largely covered by modern construction, was ample but not large. Immediately behind the shoreline only a little flat separates the sea from the land. Yet the akropolis and the port together posed a considerable challenge, as Derkylidas quickly learned. Its siege cost him eight months, but his eventual victory there at least gave him abundant supplies for his return to Ephesos. For all that, he left the Persians unharmed.¹⁹

Despite Derkylidas' successes, the Ionians were discontented and indeed still alarmed by the entire situation. They fully realized that nothing had actually been settled. Their discontent led to their dispatch of envoys to the Spartans entreating them to deal decisively with Tissaphernes. They suggested a campaign against Karia, just as the Spartans had earlier enjoined upon Thibron, to force the Persians to leave all of the Greek cities free. This appeal reminded them that neither Thibron nor Derkylidas had accomplished their assigned tasks. Though far off, Artaxerxes responded to this diplomatic effort by sending Ktesias in the summer of 397 as his ambassador to Sparta. Ktesias' message repeated the Persian stipulations that the Spartans evacuate Asia and recognize his right to the Greek cities there. Nothing new was involved here, save still another reminder that the Spartans had obstinately refused to honor their treaty obligations to him. The King's position was both an ultimatum and a sign that the Spartan campaigns had failed to move him. He thereby indicated that evasions and negotiations were alike nugatory. Unmoved, the Spartans defiantly ordered Derkylidas to cross the Maeander river to attack Karia, while their admiral Pharax would cover the army's western flank. The Spartans gave these orders in complete ignorance of the surprise that Pharnabazos and Konon were even then preparing for them.²⁰

¹⁹ Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.6–11; see also *Anab.* 7.3.15–33; Diod. 14.38.6–7. Lampsakos: L. Büchner, *RE* 12 (1924) 590–592; personal observations of 23 May 2002. Chersonesos: Hdt. 6.36; Plut. *Per.* 19.1; Pliny *NH* 4.11.43 Steph. Byz. *s.v. Agoraion Teichos*; Prokopios *Buildings* 4.10.5–9. G. Rawlinson, *The History of Herodotus*, III (New York 1860) 360 n. 2; Casson, *Macedonia*, 215–216; personal observations of 7 June 2002. Atarneus: Isok. 4.144; Diod. 13.65.4. L. Büchner, *RE* 2 (1896) 1897; Leaf, *Strabo*, 327–329; personal observations of 9 June 2002. Passive Spartan government: Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.8, 12.

²⁰ Ktesias, *FGrH* 688 F30; Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.12. On Ktesias in general, see H. Sancisi-Weerdenburg, in H. Sancisi-Weerdenburg, ed., *Achaemenid History*, I (Leiden 1987) 33–45.

Undaunted, the Spartans were hardly idle. At this point, presumably upon royal command, Pharnabazos and Tissaphernes sank their differences in the face of the common enemy. They had both used their string of truces to marshal their forces against Derkylidas. Having assembled 20,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry, they marched direct on Ephesos. Once in the Maeander valley, they encountered Derkylidas. Fully appreciating their numerical superiority, especially in cavalry, Pharnabazos urged his comrade immediately to join battle. Tissaphernes, on the contrary, harbored unpleasant memories of the valor of the Greek troops under Cyrus, and therefore shrank from a confrontation. While Pharnabazos looked futilely on, Tissaphernes and Derkylidas concluded still another truce, with the Persians retiring to Tralleis and the Greeks to Leukophrys at Magnesia on the Maeander. Tissaphernes' failure of will was a spineless blunder, for this almost flat land greatly favored the much superior Persian cavalry. Instead of crushing the invader under such opportune conditions, Tissaphernes listened while Derkylidas repeated the well-worn words about the Persians leaving the Greek cities autonomous, and the Persian responded by demanding yet again the Greek departure from Asia and Spartan harmosts from the cities. This was precisely the diplomatic situation obtaining at the start of operations. The two sides nonetheless agreed to refer the matter once again to their superiors. Tissaphernes' cowardice had cost the King a victory, and his doubts about the ability of his commander-in-chief must have deepened. Both sides knew that they had decided nothing. Derkylidas had at least extricated himself bloodlessly from defeat. Tissaphernes could perhaps temporize by hoping that the Spartans could not easily maintain themselves much longer in Asia. At the very least Tissaphernes had gained additional time for Pharnabazos' fleet under Konon to enter the fray. In that respect alone, time was on the Persian side.²¹

B. AGESILAOS IN ASIA MINOR (396–394 BC)

By 396 Persian naval preparations neared completion. The Spartans learned of them from the Syracusan Herodas, who had observed some of them while in Phoenicia. He quickly sailed to Greece with

²¹ Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.13–20; 4.8.17; Diod. 12.39.4–6, 79.4–6. Poralla, *Prosopographie*², 123–124, 167, 190. Leukophrys: Bean, *Aegean Turkey*, 207–209.

a message for the Spartans to the effect that he had seen an assemblage of triremes in various stages of fitness. Rumor reported that their entire number would amount to 300, but he knew neither their intention nor destination. The Spartans, however, expected the worst. Nor had they yet probably heard that Konon had also sailed his 40 triremes to Cilicia. Properly alarmed, they called an emergency meeting of their allies, which gave Lysandros the opportunity to bring his experience to bear on the crisis. Despite the reputed numbers of the Persian fleet, he felt that the Greeks would prove far superior at sea. The logic of this line of thought is difficult to comprehend. Owing to the loss of Persian subsidies and their own limited resources, the Spartans confronted the challenge of long maintaining a huge fleet of 120 ships. Even the loyal Greeks along the coast must look to their own defense against their neighbors. Put simply, the Spartans must again decide whether they really wanted to free the Greek cities, which they could only do by confronting the Persians, whose intentions were obvious. This time no compromise, truce, or disassembly seemed possible. It now remained to be seen whether they could accomplish by arms what they had failed to achieve by diplomacy.²²

The real reason for Lysandros' ardor for the expedition was his desire to return to Asia Minor purportedly to re-establish the erstwhile *dekarchiai*. He could thereby recreate his previous and exalted quasi-independent position abroad. Impressed by the achievements of the Ten Thousand, he thought that a well-led Spartan force could win easy victory on land. He concluded also that the Spartan fleet would prevail at sea, a calamitous miscalculation, as subsequent events would prove. He bolstered his cause by writing to his old supporters there asking them to send ambassadors to Sparta, their purpose to request the succor of a force under Agesilaos' command. He next approached the king with his plan to lead 30 full citizens, 2000 *neo-damodeis*—emancipated helots—and 6000 allies to repulse the Persians. Pleased by the suggestion, Agesilaos immediately put it before the Spartan authorities. He claimed that he would not only protect the Asian Greeks, but that he wanted also to wage an offensive campaign against the Persians that would avenge Xerxes' invasion. Later

²² Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.1–2; *Ages.* 1.6; Isok. 9.55; Nepos *Ages.* 2; *Conon* 4.4; Diod. 14.39.4, 79.4; Justin 6.2.1; Plut. *Lys.* 23.1; *Ages.* 6.1–5. Barbieri, *Conone*, 101–105; Shipley, *Plutarch's Agesilaos*, 116–123.

events would prove that Agesilaos' ambitions, though doubtless genuine, rose above his abilities. The plan was at least inexpensive. The Spartans would risk few of their own men and even including the neodamodeis, they would contribute fewer than one-half the number of the expedition. Even the Spartan 30 would serve principally as advisors, a measure that the Spartans had earlier adopted, when the commander of an army had proved unsuccessful, and desirable in the first campaign of an inexperienced king. Among these advisors were Lysandros, Herippidas, and Derkylidas, all three veterans of Asian service. The Spartan government acceded to Agesilaos' proposal, and voted him his expeditionary force and provisions for six months. This force, though to be joined with the Spartan troops already in Asia, was still too small to accomplish its goal. Its supplies were minimal, and the whole venture was inauspicious.²³

Having left orders for the assembly of his forces at the promontory of Geraistos at the southern tip of Euboeia, Agesilaos journeyed to Aulis in Boiotia to sacrifice at the sanctuary of Artemis. He declared that in a dream he was told that he rivalled Agamemnon because he too led the forces of Greece against the Asians. As had his heroic predecessor, then he must sacrifice at Aulis for victory. He seems to have forgotten what happened to Agamemnon upon his return from Troy. As will be seen, the Spartan king would receive almost as nasty a reception on his own return as had Agamemnon. More to the point, Agesilaos' estimation of his position is ridiculous but instructive of his arrogance and stupidity. While Agamemnon had led the host of Greece against Troy, Agesilaos mustered only a handful of men. The Spartan put himself on the level of one of the major Homeric heroes without having done anything to merit the comparison. Unlike his assumed predecessor, he did not lead all of Greece against barbarians. The Thebans and Athenians steadfastly refused to join the expedition. He had only those troops who chose to muster at Geraistos, which did not as yet include the entire contingent. This is the first public example of the life-long lack of judgement that marked the career of Agesilaos. Upon his arrival at Aulis, he ordered his own diviner to perform the sacrifice. This act can only be seen as a calculated slight and indeed a provocation to the Boiotians.

²³ Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.2–3, 20; *Ages.* 1.708; Diod. 14.79.2; Nepos *Ages.* 2.1; Plut. *Ages.* 6.1–5; *Lys.* 23.1–4; see also Thuc. 2.85; 5.63.

Despite the animosity between Sparta and Thebes, no one could reasonably object to a Spartan sacrifice made in accordance with proper and traditional cultic custom. The Boiotian priests, not a Spartan *mantis*, knew the rituals, and had the right to sacrifice on behalf of any suppliant. The fame of the sanctuary had spread throughout Greece, and no one could have been ignorant of the official way in which to make a sacrifice there. That withal, Agesilaos proceeded with his offering in defiance of proper religious usage. Enraged *boiotarchoi* sent cavalry to stop the proceedings. They summarily threw the offerings from the altar, leaving a humiliated Agesilaos as an angry spectator. Having called upon the gods to witness the deed, he sailed to Geraistos, where he took command of those troops who had heeded the Spartan summons. Nevertheless, Agesilaos never forgave nor forgot the slight, even though he had no one but himself to blame for it. It was also the beginning of a personal grudge that he held towards Thebes for the rest of his life, one that harmed him personally and ultimately the entire Spartan state as well.²⁴

From Geraistos Agesilaos sailed to Ephesos, where he received a message from Tissaphernes disingenuously asking him the purpose of his mission. The king predictably answered that he wanted the Greek states in Asia to be as autonomous as were the states on the Greek mainland. With wry humor Tissaphernes proposed a truce of three-months' duration so that he could consult with the King, and he proposed that meanwhile Agesilaos should return home. Tissaphernes of course knew his orders; but even though Agesilaos refused to leave Ephesos, he nonetheless agreed not to harm Persian territory in the meantime. Since Agesilaos had his own orders, his response was incomprehensibly stupid. The armistice was entirely in Tissaphernes' favor. It forced Agesilaos to consume some of his six-months' provisions, while his foe without cost bought time to build an army large enough to combat him. In the background, the Persian fleet rapidly neared completion. Agesilaos allegedly discerned the Persian's

²⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.3–4, 5.5; Diod. 14.79.1; Plut. *Ages.* 6.6–11; *Lys.* 27.1–3; *Pel.* 21.4; Paus. 3.9.3; 9.19.6–8; see also Eur. *Iphigeneia in Aulis* 1540–1601. For Agamemnon and his host, see V. Burr, *ΝΕΩΝ ΚΑΤΑΛΟΓΟΣ* (Leipzig 1944); R.H. Simpson and J.F. Lazenby, *The Catalogue of Ships in Homer's Iliad* (Oxford 1970). Geraistos: F. Bölte, *RE* 7 (1910) 1233–1234. Aulis: K. Braun in S. Lauffer, ed., *Griechenland* (Munich 1989) 155–156; A. Schachter, *Cults of Boiotia*, I (London 1981) 95–98; Shipley, *Plutarch's Agesilaos*, 120–128.

intentions but did nothing. He obviously did not know how to conduct this campaign for which he had drafted no strategy. His veteran advisors were equally worthless. Furthermore, none of them realized that they must urgently strike before the Persian fleet was fully ready for sea. Agesilaos instead passively allowed the enemy the opportunity to put perfect their preparations for a massive counter-offensive. The truce also deprived Agesilaos of much of the campaigning-season by limiting his range of action. Instead of remaining totally passive, however, Agesilaos plundered the Kaystros valley for much-needed supplies. Thence he moved on Kyme, still in Greek hands, and marched inland to western Phrygia before returning to Ephesos. These operations, coming on the heels of the truce, may cause surprise, but Agesilaos could always maintain that the terms applied only to Tissaphernes' home satrapy of Karia, not to Aiolis and Phrygia. Whatever the legal nicities, Agesilaos had hugely replenished his larder for the winter.²⁵

Agesilaos now spent the winter at Ephesos, knowing full well that he would confront Tissaphernes in the coming spring. The time was hardly quiet or leisurely. The Greek cities suffered from turmoil and indecision. The previous Athenian democracies had been swept away by the *dekarchiai*, which in turn had been disbanded. In this situation of major political confusion, many people turned to the experienced Lysandros to solve immediate problems rather than the unknown Agesilaos. They gave him their petitions instead of properly approaching the king. As appointed advisor to the king, Lysandros had his established duties, but both Agesilaos and the other Spartans considered Lysandros' conduct demeaning of royal authority. Angered and embarrassed by the attention shown to Lysandros, Agesilaos refused his every request and petition. It would have been utter simplicity for the king to dismiss his advisor and turn his attention to the problems at hand. Instead he made a point of publicly snubbing Lysandros and thus depriving himself of his considerable experience. No field-commander can legitimately be criticized for maintaining discipline, but this rivalry perceived by Agesilaos interfered with his duties. Even if Lysandros had wanted to recreate the *dekarchiai*, the king would easily have prevented it. One can perhaps argue that

²⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.4–7; *Hell. Ox.* 14.2; 15.1; Diod. 14.79.1–3; Plut. *Ages.* 9.1. G.L. Cawkwell, *CQ* 26 (1976) 62–84; Hamilton, *Agesilaos*, 96.

Agesilaos did just that. Yet by the same token the king had no political plan to deal with the uncertain situation. Instead of taking advantage of the truce to settle Greek affairs to Sparta's advantage, Agesilaos wasted it on a petty grievance. He saw months before him to rebuild Spartan influence in the east, already so warmly welcomed. Instead of fuming of slights and indiscretions, he could have attempted to build a new political system that would win loyalty without hinting at tyranny. His failure in this respect equals his few military victories. Lysandros solved part of the problem by asking to be relieved of immediate duty to be detached elsewhere. Agesilaos gladly sent him to the Hellespont. There Lysandros quickly brought Spithridates, a commander of the immediate region responsible to Pharabazos over to the Spartan side. He had thus weakened the satrap in the region while establishing at Kyzikos another Spartan foothold in the Propontis east of Lampsakos and west of Byzantion. Without toil or expense he had done more damage to the Persians than Agesilaos had yet inflicted.²⁶

His army assembled, Tissaphernes ordered Agesilaos to withdraw from Asia. The ultimatum greatly disturbed the Spartans and their allies, because now the Persians so greatly out-numbered them. In addition to confronting superior forces, they held a somewhat tentative position in Asia with long supply lines to Greece. Nonetheless, Agesilaos spread word that he planned to march on Karia, and to that end ordered the Ionians, Aiolians, and Hellespontines to assemble at Ephesos. Tissaphernes in response sent his cavalry into the plain of the Maeander, where they could overwhelm the invaders before they even reached the hilly country of Karia. Instead of marching southwards, however, Agesilaos led his army north. Around Ephesos he met his allied troops, and moved again against Phrygia through open countryside. His way probably took him as far as Pergamon before he struck northeastwards to Daskyleion, overrunning a number of cities along the line of march. Pharnabazos' superiority in cavalry stopped Agesilaos, and the satrap with his local forces drove Agesilaos back to the sea. For all that, the Spartans had seized a great deal of much-needed booty, which greatly helped

²⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.5–10; *Ages.* 1.9–12; Nepos *Ages.* 2.3–5; Plut. *Ages.* 7.1–8; *Lys.* 24; Paus. 3.9.3–4. B. Wesenberg, *ZPE* 41 (1981) 175–180; Tuplin, *Failings*, 56; Shipley, *Plutarch's Agesilaos*, 128–135.

to refill their depleted coffers. The campaign in Phrygia was of little military importance, but it underscored the need for a stronger Spartan mounted force, without which Agesilaos could not operate in the plains.²⁷

In the spring of 395 Agesilaos drilled his army. He had in the meantime collected a much-needed force of cavalry to augment his hoplites, peltasts, archers, and javelin-throwers, making this a far better balanced army than its predecessors. He also improved the equipment of all its branches. His numbers cannot confidently be determined. Derkyllidas had commanded some 7000, and the Spartans had entrusted Agesilaos with 8030, which would present an army of about 15,000. Yet none can say how many were needed for garrison duty or how many had left the ranks. A field-force of even 13,000 would perhaps be generous but not too far from the mark. At any rate, Agesilaos led the strongest army yet against the Persians. A new group of advisors arrived at Ephesos, and with them came a re-organization of the army, the major units of which came under the command of new officers. Xenokles led the new horsemen, Skythes the neodamodeis, Herippidas the Kyreians—the remnants of Cyrus' mercenaries—and Mygdon the allied troops. The Kyreians, once led by Xenophon and the Spartan Cheirisophos, provided welcome experience specifically in battle against the King's major field-army. They formed a hard corps of veteran troops. Now Agesilaos had an army to his liking. Pollis also arrived on the scene to replace Pharax as admiral of the fleet.²⁸

When ready, Agesilaos publicly announced that he would at once lead the army by the shortest route to Sardeis through the most prosperous parts of the country. Tissaphernes considered the announcement a ruse to cover his real intention of renewing his attack on Karia. He accordingly, as before, sent his infantry back to Karia, while keeping his cavalry in the Maeander plain at Tralleis, the modern Aydın. Yet instead of threatening Karia again, Agesilaos struck

²⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.11–14; *Ages.* 1.16, 23; *Hell. Ox.* 9.2–3; Diod. 14.79.3; Plut. *Ages.* 9.1–3. See also Ramsay, *Historical Geography of Asia Minor*, map between 178–179; personal observations of 21–22 May 2001; 11–12 June 2002. G. Bonamente, *Studio sulle Elleniche di Ossirinco* (Perugia 1973) 139–189.

²⁸ Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.16–20; *Ages.* 1.24–27; *Anab.* 7.8.24; Plut. *Ages.* 9.1. The chronology of the land war is bedevilled by the fact that Xenophon omits much of it, the narrative of the Oxyrhynchian Historian is quite often fragmentary, and Diodoros compresses events. See also Bonamente, *Studio sulle Elleniche di Ossirinco*, 77–100.

eastwards at Sardeis. He had the choice of several routes. The easiest led from Ephesos northerly past modern Selçuk and Torbali to Nymphaion at the modern Kemal or Karabel pass. The land stretches nearly level through fertile farmland until it rises almost imperceptibly to the pass. Thence it strikes the Royal Road leading through the Hermos Valley direct to Sardeis. Low hills run along its southern side and to the north again rise hills and mountains beyond them. Between a rolling plain spreads very broadly all the way to Sardeis. Though quite attractive, this road is longer than the more direct way that appealed to Agesilaos. This road, despite one very hard stretch, was in antiquity the major route between Ephesos and Sardeis. He accordingly led his men northeastwards from Ephesos through the Kaystros valley past Teira, the name of which is preserved in modern Tire, and Hypaipa, the modern Ödemiş. The route rises gradually among scattered low hills that form no considerable impediment to movement. For the most part the land is nearly flat and quite open along the way. Today many scattered farms dot the fertile landscape. The only topographical obstacle arises when the road turns northeastwards to confront Mt. Tmolos. Several tracks cross the mountain, the one through today's Golcük Gölü being better than the others. Hard going it is, but passable for all that. At the summit opens a small plain with a lake, a most welcome sight after a long day's march. Thence the road descends through the valley of the Paktolos river to the Hermos plain a little more than two kilometers east of the city. For three days Agesilaos tramped through the bountiful land pillaging gaily as he went. His progress ended at the suburbs of Sardeis on the northern side of the towering akropolis. Only when the Spartan army was well on his way did Tissaphernes realize that Agesilaos had actually spoken the truth about his intentions. From Tralleis he sent his cavalry quickly westwards through the Maeander valley to Ephesos. The land is broad and flat, as intensively cultivated today as in antiquity. Cavalry covered the distance easily; and upon turning north at Magnesia, the Persians followed hard on Agesilaos' heels through the Kaystros valley. They did not reach him until the fourth day of his march, his progress slowed only by his plundering of the countryside.²⁹

²⁹ Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.11, 4. 16–21; *Ages.* 1.24–27; *Hell. Ox.* 14.1–2; Diod. 14.79.1–3, 80.1–2; Nepos *Ages.* 3.4–5; Plut. *Ages.* 10.1–2; Diog. Laert. 2.52; Front. 1.8.12; Paus.

When the Persian cavalry, unsupported by infantry, reached Sardeis, it arrived on the northern outskirts of the city. Agesilaos' troops were already plundering the area on the eastern bank of the Paktolos most probably between the city and the rolling ground stretching northwards to the Hermos. The terrain to the south, thought quite unsuitable for cavalry, nonetheless gave those on foot opportunity for looting. As was so often in such cases, the scavengers were scattered across the countryside with no order and little protection. The ensuing events were doubtless as confused as the surviving accounts of them. Upon arriving on the scene, the Persian commander first took advantage of the confusion to send his baggage-train westwards across the Paktolos, thus putting his camp opposite both Agesilaos and Sardeis immediately to the east. He next promptly sent his cavalry against the Spartan pillagers still to the east. At this point the high bluffs on the eastern side of the river gradually slope to the north towards the streambed, while at the same time receding from it, allowing room for maneuver. From the western bank the land spreads into a spacious, flat plain now dotted with trees. Between the modern highway bridge and that of the railroad extends ample room for two large armies to clash. When Agesilaos saw the Persians, he ordered his own cavalry to ride to the aid of the plunderers. The Persian commander in response formed a line of his horsemen to join battle. Realizing that the Persian cavalry lacked infantry support, Agesilaos drew up his entire army, mounted and foot, and launched them against the enemy. His peltasts led the younger hoplites of the heavy infantry and the rest of the army. Even though the Persians stoutly met the attack of the Spartan cavalry, they could

3.9.4–6; Polyain. 2.19. See also Hdt. 5.100–101; Plut. *Mor.* 861A–C; Peutinger Table, Segmentum IX.4–5, for which see K. Müller, *Die Peutingersche Tafel* (reprint Stuttgart 1962). Ramsay, *Historical Geography*, 104 and map, 167; C. Dugas, *BCH* 34 (1910) 59–65; A. Philippson, *Reisen und Forschungen im westen Kleinasien*, II (Gotha 1911) 68–71; F. Rühl, *RhM* 68 (1913) 182–185; L. Büchner, *RE* 11 (1921) 100–101; *RE* 3A (1927) 275–281; J. Keil, *RE* 15 (1931) 1100–1102; *RE* 18 (1942) 2439–2440; W. Kaupert, in J. Kromayer and C. Veith, eds., *Antike Schlachtfelder*, IV (Berlin 1931) 261–289; G. de Sanctis, *Atti della Accademia delle Scienze di Torino* 66 (1930–1931) 178–179; F. Cornelius, *Klio* 26 (1933) 29–31; I.A.F. Bruce, *An Historical Commentary on the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* (Cambridge 1967) 150–156; D. Nellen, *AntCl* 3 (1972) 45–54; J.K. Anderson, *CSCA* 7 (1974) 28–41; C. Foss, *CSCA* 11 (1978) 21–60; V.J. Gray, *CSCA* 12 (1979) 189–193; J. DeVoto, *Hermes* 116 (1988) 46–49; L.A. Botha, *AntCl* 31 (1988) 71–80; Shipley, *Plutarch's Agesilaos*, 156–160. G. Wylie, *Klio* 74 (1992) 118–130.

not withstand the onslaught of the entire army. Some fell in their ranks and others in the bed of the Paktolos, the rocky bottom of which at this point is now some six meters in width. Agesilaos pursued them as far as their camp, which he captured and plundered. Though vigorous, the action meant little more than a skirmish, but it bought Tissaphernes enough time to bring his own infantry to the defense of Sardeis. Unable to take the city, as Aristagoras had earlier

A major and still unsettled dispute exists over Agesilaos' route from Ephesos to Sardeis. Thus, it was desirable to describe in the text the salient features of each of the major candidates based on personal observation of 22–28 May 2001. The ancient sources from Herodotos to the Peutinger Table agree that the principal route between Ephesos and Sardeis ran through Hypaipa, and nothing suggests that Agesilaos in 395 took any other way. Xenophon's testimony indeed confirms this conclusion. At *Hell.* 3.4.20 he writes καὶ προεῖπεν αὐτοῖς ὥς εὐθὺς ἡγήσονται τὴν συντομωτάτην ἐπὶ τὰ κράτιστα τῆς χώρας. The question becomes whether συντομωτάτην here denotes distance or time. At *Hell.* 3.4.15 Xenophon uses it for "speed", but at *Econ.* 12.19 he means "short". The route by way of Hypaipa is the shorter, speedier, and more direct than that by the Kemal pass, and had the advantage of delivering the troops virtually on the doorstep of the city, whereas the route over the Kemal pass would have required them to march a considerable distance along the Royal Road in full view of anyone in the city or on the plain. Kaupert and Anderson strengthen their argument for the road through the Kemal pass by drawing straight lines on a topographical map to indicate the distances of the two routes. Straight lines on a map have little meaning to anyone who explores the land itself. Both the Oxyrhynchos Historian and Diodoros support Xenophon by their allusions to the Kaystros plain. Diodoros is guilty of introducing confusion by writing Ἀγησίλαος μὲν ἐξαγαγὼν τὴν δύναμιν εἰς τὸ Καύστρου πεδῖον καὶ τὴν περὶ Σίπυλον χώραν. Mt. Sipylos stands above the Hermos plain, not that of the Kaystros, from which more than five kilometers by road separate them. The interpretation adopted here posits Diodoros' ignorance of the terrain. No one else mentions Mt. Sipylos.

A similar problem arises from Tissaphernes' route of pursuit. Although Kaupert in the *Schlachten-Atlas* draws a road between Tralleis and the Karystos valley, in *SA* (IV.280) he admits that no evidence supports his view: "Sichere Nachrichten, die auf die Beschaffenheit des Weges Schlüsse gestatten, liegen nicht vor". In this view too Anderson follows Kaupert. Botha (73), who explored this area herself, apparently rejects their notion. Early travellers and cartographers knew of no such route, nor can it be found on the Peutinger Table or in the *Itineraria Romana*; on the latter, see O. Cuntz, *Itineraria Romana*, I (Leipzig 1929) 336. It is likewise absent from N.G.L. Hammond, *Atlas of the Greek and Roman World in Antiquity* (Park Ridge 1981) map 13, and the *Barrington Atlas*, map 61. Only in comparatively recent years was a small motor road built to allow communications with local villages in the area. Unless and until someone can present convincing evidence for a good ancient road between Tralleis and Teira or Hypaipa, no one else need accept a Persian march over Mt. Mesogis. Finally, *Hell. Ox.* 14.3 states explicitly that Tissaphernes [ἐπηκο]λούθει τοῖς Ἑλλη[σ]ιν, the verb naturally following its usual meaning of "to follow close upon". This was pursuit (see Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.22), not an indication that Tissaphernes took a route whereby he could reach an advanced position from which he could block Agesilaos' march on Sardeis.

likewise failed to do, Agesilaos contented himself with pillaging the northwestern suburbs of the city.³⁰

Although Agesilaos' campaign was hardly of any great military importance, it produced one significant political effect. Dissatisfied with Tissaphernes' conduct of the war, the King ordered Tithraustes to replace him. Upon his arrival in the west, Tithraustes arrested and decapitated Tissaphernes, his head being sent to Artaxerxes. Then the new commander dealt directly with Agesilaos. He demanded that the Spartans sail back home. He promised that the Greek cities in Asia would be autonomous, but nonetheless be required to pay the tribute that they had traditionally rendered the King. In the plainest terms he said that the Greeks could govern themselves howsoever they wished so long as they paid their taxes. The Persians simply demanded that the Spartans observe the conditions that had obtained in the fifth century and which they themselves had in the fourth century sworn to honor. Agesilaos replied that he could not accept these terms without authorization from his home government. He spoke the truth given his orders, but it was equally true that he had no sound idea of how to carry them to success. He found himself back on the coast, no closer to success than Thibron had been. He had failed as signally as had his predecessors. With no idea of how to liberate the Greeks, especially now that the Persians had pushed him back from Sardeis, and with few resources, Agesilaos struck a bargain with Tithraustes that perfectly suited the Persian's plans. The two agreed that Agesilaos would again invade Phrygia, for which Tithraustes would give him thirty talents to cover the expenses of the expedition. The satrap simply bought time in which to prepare the counterstroke that would drive the Spartans entirely

³⁰ Though unconventional, this reconstruction of the battle not only accounts for the movements of the two armies with careful consideration of the terrain, but it also enjoys the advantage of explaining how Tissaphernes, following the van of his cavalry, was able to occupy Sardeis.

The text rejects the testimony of *Hell. Ox.* 14.4–6 because it is very improbable that Xenophon would have omitted such a victory by his hero Agesilaos. The question of whether Xenophon participated in these events, although he most probably did, is actually somewhat irrelevant: he had ample opportunity to discuss matters with the troops who had been engaged in them. As so often, Xenophon reported the things that interested him, to judge by *Hell.* 4.5.11–17; 5.4.39–41; 6.2.27–30; and were this stratagem authentic, he would surely have accorded it pride of place among his hero's laurels. Nor is this the only occasion when the Oxyrhynchian Historian has unnecessarily or erroneously embellished Xenophon's simple, straightforward narrative; see J. Buckler in C.J. Tuplin, ed. "The World of Xenophon" (Stuttgart forthcoming). See also Wylie, *Klio* 74 (1992) 118–130.

out of Asia. He would further distance Agesilaos from his unattainable goal, while reducing the power of his rival Pharnabazos. Agesilaos duly marched northwards; but while stopping north of Kyme, he received messengers from the Spartan government with orders also to take command of the fleet. Thus empowered, the king quickly directed the cities in Asia to build 120 triremes. At last the Spartans had groped towards a strategy capable of achieving some success. If, as Lysandros had long before envisaged, the Spartans could protect the Greek cities both by land and sea, they could win an acceptable accommodation with the Persians, albeit one not very different from that already proposed by Tithraustes. Agesilaos put the new fleet under the direction of his inexperienced brother-in-law Peisandros. The broader significance of this meeting between the home officials and their king lies in two things. Most immediately it shows that Agesilaos had no intention of leaving Asia of his own accord. This new fleet would give substance to his resolve. The messengers also agreed that Agesilaos should ignore Tithraustes' ultimatum. Whatever the prospect, the Spartans reaffirmed the resolve taken at the end of the Peloponnesian war to liberate the Asian Greeks.³¹

Tithraustes labored under no illusions, and was himself laying large plans for dealing with the Spartans. Those designs deserve particular attention in their due place (see pp. 75–76). It seems reasonably clear that for the moment he and Pharnabazos planned to keep Agesilaos off balance in Asia Minor until they could bring their fleet to the fore and meanwhile spark a war in Greece itself. Agesilaos' subsequent activities in Phrygia, however, deserve at least a momentary notice. In the autumn of 395 he plundered Pharnabazos' province, and intrigued in the affairs of Paphlagonia. He returned to Ephesos for the winter, having accomplished nothing of note. Even while busying himself in gathering a large army in the plain of Thebe, events in Greece soon called him home. Although some Greeks thought that he had inflicted great harm on the Persians, Agesilaos had instead proven himself a nuisance rather than a threat. Tithraustes had effortlessly put him out of the way in a remote province, all the while removing him from further and greater events then in the offing.³²

³¹ Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.25–29; *Hell. Ox.* 15.1–16.2; Diod. 14.80.5–6; Plut. *Ages.* 10.9–15.5.

³² Xen. *Hell.* 4.1.1–2; *Hell. Ox.* 16.1. For the position of Thebe, see Xen. *Anab.*

C. THE NAVAL WAR (396–394 BC)

While Agesilaos was laboring vainly in Asia, events at sea to the south further endangered Spartan ambitions. Various factors complicated the naval situation. Not only did Konon have Persian support and had nearly readied his fleet for action, but the Athenians had also secretly supplied him with weapons and crews. They had also sent envoys to the King, presumably assuring him of their support against the Spartans. Such was the situation until one Demainetos took matters into his own hands. Supposedly with the private blessing of the Athenian *boule*, he boldly commandeered a public trireme to join Konon. The Athenians in great alarm disavowed the act by informing Milon, the Spartan harmost at Aigina, that Demainetos had acted as a renegade. This small incident might seem more amusing than significant were it not for the fact that Demainetos threatened to make public a clandestine Athenian policy. Only the quick action of Thrasyboulos, Asimos, and Anytas prevented the situation from becoming a crisis. Yet the incident for all of its melodrama indicates that the Athenians had already prepared to translate their deep resentment against the Spartans into an active policy to topple them from power.³³

Events in the eastern Aegean were even then coming to a head. From Cyprus, where the fleet was still building, Konon had led forty ships to Cilicia, whence he sailed to Kaunos on the Asian coast northnorthwest of Rhodes, the gateway to the Aegean. North of it opened Knidos, a city loyal to Persia, and the more powerful states of Samos, Chios, and Lesbos, which looked rather to their own freedom than any friendship with Sparta. Konon enjoyed the opportunity to use both the King's patronage and Greek patriotism to accomplish his goals. Alive to this threat, the Spartans sent envoys to Nephertites (or more properly Nefaarud), king of Egypt, seeking an alliance. Instead of a treaty, he offered the Spartans material enough to build 100 triremes and some 432,500 litres of grain. He was willing to help the Spartans but not to the point of offending the King and risking his own throne. Pollis, the new Spartan admiral, met

7.8.7–8. Manfredi, *La Strada*, 256–257; Lendle, *Kommentar*, 479–480; Hamilton, *Agesilaos and the Failure of Spartan Hegemony* (Ithaca 1991) 100–103.

³³ *Hell. Ox.* 9; Diod. 14.39.2–4; Plut. *Mor.* 345D; see also *Lys.* 13.8–82. Bruce, *Commentary*, 52–53; B.S. Strauss, *Athens after the Peloponnesian War* (Ithaca 1986) 107–110.

the challenge by leading his 120 triremes to Sasanda, a fortress not far from Kaunos, from which he could blockade Konon's weaker force. Konon probably welcomed Pollis' response, for in the meantime he received the substantial reinforcement of ninety ships from Cilicia and Phoenicia, including a contribution from the dynast of Sidon. These units were well equipped and experienced. These naval movements were clearly premeditated. It strains credulity to imagine that 130 triremes sailing from several different ports should simultaneously and by chance happen upon the same obscure harbor situated conveniently in the neighborhood of Rhodes. Konon planned to honor his promise to Artaxerxes to destroy the Spartan fleet, and Rhodes was the lure to draw the Spartans to their defeat.³⁴

Pollis promptly sailed against Konon at Kaunos, but found himself forced back to Rhodes. Konon then went over to the offensive. He sailed to the Chersonesos on the mainland immediately north of Rhodes, and his presence prompted a revolt there against the Spartans. Confused and overpowered, Pollis fled to Knidos before he could be trapped. As inglorious as his escape proved, he had at least spared his fleet to fight another day. The Rhodians in the meantime welcomed Konon as a deliverer. Events took a darker turn, when the Rhodians rose in a vicious, but brief, revolution quietly abetted by Konon. He himself avoided the bloodshed by returning to Kaunos, but left affairs in the hands of his two chief subordinates, Hieronymos and Nikodemos. On the heels of these events, the ships bringing Nepherites' grain from Egypt sailed into the harbor and into the hands of Konon and the Rhodians. The results proved quite satisfactory to the Persians and to all Greeks who opposed Sparta. Rhodes remained loyal to Athens for the next few decades. Konon had thus effortlessly secured one of the major strongpoints in the southeastern Aegean, thus denying the Spartans a strategically significant outpost. The victory at Rhodes also facilitated the joint operations of Konon's fleet with the contingents from Cilicia and Phoenicia.³⁵

³⁴ *Hell. Ox.* 12.2; Diod, 14, 79.4–7; Manetho, fr. 73; Justin 6.2.1; Bengtson, *SdA* II².221. Diodoros' Pharax for the *Hell. Ox.*'s Pollis is just another of Diodoros' errors; see Poralla, *Prosopographie*², 107. L. Büchner, *RE* 2A (1921) 55; F.K. Kienitz, *Die politische Geschichte Ägyptens vom 7. bis z. 4.Jh. v.d. Zt* (Berlin 1953) 79–80.

³⁵ *Hell. Ox.* 18.1–2; Androtion, *FGrH* 324 F46 (*apud* Paus. 6.7.4); Diod. 14.79.5–8; Paus. 5.24.7. Ephesos still in Spartan hands: Diod. 14.84.3. Diodoros confuses the Persian naval reinforcements of Konon's fleet. *Hell. Ox.* 12.2–3, specifically, if imperfectly, links it to the operations around Kaunos before the actions at Rhodes.

In 394 Peisandros relieved Pollis as admiral.³⁶ The Spartan situation was somewhat fragile. The fleet was exposed at Knidos, and any venture against the now reinforced Konon risked all. Another strike southwards in the absence of secure bases was dangerous. The situation was less forbidding to Konon. Secure at Rhodes and its environs, he nonetheless needed money enough to keep his fleet intact for the coming campaigning-season. He had as yet not destroyed the Spartan fleet, his principal goal, and could not allow his forces to be dissipated over the winter. As keenly as the Persians, he sought a decisive victory over the Spartans. Leaving Hieronymos and Nikodemos in command of the fleet, he sailed again to Kaunos to request further funding from Pharnabazos and Tithraustes. They forwarded him to Babylon, where he had an audience with Artaxerxes. He again urged the need for more money and supplies with which to destroy the Spartan fleet, to which the King readily agreed. He put Pharnabazos in chief command of the operations, just as Megabates was superior to Aristagoras in the siege of Naxos in 499. Their needs met in large part by the confiscated estate of Tissaphernes, Konon and Pharnabazos returned to the Aegean, only to find actual mutiny among the ranks. Lack of pay had made some of the crews fractious, but Konon

Chersonesos: Strabo 14.2.15. L. Büchner, *RE* 3 (1899) 2253; I.A.F. Bruce, *CQ* n.s. 11 (1961) 166–170; *Commentary*, 97–101.

³⁶ A word on the Sparta *nauarchia* is needed here. The *Hell. Ox.* 22.1, states that Cheirikrates assumed the position of admiral as successor of Pollis, but Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.29 names Peisandros, as does Diod. 14.83.5. Xenophon (*Hell.* 3.4.27) specifically states that Agesilaos had orders to appoint an admiral of his naval forces as part of a combined operation: Πείσανδρον δὲ τὸν τῆς γυναικὸς ἀδελφὸν ναύαρχον κατέστησε. This is clearly an appointment for a specific purpose. The ephors, however, normally appointed the *nauarchos*, who presumably fulfilled his traditional duties: see G. Busolt-H. Swoboda, *Griechische Staatskunde* II, (Munich 1926) 715–718. S. Link, *Der Kosmos Sparta* (Darmstadt 1994) 67, does not take a firm stand on the issue. A friend of Agesilaos and a participant in these events, Xenophon obviously knew the nature of Peisandros' position. Diod. 14.83.5–7, adds that Peisandros was the Spartan admiral at the battle of Knidos in 394. He could possibly have continued to operate independently as part of Agesilaos' command. The problem is at present perhaps incapable of solution. Nevertheless, the weight of the evidence strongly suggests that the Oxyrhynchian Historian is wrong. His is the only notice of Cheirikrates, who is not known to have done anything other than appear in this passage. Nor does he appear elsewhere in Spartan prosopography. See also Poralla, *Prosopographie*², 129, 190. Although it is convenient to equate Cheirikrates and Peisandros, as does Poralla, 167, the evidence more surely points to an error in the *Hell. Ox.* Neither Cartledge, *Agesilaos*, 218, nor Hamilton, *Agesilaos*, discusses the issue.

quickly restored order and prepared his men for the looming confrontation.³⁷

By 394 Konon and Pharnabazos were ready to contest Spartan control of the Aegean. Based at Loryma on the tip of the Knidian Chersonesos, they commanded more than ninety triremes from a good position to protect Rhodes from the northwest. Putting out from Knidos, Peisandros sailed past Loryma, from which a direct route to Rhodes opened before him. He instead doubled the Chersonesos to land at Physkos, which stands above a small bay to the northeast of Loryma. Notorious for his incompetence in naval matters, he perhaps feared to join battle near his enemy's base or thought that he could deploy his inferior force to better effect in these confined waters than at sea. Whatever his reasons, he had cut himself off from his own base, and put himself in danger of being trapped. Although Konon and Pharnabazos could not have planned this turn of events, they immediately grasped their opportunity. The two fleets met in open water. Peisandros' confronted Konon's squadron, which was supported by Pharnabazos' ships. The Spartan left wing fled at the outset, but Peisandros continued the fight to his death. His valor withal, his fleet suffered a decisive defeat in what has become known as the battle of Knidos. Its remnants reached the illusory safety of the shore. Although some Spartan ships escaped to Knidos, Konon captured fifty beached triremes and numbers of sailors. With its naval power broken, Sparta lost all hope of suzerainty in Asia.³⁸

Persian policy resulted in complete victory for a wide variety of reasons. First was the overwhelming superiority in men, material, and wealth, along with the very extent of the empire. The Persians also skilfully used a familiar and efficient organization to bring these advantages to bear against the enemy. Ample resources provided able leaders the opportunity for far-sighted planning that extended beyond a campaigning-season or even several. Nor did temporary Spartan advantages lead to permanent gains. Next came the undeniable superiority of the Persian leadership. Men like Tissaphernes,

³⁷ *Hell. Ox.* 9.3; 19.1–20; 22.3; Diod. 14.81.4–6, 83.4; Nepos *Con.* 4.1–3; Plut. *Ages.* 17.4; Justin 6.2.11–16. Megabates: Hdt. 5.33. Bruce, *Commentary* 127–132; Dandamaev, *A. Political History of the Achaemenid Empire* (Leiden 1989) 288–289. Hamilton, *SBV*, 228–229; March, *Historia* 46 (1997) 267–269.

³⁸ Xen. *Hell.* 4.3.11; Diod. 14.83.4–5; Nepos *Conon* 4.4; Plut. *Ages.* 17.4; Justin 6.4.9, 13. Beloch, *GG* III².1.76; Hamilton, *SBV*, 228–229.

Pharnabazos, and Tithraustes habitually commanded large, well-supplied forces over extensive spaces. They thought in imperial terms. They prevented all Spartan officers from Thibron to Agesilaos and Peisandros from inflicting any significant damage to their territories. Despite rivalries among them, these three never allowed the Spartans to land a significant blow against any of them. Agesilaos came closest to a limited victory at Sardeis, where he too soon met with failure. Even had he won the city, the Persians could afford to lose it, nor could he have held it anyway. Timely retreat, as events proved, was the unavoidable result of his efforts. The three Persians also recognized the value of time and money. Their use of truces, often coupled with subsidies, distracted the Spartans, who ventured off in vain and irrelevant campaigns. All the while, the Persians marshalled their might to deliver a decisive defeat on the hapless foe. By contrast, the Spartans enjoyed none of these advantages. Their first fault led to the ultimate failure. They had conceived of no general plan of how so to defeat the Persians that they could liberate the Greek cities. Lack of ideas was matched by poverty of organization, resources, and leadership in the field. Like vagabonds their armies wandered almost aimlessly across the countryside, while the Persians prepared the day of reckoning. Both the home government and its chief officers were too ill-equipped, too inexperienced, and too myopic to achieve their goals. The consequence was Spartan failure at every level and with it the failure of Spartan ambitions, for which the Spartans had none but themselves to blame.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE CORINTHIAN WAR (395–388 BC)

A. THE INCIDENT AT MT. PARNASSOS (395 BC)

Even before events culminated at the battle of Knidos in the eastern Aegean, the well-laid plans of Pharnabazos and Tithraustes had proceeded handsomely in the west. In 395 as part of their defense against Sparta they had decided to carry the war to Greece itself. As has been seen earlier, Thebes, Corinth, and Athens had long been hostile to Spartan aspirations. Argos, of course was an inveterate enemy of its southern neighbor. Pharnabazos and Tithraustes formed a plan to send Timokrates of Rhodes with fifty talents to bribe the leading political figures in these cities to foment war against Sparta. The sum was hardly princely. Tithraustes had earlier given 220 talents to Konon and thirty to Agesilaos. Despite its leanness, the bribe sufficed to entice its recipients to do what they had already desired. The amount of the sum is actually less important than the knowledge that they had both the might and the encouragement of the Persians behind them. No one knows whether Timokrates also brought with him word of Konon's nascent fleet, but in this situation silence on that subject would cause surprise. It would rather further animate them to confront Sparta. It opened the prospect of their striking a blow against the enemy while Agesilaos still wandered around Ionia. Timokrates found eager takers for Tithraustes' gold. In Thebes he found an anti-Spartan group led by Hismenias, Androkleidas, Galaxidoros, and Antitheos, who were opposed by a pro-Spartan group, which included Leontiades, Asias, and Koiratadas. They gladly accepted money that could be applied against their foreign and domestic enemies. In Corinth Timolaos and Polyanthes likewise agreed to Timokrates' plan. They represent the degree of Corinthian disaffection towards Sparta. They were both leading oligarchic politicians who had fought alongside the Spartans against Athens in the Peloponnesian War. The collusion of such valiant and staunch commanders stands proof that even theretofore loyal and influential figures among a major ally felt betrayed by recent Spartan

policy. Both these men had developed pro-Argive sympathies, a telling fact in these circumstances. In Argos Kylon, Timoleon, and Sodamas naturally received Timokrates warmly. Athens also proved hospitable to Tithraustes' gold. Claims that Athens held aloof from Timokrates' beguilement fall before the alacrity with which Epikrates and Kephalos embraced it. In fact, Athenian hands had never winced at the touch of Persian gold. Despite the undeniable prominence of these men, the situation at Thebes proves that support for them was not unanimous. Yet the previous policies of these states and the paucity of Timokrates' money prove that the majority of their citizenry eagerly inclined against Sparta.¹

Although the four states had joined in a common cause, they had as yet established no formal organization to shape their policy and marshal their resources. Their deliberations at the outset were informal but effective. They must have decided where and how to foment war with Sparta and how each would respond to the expected reaction. How they laid their plans, however, remains unknown. That withal, none can doubt the success of their decision. The Thebans urged that they cynically take advantage of a long-nourished quarrel between the Phokians and the Lokrians over some disputed territory. The land lay between the Lokrian city of Opous, the modern Atalanti, and the Phokian cities of Hyampolis and Abai—some seventeen kilometers—rising gradually between the slopes of the ridges to a rolling valley with Mt. Parnassos clearly visible in the background. The route lacks noticeable natural obstacles and any significant geographical features that could serve as a boundary. The traveller does not know that he has walked from Lokris to Phokis until he reaches the sanctuary of Artemis and Apollo at Kalapodion. The land is suitable for sheep and cattle, and the entire area is so lacking in distinguishing features that disputes over ownership of parts of it are readily understandable. From Kalapodion the way runs easily into the Kephisos valley. The upper reaches of this shallow valley are the best candidate for the disputed land. Both peoples normally

¹ *Hell. Ox.* 10.2, 5; 20.1; 21.1; *Xen. Hell.* 3.5.1–2; 4.21; *Plut. Artox.* 20.4; *Lys.* 27.3; *Ages.* 15.8; *Mor.* 211B; *Paus.* 3.9; *Polyain.* 1.48.3; 7.16.2. Athens and Persian gold: *Thuc.* 2.7; 8.53; 56.82. *Isokrates* (14.27,31), with his usual sagacity, attributes the war to Theban hubris. Bonamente, *Studio sulle Elleniche di Osseerinco*, 103–135; M. Cook, *TAPA* 118 (1988) 57–85; Shipley, *Plutarch's Agesilaos*, 208–210; see J. Buckler, in C.J. Tuplin, ed., *The World of Xenophon* (Stuttgart forthcoming) with earlier bibliography.

grazed their sheep there; and because the boundary was unrecognizable, one side or the other often seized the sheep that it considered guilty of trespass. The people involved usually resolved these differences by arbitration.²

The Thebans persuaded their new colleagues to implement a plan whereby Hismenias and Androkleidas induced their Lokrian allies to levy a fine on the Phokians over the disputed land. The Lokrians agreed for the obvious reason that Theban military support would free them from the constraints of arbitration. They did as they were bade, and the Phokians predictably retaliated by a thrust into Lokris in which they seized considerable property. The Theban plan had succeeded admirably. When the Lokrians appealed to the Thebans for the expected support, the two Theban leaders persuaded their countrymen to ravage Phokis in retaliation. Nearly overwhelmed and with arbitration no option, the Phokians sent an embassy to Sparta pleading for relief. The Spartans welcomed such unhappy news for its pretext to justify a campaign against Thebes. They had longed to humble Thebes, and now they could do so without any appearance of aggression. Even if they sent a delegation to the Thebans ordering them to desist, they nevertheless simultaneously mustered their army for a campaign against them. Thinking that the Thebans had played into their hands, they little realized that they themselves had fallen into the trap.³

The Spartans devised an ambitious and somewhat complicated strategy for their attack on Boiotia. They planned to order King Pausanias and their Peloponnesian allies for a march northwards, while sending Lysandros to Malis in the north to assemble forces there from which he could strike southwards. They decided that Haliartos would serve as their immediate point of a combined attack and set a specific date for the assault. The capture of Haliartos, strongly placed on the main road between Thebes and western Boiotia, would deprive the Thebans of half of their native support. Yet the venture entailed hazards and uncertainties, including the problems of timing, the difficulties of combined operations, and the lack of communications between the two forces. At the risk of belaboring the obvious, the two Spartan armies would be separated by

² Personal observations of 29 May 1983; 20 October 1998; 22 August 2000.

³ See n. 1.

a great distance with no means of communications between them. If one army encountered a serious difficulty, the other had no way of knowing it. Any number of unforeseen obstacles could render the date of rendezvous impossible, which increased the problems of successful, co-ordinated movements. The differing nature of the two armies could also complicate matters. The Peloponnesian army, a body of hoplites, light-armed, and cavalry, had long served together in traditional warfare. Lysandros' force would be a rather motley group of troops of indifferent quality who had never before operated together. A successful integration of such arms was hardly simple. Lastly, the Spartans must surely have known the political inclinations of the Athenians, who could be expected to intervene on behalf of the Thebans. If so, and if anything detained either of the Spartan armies, the Thebans and Athenians could defeat them piecemeal.

While the Spartans prepared for battle, their four principal enemies laid their own plans. They concluded joint alliances. Details of only the Atheno-Theban alliance are known, but they illustrate the caution with which they all acted. Having provoked the Spartans, they were unwilling yet to wage open war with them. Rather, they were content to stand on the defensive. The Thebans sent an embassy to Athens seeking a formal alliance, not just a gentlemen's agreement. In the ensuing debate, Thrasyboulos strongly favored the proposal. In this particular case, Spartan victory at Thebes would leave Athens open to attack. The city stood in even greater peril because Piraeus still lacked walls. The Thebans at least offered them the opportunity, risky though it was, to decide whether to bid for their previous prominence or remain subservient to Sparta. In short, having made their inclinations clear to all, the Athenians needed the Thebans as the latter the former. Having already cast the die anyway, they concluded a formal defensive alliance whereby an attack on either party would evoke armed help from the other. Not acting alone, they concluded alliances with Corinth and Argos to form a grand coalition. They next established a common council at Corinth charged with drawing plans and making general arrangements for the impending war. They acted quickly to send envoys to various cities in an effort to broaden the alliance. Those in the Peloponnesos rejected these advances owing to their support and in some cases their fear of Sparta. Success crowned their efforts among the Akarnanians, Ambrakiots, and the Thracian Chalkidians. The Euboians and Leukadians likewise joined them with alacrity. Tithraustes had

done his work well in having animated a union larger than he had anticipated. The very numbers of adherents to the alliance testifies to the widespread discontent with Spartan conduct, and promised that the maintenance of Spartan ascendancy in Greece would be by no means simple or easy.⁴

The alliance presented the Spartans with a formidable challenge. They encountered a growing and unsuspected threat in Greece proper. Their only other hope was Agesilaos, who was off in Asia Minor, beset by land and sea. Between him and Sparta stood the Chalkidians under Olynthos, but once past them no serious opposition challenged him until he reached Boiotia. The Spartans at home were largely bottled up in the Peloponnesos, owing to the opposition of strategically important Corinth and Argos. At most they could use Achaian ports to reach Kirrha but at the risk of attack from the Corinthian and Theban fleets. Lastly, the Spartans could no longer draw upon Persian money, leaving them overall in an unenviable position.

Confronted with these obstacles, the Spartans pressed ahead to a quick victory in Boiotia, which alone offered them the best hope of ultimate success. When ready, they set their forces in motion. Lysandros duly travelled to Phokis, probably by way of Kirrha to Herakleia Trachinia, a Spartan colony, from which he rallied the Oitaians, Malians, and Ainianians, all inhabitants of the Sperchios valley west of Thermopylai. His position enabled him to move southwards with his newly-assembled levy up a hard slope to the modern Dema pass at Kato Dio Vouno to Kytinion, situated at modern Gravia, a strategically vital city located on a low, isolated hill that dominates the surrounding plain. The route then led him southeastwards through the wide Gravia pass to Phokian Lilaia, some fourteen kilometers away. Thence through the Kephisos valley he enjoyed an easy, indeed pleasant, march through friendly territory. This road debouches immediately upon Chaironeia in Boiotia, past which he continued to Orchomenos. Never friends of the Thebans, the Orchomenians welcomed Lysandros to the extent of contributing their contingent to his army. His way next took him westwards to the main road running

⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.8–15; Andok. 3.24–25; Lysias 16.13; Philochoros, *FGrH* 328 F148; Bengtson, *SdA* II².223. S. Accame, *Ricerche intorno alla Guerra Corinzia* (Naples 1951) 34–44; S. Perlman, *CQ* 58 (1964) 72; R. Seager, *JHS* 87 (1967) 96–98; V.J. Gray, *CSCA* 12 (1979) 107–112; H.D. Westlake, *Phoenix* 39 (1985) 119–133; G.J. Szemler, *AncW* 27 (1996) 99–100; Buckler, in Tuplin, ed. *The World of Xenophon*.

from Lebadeia to Thebes. He lingered long enough unsuccessfully to assail Lebadeia. Moving farther eastwards, he met with no resistance until he reached Haliartos, which refused to submit to him.⁵

Haliartos occupies a hill just outside today's village of the same name. Lying to the north of the modern motor road, which follows the line of the ancient way, the site covers a low hill with a very broad, fairly level terrace between road and acropolis. Here spreads the lower city both to the east and west and from the akropolis northwards to Lake Kopais. Only the southern quarter figured in the looming events. Here the slope of the hill is very gentle. The line of the circuit-wall is still easily visible, but of late the stones, long buried, have disappeared for contemporary uses. The wall did not stand on steep ground, but rather just where the land begins to rise somewhat. To the west of Haliartos rises Petra, a rock reminiscent of Gibraltar, that restricts passage from that direction. Immediately east of the city stands a similar, but lower, hill, which constricts the land between the foothills of Mt. Helikon and the circuit-walls. Within this bowl opens a small trapezoidal plain with ample room for two large armies. Haliartos stood as the last natural barrier from the west into the plains of southern Boiotia.⁶

While at Lebadeia, Lysandros sent a letter to Pausanias, then in Plataia, that he would arrive at Haliartos at dawn on the following day. This letter never reached Pausanias. Enemy scouts intercepted it, and the intervening night enabled the Thebans to send an advanced force to the endangered city. The main army followed westwards to bivouac to its east. When Lysandros arrived upon the scene, he encamped on a hill directly opposite the city. No free-standing hill exists in this area, but on the ridge south of the road rise two foothills that are out-riders of Mt. Helikon. That to the west is a flattened hillock with gently sloping sides easy of access and large enough to

⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.6–16; Plut. *Lys.* 28.2; Paus 3.5.3; see also Strabo 1.3.20–21; 9.3.1, 4.10. Lysandros' route: Dem. 18.152; Philochoros, *FGrH* 328 F56; personal observations of 9 October 1998; 15–19 August 2000. The Spartans retained control of Orchomenos: Xen. *Hell.* 4.3.15.

⁶ Haliartos is described from various visits of 14–16 August 1980, 17 July 1994, 9–10 October 1998, and 15–16 August 2000. See also Strabo 9.2.30; Plut. *Mor.* 578A; Armenidas, *FGrH* 378 F7; Paus. 9.295, 32.5–33.1; W.M. Leake, *Travels in Northern Greece*, II (London 1835) 206–213; E. Kirsten, *RE* 19 (1937) 871–872; P.W. Wallace, *Strabo's Description of Boiotia* (Heidelberg 1979) 117–120; J.M. Fossey, *Topography and Population of Ancient Boiotia* (Chicago 1988) 301–308; Lauffer, *Griechenland*, 254–255.

serve as the camp of an army. It commands the road between Lebadeia and Thebes. Lysandros had now only to follow his orders until Pausanias could bring up the main army. Dawn found invader and defender in their places, while Lysandros awaited Pausanias. The sun rose along with Lysandros' impatience, until he disobeyed his orders and marched against the city. He urged the people to surrender, his appeal surely supported by the blandishments of the Orchomenians. The Haliartians, braced by the Thebans within, refused, whereupon Lysandros attacked the wall, the scene of which was probably the stretch, some 10,000 meters in length that bordered the modern motor road. Having given his orders, Lysandros was surprised by a Theban sortie from the city, in which he and his immediate companions were killed. Meanwhile, the main Theban body still outside the city marched northwards from the road, passed around the city along its Kopaic side to fall upon the Spartan rear at the spring called Kissoura. The onset of the main Theban army broke the remainder of the Spartan left flank. Panic followed Lysandros' death, and his confused troops fled back up the foothills to their camp, hotly pursued by the Thebans. The survivors reached the heights from which they easily defended themselves. Casualty accounts vary from 200 on each side to 1000 Phokians and 300 Thebans. Certainty is impossible. Yet the mere fact that Lysandros' army had been repulsed and then caught in a disadvantageous position indicates that losses were much heavier on the Spartan side, a point supported by the nocturnal flights of the Phokians and their allies. The battle was a clear-cut Theban victory, owing partly to Theban valor and Lysandros' impetuosity.⁷

Meanwhile, as noted Pausanias, had entered Boiotia probably by way of the hard road between Pagai in the northern Megarid past Aigosthena to Plataia. This route, although somewhat difficult, at least avoided the main road northwards protected by the Athenian Eleutherai. From Plataia to Thespiiai he continued along a less

⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.18–21; Plut. *Lys.* 28.6, 10–11; Nepos *Lys.* 3–4; Paus. 3.5.3; 9.32.5. A minor topographical note on Kissoura: on 17 July 1994 a native denied knowledge of a spring in the immediate area. Later in the day I found a contemporary concrete channel at the foot of the lower slopes of Mt. Helikon opposite Haliartos. The water flowed from a spring that fits Xenophon's testimony, and is thus my candidate for Kissoura. See also F. Bölte, *RE* 7 (1912) 2241–2244; Fossey, *Ancient Boiotia*, 301–303.

demanding road to Haliartos. Upon arriving, he learned that the odds were against him. Lysandros was dead, his force defeated and many flown, and Thrasyboulos on the scene at the head of the Athenian army. He had arrived at a battlefield that was already lost to him. Perplexed and hesitant, he assembled his junior officers for a conference. When they considered the strength of the enemy position and the flight of Lysandros' army, when they realized that their own allies served without enthusiasm, that the enemy's cavalry was stronger than theirs, that they were out-numbered, and that the dead lay near the wall, they decided to conclude a truce with the Thebans. They agreed to give up the fallen, but only when the Spartans retired from Boiotia. The Spartans agreed, gathered their dead, and marched away. The Thebans erected a trophy before the gates of Haliartos, and centuries later in the time of Hadrian Lysandros' cenotaph could still be seen there. The Spartans, true to their word to the Thebans, buried him in the land of Panopeus by the road leading from Delphi to Chaironeia. The Thebans had won the first battle of the Corinthian War.⁸

On the face of it, the disturbance at Haliartos proved a small affair soon to be eclipsed by later and larger battles. Nonetheless, it proved several things at the outset of the war. It demonstrated that the allies could win in the field. Lysandros and his men were easily defeated, and the main Spartan field-army retreated from the field without even daring to challenge the allies. The larger alliance posed a genuine and greater threat to Spartan ascendancy in Greece. Although Corinth was too weak to oppose Pausanias, it refused to join him, and Argos remained stubbornly defiant. Haliartos further demonstrated both the cohesion of the alliance and its ability to work together harmoniously and successfully.

Shortly after the battle, the allies took the offensive in the north, where they were conveniently invited to intervene in Thessalian affairs. Thessaly had a long and unhappy history of internal strife, and events in 395 proved no exception. The problem lay in the

⁸ Pausanias' route: Plut. *Lys.* 28.2: Πανσανίας μὲν κύκλῳ περιελθὼν διὰ τοῦ Κιθαιρώνοιο ἐμβαλεῖν ἔμελλεν εἰς τὴν Βοιωτίαν, which rules out the direct road past Eleutherai; personal observations of the route from 11 October 1998. Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.21–24; Plut *Lys.* 29.1–40; *Mor.* 408A–B; 578B; Paus. 9.32.5. Beloch, *GG* III².1.68–70; *pace* Hamilton, *SBV*, 206–207; J.-F. Bommelear, *Lysandre de Sparte* (Paris 1981) 193–196.

ambition of the dynasts of the major cities to seize supreme power over the others. At the time, Medios, the tyrant, was at war with Lykophron, the tyrant of Pherai, traditionally one of the strongest of the Thessalian cities. Medios appealed to the common council of the Allies, as they will henceforth be styled, for assistance, a plea which they used for their own ends. The matter was neither as simple nor as altruistic as it may seem at first sight. The Spartans still maintained a garrison in Pharsalos and friendly relations with Herakleia, giving them at least a tenuous hold on the area. Now with Lysandros dead and Pausanias back in the Peloponnesos, Medios' request gave the Allies the ideal opportunity to crush the Spartans isolated there. Once in the neighborhood Hismenias' force could extract revenge from the Herakleots and their allies who had served with the Spartans at Haliartos. Not surprisingly, the council honored Medios' request by sending 2000 Theban and Argive troops under the command of Hismenias to settle several different scores.⁹

Upon their arrival, Medios duly led Hismanias' contingent to Pharsalos, which fell handily to them. They seized the Spartan garrison, and sold the inhabitants into slavery, the Spartans probably along with them. They had no reason to strengthen the enemy. Having fulfilled his assigned duty, Hismenias led his command to Herakleia, to which he was admitted surreptitiously by night. They killed all of the Spartans whom they caught, but allowed the other Peloponnesians to leave unharmed with their possessions. Here is the first sign that Hismenias wished to divide the Peloponnesians from the Spartans, an objective that future Theban politicians would pursue throughout the rest of the fourth century. He next invited the exiles whom the Spartans had banished to return to their homes and doubtless to the governance of their city. He had eliminated the most powerful friend that Sparta then had in northern Greece, and in the process had won virtual control of Thermopylai. Yet he was far from done. He left the Argives to garrison Herakleia, while he continued to deal with unsettled matters. The reckoning with the Ainianians and doubtless their neighbors who had so recently trod on Boiotian soil did not challenge the diplomatic skills of a man who stood at the fore of a victorious army. After he had marshalled another 4000 troops, he set himself against the Phokians, his primary

⁹ Diod. 14.82.5-7; see also 14.38.4-5. Diodoros omits the battle of Haliartos from his narrative.

enemy. From Herakleia he moved along the coast through Thermopylai before turning southwards over Mt. Kallidromon to Naryx, situated somewhat west and above the modern village of Rhenginion. The city occupied a narrow spur, the eastern, northern, and western sides of which drop precipitously into deep gorges, which make access to the site exceedingly difficult. Only from the south was it vulnerable to attack. It stood in an excellent position to command a route up the Boagrios valley to Thronion, still in Phokian hands, and to the Kephisos valley. Possession of Naryx, together with that of Lokrian Argolas, the modern Mendenitsa, gave the Thebans complete control of communications between Phokis and the Aegean. Hismenias' position was too menacing for the Phokians to ignore, and in response the Lakonian Lakisthenes led a Phokian army to dislodge him. The two forces fought a hard and long battle, which the Thebans won. Hismenias' men pursued the fugitives back to Phokis, inflicting heavy casualties along the way but not without suffering losses of their own. Afterwards both sides returned home with the Thebans able justly to claim that from Haliartos to Naryx they had wrought a considerable victory from great peril.¹⁰

As mentioned above, the primary goal of this campaign was to punish the Phokians and their northern neighbors who had aided the Spartans at Haliartos. To that end the Thebans and Argives did a handsome job of inflicting serious damage to them all. A friendly foothold in Thessaly provided a most welcome additional benefit. These operations took most of the northerners out of the war altogether. The acquisition of Herakleia Trachinia was a major achievement, for it not only tightened allied control of this vital guard to Thermopylai but it also denied it from Spartan allies in the area. Hismenias' victory at Naryx was a significant blow to the Phokians, especially after their losses at Haliartos. This campaign also confirms the council's willingness to undertake bold ventures. The common council was originally established to oppose Sparta, but now it extended its attention to those who had taken Sparta's side. Its confidence showed allied willingness now to take the war to Sparta.

¹⁰ Diod. 14.82.8–10. Lakisthenes: although Vogel prints Ἀλκισθένης in the Teubner text, all of the manuscripts write Λακισθένης, a very appropriate name for a Lakonian. This is yet another example of Dindorf's penchant for unnecessary emendation. Poralla, *Prosopographie*², s.v. Lakisthenes, rejects it without comment. Argolas: personal observations of 29–30 May 1983; Naryx: 13–15 July 1986.

B. THE BIG BATTLES: NEMEA RIVER AND KORONEIA (394 BC)

The defeat at Haliartos and Hismenias' successful campaign in the north prompted the Spartan government to take the Allied threat with all seriousness. Pausanias they condemned to death, but he fled to Tegea, where they were content to let him die in disgrace. They decided to strike the Allies at their seat in Corinth, itself a formidable challenge, for which they began to make considerable preparations. While gathering their wits and forces, they sent Epikydidas to summon Agesilaos from Asia Minor. In the meantime they would muster the full might of the Peloponnesian League. When the Spartan messenger arrived, he found Agesilaos mired in desultory operations against Pharnabazos. Having failed to defeat the Persians, even some of his own eastern allies had deserted him. Such were the circumstances in which Epikydidas found him. He fully explained to Agesilaos the state of affairs in Greece, and delivered his orders for Agesilaos' immediate return. The king obeyed. Although he and others thought that he was about to conquer Asia, the summons actually saved him from eventual defeat. He had neither the strategical ability nor the necessary supplies even to reach Sousa, much less Persepolis. Sardeis after all had proved beyond his reach. Although disliking the news, Agesilaos dutifully assembled his men to tell them of his orders. Many of his own soldiers preferred to remain in Asia than return to Europe, there to fight other Greeks. In order to bring with him as many of his best men, he resorted to various devices to inveigle them to join him. He appointed Euxenos as harmost of Asia to remain in his place; and when all was ready, he took the same route westwards that Xerxes had previously taken. For him the great crusade was over. The Greeks in Asia remained as securely under Persian control as the day when Thibron first set foot there.¹¹

Meanwhile the Spartan ephors called out the ban, placing the army under the command of Aristodemos. The Allies too drew up their plans. Timolaos of Corinth advised a bold, direct strike on Sparta itself, a wise suggestion baffled only because Spartan preparations were too far advanced for this strategy to succeed. The Allies also discussed the leadership of the combined forces, including the

¹¹ Xen. *Hell.* 4.1–2.8; *Ages.* 1.36; Diod. 14.83.1; Plut. *Ages.* 15.2.4–8; Paus. 3.9.12; Nepos *Ages.* 4.1–4; Justin 6.2.17, 5.8–12.

decision of how deep the phalanx should be. Since as a rule the hegemon was an officer in whose territory the battle would be fought, the commanding general was most probably a Corinthian, perhaps Timolaos himself. These things decided, the Allied army marched into the area of Nemea, while the Spartans advanced on Sikyon. Since the Spartans picked up units from Tegea and Mantinea along the way, they doubtless took the usual route northwards from Mantinea, which leads to Alea and thence straight to Sikyon. When the Allies realized that the Spartans were even then on the march, they retraced their steps; and since they were closer to Corinth than were the Spartans, they returned in good time to secure the safety of the city. Thence they deployed westwards along the coast. Once the Spartans reached Corinthian territory by way of Epieikeia, a place still unlocated, they received the unwelcome attention of Allied archers and light-armed troops. Commanding the heights on the eastern side of the Spartan line of march, the enemy inflicted numerous casualties. When, however, the Spartans had descended to the flat coastal plain of the Corinthian Gulf, they marched through it unharmed, ravaging it along the way. The Allies also entered the plain from the opposite direction, and encamped in front of a *charadra* (or mountain stream) of the Nemea River. Having advanced eastwards to within about three kilometers of the Allied camp, the Spartans encamped and remained quiet.¹²

The two armies, neither of which knew the location of the other, paused briefly to assess the situation. Although the site of the battle is still the subject of some debate, its location can be fixed with some certainty. The ravine of the modern Rachiani, the bed of the Nemea River, appears in the lower slopes of the mountains above the coast. Its bed, which is broad and often dry, offers a comfortable and hardly noticeable descent. Except for trees and shrubs virtually nothing

¹² Xen. *Hell.* 4.2.14–15; Diod. 14.83.2; Justin 6.4.11–13, who has confused the sequence of events, as had Nepos *Ages.* 5. Route of the Spartan army to Mantinea: J. Buckler, *The Theban Hegemony, 371–362 BC* (Cambridge, MA 1980) 78–81, 293–294. From Mantinea to the coast, not personally examined, see Pritchett, *Studies in Ancient Greek Topography*, II 79–81. Epieikeia: Pritchett locates it “somewhere between the city of Sikyon and the outlet of the river Rachiani”. G. Strasburger, trans., *Xenophons Hellenika* (Munich and Zurich 1988), without citing evidence, places it at the point where the Nemea River comes out at the coastal plain. Repeated personal efforts to find any remains in the area proved unsuccessful. See also Y.A. Pikoulas, *Road Network and Defense from Corinth to Argos and Arkadia* (Athens 1995).

today impedes walking, but the land is so flat that the trees reduce visibility to virtually nothing. The stream reaches the Corinthian Gulf at the modern village of Kato Assos. In its lower reaches the bed is broad and its banks about a meter and a half high. The Allies encamped on the eastern bank of the river with the Spartans not far distant on the western side. The steep banks of the streambed would have prevented any major hoplite or cavalry movements to the south. The battle then was fought in the plain west of the river and north of its bluffs.¹³

One morning in April or May 394 the Allied army moved out of its camp against the Spartans. Uncertainty surrounds their numbers, but the Allies probably slightly out-numbered the Spartans, perhaps by a margin of 25,500 to 20,800. As the Allies deployed, the Thebans originally held the left wing of the line, yielding pride of place to the Athenians on the right. The Thebans soon objected to this organization, as some said because they feared the Spartans who would likely oppose them in battle. The Spartans traditionally held the right of their own formation, so there could be some truth to the accusation. By virtue of hindsight this redeployment of forces is intelligible inasmuch as the Spartans out-numbered the Thebans by a thousand men, whereas the Athenians were their numerical equals. Yet doubt suggests that no one on either side actually knew the precise strength of the other that day. Apart from those of the Athenians and Thebans, the stations of the other contingents are imperfectly known. The Argives stood beside the Athenians, and presumably the Corinthians took station next to the Argives. The Thebans, as mentioned, now held the extreme right of the line with other Boiotian levies extending towards the center, probably meeting the Corinthians there. The Athenians and Thebans also deployed 1400 cavalry, presumably ranged in their usual position on the flanks. Yet given the bluffs bounding the southern edge of the battlefield, it is now difficult to imagine why hoplites would have needed any assistance there. Cavalry had far greater latitude on the northern flank near the sea. Although the horsemen shared in the casualties of combat, their part

¹³ Xen. *Hell.* 4.2.15, 19: since the Allies, whose position was on the eastern side of the river, moved against the Spartans on the west, they must have crossed it in their advance. Aischin. 2.168; Plato *Menexenos* 245E; Dem. 20.52; Diod. 14.82.2. Pritchett, *Topography*, II.82–83; J. Wiseman, *The Land of the Ancient Corinthians* (Göteborg 1978) 106; personal observations of 28–29 July 1994 and 14 October 1998.

in it seems to have been minor. The Nemea River would prove above all to be a contest of hoplites. On the Allied side they drew up sixteen-deep, except for the Thebans, who even further deepened their line. Their new dispositions made, the Allies advanced on the Spartan position.¹⁴

At first the Spartans did not notice the advance of the Allies because of the bushy land. Only when the Argives struck up the paean did they realize that the enemy was upon them. They at once prepared for battle, and their hoplites took up the positions that their officers had already assigned them. With admirable precaution the Spartans had previously given thought to how best to react in an emergency. The disposition of the Spartan line is also largely unknown except that the Spartans held their right, next to them stretched the Tegeans, beyond them other allies, notably the men of Pellene, and the Achaians anchored the left. The two armies advanced against each other until they were less than some sixty-four meters apart. At that point the Spartans stopped, sacrificed a goat to Artemis Agrotera, and then led the charge against the enemy. In the Allied advance the Thebans veered to the right to overlap the Achaians opposite. This yawing of the line was at least as old as the Peloponnesian War. Rather than be detached from the rest of the line the Athenians followed, even though they knew the danger of being out-flanked. Like the Thebans, the Spartans drifted to the right during their advance. They extended their wing so far beyond that of the enemy that only six tribes of the Athenians confronted the Spartans. The other four faced the Tegeans. When the armies came to grips, the Thebans and other Boiotian units crushed the Achaians, and the Thespians overwhelmed the Pelleneans opposite, although at some cost. The Argives drove back their opponents, leaving the entire left and center of the Spartan line broken and in flight. The four Athenian tribes likewise defeated the Tegeans opposite them and began their pursuit. Despite the spectre of defeat the Spartans advanced against the Athenians, first out-flanking them and then wheeling around them to roll up not only their line but also that of their allies. They

¹⁴ *IG II²* 5221–5222, 6217, see also Paus. 1.29.11. Numbers: Xen. *Hell.* 4.2.16–18; *Ages.* 2.2; Diod. 14.83.1. G. Grote, *History of Greece* IX. (New York 1868) 303 n. 1; Meyer, *GdA* V⁶:231 n. 2; Underhill, *Commentary*, 125. Kromayer, *AS* IV:595–596; J.K. Anderson, *Military Theory and Practice in the Age of Xenophon* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1970) 141–150; J.F. Lazenby, *The Spartan Army* (Warminster 1985) 135–143.

speeded along their new front even before the four victorious Athenian units could return from their chase. The Argives were not so fortunate. Having just returned from their pursuit, they encountered the Spartans on their exposed flank and soon suffered heavy losses. The same fate awaited the Corinthians, when their turn came. They suffered as the others. The Spartan contingent alone had routed the entire Allied army. The remnants of the defeated fled to the walls of Corinth, but were shut out of the city. It is unknown whether a group within was opposed to the venture or whether the Corinthians simply panicked at the magnitude of the defeat. The Spartans had won an awesome tactical victory, and the very future of the Alliance was now in question. To the latter stout walls proved at least a momentary answer, for the vanquished army could shelter under them and the distraught citizenry find safety within. Losses among the combatants supposedly numbered 1100 among the Spartans and their followers and 2800 among the Allies, a reasonable enough figure.¹⁵

Although the Spartan victory at Nemea River was a stunning tactical success, it had little effect on the strategical situation of the combatants. In purely military terms the Spartans had mauled, but had not destroyed, the Allied army. At the same time, their own allies had suffered severely. Even with the best will and valor the victorious Spartan army could not have taken Corinth. Though very badly shaken, the Alliance remained intact. Not one of the Allies capitulated after the battle. Even if some Corinthians were unsettled by the results of the battle, the majority remained loyal to the cause. To judge by coming events, their success in sustaining defeat may perhaps have given some of them renewed hope in further resistance. A visible sign that the war was about to descend into stalemate came from the Allied decision to make Corinth their base. The Spartans responded by making Sikyon theirs, an admission that they could not win the war even by such one grand victory. They chose to await the arrival of Agesilaos.¹⁶

¹⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 4.2.18–23, 3.1–2; Ephoros, *FCrH* 70 F209; Dem. 20.52–53; Diod. 14.82.10–83.2; Plut. *Ages.* 16.6. Tendency of a phalanx to veer to the right: Thuc. 5.71. Shelter of friendly walls: see Xen. *Hell.* 5.3.5. Anderson, *Military Theory*, 141–150; Pritchett, *Topography* II.83–84; Lazenby, *Spartan Army*, 199 n. 2.

¹⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 4.4.1.

While events were being played out near Corinth, Agesilaos began his march back to Greece unopposed by the Persians whose retreat was the essential point of their policy. What the satraps had failed to do in ten years of fighting, they had now accomplished with fifty talents. Agesilaos realized as much, when he said the the King was driving him out of Asia with 10,000 “archers”, a reference to the daric, the Persian coin with the figure of the King on the obverse portrayed as an archer. Agesilaos made his march around the rim of the Aegean in about thirty days, his route coinciding with the line of the later Roman Via Egnatia. He crossed Thrace without trouble, except for some ineffectual sabre-rattling from the Trallians. When he reached Amphipolis, Derkylidas met him with news of the victory at the Nemea River. Agesilaos met with no opposition until he arrived in Thessaly. There he found the Larisaïans, Krannonians, Skotoussians, and Pharsalians, all allies of the Thebans, prepared to resist his advance. The Pheraïans, isolated and enemies of the others, apparently remained aloof. The significance of the Thessalian response was two-fold. First, the Thessalians were the finest horsemen in Greece, and their land provided them with ample, suitable terrain for cavalry attacks. Next all four cities straddled this route southwards. The Thessalians harassed him, but he continued his march in a hollow square, much as Xenophon had done during the Anabasis. The Thessalian cavalry slowed his progress and inflicted some casualties, but were unable to deliver a serious blow to him. Nonetheless, they slowed him, thereby buying time for the Allies to the south to prepare their defense. From Thessaly his march was uneventful until he reached the border of Boiotia. Thence he marched along the main road towards Thebes, taking the same route as had Lysandros on his way to Haliartos. He stopped at Koroneia.¹⁷

The plain of Koroneia is dominated by the akropolis of the city, situated on the northernmost of a chain of hills that descend from Mt. Helikon. Immediately below the akropolis on the west flow the Phalaros River and farther to the west the Herkyna. Below the eastern side of the akropolis runs the Kuraïos River. To the north of

¹⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 4.3.1–9; *Ages.* 2.1–5; Diod. 14.83.2; Plut. *Ages.* 16.1–4. Time of march: Xen. *Ages.* 2.1; Nepos *Ages.* 4.4; compare the march of Xerxes, though with a much larger force: Hdt. 8.51; Nepos *Them.* 5.2. Hollow square: Xen. *Anab.* 3.4.19–23; 3.4.43; *Hell.* 4.3.41.




Fig. 4. The Battlefield of Koroneia.

the akropolis spreads a level plain, now deeply plowed, which the three streams cut into western and eastern parts. At the foot of the hills they are hardly more than rivulets, but they all cut much deeper channels as they approach the now-drained Lake Kopais. They are lined with dense foliage and undergrowth that effectively block visibility across the plain. The land between the rivulets would have prevented easy movement of hoplite armies. The fields on the eastern side of the plain are likewise level. On this side is a rill, dry in summer, but heavily overgrown and marked by steep banks. Lastly, the Triton River, which again would have caused problems to heavy-armed troops, flows by Alalkomenai. Between Alalkomenai and Koroneia stood the sanctuary of Itonian Athena, past which flowed the Kuraios River. Its site is doubtless the modern chapel of Metamorphosis, a fifteen-minute walk north from the modern railroad station of Alalkomenai. Given the evidence of topography, the only logical place for the battlefield is the terrain bounded on the north by the limit of Lake Kopais, or more precisely to the north of the modern Alalkomenai railroad station, on the east by Petra, on the south by the foothills of Mt. Helikon, and on the west by the easternmost of the three streams.¹⁸

On 14 August 394 BC, the date confirmed by a partial solar eclipse, Agesilaos prepared for battle. He had under his command a varied army consisting of a mora and a half of Spartan troops, *neodamodeis* from Sparta, the mercenary contingent commanded by Herippidas, troops from Asia, Orchomenos, and Phokis. Agesilaos had far more peltasts than had the Allies, but the number of cavalry was about equal on both sides. Against him were arrayed the Thebans, Athenians, Argives, Corinthians, Ainianians, Euboians, and both of the East Lokrian peoples. Veteran soldiers filled the ranks of both sides. Yet general fear prevailed among the Athenians, which is hardly surprising given the dreadful beating that they had taken

¹⁸ Personal observations of 25 July 1980, 8 August 1980; 10 July 1986, 18–19 July 1994. See J. Buckler, *Boeotia Antiqua* 6 (1996) 59–72, for a full discussion of the topography and the ensuing battle with previous bibliography. Knauss, *Melioration*, 141, provides a good map of the streams around Koroneia. For brief recent identifications of Alalkomenai and Itonian Athena, see Lauffer, *Griechenland*, 16, 285. At modern Vouna near Alalkomenai lie the remains of the Temple of Apollo Tilphousios, not to be confused with that of Itonian Athena. See T.G. Spyropoulos, *AAA* 6 (1973) 381–385; Schachter, *Cults of Boiotia* I.76–77; personal observations of 9 October 1998.

at Nemea River. The numbers of the two armies were about equal. Present at the battle as a combatant was Xenophon, the historian, man of letters, and erstwhile co-leader of the Ten Thousand, who left a vivid eye-witness account of the fighting. Agesilaos held the right of his army and the Orchomenians the left of the line. The other contingents filled the center. Opposite them the Thebans held the right of the Allied phalanx and the Argives the left, with the Athenians and Corinthians occupying the center. The axis of the battle was basically northwest-southeast astride the high road between Thebes and Lebadeia. Agesilaos advanced against the Allies along a line parallel to the Kephisos, and the Allies responded by marching forth from the foothills of Mt. Helikon to confront them. The armies approached each other in deep silence until they were about 200 meters apart, whereupon the Thebans raised the war-cry and attacked on the run. Desire to seek revenge on the Orchomenians who had taken the Spartan side surely sparked their zeal. When the two armies were about 100 meters apart, the mercenaries of Herippidas together with the Ionians, Aiolians, and Hellespontines, sallied against the enemy, whereupon Agesilaos' entire phalanx joined in the charge. When they came within spear thrust of the Allies, they drove back their opponents. The Argives did not even await the attack of Agesilaos' troops, but instead fled to Mt. Helikon unscathed. Many of the Athenians likewise fled. Koroneia seemed another Spartan victory to match Nemea River.¹⁹

Some of Herippidas' mercenaries were already crowning Agesilaos with a garland, when a man brought him word that the Thebans had soundly defeated the Orchomenians, and were even then plundering the Spartan baggage train. He at once deployed his hoplites by a counter-march and led them against the enemy. On the other side of the line the Thebans saw that the Argives had taken refuge on Mt. Helikon and that the Spartans had broken their left. They decided to drive through Agesilaos' phalanx to join their allies. Massing themselves in a tough knot, they charged the Spartans. In a flash of anger and stupidity Agesilaos met the Thebans head-on. Here was the opportunity to take revenge on those who had soured his crusade against the Persians by their insult at Aulis and were

¹⁹ Xen. *Hell.* 4.3.15–18; *Ages.* 2.6–11; *Anab.* 5.3.6; Lys. 13.16; Plut. *Ages.* 18.1–3; *Mor.* 212A; Paus. 3.12.13; 9.6.4; Justin 6.4.13.

instrumental in his recall from Asia. Every Spartan in the line, even his friend Xenophon, knew that he had blundered. The ordinary way in which to meet such a threat was to open a lane for the attackers, allowing them through the phalanx so that they could be struck on their exposed side. Once the enemy was through, the defenders could next fall upon their rearmost ranks. Instead, the Thebans and Spartans engaged in fierce hand-to-hand fighting; “crashing shields against shields, they pushed, fought, killed, fell dying. There was no shouting, but there was the kind of sound such as fury and battle will produce.” The most intense fighting raged around Agesilaos, who was wounded several times. Although his comrades dragged him off to safety, the Thebans cut through the Spartan line, which eventually opened ranks to let them through. Despite their losses, the Thebans were not routed and safely reached the slopes of Mt. Helikon.²⁰

Having been carried to the rear alive, Agesilaos listened to the report of some cavalry men who announced that about eighty of the enemy had taken shelter in the sanctuary of Itonian Athena. They proved to be Athenians, whose appetite for battle was slight from the outset. The wounded king gave orders to let the suppliants go wherever they wanted so long as they committed no wrong. After their dinner the Spartans slept on the battlefield. Their surroundings were grim. Theirs was the cold companionship of the distant stars and the nearby corpses. The ground was stained with blood, friend and foe lying dead side by side, smashed shields, broken spears, bared daggers, some on the ground, others embedded in the corpses, still others yet gripped by the hand. Such is Xenophon’s bald description of the scene. Others were fortunate to return to their homes, including doubtless the Orchomenians and Athenians. The Thebans and Argives, however, maintained their position on Mt. Helikon. Next morning Agesilaos ordered the polemarchos Gylis

²⁰ Xen. *Hell.* 4.3.18–19; *Ages.* 2.12., from which the translations were made; Diod. 14.84.1–2; Nepos *Ages.* 4.5.8; Plut. *Ages.* 18.4–9; Paus. 3.9.13. Counter-march: see also Xen. *Kyrouph* 8.5.15; Ail. *Taktika* 27, 28.4; Asklep. 10.6. Massed Theban attack: cp. Thuc. 1.63; Plut. *Pel.* 17.5; Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.22. These last incidents and others besides prove, contrary to the views of some contemporary historians, that the push or *othismos* was indeed an essential factor of the massed hoplite phalanx, *pace* V.D. Hanson, *the Western Way of War* (New York and Oxford 1989) 169–174; P. Krentz, *CA* 4 (1985) 13–20; G.L. Cawkwell, *CQ* n.s. 26 (1976) 62–84. Agesilaos’ blunder: see also Front. 2.6.5; Polyain. 2.1.9, both of whom confuse certain details, *pace* Tuplin, *Failings of Empire*, 53, and Cartledge, *Agesilaos*, 221. see also Lazenby, *Spartan Army*, 143–148.

to draw up the phalanx and erect a trophy. The men were to crown themselves with garlands to the music of flute-players. The Thebans retrieved their dead under a truce, and the Spartans, carrying Agesilaos, retired to Delphi. Along the way the wounded king passed the tomb of his arch rival Lysandros. Gylis moved through Phokis to attack Lokris by way of retribution, but his frustration cost him his life and those of other Spartans. The campaign of Koroneia was over.²¹

Although most ancient historians and modern scholars claim that this battle was a Spartan victory both in terms of tactics and strategy, it is impossible to understand this verdict. In terms of tactics the Thebans had independently broken both wings of the Spartan line, wounding Agesilaos in the process. Nor had he destroyed the two most powerful contingents of the enemy's main army. Even more importantly Koroneia proved a strategical victory for the Thebans. At its end they still stood between the invaders and Boiotia to the east. Caught in hostile territory, a shaken Spartan army could either attack the victorious Thebans and the uninjured Argives or retreat. In effect, Agesilaos had failed to achieve any of his military goals: the Thebans and their allies were nearly as strong after Koroneia as they were before and the Spartans somewhat weaker. Instead of landing a decisive blow against the enemy, he found himself wounded and his army in retreat. The Alliance was still intact, and its members had again—and this time successfully—rallied to face a veteran army. Furthermore, the Spartan defeat at Koroneia allowed the Thebans to re-establish their pre-eminence in central Greece. Once again, decisive victory had eluded the Spartans.²²

C. STALEMATE AT CORINTH (394–388 BC)

After the battle of Koroneia both sides settled down to a protracted war marked by skirmishes, raids, some major campaigns but no further battles of the magnitude of the two most recent ones. The

²¹ Xen. *Hell.* 4.3.20–23; Ages. 2.13–16; Plut. *Ages.* 19.1–4. Suppliants: Xenophon gives no ethnics; Paus. 3.9.13: “Boiotians”; Polyain. 2.1.5: “Athenians”. For a defense of Polyainos’ testimony, see Buckler, *op. cit.* n. 18 above. Xenophon was loath to admit that the men were Athenians.

²² Among those who somehow see Koroneia as a Spartan victory, see Pritchett, *Topography*, II.94–95; J.V.A. Fine, *The Ancient Greeks* (Cambridge, Mass. 1983) 549; Hammond, *HG*³ 458; Cartledge, *Agesilaos*, 222.

antagonists instead prepared themselves for a period of stalemate in which neither side could land a decisive blow on the other. The war waned to a mutual siege in which endurance largely replaced mobility of arms. With the exception of the battle near Lechaion in 390, conflicts, though many, were normally minor, tenuous, and temporary. The Allies faced this war of slow attrition by creating an elaborate organization that conducted military, political, and diplomatic affairs alike. Though hardly perfect, it provided its members with a novel means of directing their energies towards a common goal. In that respect it was a curious experiment in multi-state co-operation. First, as already seen, the Allies created a general council or *synhedrion* to define common goals and the measures necessary to achieve them. Each of the four Allies enjoyed an equal vote in the decisions of the council. Joint military planning included discussions of and agreement on strategy and tactics. Although at Haliartos and Koroneia the Allies had assented to Theban leadership in the field, that was probably because of the custom of bestowing the command of an allied army on the ally in whose territory the battle was to be fought. On other occasions command probably rested with the senior or most experienced officer on the spot. In diplomacy the Allies normally acted in unison, especially on the subject of peace with Sparta. Thus, to be proleptic, joint embassies of the four would be found in 390, when Agesilaos campaigned in Perachora, and at both meetings involving the Spartans and the King in 392 and 387. Counsels were sometimes sharply divided, but not so deeply as to disrupt the Alliance. An excellent example comes from the negotiations at Athens in 392, when the Athenians and Thebans desired peace but against the wishes of the Argives and Corinthians. All that members could do in such situations was to resolve differences by discussion and negotiation. The Allies lacked any institutional instrument for resolving disputes and enforcing their will. Despite their occasional differences and institutional imperfections, the Allies successfully maintained a working alliance until the King's Peace of 386 dissolved it.²³

The system of alliances that created the association is more complex than is immediately apparent. The four main Allies were obvi-

²³ Alliance: Xen. *Hell.* 4.2.18, 4.1; Diod. 14.82.2. Military leadership: Xen. *Hell.* 4.2.10–13; 4.9–10; 5.13; see also *IG* I³ 86 lines 24–25; Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.39. Diplomacy: Xen. *Hell.* 4.4.19; 4.5.6, 8.13; 5.1.25–26; Andok. 3.26–41.

ously the heart of the compact, and dominated it in the field and the counsel chamber. The position of the lesser allies presents more of a problem. When the original Allies dispatched ambassadors to the other Greek states, many joined them immediately, including all of Euboia, the Leukadians, Akarnanians, Ambrakiots, and the Thracian Chalkidians. Of these the Euboians, the Opountian and Ozolian Lokrians, the Malians, and the Akarnanians had fought alongside the Allies at the Nemea River. The Euboians and both Lokrian peoples had also fought at Koroneia, and the Ainianians had joined them just before the battle. They all must surely have added their voices to the discussions at Corinth and in the camp. Even if they played only a minor role in affairs, nothing more than accepting or rejecting the decisions of the leading powers, their very presence proves at least some formal connection with the pre-eminent four. Even so, nothing suggests that the synhedrion functioned like that of the Athenian League later created in 377. Either they concluded formal treaties with one, more, or all of the major powers or they followed the policy of a state with which they were already allied. The example of the Lokrians suggests the latter. Traditional friends of the Thebans, the Opountians had participated in the events that had triggered the Corinthian War. At about the same time they also concluded a separate alliance with Athens. Yet they are not known to have made formal ties with Argos and Corinth. The same situation obtains with Chalkis and Eretria, the latter of which concluded a separate alliance with Athens about this time. So too with the Akarnanians: despite their appearance at Nemea River as Theban allies, they are not specifically known to have had any official ties with Corinth and Argos. To complicate matters Thebes and Athens had concluded a separate alliance binding only the two. The treaty lacked a clause requiring them to have the same friends and enemies as the other, which in this particular formally excluded the Argives and Corinthians. Indeed, the former sometimes acted against the two others. From the evidence stems the conclusion that actual relations among the Allies, both major and minor, were more fluid and individual than purely legal. Nothing indicates that the Allies envisaged a coherent, tightly structured organization of adherents with a formal membership ratified by all with an established set of rules, rights, and obligations. This Alliance did not constitute a formal political organization complete with a recognized permanent hegemon,

treasury, taxes, and protocol. It was rather a congeries of agreements that constituted a tidy, close-knit general alliance but nothing resembling a league.²⁴

Despite the uncertainties, some definite things can be said of the Alliance's actual functioning. Finances were simple. Each Ally paid for its own forces. Some money came from the King but not much and not regularly. Obviously then a treasury was an unneeded luxury. Daily conduct of the war was equally uncomplicated and strategy rudimentary. Before 392 the Allies kept large armies of citizen-soldiers at Corinth, but thereafter they maintained garrisons. Even offensive operations were basically defensive in nature, consisting of raids on Spartam positions staged at will by various garrison commanders. Most of this work fell to mercenaries, as will be shortly seen, who in addition to protecting the city also fortified various places in the Corinthia. These troops repelled the enemy and harassed their garrisons already in position. This sort of sporadic warfare needed no permanent hegemon and none was named. When the rare large and generally unexpected engagement occurred, individual officers on the spot assumed command of the combined forces. Such situations were occasional and often impromptu. For the most part, all of these actions aimed at securing Corinth and confounding the enemy. They were incapable of anything decisive, and nothing of that magnitude was expected of them.²⁵

The primary aim of the Alliance, as already stated, was to defeat Sparta, and the existence of the body was limited to that goal. No one entertained the idea of creating a permanent political organization for any future purpose. At the outset of the war the Allies had openly appealed to all Greek states to join them, and some did, but there was never a strong or obvious urge towards panhellenism. The various states simply chose their sides either to settle old scores or to win new advantages. The Allies paid no attention to the Greek states of the Aegean or Asia, and the closest they came to addressing the matter was in 393, when Konon urged them to remain loyal to the King. That meant leaving the Greeks of the

²⁴ Allies: Xen. *Hell.* 4.2.17, 3.15, 6.2; *Hell. Ox.* 21.4. Individual alliances: *IG* II² 14–16; Andok. 3.28, 32. Larsen, *GFS*, 101–103.

²⁵ Finances: Xen. *Hell.* 4.2.2, 5.1, 8.8. Garrisons: Xen. *Hell.* 4.4.2, 14, 7.6, 5.11–17; Philochoros, *FGrH* 328 F150; Polyain. 3.9.43.

islands autonomous and those of Asia in Persian hands. Content to take the King's money to instigate war against their local enemy, they cared little for the situation in the east. No one but the Athenians, for their own purposes, showed any interest in forging stronger ties with the King. The others were decidedly suspicious of him. As a group, the Allies seem to have formulated no policy regarding the King, and for the moment apparently gave him little thought. Bent solely on the defeat of Sparta, they paid scant attention to the future. That could wait.²⁶

The Spartans were better prepared for the war than were their enemies. In the first place the Peloponnesian League had perennially functioned effectively both when political and military necessity demanded. The Corinthian War caused them fewer difficulties than the more complex Peloponnesian War. In addition to the reliable Peloponnesian military units, the Spartans began to rely on mercenaries for such routine duties as garrisons and patrols, thus alleviating the burden on Spartan and Peloponnesian soldiers alike. They pursued a much more active strategy than did their opponents. While maintaining a close blockade of Corinth, they sought opportunities to reduce the city both directly by surprise attacks and by intercepting its supplies. These forays caused some considerable but indecisive harm to the city, whose people were soon worn down by their losses and hardships. In their beleaguering they established a strong base at Sikyon garrisoned by a Spartan *mora* and support troops, and later an outlier at Epiekeia to protect it. Close but farther to the rear Phleious stood in support of Sikyon, and from 391 the Spartans occupied it with a garrison. Although both cities were themselves subject to Allied raids that at times caused moderate casualties and damage, neither place was ever seriously threatened. They in turn also secured communications between Sparta and the southern littoral of the Corinthian Gulf. In the north a Spartan *mora* held Orchomenos, which somewhat limited Theban movements in central Greece. The Spartans had in effect done everything within their power to cut Corinth off from the outside world and to trouble Thebes at home. Spartan operations elsewhere yielded indifferent results. The lack of a fleet made it impossible for them completely to invest Corinth, and Thebes was largely impervious to any naval

²⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 4.6.14; Meiggs-Lewis, *GHI*².67; Xen. *Hell.* 4.5.5–14; 5.1.29–32.

threat. In all, the fundamental weakness of the Spartans was their lack of resources to maintain a truly Aegean empire.²⁷

The finances of the Spartans often proved erratic and precarious but at first surprisingly steady. Besides the income from normal annual agricultural production came monies from other sources. Between 400 and 394 their maritime empire provided them with 1000 talents annually, but maintenance of their presence in the Aegean and Asia Minor immediately consumed much of that. In 394 Agesilaos brought with him 1000 talents from Asia, of which he dedicated a tithe to Apollo at Delphi.²⁸ The major source of money after 394 was the booty collected from military successes. From 399 to 386 the Spartans launched at least eighteen campaigns or inroads in both theaters of war. As seen, and will be seen in due course, in Europe Spartans plundered Elis, Akarnania, Argos, Peiraion, and Corinth continually, and even raided Attika, Teleutias' sally into Piraeus being the boldest stroke.²⁹ So too in the east, where various Spartan generals ranged from the Chersonesos and the Hellespont, through Bithynia, Phrygia, to Troas, Aiolis, and Ionia, once striking as far east as Sardeis and as far south as Karia.³⁰ Irregular as were these means, they sufficed to meet immediate needs, but were clearly insufficient to win victory.

The war aims of Sparta and Persia were far more complicated than those of the Greek Allies. Until 395 the Spartans fought Persia for control of the Greek states of Asia Minor and thereafter until 386 simultaneously both Persians and fellow Greeks. The war on two fronts was their nemesis. Victory in Greece alone was perhaps possible but hardly a foregone conclusion. The Thebans and Athenians

²⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 4.4.1–9, 5.9; 5.1.29.

²⁸ Isok. 4.132; Diod. 14.10.2, 39.1–4, 79.4–6; Plut. *Ages.* 19.4.

²⁹ Campaigns in Europe: Elis (398): Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.26–30; Argos (391): Xen. *Hell.* 4.4.19; *Ages.* 2.17; Argos (388): Xen. *Hell.* 4.7.7; Diod. 14.79.5; Paus. 3.5.8–9; Peiraion (391): Xen. *Hell.* 4.5.1–3; *Ages.* 2.18–19; Plut. *Ages.* 22.1; Akarnania (389): Xen. *Hell.* 4.6.6; Plut. *Ages.* 22.9; Attika (389 and 388): Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.1, 9; Piraeus (388): Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.19–24.

³⁰ Campaigns in Asia: Kaïkos valley (399): Xen. *Hell.* 3.1.6–7; Diod. 14.36.3, 38.3; Troas (399): Xen. *Hell.* 3.1.16, 28; Diod. 14.38.3; Bithynia (399): Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.2; Diod. 14.38.7; Pliny, *NH* 4.43; Aiolis (398): Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.11; Phrygia (396): Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.12; *Ages.* 1.18; Diod. 14.79.2–3; Paus. 3.9.2–3; Hellespont (396): Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.10; Paus. 3.8.3; Ionia including Sardeis (395): Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.19–21; *Ages.* 1.34; near Ephesos (390): Diod. 14.99.3; Karia (391): Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.22–24; Abydos (388): Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.6.

were themselves formidable enough to baffle Spartan ambitions, but the addition of the Argives, the Corinthians, and the Chalkidians under Olynthos formed a still more daunting challenge. So long as these states could maintain their political cohesion and protect their lands from despoilation, they were economically strong enough to maintain their armies as easily as could the Spartans. Moreover, their superiority in numbers meant that they could absorb combat losses more readily than the Spartans. It is far more doubtful that the Spartans could have wrestled Asia Minor from Persia. Their only chance would have been to emulate effectively the fifth-century Athenian use of seapower. Yet after four years of fighting they had failed to do anything of the sort, but instead had done nothing more than skirmish at various points along the coast. That challenge stood well beyond them, especially given the fact that Persia remained free to muster its superior military, naval, and economic might against one enemy, the strategical position of which was vulnerable and its political support questionable. The Spartans certainly had no hope of winning a war against both enemies and eventually they would forego Asia for Europe. Yet it would take them nine more years to learn that lesson.

The Allies meanwhile encountered serious problems of their own. The fifty Persian talents had not gone far, but the Spartans still threatened Corinth. The Spartan defeat at Knidos and the return of Agesilaos also complicated matters for them on the home front. Having achieved their basic goals, the Persians had little further need of their erstwhile associates. Indeed, the Persians could safely watch from afar while these troublesome neighbors wrangled among themselves. The first signs of strain within the Alliance appear after the major battles and immediately after the period of stalemate had set in. Two series of events in 393 marked the point, the first a tentative groping for peace among all the belligerents, including the King, of which more anon, and the next *stasis* in Corinth. The first sign of Corinthian discontent with their part in the war was shown at the Allied defeat at the Nemea River. As recalled, the defeated remnants of the Allied army fled to the walls of Corinth for refuge, but only the foremost of them safely entered the city. The Corinthians shut the gates on the rest, who returned to their original camp. Corinthian conduct could be ascribed to panic following the unexpected defeat were it not for an Athenian accusation of treachery on the part of some Corinthians in the city. According to Athenian

accusations, those Corinthians even sent heralds to the victorious Spartans, perhaps to make a separate peace. They were, however, still in the minority, as proven by the decision of most Corinthians to contribute a levy to the Allied army at Koroneia. That withal, signs of serious problems had appeared for all to see.³¹

The real crisis in Corinthian politics came with the establishment of the city as Allied headquarters, which made it the focal point of the war. The Spartan garrison at Sikyon ravaged the fertile plain between them, thus bringing the war to Corinth itself. Some Corinthians concluded that in these raids they lost many men and suffered wasted land, while the other Allies lived in peace and prosperity. The most discontented of them were the rich oligarchs who owned the most fertile land between Sikyon and Corinth. Though powerful, they formed a minority, but one that had originally ranged themselves with their other countrymen who had incited the war. Now that they had seen their own homesteads devastated, they lost their taste for war. Their discontent is understandable. The ravaging of their land meant not only immediate financial loss but also years of further loss as the land recovered. Despite some current notions, such carnage produced lasting effects. The two most valuable agricultural products of the region were typically the olive and the vine. The olive tree requires fifteen to twenty years to produce its first crop, so the destruction of an entire grove meant considerable and lasting loss. Vines recover much more quickly, but they require years and not just one growing-season in which to do so. Bleak though their plight was, these rich oligarchs were atypical of their fellows. By this point the Spartans had left the rest of the Corinthia untouched. Small holders elsewhere cultivated their lands unhindered. The war had not yet endangered their livelihoods. Nor had others of the oligarchy suffered considerably. Commerce, not agriculture, was the basis of Corinthian prosperity, and no Spartan campaign to date had damaged trade. Spartan plundering of one small strip of land had little effect on the fundamental economic interest of these other rich oligarchs.³²

³¹ Xen. *Hell.* 4.2.23, 3.15; Underhill, *Commentary*, 127. Athenian accusations: Dem. 20.52–53; Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.34.

³² Agricultural resources of the Corinthia: Strabo 8.6.20–23; Athen. 5.219a; Livy 27.31.1. Modern figures: British Naval Intelligence Division, *Geographical Hand Book Series, Italy*, III (1945) 39; M. Rostovtzeff, *Social and Economic History of the*

Despite some claims to the contrary, the aggrieved oligarchs formed no aristocratic party.³³ In fact, Classical Greece knew no equivalent to the modern political party. The Greeks created no institutional structures to shape and carry a strictly defined agenda or program. Individualism generally triumphed over political organization. Yet that does not mean that some Greeks holding similar views on a particular issue or general policies did not unite to achieve them. Such groups, sometimes called political clubs, seem to have remained small in numbers. The little known of them suggests that like-minded men, though willing to unite for one purpose, would not necessarily favor others. A kaleidoscope of interests and prejudices took the place of stable political planning.³⁴ In fact, the constitution of Corinth had remained oligarchic from the time when the tyrannical house of the Kypselids was overthrown in *ca.* 582 BC, to 393 BC. The landed aristocracy having been weakened by the tyrants, the succeeding government remained one in which citizens enjoyed equality under the law but at the same time enjoyed only limited access to the actual exercise of political power. The aristocrats, a minority, became part of a larger group composed of the commercially wealthy. Neither in fact nor law existed any political distinction between the two groups. They were oligarchs alike, despite the origin, nature, and extent of their wealth. They sometimes differed

Hellenistic World, III (Oxford 1941) 1459; J.B. Salmon, *Wealthy Corinth* (Oxford 1984) 19–31, who nonetheless makes the incredible assertion (p. 154) that agriculture formed the basis of the Corinthian economy; H.-J. Gehrke, *Jenseits von Athen und Sparta* (Munich 1986) 131–132; D. Engels, *Roman Corinth* (Chicago 1990) 27–33, who estimates that only one-eighth of the population could sustain itself by agriculture, which means that the oligarchs holding only some thirty square kilometers of the plain formed a distinct minority; J. Buckler, in R. Mellor and L. Tritle, *Text and Tradition* (Claremont 1999) 76–78.

³³ Pace G.T. Griffith, *Historia* 1 (1950) 236–256; D. Kagan, *AJP* 81 (1960) 291–310; *PP* 16 (1961) 321–341; *Historia* 11 (1962) 447–457; C.D. Hamilton, *Historia* 21 (1972) 21–37; *Sparta's Bitter Victories* (Ithaca 1979) 266–267, against whose views see Buckler cited in n. 32 above.

³⁴ Although Griffith, Kagan, and Hamilton (see previous note) all rely very heavily on the modern concept of political parties when dealing with Classical Greek politics, the notion is anachronistic and best avoided. See instead W.R. Connor, *The New Politicians of Fifth-Century Athens* (Princeton 1971); Strauss, *Athens after the Peloponnesian War*, 15–28; and most concisely M.H. Hansen, *C&M* 48 (1977) 246–250. Even though these studies concentrate on Athenian politics, their conclusions apply to what is known of politics elsewhere in Greece. Demosthenes and Aeschines both use *μερίς* to describe a political group that shared a common view. See S. Preuss, *Index Demosthenicus* (Leipzig 1892), *s.v.* *μερίς*, and Fr. Blass, ed., *Aeschines Orationes* (Leipzig 1986) *s.v.* *μέρος*.

among themselves on matters of policy, especially regarding foreign affairs, but not on the nature of their constitution. Corinth lacked any democratic political group.³⁵

This background is necessary for the understanding of pending events. By 393 the hardships of war had bred dissent among many of the same Corinthian oligarchs who had originally voted for hostilities. Like their countryman Timolaos, they had expected a short war crowned by a swift victory. Allied defeat at the Nemea River, the Spartan camp at Sikyon, and the presence of Allied troops in their city turned many of the oligarchs to thoughts of a separate peace. No differences of political philosophy or social status divided them from those still intent on war but only a disagreement on policy. The same thing had happened during the Peloponnesian War. Their desire for peace also inclined these disaffected men to re-adopt a pro-Spartan policy, which obviously alarmed their fellow oligarchs and their Allied supporters. They could not realistically expect the others demurely to countenance both their abandonment of the war and renewed friendship with the enemy still in the field. Even if their wishes were granted, they would simply exchange sides in the same war, which would not bring them peace, nor would it save their land from further harm. As admirable as their convenient desire for peace may have been, it remained fatuous.³⁶

Peace was not to be theirs. Instead, their disquiet aroused the fears of other countrymen and Allies alike. Those Corinthian oligarchs who had also accepted Persian money plotted to massacre the dissenters. They planned nothing more ideological than to seize complete power. They did not intend to change the constitution that they strove to lead. This was a contest between two oligarchical

³⁵ Nikolaos of Damascus, *FGrH* 90 F60; Jacoby, *FGrH* IIC.250; Hdt. 5.92a–b; Thuc. 3.52.3; Gomme, *HCT* II.347; Thuc. 5.31.6; Gomme, *HCT* IV.41; Arist. *Pol.* 5.5.9; Diod. 16.65.6; Plut. *Timol.* 4.4; *Dion* 53.4. G. Busolt, *Griechische Geschichte* I² (Gotha 1893) 658 n. 1; T. Lenschau, *RE* Sup. 4 (1924) 1021–1029; E. Will, *Korinthiaka* (Paris 1955) 609–624; Salmon, *Wealthy Corinth*, ch. 16; Buckler in *Text and Tradition*, 73–81; *CP* 94 (1999) 211–214.

³⁶ Peace group (Xen. *Hell.* 4.4.1–2) that had earlier voted for war: Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.1–2; *Hell. Ox.* 21.1; Paus. 3.9.8. Quick victory: Xen. *Hell.* 4.2.11; Majority in Corinth: Dem. 20.52–53; Xen. *Hell.* 4.2.23; 4.4.1; Their pro-Spartanism: Xen. *Hell.* 4.4.2. Corinth in the Peloponnesian War: Thuc. 5.30–31; Gomme, *HCT* IV.38–41. Grote, *HG* IX.328–329; E. Curtius, *Griechische Geschichte*, III⁶ (Berlin 1889) 171, 178–179; H.D. Westlake, *AJP* 61 (1940) 413–421. Sikyon: A. Griffin, *Sikyon* (Oxford 1982) 66–67; Y.A. Lolos, *AJA* 102 (1998) 369.

groups, and the question of democracy or the political status of the common folk never arose. Only the Corinthians and Argives were actively engaged in this intrigue. The Thebans then held the harbor of Lechaion, and Athenian mercenaries under Iphikrates may have occupied Acrocorinth. The conspirators made a list of their most influential opponents, chiefly the older men, determined where most easily to find them, and designated assassins to murder specific individuals. The planners also chose the festival of the Eukleia as the time to strike. They would thereby find their victims in public places, when and where they least expected violence. Striking quickly and efficiently, the conspirators easily cut down their targets, some 120 of them. Success proved incomplete, for many of the younger men, Pasimelos prominent among them, had suspected foul play. Well armed, they gathered at the gymnasium of Kraneion to await events. When survivors of the massacre spread news of the attack, Pasimelos and his fellows fled to Acrocorinth for safety. If Iphikrates did then indeed occupy Acrocorinth, a curious turn of events developed. Although he himself subsequently entertained the notion of seizing Corinth, for the moment he must have remained aloof from the internal affairs of an Ally. At any rate, Pasimelos and the other fugitives successfully defended themselves against an attack by the Argives and others. An omen, a sacrifice, and the seers among them persuaded the band to retire quietly beyond Corinthian territory. There in security they debated the prospects of exile, during which the members of their families and some of the conspirators tried to persuade them to return to the city. Some did so, but Pasimelos and about 500 others remained out of harm's way.³⁷

Those who returned home under the guarantee of immunity found the city under the control of the prevailing oligarchs and the Allies. Of these the Argives played the predominant part in subsequent events. With their local adherents they began to incorporate the polis

³⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 4.4.2–5; Diod. 14.86.1–2; Paus. 2.2.4. Seizure of power with nothing to do with democracy: Buckler, in Mellor and Tritle, eds., *Text and Tradition*, 87; *CP* 94 (1999) 210–211. Position of the Thebans: Xen. *Hell.* 4.4.9, 12; of Iphikrates: Aristeid. *Panath.* 194; see also Philochoros, *FGrH* 328 F150; Diod. 14.92.1 Xenophon bares his feelings about this sad incident. He minimizes the fact that those killed, like their killers, were the ones who had helped to ignite the war. Yet he calls them “the most and best citizens”. They were neither better nor more socially superior than their murderers, a fact that not even their deaths at the various shrines and altars can rebut: Buckler, *CP* 213 n. 23.

of Corinth into that of Argos in what was ostensibly called unification, either *isopoliteia* or perhaps better *sympoliteia*, which in this case meant the creation of a single Argive franchise shared by the Corinthians. The Argives pulled up Corinthian boundary stones and renamed the city Argos. In real terms, they watched helplessly as their city ceased to be a polis. Although the Corinthians shared the the unrelished right of citizenship with the Argives, these oligarchs now nominally became Argive democrats, or at least subject to democratic control. In effect, Corinthians could now exercise full political rights only by attending meetings of the assembly in Argos, an imposition that increased difficulties for all and made active participation in government virtually impossible for many. Unification meant that Corinthian policy would thenceforth be made in Argos. To soften the destruction of Corinth's sovereignty the Argives left the Corinthian oligarchs in power as a puppet-government. Not an act of kindness, the Argives needed dependable people effectively to govern their new acquisition, so these oligarchs were the only available candidates. These unwelcome proceedings surely rankled in every Corinthian heart, regardless of political opinions or factional preferences. Commoners who stood to gain something politically by these changes were doubtless patriotic enough to resent the assault on their ethnic identity and historical heritage. Under these conditions a democratic government did even the Corinthian *demos* little good, and nothing suggests that they lent it any genuine support. They seem rather to have looked upon their new officials as tyrants. The widespread distaste for this new order cut across all previous political lines, the surest sign of which is their reversion to oligarchic government in 386. Then, released from its political harness, Corinth remained oligarchical until it became a Roman city.³⁸

Upon the heels of these successful preliminaries came the full strength of the Argive army to join the Theban and Athenian contingents already on hand. The final touch to Argive control of Corinth was the installation of a garrison on Acrocorinth. In the process the

³⁸ Xen. *Hell.* 4.4.6; 5.1.34; Diod. 14.86.1, 92.1. Nature of unification in general: A Giovannini, *Untersuchungen über die Natur und die Anfänge der bundesstaatlichen Sympoliteia in Griechenland* (Göttingen 1971); W. Gawantka, *Isopoliteia* (Munich 1975); for Corinth, Salmon, *Wealthy Corinth*, 404–412; Engels, *Roman Corinth*, 14–21. Although Iphikrates independently wanted to seize Corinth for Athens, the home government refused (Diod. 14.92.1–2). The Athenians, though perhaps sincere, could more easily realize the same goal with someone else bearing the onus for the political outrage

Argives had significantly enhanced their position within the Alliance. They now spoke for half of it, with their voice accordingly carrying all the louder. At least at the outset they retained Theban and Athenian approval of their aims. They were now entrenched in a position from which they could wage war at little immediate danger or loss to themselves. They could also apply Corinthian resources to the maintenance of their army. Henceforth, they increasingly looked to their own interests, which were to preserve their land from devastation, to hold the Spartans in the Corinthia, and to retain their grip on the city. They had no reason to seek peace except on their own terms, and their customary hostility towards Sparta meant that an end of the war would now be the harder to achieve. In fact, from this point until 386 they opposed all peace efforts.³⁹

The annexation of Corinth pushed Pasimelos and his fellow exiles into open resistance. Crossing a rivulet west of Corinth, perhaps the modern Rhema Rachiani, he made contact with Praxitas, the Spartan military governor of Sikyon. Cancelling orders for his mora to return to Sparta, he and Pasimelos instead planned a surprise stroke on Corinth. Once they had gathered a Sikyonian contingent and 150 Corinthian exiles to reinforce the Spartans, by stealth they entered the city by night. They next fortified a position between the Long Walls that ran north and south between the city and the harbor below. Scant remains of them indicate that ordinarily some 1300 meters separated them. The land between them lies surprisingly flat with a gentle descent to the sea, and only in its northernmost reaches does it rise to meet the low foothills of the heights above. These are artificial mounds raised from material dredged from the roadstead to construct the harbor. No evidence suggests that they existed in

³⁹ Diod. 14.86.2, 92.1. Chronology: Buckler, 210 n. 1, and general course of events: 394, end of the campaigning-season: Xen. *Hell.* 4.4.1. 393: *stasis* in Corinth: Xen. *Hell.* 4.4.2; Argive occupation of Corinth: Xen. *Hell.* 4.4.6; 5.1.34; Xen. *Ages.* 2.17; adds that the Argives had taken Corinth by 391; battle of Lechaion: Xen. *Hell.* 4.4.7–13; Konon and the Long Walls: Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.11. 392: Iphikrates at Phleious: Xen. *Hell.* 4.4.14–15. Although Diodoros (14.92.1) places the Argive occupation of Corinth in an archon-year later than that of the *stasis* (14.86.1), he has obviously divided the events of one campaigning-season into two archon-years, as he does elsewhere (e.g. 15.62–67). Further proof is that Praxitas was about to send his mora back to Sparta (Xen. *Hell.* 4.4.7), which indicates that the attack on Lechaion occurred at the end of the campaigning-season. See also Aristides *Panath.* 194, of no historical value. Beloch, *GG* III².2.219; G.T. Griffith, *Historia* 1 (1950) 236–256; C. Tuplin, *CQ* 76 (1982) 75–83; M. Whitby, *Historia* 33 (1984) 295–308.

393. The land instead presented a clear field for battle. In these circumstances they awaited the morrow's events. Morning found them between the Theban garrison in the harbor and the main Allied force in the city. Marching from the city the latter drew up in line of battle between the walls. Iphikrates and his mercenaries held the right, the Argives the center, and the Corinthians the left. Against them facing south Praxitas placed the Spartans on his own right, the Sikyonians in the center, and the Corinthian exiles on the left near the eastern wall. At the outset the Argives put the Sikyonians opposite to flight, piercing the Spartan center. Instead of wheeling against the exposed left Spartan flank, they drove the defeated to the sea, thus leaving a gap in the Allied line. In this dire situation Pasimachos, the Spartan cavalry commander, dismounted his force, seized the shields of fallen Sikyonians, and launched a counter-attack towards the city. Praxitas meanwhile had readily handled the Corinthians on his front. His own Corinthian exiles on his left had simultaneously driven Iphikrates back towards the eastern wall. Success on his left freed his exposed left flank from danger, thereby giving him the opportunity for further maneuver. Praxitas kept his head in the midst of this confusion. If the Argives were in his rear so too was he in theirs. He faced about to confront the Argives, who were themselves retiring towards the city. They fled on the run only to be caught between the Spartans and the victorious Corinthian exiles. After suffering grievous losses, they scattered in confusion, which gave Praxitas the opportunity to drive the Thebans from Lechaion. The defeated Allies concluded a truce that ended the carnage. The victory gave the Spartans control of the coastal plain from Sikyon to Lechaion, and pinned the Allies within the city walls of Corinth.⁴⁰

As Praxitas and his men caught their breath, the Spartan allies arrived in their support. Now the Spartans could make use of their victory. Praxitas next destroyed portions of both Long Walls large

⁴⁰ Xen. *Hell.* 4.4.7–13, 17; Andok. 3.18, who intimates that the full Athenian and Theban armies were not present; Diod. 14.86.3–4. Topography: F.J. de Waele, *RE* Sup 6 (1935) 190, provides a good map of the locality. See also Wiseman, *Ancient Corinth*, 87–88; Salmon, *Wealthy Corinth*, 133–134, for Lechaion. Although the unappealing Lechaion has not yet been fully excavated, a large number of buildings that served the port during the Roman and Christian times has been uncovered. Personal observations of 25–27 July 1994. Xen. *Hell.* 4.4.7–13; Andok. 3.18, who intimates that the full Athenian and Theban armies were not present; Diod. 14.86.3–4.

enough to allow the passage of an army. That meant that the area between the city and Lechaion lay as open to the Spartans as to the Allies. The Spartans had breached the commanding position of Corinth. Praxitas could now be regularly reinforced and supplied both by land and sea, and from this secure position pursue further operations to encircle Corinth. He first reached Sidous, located near modern Kalamakion. The land thereabouts narrows between mountain and sea, making it an attractive defensive position against approach from the east. The roadstead is open, providing little protection for an invading fleet. Sidous formed a significant link between Corinth and Krommyon, Praxitas' next objective. Krommyon, the modern Aghios Theodori, lies along the road skirting the coast. Its landfall is also rather open, but spacious enough to accommodate a large number of ships. Despite modern developments, enough of the past remains to prove the strategical importance of the site. It easily blocked the coastal road from Attika along the Skironian cliffs, the modern Kake Skala, "the Bad Ladder". This hard route forms the first approach from the east where the formidable road reaches even remotely open land. Krommyon is a bottleneck that closes one of the three major routes from Megara to the Corinthia. Praxitas installed garrisons in both of these strongpoints, thereby putting two considerable obstacles across a major, and already difficult, thoroughfare between the Athenians and their Corinthian allies. He had also denied the Athenians landing places between Nisaia and Kenchreai. His work done, he retired to Lechaion. His garrison there was too weak and vulnerable alone to hold the harbor, so he covered its withdrawal as he retreated to Sikyon. Along the way he now fortified Epieikeia as an outpost of Sikyon.⁴¹

⁴¹ Xen. *Hell.* 4.4.7–13; 17; Andok. 3.18; Diod. 14.86.3–4; Sidous: Hdt. 8.71; Strabo 9.1.4; Paus. 1.44.6. Geyer, *RE* 2A (1923) 2239; personal observations of 13 October 1998. Krommyon: Thuc. 4.45; Strabo 8.6.21–22; 9.1.6; Diod 12.65.7. Pieske, *RE* 11 (1922) 1973–1974; Frazer, *Paus.* III.3; personal observations of 13 October 1998. Spartan withdrawal from Lechaion at this time explains how the Corinthians could command the Gulf later this year: Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.10. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that the incidents of 4.4.17 are out of chronological order, and should belong to the events of 4.4.7–13 for the following reasons. Praxitas and his army, which included allies, left Corinth at the end of 393 (4.4.13), the Athenians repaired the Long Walls in the following year (4.4.18). During that same year the Corinthians commanded the Gulf (4.8.10), and in 391 Agesilaos recaptured the walls rebuilt by the Athenians (4.8.19). Given the contempt of the Spartans for Iphikrates' peltasts (4.4.17), the reasons for it beyond doubt occurred

Praxitas' exploits provide a rare example of a Spartan officer who displayed ingenuity, independence, and initiative in the face of an unexpected but promising opportunity. With quick decision and remarkable speed he upset Allied plans for an uncontested annexation of all of Corinth. If his hold on Lechaion was brief, he at least momentarily baffled the plans of his enemy and even threw them onto the defensive. His garrisons on the road to Athens complicated movements eastwards. If he failed to isolate Corinth, he at least impeded its communications with the broader world. Perhaps his chief achievement was the establishment of the garrison at Sikyon, a standing and annoying threat to Corinthian security. Sikyon and its various supporting strongpoints formed the cornerstones of Spartan land strategy for the rest of the war. If the Spartans could not overwhelm Corinth, they themselves could not easily be dislodged from Sikyon. The war had fallen into virtual stalemate in the Corinthia.

While the Spartans and Allies were contending for control of Corinth, Konon appeared on the scene with his victorious Persian fleet. Fresh from his victory at Knidos, he added new laurels by sailing to Kythera, which he captured. Thence he sailed to Corinth for a meeting with the Allies. Though an Athenian, he came as a representative of the King, not of the Athenian government. In meetings with the Allied synhedrion he discussed all aspects of the war, and urged them to continue their efforts against Sparta with all vigor. He himself would in the meanwhile operate in the Aegean to dismantle the remains of the Spartan empire there. By their joint efforts, they could confront the Spartans with a two-front war. To any objections that he served merely as an agent of the King he could readily reply that since they had also taken the King's money, they were all in reality already fighting on the same side. To seal the resolve he offered them an alliance with Persia and himself. Since actually

before Iphikrates' victory over the Spartan *mora* in 390 (4.5.7–18). The ποτε of 4.4.17, "at some time", indicates that the incidents described in it are not in chronological order. The freedom of Spartan movements in 4.4.17 suggests that the main Allied forces made no effort to oppose their enemy, which is understandable in the immediate aftermath of the Allied defeat. Had Praxitas returned in 392, his presence makes it more difficult to explain how the Corinthians could enjoy mastery of the sea without possession of Lechaion (4.4.15–16). Finally, when the Athenians advanced towards Lechaion πανδημί (4.4.18), they met with no known resistance, the obvious explanation for which is that the Spartans were no longer there. Based on these facts, the logical conclusion is that all of these events belong to 393. See also Underhill, *Commentary*, 139–140.

only Pharnabazos could make formal arrangements binding the Persians, Konon technically acted on his own but surely with the full approbation of Pharnabazos. As a real enticement to his new friends he left them a large sum of money to finance their pursuit of the war. The Allies agreed, and duly pledged to be faithful to the King. By so doing they acknowledged that the Greeks of Asia Minor belonged to the King and those in the Aegean were to be autonomous. Neither was a serious concern of the Thebans, Argives, or Corinthians, and the Athenians already planned to play a double game. Although one report states that the Athenians rejected this clause that undermined their ambition to regain naval ascendancy, the claim is a palpable lie, the product of a later and undependable source eager to deny Athens' part in the deal. It is most unlikely that any such serious complaint was then voiced, for everyone at Corinth surely knew that Konon offered his countrymen the opportunity to rebuild their empire in the Aegean. Asia Minor was lost to the Athenians, but some of them could piously and speciously claim that the King held the coast despite their protests. Reality prevailed over such self-serving mawkishness. Konon met any such implausible reservations by promising the Athenians to rebuild the Long Walls of Piraeus, an offer they could scarcely refuse. Konon was in truth offering the Allies their best chance since the battle of Koroneia to defeat Sparta.⁴²

Konon's visit had an immediate impact on the war in the Peloponnesos, for Persian money made it possible for the Allies to maintain their military presence in Corinth by means of standing garrisons instead of field-armies. The most notable results came from the continued presence of Iphikrates' mercenary peltasts. Their first experience of set battle proved inauspicious. They were soundly beaten by the Corinthian hoplites in the battle between the Long Walls, and the experience painfully demonstrated that they were unsuitable substitutes for hoplites in this arena. Even in open field they were vulnerable to swift, young hoplites. Given their own suitable terrain,

⁴² Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.8, 15; Diod. 14.84.5; Dem. 20.69; Plut. *Ages.* 23.1; Nepos *Con.* 4.5–5.3. Athenian hypocrisy: Plato *Menexenos* 245c; see also Rhodes-Osborne, *GHI* 62, on which P. Funke, *Homonoia und Arche* (Wiesbaden 1980) 133 n. 92. J.G.P. Best, *Thracian Peltasts* (Groningen 1969) 85–88; Lewis, *Sparta and Persia*, 143 n. 55, is lapidary but lacking support, so best ignored. On the alliance, see G. Busolt, *Der zweite athenische Bund* (Leipzig 1874) 669–670.

however, they were peerless. That terrain demanded rough, broken ground and heights to which they could find refuge in flight and from which they could pelt their pursuers with javelins. This style of fighting had worked well against Demosthenes in Aitolia during the Peloponnesian War and shortly thereafter with equal effect against the Spartans at Sphakteria. Iphikrates used his peltasts much more effectively against the Mantineians at Corinth in 393, and in the following year he received the opportunity further to hone his skills and to develop peltast tactics to their best and most efficient potential. Iphikrates neither created the arm of peltast soldiers nor did Konon first put it together as a military unit at Corinth, but at one point it numbered about 1200 men. They were to see steady combat over the course of several years, whereby they became a veteran, well co-ordinated, and efficient force, one that could well be called regular. As will be seen, Konon's own duties and ambitions immediately took him first to Athens and then back to the Aegean, but he left Iphikrates in command of this new corps.⁴³

Konon's money enabled the Allies to plan on a scale larger than before possible and simultaneously allowed them to strike the Spartans on several fronts. They could again return to the offensive. Their plan was three-fold. First, Iphikrates would distract the enemy in the northern Peloponnesos, while the Allies strengthened themselves by land and sea in the Corinthia. All the while these actions would pin down Spartan forces there that could otherwise interfere with the rebuilding of the Long Walls of Piraeus. Iphikrates launched the initiative with a bold plan to put the range and speed of his peltasts to best use. He made swift forays into the interior lines of the Spartan communications. His thrusts were unlike those of hoplite commanders who invaded enemy territory to ravage it, to challenge their opponents to pitched battle, or besiege their city. Iphikrates instead depended on sharp, quick raids and ambushes to plunder the countryside and to torment groups of defenders who sortied to drive the pests away. For Iphikrates mobility was more telling than numbers.

⁴³ Events: Xen. *Hell.* 4.4.14; Dem. 18.9. Iphikrates and hoplites: Xen. *Hell.* 4.4.11, 16. Demosthenes: Thuc. 3.97.3–98.5; Sphakteria: Thuc. 4.32.3–35. Peltasts: Philochoros, *FGH* 328 F150; Ar. *Ploutos* 173 with schol., Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.34; Andok. 3.18; Dem. 4.24; 20.84; Diod. 15.44.2–4; Nepos *Iphic.* 1.3–4; Justin 6.5.2–8; Polyain. 3.9.10, 57. H.W. Parke, *Greek Mercenary Soldiers* (Oxford 1933) 48–53; F. Lenschau, *RE* 19 (1937) 404–405; Best, *Thracian Peltasts*, 87; Pritchett, *GSW* II, 62–64, 117–121.

He first applied this method to Phleious, where the defenders suffered losses of more than 300 without their having inflicted any harm on him. The situation was serious because Phleious was the essential link between Sparta and Sikyon. If Iphikrates prevailed, the Spartans must abandon their nearest outpost to the enemy. The new tactics baffled and dismayed the Phleiasians, who in desperation put their city into the hands of a Spartan garrison. This reinforcement prompted Iphikrates to depart but not in failure. He had not only harassed the Phleiasians but also had distracted the Spartans by forcing them to disperse their strength. Iphikrates' operations stand in stark contrast to the long and laborious siege that Agesilaos would conduct against Phleious in 381–379. Although Iphikrates admittedly did not take the city, which was not his primary interest anyway, he effectively put it out of the war.⁴⁴

The incident at Phleious also reveals a new tension between Sparta and its allies. The Phleiasians in power had exiled their pro-Spartan opponents, the dispute being between two groups of oligarchs that were at odds over foreign policy. It had nothing to do with oligarch against democrat. Rather, those then in power had refused to send troops to the battle of Nemea River and generally opposed Spartan aspirations in the Peloponnesos. These disagreements notwithstanding, the Spartans proved true to their trust, and refrained from interfering in Phleious' internal affairs. All, however, was not settled, and the problem would arise again after the Corinthian War. The incident does stand, however, as an indication of the future problems that Sparta would confront in the Peloponnesos.⁴⁵

From Phleious Iphikrates next struck Sikyon itself, where the defenders joined battle outside the walls, themselves suffering heavy losses in the process. This raid on the principal Spartan base was particularly daring and demonstrated the increasing confidence of

⁴⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 4.4.15; Diod. 14.91.3, mentions a second raid of Iphikrates on Phleious, and Polyainos 3.9.10, 49, 54, provides episodes of fighting that easily fit either occasion. They show that the Phleiasians acted only in defense of their city without posing any threat to Corinth. See also Ael. Arist. *Panath.* 290–291 with schol., together with W.E. Thompson, *GRBS* 26 (1985) 51–57. Agesilaos' siege: Xen. *Hell.* 5.3.8–17. Polyainos (3.9.48) an incident at Epidauros, provides a good example of the impossibility of putting all of these events into a satisfactory historical context.

⁴⁵ Nemea River: Xen. *Hell.* 4.2.16. A. Linott, *Violence, Civil Strife, and Revolution in the Classical City* (Baltimore 1982) 225–226; see also Legon, *Historia* 16 (1967) 324–337; Buckler, *CP* 94 (1999) 213–214.

the commander and his peltasts. Once again he had put the Spartans on the defensive at little cost to himself. Iphikrates spent the rest of the season ranging over large parts of Arkadia, plundering the countryside and even assailing walled towns. Although Iphikrates inflicted no real damage to the Arkadians, he reduced their appetite for war and weakened their confidence in a Spartan policy that only brought hardship to the Peloponnesos. All the while he honed the skill and increased the confidence of his troops. More immediately, he won time for the Allies to regain control of Lechaion, repair the walls damaged by Praxitas, and to re-install their own garrison there. Now without enemy resistance Iphikrates allowed them the opportunity to undo the most important part of Praxitas' work. Konon's investment thus bore immediate dividends.⁴⁶

With Lechaion back in their hands, the Corinthians next strove to regain command of the gulf named for them. The situation there had remained troubled since the fifth century BC. The key to these waters is the straits between Rhion and Antirhion, some two kilometers in width. Commanding them is Naupaktos, a small but secure harbor immediately to the northeast. Founded by the Ozolian Lokrians, the Athenians had bestowed it upon the Messenians in *ca.* 459. The Spartans expelled them after the Peloponnesian War, and it reverted to the Lokrians. In dire need of another naval base in the region, in 390 the Athenians converted the nearby harbor and city of Oiniadai to the purpose. Though no adequate substitute for Naupaktos, Oiniadai at least gave them a good anchorage from which they could challenge hostile naval movements from the northern ports of the Peloponnesos. If the new Corinthian naval forces could make contact with the Athenian station, they could challenge Spartan control of the entire gulf. Their fleet ready, the Corinthians entrusted it to Agathinos, who quickly won command of the seas. The high point of his success was the capture of Rhion, which proves that he had swept past whatever naval forces the Spartans had in the gulf. In this and subsequent fighting, nothing suggests that the Athenian

⁴⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 4.4.16–18; 4.8.10. Diod. 14.92.2 is a doublet of 14.86.4. R.P. Legon, *Historia* 16 (1967) 324–337. Although Salmon, *Wealthy Corinth*, 365 n. 99 dates the events of 14.91.2–3 to 390, Diodoros states there that the Corinthian exiles had tried to seize the walls. Yet Agesilaos (Xen. *Hell.* 4.4.19; *Ages.* 2.17) had secured them the year before. Thus, the attack on Sikyon is most easily placed at this point before Iphikrates' subsequent victory over the Spartan *mora*.

squadron at Oiniadai lent him any support. The lack of co-operation indicates either the absence of joint planning or Athenian fear to commit ships so near Naupaktos. At any rate, the Corinthians faced the Spartan counter-attack alone. In their first challenge to Agathinos the Spartans suffered defeat and the loss of their admiral. They fared no better under their vice-admiral Pollis, who was wounded in a subsequent encounter, and replaced by Herippidas, the veteran officer of the fighting in Asia Minor and Koroneia. Herippidas concentrated his efforts on the recapture of Rhion, and he exerted such pressure that Proainos, the Corinthian admiral who replaced Agathinos, abandoned the harbor and the waters around it. By the end of 392 Corinthian seapower was so depleted that the remnants of the fleet retired to Lechaion. Herippidas had won control of the gulf. The failure of the Corinthians proves that they lacked the ships and determination to wrestle control of the seas from the Spartans. Nor could they be proud of the Athenian allies who had left them in the lurch. If the Spartans could regain Lechaion, they could then hold it with a garrison supported by a victorious fleet.⁴⁷

This fighting paled in importance to the diplomatic activity that dominated the attention of the belligerents, Greeks and Persians alike, during this year. Their weight is such that they deserve particular treatment, and so will be examined later in their own context (see pp. 129–131). For the moment, a notice must suffice. Over the winter of 392 the Spartans, Allies, and Persians met at Sparta seriously to consider peace, but for various individual reasons, each of the Allies rejected the terms offered. The failure of diplomacy meant the continuation of war. The principal opponents of the peace were Argos and Athens, but the latter was beyond Spartan reach so long as a strong Argos stood in the way and a Thebes, far removed from attack, could provide it with quick support. The natural target, then,

⁴⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.10–11. Messenians: Thuc. 1.103; Gomme, *HCT* I.401; K. Freitag in P. Bertold et al. eds., *Akamaniēn* (Würzburg 1996) 75–82; see also Diod. 14.78.5; Paus. 4.24.7–26.2; 10.38.10. Achaia and Kalydon: Xen. *Hell.* 4.6.1, 14; Diod. 15.75.2; see Freitag, 83–86. Oiniadai: Xen. *Hell.* 4.6.1, 14; Paus. 7.22.10. Frazer, *Pausanias*, IV.156–157; W.A. Oldfather, *RE* 16 (1935) 1989; Gomme, *HCT* II.222; K. Freitag, *Klio* 92 (1994) 212–238; personal observations of 14–17 October 1970; 3, 7–10 July 1995. Chronology: K.J. Beloch, *Attische Politik seit Perikles* (Leipzig 1884) 348–349; Poralla, *Prospographie*², 62, 107, 116–117. That this fighting involved small numbers of ships is indicated by the fact that Teleutias in the following year captured Lechaion with only twelve triremes: Xen. *Hell.* 4.4.19.

was Argos, the most exposed of the Alliance. Agesilaos spent his time planning a major campaign against Argos and Corinth, one of his few really masterful strategical strokes. After invading Argos, he would turn north to attack Corinth. Meanwhile, taking advantage of his newly-won naval superiority, Teleutias would strike Lechaion from the west. Such co-ordination of arms was as difficult as it was complicated, and the recent failure of Pausanias and Lysandros must have been a nagging memory. The difference now, however, was the lack of rivalry between the king and his brother, and the ease with which Teleutias could on short notice bring up his squadron. The Spartans would also enjoy the advantage of surprise, for they had attempted no such previous combined operations by land and sea.

In the spring of 391 Agesilaos launched his campaign, first meeting his Peloponnesian allies probably at Tegea before marching eastwards by way of Hysiai. From the heights the road descends gradually through a narrow valley, posing no material obstacle to the movement of a large army before debouching into the Argive valley. This area, that had theretofore been spared the ravages of war, he now plundered at his leisure. From the Argolid he took the pass through Tenea, near modern Klenia, past Kleonai in the Corinthia to Lechaion. The remains of the harbor visible today date to the Roman period with little earlier to be seen. Yet the outline of the harbor's facilities is still clear in the silt. The port consisted of an outer harbor marked by the vestiges of two breakwaters and jetties, the latter leading to the inner port, which contains three basins. The whole complex is spacious, but exposed to the northerly winds. The land remains surprisingly flat until it meets the low foothills behind the harbor. A large excavated congeries of buildings mark the port city, but no fortification wall is now discernible.⁴⁸

At Corinth Agesilaos launched a simultaneous attack on the Long Walls and Lechaion itself. His assault confused the defenders as to his real intentions, which prevented them from reinforcing the port in time to prevent Teleutias' landing. Agesilaos easily captured the

⁴⁸ Xen. *Hell.* 4.4.19; *Ages.* 2.17; Andok. 3.27; Plut. *Ages.* 21.1–2. Lechaion: K. Lehmann-Hartleben, *Die antiken Hafenlagen des Mittelmeeres* (Leipzig 1923) 52–54, 80, 291; Wiseman, *Land of the Corinthians*, 87–88; Salmon, *Wealthy Corinth*, 133–134; D.J. Blackman in J.S. Morrison and R.T. Williams, *Greek Oared Ships 900–322 B.C.* (Cambridge 1968) 181–192; D. Engels, *Roman Corinth* (Chicago 1990) 58; personal observations of 27 July 1994.

part of the walls that the Allies had recently repaired, and Teleutias with his twelve triremes quickly overwhelmed the garrison in Lechaion, capturing both the harbor and the remains of the Corinthian fleet. Agesilaos detailed a mora to garrison the harbor, thereby regaining control of the entire gulf. He thus put Spartan forces in a position to harass Allied naval communications between Corinth and Kreusis in Boiotia, a major and convenient link. The garrison also re-opened the road to the east, where Praxitas' garrisons at Sidous and Krommyon still barred the way to Athens. The Spartans now enjoyed easy movement from Sikyon to Krommyon along the northeastern coast of the Peloponnesos. Agesilaos had won a remarkably effortless victory. Taken aback and overrun, the Allies for the moment fell back onto the defensive. Agesilaos' victory promised the Spartans an end to the stalemate and the opportunity again to isolate Corinth. Yet in early summer, with victory in his grasp, he led the army home blithely throwing away an excellent opportunity to win the war. In his defense it can perhaps be said that he reasonably hesitated to assault the walls of Corinth, hoping instead to starve the population into submission. Whatever his reason, the Allies at Corinth held firm.⁴⁹

In 390 Agesilaos, after his pious interlude, renewed his efforts against Corinth, so well begun the year before. The Corinthian exiles informed him that their countrymen had placed their cattle and other supplies in the security of Peiraion, the modern Perachora. Located immediately northeast of Corinth, Peiraion formed the large, fruitful peninsula dominated by Mt. Gerania. Through it led the main road to Boiotia, a route made all the more valuable because of Praxitas' garrisons to the east. Securing this northern way for the Allies were Corinthian forts at Oinoe to the east, Peiraion itself on the north, and the sanctuary of Hera Akraia across from Lechaion. Because of the blockade of Corinth, this well-protected area became the larder of the city, safely out of Spartan reach until Agesilaos had regained Lechaion. While stopping at the harbor, he left there all of the hoplites of Amyklai so that they could later return to Sparta to celebrate the festival of the Hyakinthia. He ordered the garrison commander that when the time came due he was to provide a mora of infantry and another of cavalry to escort them beyond Corinth.

⁴⁹ Xen. *Hell.* 4.4.19; 4.5.10; *Ages.* 2.17; Andok. 3.27; Plut. *Ages.* 21.1–2. Although Xenophon claims that Agesilaos ravaged all of the Argive land, he contradicts himself at 4.7.5.

Agesilaos then marched to the Isthmus, the first time in three years that a Spartan army had ventured so far eastwards. Agesilaos saw Peiraion, not the Isthmus, as his primary goal, a logical extension of his previous efforts. Success there would deprive the Corinthians of their principal supply of foodstuffs. A secure hold of the area would also cut the main land route with their Boiotian allies, and together with the possession of Lechaion, would entirely sever communications between them. Agesilaos would thereby further tighten the ring around Corinth, where he could more intensely concentrate the land fighting. In 390 his only opponents in the field were Iphikrates' peltasts whom the Athenians had stationed in Peiraion to protect Corinthian supplies. He arrived in May or June in time to disrupt Argive and Corinthian plans to celebrate the Isthmian games. The Argives were even then sacrificing to Poseidon, but fled headlong to Kenchreai upon the Spartan approach. Instead of pressing them, Agesilaos offered his own sacrifice, watched the Corinthian exiles preside over the games and award the honors. Four days later he left for Peiraion, after which the Argives returned to celebrate the games again. Much has been made of these incidents, but they amounted only to the Spartan rejection of the notion that Argos and Corinth were one. Interestingly enough, the political quarrel did not prevent the other Greeks from celebrating the festival regardless of who presided. Two sets of victors, generally the same ones, won crowns, and their victories were recorded. The gods were apparently satisfied with both sacrifices.⁵⁰

Agesilaos' march did not immediately advance beyond the Isthmus because of Iphikrates' force, which he declined to confront on broken ground. On the fourth day after his arrival there, the king reversed direction towards Corinth. The Corinthians, spurred by reasonable fears of treachery from within, quickly recalled most of Iphikrates' peltasts, more to keep the city quiet than to repulse Agesilaos. Iphikrates responded quickly, leaving Peiraion unprotected.

⁵⁰ Xen. *Hell.* 4.5.1–3, 11; *Ages.* 2.18; Diod. 14.86.5; Plut. *Ages.* 21.3–10. Date of the games: Beloch, *GG* I².2.146–147. Peiraion: Strabo 8.6.21; 9.2.25; Paus. 1.44.10; Steph. Byz. *s.v.* "Peiraion". Bursian, *Geographie*, I.382–383; E. Meyer, *RE* 19 (1937) 565; H. Payne *et al.*, *Perachora*, I (Oxford 1940) *passim*; Wiseman, *Ancient Corinthians*, ch. 2; J. Pollard, *G&R* 15 (1968) 78–81; G. Sanders, in H. Tzalas, ed., *Trogos* 4 (Athens 1996) 423–428; K. Freitag, *Der Golf von Korinth* (Munich 2000) ch. 6; personal observations of 24 November 1970; 23 July 1994; 1 August 1994; and 11–12 October 1998.

When the king learned that the peltasts had slipped past him in the night, as he had hoped, he resumed his march northwards. He reached Therma, modern Loutraki, at nightfall, and sent one mora to the top of Mt. Loutraki, which commanded both the coastal road to Heraion and the plain of Peiraion below. The detachment on the heights suffered through a wet and cold night, its hardships relieved by Agesilaos' dispatch of fire and provisions. The sight of the Spartan camp-fires alerted the defenders that they had lost control of the high ground and that they could expect a two-pronged attack in the morning. They spent the rest of the night getting themselves and their possessions together before seeking refuge at the Heraion.⁵¹

On the following day Agesilaos led his army by way of modern Oasis and thence westwards along the coast. Steep and difficult heights overlook this road that turns inland east of Lake Eschatiotis, modern Vouliagmeni, at the Heraion. The mora on the heights simultaneously moved into the valley of the modern village of Bissia and over a short but rugged pass onto the heavily fortified town of Oinoe, which commands a coastal plain and the harbor of Schoinous. With the latter in their hands the Spartans controlled all of Peiraion, which they thoroughly plundered before rejoining Agesilaos at the Heraion. Those in the sanctuary faced little choice but to surrender to the Spartans. The presence of ambassadors from several states, most notably the Thebans, added a curious touch to the scene. No reason is given for the gathering of any but the Theban delegation, which wanted to learn Spartan peace terms. The only explanation for this unexpected concourse of envoys is the presence of Agesilaos himself, whose actions in the Corinthia were already well known. An informal meeting would at least determine whether or not a further pursuit of peace was desirable. Agesilaos disdainfully ignored the Thebans despite the efforts of Pharax, their *proxenos*, while he settled the fate of the Corinthian captives. Those of them who had participated in the massacre he turned over to the exiles for punishment; and the rest, people and possessions alike, he sold. His severe treatment of the captives placated the exiles and intimidated the Thebans. As Agesilaos sat haughtily in a circular building, the foundations of

⁵¹ Xen. *Hell.* 4.5.3–5; Ages. 2.18. Therma: E. Meyer, *RE* 5A (1934) 2376; Payne, *Perachora*, I.5; Wiseman, *Ancient Corinthians*, 32, 41 n. 105. J.M. Fossey, *EMC* 34 (1990) 201–211. Plain of Peiraion: C.A. Robinson, in H.N. Fowler *et al.*, *Corinth* I.1 (Cambridge, Mass. 1932) 41.

which are still visible, observing the captives and booty, a Spartan rider hastily announced the destruction of a Spartan mora at Lechaion. Agesilaos' arrogance quickly turned to dismay. He could, however, do little other than sell the booty and summon the Thebans to hear their message. Saying nothing further about peace, they asked only to join their own soldiers. Agesilaos put the best face on this grim situation by magnanimously offering to conduct them safely to Corinth. Before leaving, he stationed a garrison at Oinoe, which sealed the success of the campaign. The critical situation at Corinth now drew his entire attention lest events there would negate his accomplishments.⁵²

While Agesilaos operated slightly to the north but across the gulf, the men of Amyklai behind at Lechaion began their march homewards accompanied by two *morai*, one of hoplites and the other of cavalry. The ancient road led westwards along the foot of low bluffs through a gently rolling plain. When the Spartans were a little less than two kilometers from Sikyon, the *polemarchos* in command of the escorting hoplites, to be followed by the cavalry, began to return to his station. Aware of the Athenian hoplites and peltasts in Corinth, the Spartans nonetheless contemptuously ignored them. Iphikrates and Kallias, the *strategos* of the Athenian hoplites, carefully noted the vulnerability of the Spartan troops and acted immediately. Kallias drew his hoplites into a phalanx with Iphikrates and his peltasts forming in their front. Not far from Corinth, they probably deployed at the modern Aghios Gerasimos. There rises a small hill, steep-sided on the north, some 300 meters distant from the modern coastline. In antiquity, no natural or artificial obstacles prevented the movement of troops between them. The Athenians planned to strike the Spartans from the south, catching them on their exposed left side and leaving them with the sea on their right. When Iphikrates' peltasts attacked the Spartan column with javelins, they struck down

⁵² Xen. *Hell.* 4.5.5–10; Plut. *Ages.* 22.1–6; see also Livy 32.23.11; Strabo 8.6.22; 9.2.25; Plut. *Kleom.* 20.4; Steph. Byz. *s.v. Peraia, Peiraios*. Meyer, *RE* 19 (1937) 565; Robinson, *Corinth*, I.1.40–41; Wiseman, *Ancient Corinthians*, 32–33; personal observations as cited in n. 50 above. Although Robinson denies the existence of a coastal road, it can still be traced as described in the text. Nor is it easy to understand what he means, when he speaks of the “eastern end of the peninsula” as being impassable. That is palpably inaccurate. Nor is it precisely true even of the western end near Lake Vouliagmeni. Payne, *Perachora*, I.3, 17–18, gives a far more accurate topographical description. Oinoe: Wiseman, 28–32. Lastly, the identification of Vouliagmeni with Eschatiotis is sometimes disputed: Wiseman, 24–27; S.C. Stiros, *BSA* 90 (1995) 17–22.

a few men, whereupon the polemarchos ordered his youngest hoplites to drive them off. The pursuit proved brief and unsuccessful. After initially retiring before the hoplites, Iphikrates' men turned and repulsed them, inflicting still more casualties. Although the Spartan cavalry came to the support of their belabored comrades, they failed to co-ordinate their own renewed attack, which resulted in further Spartan losses. The demoralized remnants finally broke and fled to the nearby hill, which became the focal point of the fighting. Hippias now brought up the Athenian hoplites for the final blow, which routed the harried Spartans. Some of them reached the sea, where they were rescued by boats sent from Lechaion, others escaped with the cavalry to the port, and some 250 remained on the field.⁵³

Such was the scene that greeted Agesilaos upon his return to Corinth. He could do little beyond stationing a mora from his army at Lechaion and leading the survivors of the battle back to Sparta. Along the way he avoided making them conspicuous by marching them into cities late and out early. He especially avoided Mantinea because of a recent, ugly incident. At Lechaion the Mantineians had suffered at the hands of Iphikrates' peltasts a fate virtually identical to that of Amyklaians. The Spartans had mocked their allies for their perceived cowardice. The Spartans had now endured the same fate, and Agesilaos wished to shield his bedraggled charges from the same insults that they had earlier heaped upon the Mantineians. The attitude of the Peloponnesian allies indicates a serious dissatisfaction with the Spartans themselves, their conduct of the war, and the war itself. They actually delighted in the misfortune of their leaders, an ominous sign for the future.⁵⁴

Losing no time in taking advantage of his victory, Iphikrates began to reduce the isolated Spartan garrisons in the Megarid and Peiraion. He marched first on Sidous and Krommyon, which fell easily to him and re-opened the coastal road to Attika. Thence he returned to Peiraion, where he captured Oinoe. The Spartans and Corinthian exiles in Lechaion stood idly by, doubtless benumbed by their sudden

⁵³ Xen. *Hell.* 4.5.10, 13–17; Philochoros, *FGrH* 328 F150; Diod. 14.91.2; Nepos *Iphic.* 2.3. Date of the festival of Hyakinthos: Xen. *Hell.* 4.5.11. Jacoby, *FGrH* IIIb (Sup.) I.521; Parke, *Greek Mercenary Soldiers*, 50–53; Pritchett, *GSW* II.117–125; Wiseman, *Ancient Corinthians*, 99; Best, *Thracian Peltasts*, 87–88; personal observations of 24 July 1994; 13 October 1998.

⁵⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 4.4.17; 5.18. G. Fougères, *Mantinee* (Paris 1898) 411–412; Pritchett, *GSW*, II.122.

reverses. Sidous and Krommyon were perhaps already beyond their reach, but they could have hazarded their naval strength to defend Peiraion. By these swift movements Iphikrates had undone with little effort all that the Spartans had achieved since 393. He had most importantly re-opened communications between Corinth and both Attika and Boiotia, thus breaking Corinth's virtual encirclement. The Spartans still held Lechaion and both sides continued to harass the other, but these actions devolved into nothing more than desultory raids. The only real gain that either side had made in three years of fighting was Sparta's retention of Lechaion and Sikyon and the Allied hold on Corinth, which enabled them all to continue the stalemate.⁵⁵

At this point occurred a curious event that perhaps baffles explanation. The Argives rewarded Iphikrates for his success by a curt dismissal. The charge stated that at some previous, undetermined time the Athenian had put to death some pro-Argive Corinthians for unknown reasons. Iphikrates also fell under suspicion of planning to seize Corinthian territory, only to be thwarted by the home government. If realized, this ridiculous plan would have left the Spartans in Lechaion, the Athenians on the countryside, and the Argives in the city. That alone indicates that more rumor than truth is involved in this last accusation, which renders speculation useless. In the event, Iphikrates supposedly resigned his command of his own accord, yet the Athenians must surely have replaced him to placate the Argives. The matter may have involved nothing more than an isolated incident between Iphikrates and the Argives over local authority. He and his peltasts dutifully returned to Athens with Chabrias replacing him in Corinth. Even though at least some Athenians resented Argive control of Corinth, they were hardly so angry as to come to blows with a powerful ally in the face of the enemy. At any rate, nothing indicates broader implications of this affair, nor is anything subsequently heard of Atheno-Argive disagreement over the actual administration of Corinth.⁵⁶

⁵⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 4.5.19. Parke, *GMS*, 54–55.

⁵⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 4.5.19; 8.34; Diod. 14.92.2; Ael. Arist. *Panath.* 270. Diodoros' testimony is further complicated by Dindorf's needless emendation of πόλιν for the χώραν in the manuscripts for no satisfactory reason. Diodoros obviously wrote *choran* and meant it; whether he was right or not is an historical, not a philological, problem. In fact, the unemended text serves to negate trust in the accuracy of Diodoros' account. Iphikrates: Theopompos, *FGH* 115 F105. Griffith, *Historia* 1 (1950) 244–245; and more elaborately by W.E. Thompson, *Studi italiani di filologia classica* 3, 4 (1986), 162–164, against which see Buckler (n. 35 above); Salmon, *Wealthy Corinth*, 367.

Fighting in this theater of the Corinthian War was not confined to the northeastern Peloponnesos. As noted above (p. 3) the north-western area of the gulf had witnessed unsettled conditions since the end of the Peloponnesian War. For the most part, the conflict there is little known and hard to interpret with any certainty. Thus, the events of 389–388 stand in front of very little background. Certainly, however, the Akarnanians had spread their authority perhaps as far eastwards as the lagoon of Mesologgion, as proven by attacks on Kalydon, then a member of the Achaian Confederacy. The Achaians did not hold the city merely as the spoils of war, but had incorporated it into their league. Although both the Ozolian Lokrians and the Aitolians harbored legitimate claims to Kalydon, the Akarnanians in 389 were trying to add it to their sphere of influence. Their vigorous pressure forced the Achaians to appeal to Spartan help in maintaining their possession of the city. To complicate matters, the Akarnanians were allies of the Thebans and Athenians, whom they had joined at the Nemea River. Now the three of them joined forces to diminish pro-Spartan influence in the region. This combined threat had proven so successful that the Achaians considered a private settlement with the enemy unless the Spartans provided considerable assistance. Achaian command of this region provided added maritime security for Lechaion. The Achaians themselves had proven such loyal allies, which taken with the great significance of their strategical position, meant the the Spartans could not ignore their plight.⁵⁷

Thus prompted, the ephors entrusted Agesilaos with two *morai* and the usual portion of allied forces to conduct a campaign against the Akarnanians. The Achaians also mustered their entire levy. The ensuing operations are fraught with so many uncertainties that only a tentative reconstruction can be attempted. The combined Spartan force probably crossed from the Peloponnesos to Naupaktos, where they met the Achaian levy, and marched thence south of Lakes Trichonis and Lysimachia to the Acheloos River. They thus avoided

⁵⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 4.6.1; *Ages.* 2.20; see also *Hell.* 4.2.17; Plut. *Ages.* 22.9. E. Oberhummer, *Akarnanien, Ambrakia, Amphilochien, Leukas im Altertum* (Munich 1887) 121–122; Larsen, *GFS*, 80–85; Beck, *Polis und Koinon*, 47. I.L. Merker, *Hesperia* 58 (1989) 305, makes the unlikely suggestion that the Achaians gained Naupaktos only in 388 as a result of Agesilaos' campaign in Akarnania. Had the city not been in Achaian hands in 389, as was Kalydon (Xen. *Hell.* 4.6.1, 14) they would surely specifically have asked the Spartans to help them hold it.

any naval interference from the Athenians at Oiniadai and outflanked the Akarnanian force still at Kalydon. Agesilaos' movements from this point cannot be known with any certainty. Since the Acheloos was the traditional boundary between Akarnania and Aitolia, he probably stopped there to send an ultimatum to the Akarnanians then meeting at Stratos. Agesilaos' terms far exceeded the dispute of Kalydon. He demanded the dissolution of the Akarnanian alliance with Thebes and Athens, and further demanded that they conclude a treaty with Sparta and Achaia. Otherwise, he would systematically ravage their land. Upon their rejection of his terms, he began a slow march of methodical devastation. The Akarnanians fled from the countryside to the walled towns, and drove their cattle and other moveable wealth to remote parts of the region, namely the western and northern mountainous areas. Agesilaos meanwhile continued inexorably through the land at a rate of some three kilometers each day for a little more than two weeks. Lulled by this slow progress, the Akarnanians brought their livestock from the mountains, drove them to Lake Loutraki, immediately northeast of modern Katouna. They continued to cultivate the rest of their land, the most productive of which lay in the eastcentral part around Stratos. On the fifteenth or sixteenth day of his campaign, Agesilaos suddenly covered over thirty kilometers before arriving at the lake, which is completely surrounded by mountains. There unopposed he captured nearly all of the herds, much other stock, and many slaves. This booty he sold the next day. He was still encamped on the mountain side west of the lake, when Akarnanian peltasts arrived on the ridge above them. Pelting Agesilaos' men with javelins and stones, the Akarnanians drove them down to the plain. On the following day Agesilaos took the road southwards along it, being harried all the way. At a pass through the foothills he reached ground suitable for his hoplites, who drove the peltasts from some low heights. He was then able to break out onto open ground, whence he continued his devastation of the countryside. His target now was probably the rich expanse from Medion, located probably at the modern Profitas Elias, to Lake Lysimachia.⁵⁸

⁵⁸ Xen. *Hell.* 4.6; *Ages.* 2.20; Plut. *Ages.* 22.9–11; Polyain. 2.1.1, 10. Leake, *NG* III.508–509; L. Heuzey, *Le Mont Olympe et l'Acarnanie* (Paris 1860) 357–358; Oberhummer, *Akarnanien*, 120–121; Underhill, *Commentary*, 149; Pritchett, *Topography*, III.92–100; Cartledge, *Agesilaos*, 225; Tuplin, *Failings of Empire*, 73; R. Landgraf and

Agesilaos still faced the immediate problem of how best to retire from Akarnania, made all the more difficult because the Athenians at Oiniadai, now alerted to his movements, blocked the way from Kalydon to the Peloponnesos. To avoid the long narrow pass from Lakes Lysimachia and Trichonis to Pleuron he received permission to march through Aitolian territory, most probably along the northern margin of Trichonis to Thermon. Whether an earlier treaty with the Aitolian Erxadieis influenced Aitolian thinking, desire to regain Naupaktos did. Aitolian hopes, however, proved completely unrealistic, for Sparta could not afford to offend the Achaians by depriving them of Naupaktos. For all of the harm wrought in Akarnania, Agesilaos had failed to capture a single city despite Achaian urging. He assuaged their complaints about his ineffectiveness by promising to return the following summer to destroy the young crops of their enemies. That done, he safely returned to the Peloponnesos by way of Rhion.⁵⁹

G. Schmidt in Oberhummer-Gesellschaft e.V. München, *Akarnanien, eine Landschaft in antiken Griechenland* (Würzburg 1996) 105–112; personal observations of 7–10 July 1995; 20 August 2000.

Two aspects of this curious campaign can be clarified. Although Leake and Pritchett assume that Agesilaos entered Akarnania from Loutraki in the north, they contradict Xen. *Hell.* 4.6.4, who writes that Agesilaos waited at the border before invading the region. Loutraki, a harbor town, is in fact as much a part of Akarnania as Piraeus is of Attika; see Lolling, *Reisenotizen*, 253. Xenophon states ἐπεὶ δὲ διέβη ὁ Ἀγησίλαος, which means “to cross over”, generally with regard to a sea or river, (*LSJ*⁹ s.v. διαβαίνω, II.2). A διάβασις is not a περίπλους (*LSJ*⁹ s.v. περίπλους). At 4.6.14 Xenophon ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐγένετο κατὰ τὸ Ῥίον, ταύτη διαβάς οἴκαδε ἀπῆλθε, which surely proves that Xenophon means the same thing in the former passage: a short crossing.

The next point of dispute involves which of the Akarnanian lakes served as the scene of the battle. Although several have received credit only Lake Loutraki deserves it. Most topographers have rejected it because even in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries only a swamp existed there. On the morning of 20 August 2000 Mr. Richard Irvine, a long-time resident of Agrinion and a teacher of English to Greek children, kindly led an expedition to Katouna. We found a farmer whose great-grandfather had seen open water there to the depth of several meters. Others verified his report. Several large pumping stations have now drained the lake to irrigate the surrounding fields.

⁵⁹ Sparto-Aitolian alliance: Meiggs-Lewis, *GHI*² 617 bis (312), which is generally dated sometime in the fifth century. D.H. Kelly, *LCM* 3 (1978) 133–139, suggests that the treaty resulted from Agesilaos’ campaign. Yet Agesilaos alone could not conclude a binding treaty (see Agis in 405: Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.11–12, and Agesilaos in 397: *Hell.* 5.3.23–25), and it was soon apparent that Sparta would not prefer the Aitolians to an ally of far greater value. Finally, although Pritchett (*Topography* VII.99) suggests that Agesilaos returned by way of Kalydon, Xenophon (*Hell.* 4.6.14) writes that the Athenians had barred this route to him.

In 388 Agesilaos honored his promise to the Achaians and realized his prediction. At the beginning of spring he called out the ban against the Akarnanians who feared a repetition of the previous year's depredations. They simply could not bear the destruction of the budding crops after their recent losses. Hence, they sent ambassadors empowered to make peace with the Achaians and an alliance with the Spartans. Part of this pact doubtless included the Akarnanian renunciation of any claim to Kalydon and perhaps Naupaktos. If, as is quite likely, the treaty included the clause demanding that the contracting states have the same friends and enemies as the Spartans, the Akarnanians also renounced their alliances with Thebes and Athens. The Spartans had thereby tightened their hold on the Corinthian Gulf and its environs, further isolating the Athenians at Oiniadai. They had effectively put their enemies in this region out of the war. Agesilaos' victory over the Akarnanian peltasts was minor in itself, but did much to restore Spartan morale and prestige after the disaster at Lechaion. The Akarnanian venture, despite the absence of spectacular triumphs, ended in marked success and confined the war more narrowly to the northeastern Peloponnesos.⁶⁰

Although the muster of Agesilaos' forces never occurred, the Spartans and their allied forces did not sit idly through the campaigning-season of 388. The pause and their recent successes gave the Spartans the opportunity to take immediate action against Argos,

⁶⁰ Xen. *Hell.* 4.7.1; Ages. 2.20; Plut. *Ages.* 22.11. Sparto-Akarnanian alliance: see *IG II²* 43 lines 96, 106; Diod. 15.36.5. Cargill, *Second Athenian League*, 106–107.

Although V.D. Hanson, *The Western Way of War* (New York and Oxford 1989) 33–34; and *The Other Greeks* (New York 1995) 373–34, denies that Greek armies could do any enduring damage to agricultural land, C. Hutchinson, *Xenophon and the Art of Command* (London 2000) 174 n. 11; 246–248, disputes the notion. While Hutchinson fails to develop his position fully, he has the better of the argument. Hanson seems to draw his conclusions solely from the Athenian experience of the Peloponnesian War, an atypical city in an atypical situation. Hanson seems not to understand that the Greek aim in warfare was far more often than not to defeat the enemy, not utterly to destroy him. The polis was generally considered sacred; and even after the horrors of the Peloponnesian War, the Spartans, as already seen (p. 3 above), refused to allow defeated Athens to suffer obliteration. Furthermore, Hanson has completely failed to note the following historical events that disprove his thesis of the ineffectiveness of ravaging the land to bring about surrender: Elis, 400–399 (Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.30–31); Corinth, 393 (Xen. *Hell.* 4.4.1); Akarnania, 389 (Xen. *Hell.* 4.6–7.1); Olynthos, 382 (Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.43; 3.18–19); Phleious, 379 (Xen. *Hell.* 5.3.21); Thebes, 378–377 (Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.56); Kerkyra, 374 (Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.8). Contrary to Hanson's assertions, this unsuccessful method of warfare regularly produced predictable and victorious results.

their hereditary enemy. They actually had no other reasonable options for immediate action. Argos was near, somewhat removed from its Allies, and exposed. Agesilaos' invasion of Argos in 390 and his subsequent success in Peiraion demonstrated how effective mobile operations could be. Now, then, was the time for the Spartans unexpectedly to strike Argos alone. The Spartans accordingly put Agesipolis in command of the expedition. The king's first duty was sacral. While the Spartan allies mustered at Phleious, he offered the customary sacrifices at the border before travelling to Olympia to consult the oracle of Zeus. Since the Argives had previously invoked holy truces to prevent Spartan invasions, Agesipolis asked the god whether he was obliged to honor a fraudulent truce. When the god answered that he was not, Agesipolis had received the divine approval for his policy that all Greeks were expected to acknowledge. He thereby legally took from the Argives all divine sanction for their practice, and to that fact the Spartans could point in their official dealings with the rest of the Greeks. Ere long a satisfied king met his army at Phleious and turned to the invasion of Argos.⁶¹

From Phleious Agesipolis marched by way of Nemea through the pass of Dervenakia down a narrow valley, the descent of which is gradual, posing no natural difficulties to the movements of large armies. The road took him into the plain with remarkable ease, and there he was met by two garlanded Argive heralds pleading a holy truce. With the gods' approval he brushed it abruptly aside. He advanced deeper into Argive territory, not even allowing an earthquake, the portent of Poseidon, to stop him. From those who had also campaigned with Agesilaos, the king learned how far his predecessor had marched, and determined at once to go beyond his mark. Having advanced first as far as the walls of Argos, he pinned the attention of the defenders, while sending parties to raid the outlying districts. The mission of these detachments was to ravage the land and not to capture strongpoints. Before he had retired to Lakonia, Agesipolis had thoroughly devastated the Argolid, all without noticeable hindrance.⁶²

⁶¹ Xen. *Hell.* 4.7.1-3; Andok. 3.27; Arist. *Rhet.* 2.23.12. Although Underhill, *Commentary* 151, correctly notes that Xenophon does not mention other examples of this subterfuge, Andok. 3.27, already hints at such cases as early as 390; on the date of *On the Peace*, see R.C. Jebb, *Attic Orators*, I² (London 1893) 82.

⁶² Xen. *Hell.* 4.7.3-7; Diod. 14.97.5; Paus. 3.5.8-9; Strabo 8.6.24. On his return

The fighting on the Greek mainland from 394 to 388 raged mainly throughout the region of the Corinthian Gulf. The Spartans had proved successful in keeping Corinth under close blockade without, however, entirely cutting it off from contact with its Allies. They had denied nearly all of the Corinthia to the defenders and made a devastating attack on the stores accumulated in Peiraion. They had likewise twice subjected the Argolid to widespread depredations. If they had not entirely and successfully defended their Sikyonian, Phleisian, and Arkadian allies from harm, they had at least saved them from serious damage. They had knocked Akarnania out of the war and strengthened Achaia. Farther afield, they had maintained a garrison of one mora in Boiotian Orchomenos, which was undisturbed by any known action. For their part, the Allies had held Corinth, the Argives by military occupation and political sham, thereby confining the Spartans to the Peloponnesos. The Alliance had also held together, which was a feat in itself. Despite the battles of Lechaion and Lake Ambrakia, the fighting in this theater had proven not aimless but ineffective, something that could be called relentless attrition leading no one to victory. The two sides had done nothing but cause and suffer meaningless trouble.⁶³

Agesipolis did not fortify the road past Mt. Kalousa because of a portent. E. Meyer, *RE* 20 (1941) 281; Frazer, *Pausanias*, III.86. Personal observations of 30 July 1994.

⁶³ Andok. 3.20; Xen. *Hell.* 4.5.19; 5.1.29.

CHAPTER FIVE

KONON'S WAR AND THE KING'S PEACE

A. KONON AND THE PERSIAN COUNTER-ATTACK (394–391 BC)

Having won the battle of Knidos in 394, Pharnabazos and Konon set about securing a peace to their satisfaction. They chose the reasonable and familiar path of returning to the principles enunciated in the treaties concluded between the Persians and Spartans towards the end of the Peloponnesian War. Those held no surprises and included no new significant stipulations. They began actively to assert the King's rights as stipulated by his treaty with the Spartans and their allies that were supposed to govern the ensuing peace. Their overriding principle maintained that Asia was the territory of the King who alone had any right to it. Although the Greek cities there were his, they should remain autonomous and render the ancient tribute to him. Pharnabazos also declared that he would forgo fortifying their *akropoleis*. That also implies that he would not install garrisons in the cities unless invited to do so. These stipulations did not necessarily entail any contradiction between the King's sovereignty and local autonomy. The Greeks under the King pursued their internal affairs according to their ancestral laws but paid him his tribute and obeyed him in matters of royal policy. If they refused to obey him in external affairs, he would enforce his will by his own arms. If the cities through internal strife or foreign intrigue broke their ancestral laws, he was obliged, for their own good, to restore order. An excellent example of this arrangement comes from Klazomenai, whose populace, just as the Athenians, swore to honor the treaty with Pharnabazos. They were otherwise to be free, not simply autonomous, just as were the Athenians. Klazomenai need not see a military governor or garrison unless the city invited them. A new element, however, was the status of the Greek islanders in this state of affairs. Pharnabazos granted them also autonomy and freedom from fortified *akropoleis*, and he did not claim Persian sovereignty over them. He proclaimed in effect that the Persians had no designs on the Aegean. In the absence of a hostile fleet in the sea he had no real reason

to intrude. For the moment he could rely on persuasion, and the presence of the Athenian Konon in tactical command of the fleet gave the Persian position a cosmetic validation. Thus, the Persians confined their war to the Spartans and their willing allies, not to the rest of the Greeks. So they in effect shared the King's purpose. Once the Persians had abandoned their claim to the hegemony of the Aegean, the Greeks eagerly responded to the welcome proclamation, some by expelling their Spartan garrisons and others by siding with Pharnabazos and Konon.¹

In this heady climate of change Pharnabazos and Konon immediately began to erase the remnants of the Spartan naval hegemony. They sailed first to Kos, which boasted a well-sheltered small port, whose inhabitants willingly joined them. They next persuaded the people of Nisyros and Telos to follow the example of their neighbors. These two islands to the south of Knidos gave it an early warning of ships sailing from Rhodes. All three islands protected the Bay of Keramos from unexpected and unwanted naval descents. More importantly, Chios, Mytilene, Ephesos, and Erythrai also joined Konon. These much more powerful states all commanded the straits between the Asian mainland and the offshore islands. The adherence of Ephesos was especially important because of its role as the traditional main Spartan base for Asian operations. Its loss now eliminated for the moment the possibility of Spartan operations on the mainland. The entire stretch of the eastern Aegean from Mytilene to Telos, with the possible exception of Samos, was in the victors' hands.²

Konon was not merely Pharnabazos' loyal lieutenant and advisor in this policy towards the islanders. If the Persians foreswore any designs on them, Konon saw the opportunity to rebuild an Athenian empire in the Aegean. He would continue where he had stopped at Aigospotamoi. He would henceforth loyally use the Persian-financed fleet to further Athenian interests without rekindling fear of new Athenian imperial ambitions. From the outset he lost no occasion to identify himself and by implication the Athenians with this lib-

¹ Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.1-2; Diod. 14.84.3-4. Beloch, *GG* III².1.77-78; Seager, *JHS* 87 (1967) 101-103; Funke, *Homonoia und Arche*, 131-132.

² Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.1-2; Diod. 14.84.3. Although Diodoros intentionally wrote Teos, an Ionian city farther north on the coast, it must be a mistake for Telos, the island in the vicinity of Kos, Nisyros, and Knidos; see also H.M. Denham, *The Aegean* (New York 1963) 152.

eral policy of independence for the Greeks and opposition to Spartan domination of them. It also appealed to the islanders who saw at the helm of Pharnabazos' fleet not the hand of the barbarian but that of a fellow Greek. Although Konon exercised a great deal of latitude in his use of Persian forces, Pharnabazos and ultimately the King made the final decisions. Yet the partnership was an effective one, for it provided the Greeks with the ready opportunity to ignore the real basis of Konon's position.³

With affairs in the southeastern Aegean in reasonable order, Pharnabazos determined to crush the remnants of the Spartan invaders still in his home satrapy. Desire to punish his old enemy Derkylidas fuelled his eagerness. From Ephesos he dispatched Konon with forty ships to Sestos in the Hellespont while he marched his army along the coast to Abydos across from it. Sestos was important both strategically and commercially. Controlling the main road between Asia and Europe, the city overlooked perhaps the best bay along their entire straits. At Sestos and Abydos the channel widens, but a shoal stretching out from the Asiatic shore forces ships close to the European side. Much of the wealth of the area was derived from direct and indirect taxation on ships sailing through the straits, from harbor dues and from piloting. This income, in turn, attracted investment in the form of loans on bottomry. The fine harbor was the chief feature of Sestos, which had always been the principal Athenian naval base in the Chersonesos. From it a naval power could control the entire passage from Elaios to Kallipolis and could prevent an enemy from entering or leaving the straits. Even more importantly, Sestos stood aside the main artery of the Athenian grain trade, which made it vital to the Athenians. More to the immediate point, this joint movement, if successful, would trap Derkylidas, forcing him either to fight under unfavorable circumstances or to flee at great risk. Pharnabazos could drive the last significant Spartan force from Asia, and thus end Spartan dreams of Asian conquest. Victory at Sestos and Abydos would conclude the work at Knidos. Derkylidas, determined to resist, made Abydos a haven for Spartan harmosts who had fled or been driven from their commands. He next crossed

³ Honors to Konon: *SIG*³ 126; see *IG* II² 20; D.M. Lewis and R.S. Stroud, *Hesperia* 48 (1979) 180–193; M.B. Walbank, *Hesperia* 58 (1989) 72–74; Tod, *GHI* II.128; Isok. 9.57; see also 4.142–143; 6.62–64; Dem. 20.70; Paus. 1.3.1, 24.3; 6.3.16.

over to Sestos, where he gathered all of the settlers of the eleven towns that he had founded in 398. With Sestos and Abydos in his hands, he defied Pharnabazos' demand to surrender, while holding off combined land and naval attacks. Pharnabazos relented in the face of this resistance and the lateness of the season, but not before ordering Konon to win the support of the Hellespontine cities. He also received instructions to collect as large a fleet as possible for the next year's operations.⁴

The end of the campaigning-season saw the continuation of a very active Athenian diplomatic endeavor. In broad terms the Athenians took the first steps to rebuild their imperial power in the Aegean. Sparta provided them with the justification and Konon the means. Only traces of this effort unfortunately can now be seen, but they were wide and simultaneous. To begin in the north, the Athenians restored good relations with Thasos, sealed sometime between 391 and 388 with an alliance. This pact helped secure the northwestern Aegean. Farther to the south Konon won Erythrai to the Athenian side. The Athenians similarly re-opened communications with Rhodes, reflecting the strong ties between the two democracies. This move came at a time when the Rhodian democrats combatted their pro-Spartan countrymen for control of the island. The Athenians also cast their diplomatic net more widely to include Dionysios of Syracuse in the west and Euagoras of Cyprus in the east. Syracusan fleets, usually under the command of the famous Hermokrates, had effectively helped the Spartans to win the naval battles that had ended the Peloponnesian War. Dionysios had renewed that policy to the extent of preparing a fleet of triremes for them. Only Konon's timely persuasion convinced Dionysios not to dispatch them. Even though he did not become an Athenian ally, he had not aided the enemy, and so was well worth courting. As it later happened, he would send the Spartans a fleet in 387, but for the moment he remained merely a spectator. Euagoras presented the other side of the coin. He had long abetted the Athenian ambitions, for which he had received citizenship. After Aigospotamoi he had given Konon sanctuary, and

⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.10; 4.8.3–6, Sestos and Abydos: Thuc. 8.62.3; Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.7–8, 2.13; 5.1.28; Ephoros, *FGrH* 70 FF40, 155; Diod. 13. 39.5, 49.2, 106. T.A. Trant, *Narrative of a Journey through Greece* (London 1830) 431; Oberhummer, *RE* 2A (1923) 1892–1894; S. Casson, *Macedonia, Thrace, and Illyria* (Oxford 1926) 210–228; Cook, *Troad*, 52–57; personal observations of 24 May and 4 June 2002.

together they had plotted to relieve Athens of its misfortunes. Euagoras succeeded in having the King appoint Konon as admiral of the Persian fleet and had supposedly furnished most of the forces for it. The Athenians had good reasons publicly to thank him for past services and to encourage him to repeat them. The evidence provides ample documentation of a new and energetic Athenian effort to reap the greatest awards possible for the victory at Knidos, which they openly declared their own. They and Konon used it to superb effect. Athenian influence at no cost to themselves stretched from Thasos and the Hellespont in the north, southwards along the Asian coast past Mytilene, Chios, Klazomenai and Erythrai, Ephesos, on to Knidos and its outlying islands and finally to Rhodes. A friendly Cyprus lay still farther beyond. These efforts mark the most energetic attempt since their defeat in the Peloponnesian War to regain their empire. Although the Athenians dutifully defended Corinth, they now looked primarily again to the Aegean.⁵

During the years between 394 and 390 one of the most mysterious organizations of fourth-century Greece sprang up in the eastern Aegean. Byzantion, Kyzikos, Ephesos, Samos, Iasos, Knidos, Rhodes, and perhaps Lampsakos minted coins on the same standard. These coins raise the historical problem of the nature of this association and its role in the events of these years (see Annexe to Ch. V). Whether they formed a political alliance or a commercial union remains unknown, but the scant evidence points to some sort of organization of Greek cities whose purpose may well have aimed at protecting their local interests without alienating either the other Greeks or the Persians. If its members intended political independence, reality opposed them. They were too scattered to present an effective front against more powerful forces, and in 394 Pharnabazos and Konon alone possessed them.

⁵ Thasos: *IG* II² 17, 24–25; Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.25–31; Lysias 28, 29; Dem. 20.59; Diod. 14.94. Rhodes: *IG* II² 19; Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.20–25; Dionysios: *IG* II² 18; see also Diod. 13.96.2.; Xen. *Hell.* 1.3.13. Syracusan support of Sparta: Thuc. 8.104.3; Diod. 13.39.4; Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.28; Lysias 19. 19–20; Euagoras: *IG* I³ 113; Isok. 4.141; 9.54; Andok. 2.20; Dem. 12.10; Paus. 1.3.1; Konon: Xen. *Hell.* 2.1.29; Isok. 9.52; Diod. 13.106. Persians: Isok. 9.54–56; Ktesias, *FGrH* 688 F30; Diod. 14.39.1–4, 84.3. Although *SIG*³ 129 (= *IG* I³ 1454), honoring the Karpathians, was previously discussed in connection with these events, the inscription has now been re-dated to the third quarter of the fifth century, which renders it irrelevant; see Develin, *AO*, 113. E. Badian, in W. Eder, ed., *Die athenische Demokratie im 4. Jahrhundert v. Chr.* (Stuttgart 1995) 79–86.

Over the winter of 394 Pharnabazos and Konon formed a new and very ambitious war-plan. They had already forced Agesilaos from Asia, penned Derkylidas in the Hellespont, and driven the Spartans from the eastcentral Aegean. The next logical step was to take the war to Sparta itself and to provoke further action in the western Aegean. To shift the war to the south and west they planned to strike direct at Spartan territory and next to supply aid to the Allies at Corinth. By so doing, they would force the Spartans to concentrate their efforts on defending mainland Greece and with any success to pin them down in the Peloponnesos. That done, they could suppress an isolated Derkylidas. Success would drive Sparta out of the war, secure Asia for the Persians, and make the Greek islands autonomous and neutral, or at least not anti-Persian. Only Athenian ambitions presented an incalculable aspect to this policy, for the Athenians more than ever before wanted to recover their maritime empire. That desire would inspire Athenian foreign policy throughout the fourth century. Yet it would at some point conflict with the Persian aim to see an Aegean unaligned with any Greek state.

Having gathered a large fleet and numerous mercenaries, in the spring of 393 Pharnabazos and Konon sailed southwards uneventfully through the islands to Melos, which is possessed of a spacious and well-sheltered bay. Their designation of Melos as their main naval base signalled a significant change in their strategical plans. The destruction of the Spartan fleet the year before meant that Ephesos and Knidos stood too far away from the new scene of conflict to provide immediate naval support for operations in the western Aegean. Melos enjoyed easy communications between Greece and Asia Minor. With the island firmly in their hands, Pharnabazos and Konon struck directly at Spartan territory. They landed at Pharai in Messene, the modern Kalamata, its small harbor providing sufficient shelter during the summer. From there they raided the coastal regions, but apart from desultory devastation of the interior they could do little harm. Pharai could serve as a useful beachhead only with substantial logistical support, which the invaders lacked. In that absence they could not make it a second Sphakteria. Yet their incursion could perhaps worry the Spartans enough for them to see more to defense of their homeland than the beleaguerment of Corinth. Realizing that they could do little more at Pharai, they next descended on Kythera to the southeast, making landfall at Phoinikous, probably the modern Avlemon. Having taken the inhabitants of Kythera, located on modern Palaiokastrou, by surprise, they allowed them to depart

unharméd. They themselves occupied the island with a garrison, which they put under an Athenian harmost. With Kythera in his hands Pharnabazos controlled the sealanes between Sicily and Crete, allowing him to hinder any Syracusan naval reinforcement of the Spartans in the Aegean. He now commanded the entire southern Aegean. He could also use the island as a staging-point for raids into Lakonia, as the Athenians had envisaged during the Peloponnesian War. Then the Spartans had faced the prospect of employing garrisons throughout the region, which forced them onto the defensive. Whether or not Pharnabazos could again raise that spectre, he could at least further complicate the Spartan defense of Lakonia, another step in diverting attention from Corinth. Lastly, Pharnabazos doubtless treated the Kytheraians leniently to display his good-will to other Greeks. The Athenian harmost was obviously appointed to remove any hint of Persian designs on Greek land.⁶

From Kythera, probably in early summer, Pharnabazos and Konon sailed for Corinth; and their appearance, coming on the heels of their exploits around Lakonia, may account for Praxitas' retirement from Lechaion (see p. 110). He lacked the force to resist their fleet and large establishment of mercenaries. Pharnabazos and Konon met with the Allied *synhedrion*, and in this connection the Athenian played an invaluable diplomatic role. The Allies trusted him as a Greek who spoke for the Persians and themselves. Konon urged the assembled to continue the war against Sparta and make it a common one with Persia on their side. He urged the Allies to prove themselves faithful to the King, a delicate way of avoiding the word alliance but meaning in practice much the same thing. He more concretely meant that they should adhere to the Persian program for peace. That included the general recognition that the Greek cities of Asia should remain autonomous but under the rule of the King; the islands and all the cities elsewhere, both great and small, should be autonomous; and that the Spartans and all other Greeks should honor these stipulations, by force if necessary. Some of these stipulations were very sensitive, and Konon was apparently adroit enough not to enter too deeply into specifics about them. As subsequent

⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.7-8; Lysias 19.12; Diod. 14.84.4; Nepos *Con.* 1.1. Melos: Bursian, *GG* II.496-501; W. Zschietzschmann, *RE* 15 (1931) 568-569. Pharai: Strabo 8.4.4-5; Steph. Byz. s.v. *Pharai*. Bursian, *GG* II.140-142; J.N. Coldstream and G.L. Huxley, eds., *Kythera* (Park Ridge, N.J. 1973) 38-39; Athenian use of: Thuc. 4.53-55; Gomme, *HCT* III.507-511.

events would shortly prove, none of the Allies except Athens was seriously concerned with the fate of the Greeks in Asia or the status of the islanders. The clause calling for the autonomy of all cities was tender to the Thebans because it could result in the dissolution of the Boiotian Confederacy. Likewise, the Argives and Corinthians feared that it could mean the end of their union. Yet since these details were not nearly so immediately urgent as the defeat of Sparta, they could for the moment be left conveniently in the background. The mere pledge of mutual good faith, when joined with material advantages, would suffice for co-operation against the present enemy.⁷

The Allies and Persians agreed to joint action against Sparta simply because it was mutually advantageous. They decided to continue land warfare around Corinth and to accelerate the war in the Aegean. The first benefitted the Allies without committing them to distant naval operations. To the Persians it promised that the Greeks would continue to distract the Spartans on the mainland. The second obviously served the Persians and, Konon hoped, the Athenians. Konon supposedly now persuaded Pharnabazos to leave the fleet with him. He promised to support it by nourishment from the islands, a florid euphemism for fifth-century tribute, which as earlier would be collected at trireme-point. Pharnabazos left the Allies at Corinth with his war-chest, while he returned to his satrapy. Those who had earlier accepted Tithraustes' gold eagerly accepted Pharnabazos'. They used it to repair Praxitas' damage to the Long Walls (see pp. 108–109) and the Corinthians to build a small fleet. For them only the overthrow of Sparta was important. Although the Allies had not entered into a formal alliance with Pharnabazos, they had tied their fortunes to his. Chance doubtless played no part in these events. Pharnabazos and Konon must surely have already devoted considerable thought and long discussion to this course of action. They had every reasonable expectation that the Greeks would lend ardent support to their designs.⁸

His work at Corinth done, Konon sailed the short distance to Piraeus, where he was to finance and direct the refortification of the

⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.8; Diod. 14.84.4–5. H. Kaletsch and S. Grunauer von Hoerschelmann, in Lauffer, ed., *Griechenland*, 362–363.

⁸ Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.8–9; Diod. 14.84.5. J.B. Salmon, *Wealthy Corinth* (Oxford 1984) 353–354.

harbor. Work on the Athenian Long Walls had already begun, so Konon need only supply his countrymen with the money that Pharnabazos had contributed. The venture, however, posed something of a problem. The ultimate goals of the two men were largely and immediately, but not completely, identical. Not content with the victory at Knidos, Pharnabazos was determined utterly to destroy Spartan power in the Aegean with Konon as his instrument. For his part, Konon strove to re-create the Athenian empire, culminating in the conquest of Ionia and Aiolis. He could do so only with Pharnabazos' fleet. So long as Sparta was their mutual enemy, both designs were handsomely compatible; but ultimately Pharnabazos must deny his Athenian colleague complete success. A veteran of this sort of military and political intrigue, he knew how to deal with the Athenians and Spartans. He took the risk of crippling the Spartan war effort all the while recognizing the potential danger of growing Athenian power. He knew that by so bolstering Athenian might he ran the risk of a new and unwelcome presence in the Aegean. If that was the price of keeping Athens in the war against Sparta, he resolutely paid it. He could always rely upon his wits and wealth to keep the fleet truly his. Nor could he leave the region a political vacuum so long as Sparta was undefeated, and at the moment Konon was his most convenient tool. Moreover, he could justify his conduct by pointing out that he was only obeying the King's orders to defeat the Spartans. Pharnabazos also had his private reasons. He was proud and ambitious. He had behaved carefully under Cyrus the Younger, chafed under Tissaphernes, and engaged in a careful rivalry with Tithraustes, whose success in so effortlessly driving Agesilaos from Asia had so greatly enhanced his career. Pharnabazos' like success against the Spartans promised the best way to further his own future with the King, one that would draw him closer to the innermost circles of the court. Further weight is given to this view by his excellent position from which to deal separately with both the Athenians and the Spartans. He could treat Konon as he had Alkibiades; and should he at some point want to shift his support to the Spartans, he could rely upon his cordial relations with Agesilaos. Pharnabazos was in all likelihood playing a complex and subtle game of his own. If so, he was—as usual—too crafty openly to show his hand.⁹

⁹ Konon and Athens: Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.9; Isok. 9.56; *IG II²* 1656–1664; Diod. 14.39.3;

That withal, Konon arrived safely with Pharnabazos' fifty talents, a sum equal to that provided by Tithraustes to ignite the Corinthian War. The Athenians gave Konon and his eighty triremes a welcome unparalleled since that of Alkibiades in 407. They honored him with a statue, and in return he either built or adorned a sanctuary of Aphrodite Euploia in Piraeus. By far his most significant benefaction, however, was Pharnabazos' money and the crews of his ships to continue the construction of the Long Walls of Athens. The Thebans furthered the effort by sending 500 artisans and masons, and some other cities also helped. The work continued during the following years until eventually the circuit was largely restored. Without any doubt, this was the grandest and proudest moment for the Athenians since the destruction of their walls after the Peloponnesian War. More than just pride and honor was involved. Athens now enjoyed protection, safety, and a secure naval base from which to rebuild a naval empire. These walls marked a turning-point in the war. Not only a sign of Spartan defeat, they meant that Sparta, unable to win the war by land, could now not defeat Athens by sea. This occasion most probably saw the Athenians resume authority over Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros, strategically urgent objectives eagerly desired since the Peloponnesian War.¹⁰

Konon's visit also spurred increased activity in Athenian foreign affairs. The Athenians now awarded Euagoras, to whom they had already granted citizenship, a gold crown and a statue to be erected near those of Konon and Timotheos. At the same time they also honored Dionysios of Syracuse and his family, including Polyxenos, the brother of Hermokrates' wife. Some have connected it with the Lenaion festival because of the tyrant's pride in his dubious poetic

Nepos *Con.* 4–5.3. Konon's orders: Xen. *Hell.* 4.1.38; Nepos *Con.* 4.1–3. His relations with Persian commanders: Cyrus (Xen. *Hell.* 1.4.1–7); Tissaphernes (Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.13); Tithraustes (Xen. *Hell.* 4.1.37); see also 3.4.26; Barbieri, *Conone*, 166–168. Pharnabazos and the Greeks: Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.6, 24–25; 1.3.7–13; 1.4.1–7. Chronology: Buckler *CP* 94 (1999) 210 n.1.

¹⁰ Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.9–10; Diod. 14.85.2–5; Nepos *Con.* 4.3–5. Alkibiades: Xen. *Hell.* 1.4.8–21; Nepos *Alc.* 5.7.7; Plut. *Alk.* 35–36. Walls: *IG* II² 1656–1664; Isok. 5.64; Andok. 3.12, 14; Xen. *Poroi* 6.1; Dem. 20.68, 70. R.E. Wycherley, *The Stones of Athens*, (Princeton 1978) 7–25; personal observations of 36 February 1971; 24 August 2000. Statue: *IG* II² 377 = Rhodes-Osborne, *GHI* 10; Paus. 1.24.3, Nepos *Tim.* 2.3. Aphrodite: *IG* II² 167; Paus. 1.1.3. Garland, *Piraeus*, 150, 217. Lemnos etc.: *IG* II² 30; Andok. 3.12, 14. A. Conze, *Inseln des Thrakischen Meeres* (Hannover 1860); J. Cargill, *Athenian Settlements of the Fourth Century BC* (Leiden 1995) 12–15.

gifts. That, however, fails to explain why members of his family also received commendation. Far more likely that the Athenians were trying to woo Dionysios and the cream of Syracusan society to their side. The friendship of Euagoras promoted Athenian ascendancy throughout the Aegean, and similar cordial ties with Dionysios could remove any threat from the west. One further consideration demanded attention, that being the Athenian need further to improve relations with Persia, which had taken such a victorious and amicable turn. Probably in 393 the Athenians sent an embassy consisting in part of Epikrates and Phormisios to the King. Epikrates had played a leading role in bringing Athens into the war, for which he had taken the King's money. While the specific purpose of their mission is unmentioned, the assurance of Athenian good faith and assurances of future co-operation were surely parts of their message. Likewise, no specific results of this embassy survive beyond the King's contribution to the financial well-being of the two envoys.¹¹

The full significance of this dramatic turn of events was hardly lost on the Spartans. The defeat at Knidos, the deadlock at Corinth, and the fortification of Athens forced them to admit that they had lost the war that they had started in 400. The Greek cities stood beyond their grasp, and Athens no longer lay prostrate. The Spartans now possessed more burdens and unrelenting enemies than resources and powerful friends. Facts demanded a hard-eyed change of policy. The first bitter certainty to accept was the irretrievable loss of Asia Minor and the Aegean empire. In their place a return to the traditional policy of hegemony of Greece was essential, for only it offered any hope of retrieving anything from the wreck of war. The Spartans faced unpleasant reality without flinching. They decided to send Antalkidas with full powers to offer the King their complete surrender of Asia and the islands together with all further ambitions to them. In return they sought only peace with him.

Antalkidas brought terms to Tiribazos, the satrap at Sardeis, that ostensibly concerned only the war with the Persians. His proposals

¹¹ Euagoras: *IG* I³ 113; II² 20 (= Rhodes-Osborne *GHI* 11); *SEG* XXIX.86 (see also P. Funke, *ZPE* 53 [1983] 152); Isok. 4.141; 9.54, 57; Andok. 2.20; Ps.-Dem. 12.10; Paus. 1.3.1 Dionysios: *IG* II² 18 (= Rhodes-Osborne, *GHI* 10); Diod. 13.96.3–4; see also Xen. *Hell.* 1.3.13. Epikrates: Plato com. F119; Ar. *Ekkl.* 71; Dem. 19.277–280; Plut. *Pel.* 30.12; Athen. 6.251a–b. Th. Lenschau, *RE* 20 (1941) 541; A. Georgiadou, *Plutarch's Pelopidas* (Stuttgart and Leipzig 1997) 210–211.

were agreeably simple for a complex situation. He stated that Sparta wanted a peace with the King that was entirely to his satisfaction. He announced that the Spartans relinquished all claims to the Greek cities of Asia, agreed that all the islands and the cities in Greece proper should be autonomous, and promised that Sparta would no longer wage war on Persia. In short, Sparta offered the King everything that he had demanded for eight years. Tiribazos was delighted by the Spartan message that in fact honored nearly all of the treaty agreements made in 411. This end of the war entirely satisfied the Persians. That much agreed, Antalkidas next artfully drew the logical conclusion that the two powers had no further differences between them. His proposals in effect called for the Persians to drop their support of the Allies. Just as the Spartans harbored no hostile designs in Asia and the islands, the King should have none in Greece. The situation obviously pleased Tiribazos, who literally owed the Allies nothing. He had not even been responsible for having recruited them in the first place. Having served their purpose, he could now conveniently discard them. Tiribazos more favorably inclined to this turn of events because of the recent growth of Athenian power. Peace with Sparta gave the King the perfect reason to cut off funds for Konon's fleet, his use of which had lately aroused Persian suspicions. For the Persians Antalkidas' settlement solved all of their outstanding difficulties in Greece and the Aegean, leaving them free to deal with Cyprus and the ever-recalcitrant Egypt.¹²

While Sparta and Persia drew close to establishing peace, news of Antalkidas' mission alarmed the Athenians, who reacted swiftly. The course of subsequent events is complex and disputed; but what began as bilateral discussions between Sparta and Persia quickly encompassed all of the major belligerents. While sending messengers to the Thebans, Argives, and Corinthians, the Athenians prepared their own embassy to the Persians. They chose Konon himself as its most influential member, an appointment that has raised some mod-

¹² Previous treaty obligations: Treaty of 411: Thuc. 8.58. Bengtson, *SdA* II².200–202; Tissaphernes in 400: Xen. *Hell.* 3.1.3; Derkylidas in 397: Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.12; Tissaphernes' response: Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.20; Ktesias: *FGH* 688 F30; Tissaphernes and Agesilaos: Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.5, 11; Tithraustes: Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.25; Pharnabazos: Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.1; Antalkidas: Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.14. Cyprus and Egypt: Judeich, *Kleinas. Stud.*, 117–118; Beloch, *GG* III².2.226–229; R. Urban, *Der Königsfrieden von 387/386 v. Chr.* (Stuttgart 1991) 60–67; M. Jehne *Koine Eirene* (Stuttgart 1994) 31–33.

ern doubts. The principal objection is disbelief that the Athenians would send as their representative the same man who was even then so highly placed in the King's service. The obvious response is that no better choice was possible than the man who had rebuilt the Long Walls and done so much to restore Athenian influence in the Aegean, all with Pharnabazos' approval. Still a private Athenian citizen, Konon's employment with the King was intrinsically no different from any other private enterprise such as leather-tanning or shield-making. No one else could better or more persuasively explain how Athenian and Persian interests coincided. He, a veteran of Aigospotamoi, could readily remind the King that the Spartans had betrayed him after the Peloponnesian War and could hardly be trusted after Knidos. This was no time to allow them to escape the dire consequences of their perfidy. Only the Athenians shared Persian aims in the Aegean, and they could only serve at the pleasure of the King. In short, no other Athenian could function for both Athenians and Persians like a latter-day Alkibiades. Konon enjoyed a stronger position than his predecessor in that he was untainted by the stigma of an exile. No one else then in Athens better embodied Atheno-Persian unity.¹³

¹³ Andok. 3 on which see Jebb, *Attic Orators*, I.81–83; Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.12–15; Philochoros, *FGrH* 323 F149, on which see Jacoby, *FGrH* IIIb (Sup) 1.516; Plato *Menexenos* 245d–e, on which see S. Tsitsidiris, *Platons Menexenos* (Stuttgart and Leipzig 1998); Dem. 10.34; 19.277–279; Ps.-Plut. *Mor.* 835A. Date: Philochoros and Demosthenes, who are mutually supportive. Dem. (10.34) speaks of past Persian efforts to help the Athenians, which he contrasts with their current ungrateful rejection of his friendly advances. Only Konon's role in the rebuilding of the walls fits the first occasion, for between 392 and 386 the Athenians and Persians were enemies.

E. Badian, *Georgica*, Institute of Classical Studies, Bulletin Sup. 58 (1991) 25–43, needlessly complicates the matter. He claims (31) that Philochoros F149a “clearly refers to the Peace of 387/6”. Yet this part of the fragment, in addition to giving the archon-date, provides the reasons for the subsequent rejection of the treaty, mentions the conference in Sparta, and names Andokides as an ambassador, a man who was in exile in 386. In fact, none of the Athenian ambassadors of 392 thereafter reappears in the historical record. Badian bolsters his interpretation by correctly pointing out that Andokides in his speech never mentions the clause that gave the Asian Greeks to the King. Andokides surely did not wish to remind the Athenians of that. Nonetheless, traces of the clause remain in the speech, and Badian errs in not recognizing the significance of the provision relating to the islanders, which was connected with the status of the Asian Greeks. When Andokides (3.12) mentions that Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros were to remain Athenian, the only reasonable conclusion is that the other islanders were to be autonomous (3.16). When the orator admits (3.15, 19) that the Athenians could not expect to regain their foreign possessions, he could only have referred to the Greeks of Asia Minor (see *IG*

The arrival in Sardeis of the Allied delegations introduced a whole new element to the negotiations. No longer a matter solely of peace between Sparta and Persia, the Allies now thrust the general issue of the war in Greece into the forefront of the discussion. The question of Greek autonomy came particularly to the fore. In 392 the Persians and Spartans applied autonomy to the Greeks of Asia and the Aegean in a specific and mutually accepted way, one that went back to the middle of the fifth century. According to the so-called Peace of Kallias, the Greek cities remained free to govern their local affairs so long as they paid tribute to the King and lived obediently under his suzerainty. The Athenians, not the Persians, had abused these notions. In 411 the Spartans had officially recognized that Asia was the King's to do with as he pleased. Yet a distinction remained between the Asian Greeks and the islanders. The former still formally belonged to the King to whom they owed their traditional obligations. The islanders, however, had not been the subjects of Persia. Hence, they neither paid tribute nor were under Persian rule. In 394 Pharnabazos had voluntarily refrained, for his own immediate political purposes and doubtless through custom, from fortifying their akropoleis (see above). Despite these differences, both groups of Greeks were considered autonomous in that they enjoyed their internal affairs according to their ancestral practices.¹⁴

Concerning the islanders, the enigmatic Coinage Alliance, which refuses to fit into any tidy category, adds its own curious element to the issue. As will be recalled (see p. 133), it consisted of both

II² 28; *SIG*³ 126; Rhodes-Osborne, *GHI* 18). Since the Athenians accepted the King's Peace of 386 (Bengtson, *SdA* II².242), while having rejected that of 392, F149a cannot refer to the former. Badian also dissociates the meeting at Sardeis with the subsequent one at Sparta by objecting that the King had not sent down the peace. He is probably technically right, but the Greeks could certainly expect his satrap to echo his long-known will on an issue publicly avowed since the end of the Peloponnesian War: see Thuc. 8.58; Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.20, 4.25; 4.8.1; Ktesias, *FGrH* 688 F30. Particularly supportive of this view is the example of Ariobarzanes and Philiskos in 368: Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.27. One last word is pertinent: Antalkidas routinely handled all known Spartan negotiations with the King until his death: W. Judeich, *RE* 1 (1894) 2344–2346. He became so associated with these treaties that modern confusion becomes understandable. Nevertheless, there should be no doubt that Philochoros F149a belongs only in 392.

¹⁴ The purported "Peace of Kallias" is no more than a fourth-century Athenian forgery, despite E. Badian, *From Plataea to Potidaea* (Baltimore and London 1993) ch. 1. 411: Thuc. 8.58. R. Seager and C. Tuplin, *JHS* 100 (1980) 141–154. See also Thuc. 8.18.1, 43.3–4; Gomme, *HCT* V.41, 90–91, for Persian claims beyond Asia. Pharnabazos: Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.1.

islanders and Asian Greeks, each of which felt entitled to establish an independent diplomatic union. Yet technically the Asian Greeks were not sovereign, whereas the islanders formally were. In reality the alliance was a short-lived instrument of no lasting political significance, but it nevertheless proved theoretically that autonomy was compatible with membership in a league of states. It matters little that the alliance was apparently a simple arrangement, not a highly structured organization like the Peloponnesian League or the Boiotian Confederacy; the principle of free political association is the same. The right of autonomous islanders to form a broad league would later be clearly and publicly broadcast in the creation of the Athenian Confederacy in 377. The combination of the two concepts of autonomy and the right to political membership in a league proved unimportant in the case of the Coinage Alliance, but the question would cause considerable difficulties when applied to the federations of mainland Greece, as the conference at Sardeis would quickly demonstrate.

The Allied ambassadors found Antalkidas and Tiribazos in general agreement, and the terms of the proposed peace between them pretty much set. The Allies immediately realized that such a peace endangered them, and undercut their new policy of co-operation with Pharnabazos. Having accepted his money and energetically renewed the war, they found themselves abandoned and their basic concerns left dangling in the air. The situation demanded nothing less than the complete reappraisal of the situation in Greece and the Aegean basin. The specific topics included the Argive-Corinthian union, the political legitimacy of the Boiotian Confederacy, and the waxing power of Athens. These new issues guaranteed that any settlement reached would prove different both from the treaty that had ended the Peloponnesian War and also from the accord then being negotiated between Sparta and Persia. At heart in 392 would lie the application of the concept of autonomy to basic Allied concerns.

In these circumstances the autonomy-clause assumed a new and unprecedented significance. The very definition of autonomy became a vital issue. Nothing more need be added to Persian views on the subject. The Spartans had often officially insisted upon its importance without, however, having articulated to any degree their meaning of it. Hence, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, the Spartans had demanded that the Athenians give their allies autonomy, and their intentions can be discerned by the trenchant Athenian response.

Perikles promised to allow Athenian allies autonomy, when the Spartans allowed their own allies to be autonomous, by which he meant that they should have the type of government that they desired and not necessarily the one that pleased the Spartans. The Athenians thereby defined the right of a city to determine its own form of government without external compulsion as autonomy. The Spartans held a concept of autonomy that they denied the Athenians. The problem stands out starkly: the Spartans demanded of other Greeks an autonomy that they themselves refused to grant to their own allies. The Spartans allowed autonomy in local affairs but demanded obedience in foreign policy. For them necessity and hypocrisy forged a union. The fullest example of Spartan purport comes from the conclusion of the Thirty Years' Truce between Sparta and Argos in 418, wherein the Spartans stipulated that all of the cities in the Peloponnesos, both great and small, should be autonomous according to ancestral custom. Furthermore, Spartan allies outside the Peloponnesos should be just the same as the Spartan and Argive allies, all holding their own possessions. In this case, autonomy involved political life governed by traditional usage and security of property. More to the immediate point Agesilaos had explained to Tissaphernes his concept of autonomy as recently as 395, when he declared that the cities of Asia should be autonomous just as those were in his part of Greece. He clearly meant the terms of 418. Therefore, according to Spartan diplomatic usage autonomy meant a city's right to its unimpeded governance of its own lands according to its own chosen form of government. The question of its voice in its own foreign affairs does not arise. This vague concept obviously allowed for manifold and possibly differing interpretations of what constituted possessions, how tradition was defined, and who was the final arbiter of these questions. There could be, and were to be, as many interpretations as interpreters. The evidence presented above demands the conclusion that autonomy was more of a vague notion than a political tenet. Since nothing was certain, a mere declaration of or appeal to autonomy could prove meaningless. At worse, it could become a pretext for intervention and interference in the internal affairs of another city.¹⁵

¹⁵ Autonomy: M. Ostwald, *Autonomia* (New York 1982); M. Hansen, in M. Hansen and K. Raafaub, *Studies in the Ancient Greek Polis* (Copenhagen 1995) 21–43. Perikles:

None of the differences now before the principals was simple, as the union of Argos and Corinth readily demonstrated. As already seen (Ch. 0), the Argives claimed that at the request of certain Corinthians they had intervened in a *stasis* to guarantee the safety and political rights of the oppressed. The Spartans, and even some of the Athenians, however, claimed that the Argives had militarily overwhelmed the city, and were even then holding it as conquered territory. The Argives claimed that they were upholding autonomy, the Spartans that they had suppressed it. In 392 The Spartans put the definition of autonomy in the hands of the King, who would naturally define it to his satisfaction. This situation held wider ramifications as to the solidarity of the Alliance. A decision against the Argives raised the certainty that Thebes and Athens must decide between peace at the expense of Argive and Corinthian interests. This dilemma involved the very solidarity of the Alliance.

Another aspect of this common concern involved the case of Orchomenos and the Boiotian Confederacy, which added its own peculiar complications. The Confederacy had served as a loyal, if somewhat wilful, ally of Sparta throughout the Peloponnesian War; and the treaty ending it had effectively recognized its right to exist as a political body. The outbreak of the Corinthian War altered the political status of neither. The change came in 395, when the Spartans received the adherence of Orchomenos as a Boiotian rebel, not as a prize of war. They thus denied, in the face of their previous policy, the legitimacy of the Boiotian Confederacy, which meant therefore that Orchomenos could not enjoy autonomy as a member of it. In Spartan eyes, then, the Confederacy violated the basic requirements of autonomy by denying its members the right voluntarily to live under a form of government that they considered traditional. The Thebans responded that they were only trying to liberate a rebellious and now occupied member of the Confederacy. They could easily defend their position by proving that the Confederacy was an ancestral form of government with a long history, proven by its many treaties with other states and its federal coinage. They could also prove it a voluntary association by referring to its common institutions shared by all members and their willing participation in its

Thuc. 1.144.1, cp. 1.19. Sparta and Argos; Thuc. 5.77.5, 7; Bengtson, *SdA* II².194. Agesilaos: Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.5; Bengtson, *SdA* II².220.

re-establishment in 447. Regarding Orchomenos itself, they could point to the prominent part that it had played in those very events. So, the Thebans could readily establish that Orchomenos' federal citizenship was both voluntary and traditional, and that no one, with the possible exception of the Spartans, had violated its autonomy. This tension between federalism and autonomy proved virtually intractable. The basic question was whether a city by voluntarily joining a union of other cities thereby surrendered any of its autonomy to that federation. If it did, did its residual autonomy nonetheless permit it to secede from that association without the consent of the other members. They had all entered into a mutual contractual agreement. Since the city had enjoyed the rights, privileges, and benefits of that association, did it also owe its fellow members certain reciprocal responsibilities. Free combination of cities logically dictated that only their fellow members possessed the right to answer these questions and that Sparta as an outsider had no legitimate grounds for intervention in them. Even though the Spartans rationalized that Orchomenos could freely change its mind about membership, a position that they would support, nothing gave them the legal right to interfere in the internal affairs of the Boiotian Confederacy or to pose as the arbiters of autonomy. The King likewise had none. On these grounds, the Thebans correctly rejected the enemy's position as irrelevant, unwarranted, and unjustified. Once again, however, power, not principle, would decide the matter.¹⁶

For the Athenians autonomy formed only one part of the uncomfortable situation in which they found themselves. The other parts included their broken peace treaty with Sparta and their ardent desire to build a new maritime empire. First, the Athenians dreaded a treaty that re-affirmed the instrument of surrender, for it would presumably entail the loss of their new walls and fleet, both still under construction. The recent acquisition of Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros presented an additional source of worry because it openly flew in the face of the clause calling for the autonomy of the islanders. On these points alone the Athenians had violated one treaty, and

¹⁶ In general see J.A.O. Larsen, *TAPA* 86 (1955) 40–50; *CP* 55 (1960) 9–18; J. Ducat, *BCH* 97 (1973) 59–73; J.P. Michaud, *BCH* 98 (1974) 644–645; M.H. Hansen, in M.H. Hansen, ed., *Sources for the Ancient Greek City-State* (Copenhagen 1995) 13–63; A.C. Keen, in M.H. Hansen with K. Raaflaub, eds., *More Studies in the Ancient Greek Polis* (Stuttgart 1996) 113–125.

were at odds with that under consideration. In addition, they strenuously opposed the clause that recognized the King's right to rule the Greeks of Asia. As a traditional element of Persian policy, it should not have surprised them; but they disliked its reiteration, especially when it now entailed full Spartan support. The clause stood squarely in the way of the new empire, for the sake of which alone the Athenians must reject it. To justify themselves they found it useful propaganda to call for "the freedom of the Greeks of Asia". For the Athenians this specious slogan only concealed their imperialistic designs. It stands as no proof that by 392 they had learned much from their recent defeat, but it provided them with a nobly gaseous excuse to reject a treaty that could eradicate all of their gains made since the outbreak of the Corinthian War.¹⁷

The envoys set about grappling with these problems, and to judge by subsequent events they made certain serious compromises. The exceptions were the Argives and Corinthians, who refused to budge at all from their position. The Thebans likewise rejected the idea of abolishing their confederacy, nor would the Athenians countenance the surrender of the islands of Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros and the abandonment of the Greeks of Asia. The Spartans and Persians yielded nothing to the Argives and Corinthians. Their union presented a serious threat to Sparta's strategical position while defying all previous concepts of Greek autonomy. The Thebans, however, accepted the secession of Orchomenos on the explicit understanding that the rest of the confederacy would remain intact. The concession was small for them inasmuch as they had already lost the city anyway. The Athenians drove a harder bargain, insisting that they retain their walls, fleet, and the three islands to which the Spartans and Persians acceded. The Athenians also assumed that the new peace superceded the instrument of surrender, thereby leaving them free to re-arm fully and to strive for their previous naval pre-eminence. The clause covering the Greeks, however, blocked their course to empire. This obstacle was the essential point of disagreement

¹⁷ Andok. 3.1, 12, 14; see also *IG II²* 30. Andokides (3.15) also warns the Athenians against trying to rebuild the empire, the desire for which forms the heart of Isokrates' *Panegyrikos*; see also Lysias 2.57. C. Mathieu, *Les Idées politiques d'Isocrates* (Paris 1925) 51–64; E. Buchner, *Der Panegyrikos des Isokrates* (Wiesbaden 1958); C. Eucken, *Isokrates*, (Berlin and New York 1983); D. Grieser-Schmitz, *Die Seebundpolitik Athens in der Publizistik des Isokrates* (Bonn 1999).

between the Athenians and their opponents, but the Athenian delegates at least gave it serious consideration. Their decision was wise, for the fleet upon which they depended was Pharnabazos', not theirs. The various ambassadors had made enough progress to see the value of further negotiations. With the exception of the Spartans none of the others had received full discretionary power to conclude a formal peace, which made their positions tentative and subject to endorsement by their home governments. The Allies felt that the concessions were promising enough to submit to their countrymen, and on that basis a second assembly was scheduled at Sparta to hear the Persian response to the preliminary discussions. On that understanding the delegates returned to Greece.¹⁸

Upon their return, the various embassies reported to their governments, which agreed to meet in Sparta to decide upon the treaty. The document contained the following clauses: the Greek cities of Asia were to be autonomous; the cities of Greece, both large and small, also to be autonomous; Corinth to be independent of Argos; Orchomenos from the Boiotian Confederacy; Athens to keep its walls, fleet, Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros; and lastly Sparta to establish peace with its present enemies. The Argives and Corinthians flatly rejected the terms and urged the same course on their Allies, their opposition threatening to divide the union. Satisfied with the compromise reached at Sardeis, the Thebans willingly agreed to the peace. Having been unable to dislodge the Spartan mora stationed

¹⁸ Since Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.15 gives the impression that negotiations ended at Sardeis with a general rejection of the peace, some explanation of his account is necessary. First, he warns (*Hell.* 4.8.1) that in this section of his history he would record only what he considered important. Because ultimately nothing came of this phase of the peace efforts, he narrated only the major clauses and the reasons for their rejection. He nonetheless continues his description of subsequent events. He has merely compressed them, not necessarily suppressed details in order to misrepresent them. Seen in this light, nothing in his narrative contradicts the details found in Andokides and Philochoros nor they his. Rather, they are each complementary. Xenophon leaves the meeting in Sparta untreated because he did not record futile peace negotiations, as witnessed by his silence on Ktesias' embassy (*FGH* 688 F30) and his refusal to explain why the Boiotians and others sent envoys to Agesilaos in 390 (*Hell.* 4.5.6). Furthermore, a very similar and successful conference at Sparta in 387/6 would settle all of these matters and to that occasion he devotes his attention. Pertinent also is Xenophon's inadequacy as a diplomatic historian, as demonstrated by his failure to give the full details of the instrument of surrender in the Peloponnesian War—indeed the reader learns more about its clauses from Andokides' *On the Peace*—nor any one of the Common-Peace treaties.

at Orchomenos, they satisfied themselves in the safety and integrity of the rest of the Confederacy.

Only in Athens did the peace terms spark any other serious differences of opinion, with some eager to continue on the road to empire and others hesitant to try an uncertain future. The composition of the new embassy provides the only reliable indication of public opinion. The Athenians sent to Sparta a delegation consisting of some of their most prominent men. Their leading figure was the orator Andokides, who had been accused of having mutilated the herms in 415, but proved nonetheless loyal to the democracy. In 411 he was imprisoned by the Four Hundred, and returned to full public life only after the Peloponnesian War. By 392 his youthful exuberance had given way to a more moderate approach to foreign affairs. He favored peace because it guaranteed recent gains. Of the others little specific can be said. The only exception is Epikrates, a champion of the Athenian democracy, one of those who had marched onto Athens from Piraeus. He had taken Timokrates' gold to begin the Corinthian War, and was a staunch advocate of an aggressive Athenian foreign policy. He was obviously a politician who identified Athenian interests with those of Persia, and was no friend of Sparta. He had served as an ambassador to the King probably in 394, but was known more for his fondness for royal gifts and his beard than any other diplomatic ability. The Athenians may have elected him to the mission to balance Andokides' pro-Spartan inclinations. Euboulides was the last member of the embassy about whom anything is known, and he only as the archon of 394/3. His colleague, Kratinos of Sphettos, is likewise as unknown as his political views. Modern attempts to find any broader political affiliations of these men to other Athenian public figures have invariably led to more speculation than enlightenment. The bestowal on these envoys of full authority to accept or reject the treaty without reference to the assembly—an almost unheard of decision—stands as a puzzling sign of the political climate. The demos either then trusted them implicitly or felt a strong sense of self-confidence to invest them with a trust as great as their power. The Athenians may well have felt that their recent achievements could win them further concessions.¹⁹

¹⁹ Philochoros, *FGrH* 328 F149.a. Epikrates: Ar. *Ekkl.* 71; Plato com. fr. 119; *Hell. Ox.* 10.2; Dem. 19.277–280; Plut. *Pel.* 30.12. J. Kirchner, *RE* 6 (1907) 119.

At the peace conference the Spartans proposed the terms upon which the Thebans apparently and the Athenians certainly agreed. The Argives and Corinthians stood firmly opposed. Despite the plenipotentiary powers granted them, Andokides and his colleagues refused to exercise them from fear of subsequent domestic disapproval and punishment. Instead they preferred that the assembly make the final decision. The Spartans accordingly permitted the Athenians a period of forty days in which officially to ratify the treaty. On that basis Andokides and his colleagues returned home accompanied by a Spartan delegation to explain the situation and to receive the oaths. Despite Andokides' defense of the pact, many Athenians objected to it, ostensibly out of fear for the safety of the existing constitution. Peace coming so soon after the Peloponnesian War may give some explanation for the hesitation, but in view of the recent diplomatic dealings, it sounds decidedly suspicious. Athenian orators objected most strenuously to the clause granting the Greeks of Asia to the King, but this too was doubtless only a blind for the real reason for dissatisfaction—their refusal to abandon dreams of empire. Andokides had clearly realized the strength of this feeling, and indeed it explains why he refused to use his sweeping powers in Sparta. Despite their opportunity further to negotiate and to amend the treaty, the Athenians rejected the entire peace on the basis of this one clause. Another blow to it came from Kallistratos of Aphidna, soon to become one of the most prestigious politicians in Athens, who indicted all of the ambassadors for having betrayed vital Athenian interests. The condemnation and punishment of these men for having scrupulously done their duty provides a cold look at the Athenian politics of the moment. By defying Sparta and Persia, the Athenians placed their immediate hopes on Konon and Pharnabazos, presumably expecting to win enough time to rebuild a fleet of their own, for which they needed the resources of the islanders and the Asian Greeks.²⁰

Euboulides: J. Kirchner, *RE* 6 (1907) 869. For the difficulties of establishing precise political affiliations among the public figures involved, see Strauss, *Athens*, 136–143, and Jacoby, *FGH* IIIb (Sup) 1.518–521; Develin, *AO* 212–213.

²⁰ *Autokrateia* of the envoys: Andok. 3.33–35. Written orders of the assembly: Andok. 3.35; power of the assembly to amend the agreement; Andok. 3.40. Even when the demos gave specific written instruction to their embassies, the envoys often possessed wide discretionary powers, a good example of which is the later embassy to receive Philip's oath to ratify the Peace of Philokrates (Aisch. 2.104, and below

There remained the Persian and Spartan responses to these events, of which none was weightier than Tiribazos'. Although the chronology of these events is so uncertain that only a tentative reconstruction is possible, no pressing reasons forced Tiribazos to take active measures himself until the failure of the peace. The Athenian rejection of it caused repercussions more serious than the Athenians could then have imagined possible. Their implied desire to liberate or dominate—their distinction is unclear—the Asian Greeks defied a major tenet of Persian policy. The situation forced the Persians to reassess their Greek alignments. The Spartans seemed no longer the threat that the Athenians had begun to pose. Displeased by the Athenian disruption of his plans, Tiribazos in 391 supplied Antalkidas with money for a Spartan fleet to operate against Pharnabazos'. In fine, two Persian satraps financed two different Greek fleets—the one under an Athenian admiral, the other under Spartan command—to pursue two different policies. Pharnabazos' ambitions were inscrutable to the point of the sinister. Tiribazos, however, followed traditional Persian policy. He struck the first blow against his potential rival by summoning Konon to discuss the changed situation in the Aegean. Fully aware of Konon's goals, he imprisoned the Athenian for having wronged the King. He next reported direct to Artaxerxes, denouncing Konon as a renegade and telling him of his own dealings with the Spartans and their response. He then left the entire matter in the hands of the King. Artaxerxes' reaction came as a surprise. The Athenian rejection of his peace treaty notwithstanding, he entirely rejected Tiribazos' conduct, and replaced him with Strouthas, an advocate of the Athenians. Strouthas energetically supported Athens and its allies but not at the expense of Persian interests. He also distrusted Sparta because of Agesilaos' depredations in Asia Minor. The King's reasons pose a harder problem. Clearly not yet alarmed by Athenian schemes and still trustful of Pharnabazos, he disbelieved the sincerity of the Spartans who had betrayed him after the Peloponnesian War. He remained unpersuaded that one defeat had taught them to honor their oaths. Some nine years of warfare could

p. 447). Aischines and the others were empowered to do whatever good they could: see also *IG II²* 43 lines 74–75, 116 lines 46–47, for the same clause. U. Kahrstedt, *Studien zum öffentlichen Recht Athens*, II (Stuttgart 1936) 276–277, concludes that no embassy enjoyed full powers; see also M.H. Hansen, *The Athenian Assembly* (Oxford 1987) 113–114; *The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes* (Oxford 1991) 156–157.

not be ignored because of current promises. His decision to continue his anti-Spartan policy can now be seen as mistaken, but the issue was not so clear then. Furthermore, it was a mistake that he could always rectify rather easily, and at the very least he still had his Greek enemies at one another's throats. Given Strouthas' genuine concern for the King's domain, he could reasonably expect his satrap to defend it against all predators, the Athenians included. Despite the King's stand, Tiribazos' venture at least succeeded at ending Konon's career. Although Konon managed to escape to Euagoras in Cyprus, there he died a natural death. His passage from the scene opened the way to younger Athenian leaders, men with little or no experience of the Peloponnesian War, who learned that working with the Persians for limited gains brought greater results than trying completely to overthrow them. The days of Kimon and Perikles were past, those of Alexander yet to begin.²¹

B. THE WAR REKINDLES (391–386 BC)

The failure of the peace efforts sparked in 391 the resumption of active hostilities, which took the form of renewed Spartan invasions of the King's lands and a fresh burst of Athenian naval activity throughout the eastern Aegean. Euagoras' efforts to build an independent kingdom in Cyprus further complicated the situation. He expected and obtained Athenian help, which was unlikely to endear them to the King. The revival of war thus drew in an additional factor, but one that at least did not directly involve Sparta.

The Spartans responded to this situation by reverting to their original policy of 400, of a land attack against the coastal areas of Asia Minor. They had learned a dire lesson at Knidos that they dared not repeat. Yet Agesilaos' successes there before the Corinthian War,

²¹ Tiribazos and Konon: Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.16–17; Lysias 19.39–41; Isok. 4.145; Diod. 14.85.4; Neos *Con.* 5.3–4. Strouthas: *IG* II² 21. Theopompos, *FGH* 115 F105 (see also Nepos *Chab.* 3.4), observes that the new Athenian commanders like Chabrias, Timotheos, Iphikrates, and Chares, among whom he includes Konon for his Cyprian connections, preferred to pursue their lives abroad in their own private domains, a far cry from striving to overthrow the Persian Empire. Theopompos typically ascribes this phenomenon to their love of licentiousness, but none of them took very active service against the King. Pritchett, *GSW* II.100–101; M.A. Flower, *Theopompus of Chios* (Oxford 1994) 150–152.

though limited, had at least shown promise. So inspired by the promises of a land campaign, the Spartans decided to resume operations in Ionia, making Ephesos, as before, their principal base. Strangely enough, however, they did not again assign the command to Agesilaos, a veteran of the fighting there and one thoroughly acquainted with its military and political situation. The decision not to send Agesilaos still puzzles. His rival Antalkidas' policy of rapprochement with Persia had failed, the king had promised the Greeks of Asia that he would return, and he had mended from the wounds suffered at Koroneia. Perhaps the most satisfactory explanation stems from the home government's unease and insecurity now that Pharnabazos had strengthened the Allied position at Corinth. Nonetheless, it certainly seems as though Agesilaos showed no particular eagerness to hold this command. For whatever reason, the Spartans selected Thibron, whose previous campaign in Asia had borne the marks only of incompetence and failure, to command the new expedition. The selection illustrates the poverty of Spartan strategical thinking. After nine years of war, the Spartans still had not devised a rational, coherent, and successful plan to defeat Persia in its westernmost provinces, much less to liberate the Greeks from Persian control. The Spartans had learned nothing. The choice of Thibron to command the new effort bespoke new failure.²²

Athenian strategy reverted to the simple and traditional object of regaining full control of the grain route through the Hellespont, which in 391 would probably prove to be easy. Although Derkylidas still held Sestos and Abydos, he was isolated by land and sea, vulnerable, lacking in naval forces, and incapable of doing more than holding his own. The question of Byzantion was slightly more complicated. It still presumably remained a member of the Coinage Alliance insofar as that mattered. The strength of Pharnabazos and Konon in the area and the weakness of Sparta dictated Athenian collaboration with the city. The resolution of internal affairs there, the old tension between pro-Spartan oligarches and pro-Athenian democrats, would decide the city's allegiance. The Thracian coast also offered the Athenians considerable scope to expand their influence in the north. They had successfully wooed the Thracians since 394, thus making their presence favorably felt. For their part, the Thracians

²² Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.17. Beloch, *GG* III².1.84; III².2.223; Funke, *Homonoia und Arche*, 94.

had little love for Derkylidas and the Spartans, owing to his operations in the Chersonesos in 398. In sum, at the moment no other area loomed more vital to the Athenians than the northern Aegean both to ensure the safety of their grain route and to secure a base of their efforts to re-establish their empire.²³

In 391 the Spartans sent Thibron again to invade the King's territory, where they all repeated their previous mistakes. Their preparations were on the same scale as previous ventures. Thibron had 8000 men under his command, whom he was to augment with local levies. Material and funding sufficed to fit out the expeditionary force but proved as inadequate to sustain it as in earlier failed adventures. Even Agesilaos, commanding a similar force, had accomplished little more than splendid and profitable raids yet nothing more enduring. His repulse at Sardeis proved that even an abler general than Thibron could neither take fortified cities nor hold extensive tracts of enemy territory. Against Thibron stood Strouthas at Sardeis, *karanos* of Asia Minor, well supplied with the necessities of real war. Once again the Persians held a decisive superiority in cavalry, which meant that any Spartan gains would prove limited and tentative. Strouthas had decried Agesilaos' earlier depredations of the King's domain, and he was now keen to exact retribution from Thibron. In effect, the Spartans sent an inept leader with insufficient supplies into a dire situation against superior odds.²⁴

Thibron sailed direct to Ephesos, which meant that the city was no longer a member of the Coinage Alliance, which could not have survived this extensive renewal of war. Given its superb strategical position, it is difficult to explain how Pharnabazos and Konon could have let it slip from their grip. The blunder was major, for without Ephesos the Spartans could not realistically mount a serious campaign in Asia Minor. Genuine Ephesian sympathy with Sparta proves an obvious answer, but does not explain the lapse. Thibron immediately secured the city by seizing the surrounding area of Isinda and lofty Mt. Solmissos some seven kilometers southeastwards of it. Like Derkylidas before him, he also occupied Priene, the fortress of Achilleion near Smyrna, and Leukophrys, the site of an Artemision

²³ Hellespont: Dem. 18.241. Derkylidas: Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.5–6, 31–32; see also 3.2.8–10 and pp. 161–162. Thrace: *IG* II² 17, 24.

²⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.12, 17; Diod. 14.99.1–2. V. Ehrenberg, *RE* 6A (1936) 274–275.

by a lake of fresh water. Although he had secured the western Maeander Valley, he had not advanced far inland. Instead he began plundering the immediate countryside, from the proceeds of which he minted coins for his troops. His conduct of the war was typical of Spartan commanders, and he clearly had formed no coherent plan to defeat Strouthas. Nor had he learned anything from his previous mistakes. The decision to plunder the countryside testifies to the bankruptcy of his military thinking. Only the defeat of the enemy in battle promised him any hope of larger success. Nothing of the sort having occurred to him, he conducted his raids in a desultory, disorganized, and languid manner. Both strategy and success eluded him.²⁵

Meanwhile Strouthas bided his time, allowing Thibron to plunder at will, while he assembled his forces. When ready, he led out an army supposedly some 25,500 strong. Despite the wonted uncertainties about ancient military strengths, the Persians doubtless enjoyed a huge superiority in cavalry and light-armed troops best able to conduct swift, open warfare against a disorganized enemy. Strouthas' hoplites stood in support, should the enemy rally. Finally, when he found Thibron's men plundering in disorder and their van few in number, he sent in his cavalry, which took the Spartans completely by surprise. The attack found Thibron himself not even in the field. He was instead amusing himself by throwing the discus, while his troops suffered utter rout and considerable loss. Some survivors made their escape either back to their camp or to friendly cities, but they no longer posed a threat to Strouthas. Although this bold stroke threw the Spartans onto the defensive, they nonetheless kept their hold on the cities, which Strouthas forbore to attack. In one stroke, however, he had re-established the security of the wider lands, and put an inglorious end to still another inept Spartan invasion of Asia Minor. The Spartan government responded to the news by sending Diphridas, who had been ephor in 395, to Ephesos to assume command of Thibron's army. Although he attempted to carry the war to Strouthas, he succeeded only in capturing the Persian's daughter and Tigranes, his son-in-law, who were subsequently ransomed. With the money Diphridas hired mercenaries, but remained on the defensive. Diphridas had succeeded only in further antagonizing Strouthas

²⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.17; see also 3.2.17–19; Diod. 14.99.1–2; Steph. Byz. *Achilleios dromos*. Thibron's coinage: Pollux 3.86.

without bringing the war to a successful conclusion. His inability to achieve anything of note stands as yet another example of the utter failure of Spartan military thought.²⁶

Larger currents, however, were then stirring the southeastern Aegean. Ever since Konon had established democrats in power in Rhodes, the island had seethed with discontent. In 390 stasis broke out when pro-Spartan oligarchs successfully rose against the prevailing democracy and expelled its leaders and their followers. Realizing that complete victory had eluded them, the oligarchs appealed to the Spartans for help. The Rhodian embassy posed a dilemma to the Spartans. Reluctant to venture to sea again with their feeble navy, they could not, however, blithely ignore such a lucrative opportunity to win the allegiance of such a powerful naval state. The Rhodians offered them a major ally with little obvious risk. A friendly Rhodes would also strengthen the tenuous Spartan hold on the Asian coast, while denying the Athenians a strategically important naval friend. For all of these reasons the Spartans voted to send eight ships under the admirals Ekdikos and Philodokos to restore Spartan authority in the area. Reality, however, proved unkind. Diphridas scarcely held his own at Ephesos, and the attempt on Rhodes demanded greater resources than the Spartans could summon. Yet again ambition exceeded ability. For all that, Ekdikos dutifully sailed, putting in first at Knidos, another member of the Coinage Alliance to take sides in the renewed war. There he learned that though defeated in the city, the Rhodian democrats controlled the land. More ominously, they outnumbered him in triremes. His call for reinforcement spurred the home government to order Teleutias and his twelve ships to sail from the Corinthian Gulf to relieve Ekdikos. The Spartans could not have made a better choice. The victor of the naval battle off Lechaion in 392, Teleutias was a swashbuckler who fully appreciated the mobility and striking-power of a fleet. Bold by temperament, he sailed not immediately to Knidos but to Samos, from which he acquired seven more ships. Although the staunchest Athenian allies in the Aegean, the Samians now stood alone and unprotected. Nothing suggests that Teleutias overwhelmed the island, for which he lacked the resources, or that the Samians defected to the Spartan side. If, as will be seen,

²⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 4.18–44; Diod. 14.97.3, 99.2–3. Poralla, *Prosopographia*², 47, s.v. *Diphridas*.

Teleutias could not overrun Rhodes, where he had oligarchic friends, he could hardly be expected to conquer pro-Athenian Samos. He had, however, taken them by surprise, and necessity required immediate compliance with his demands. He next sailed to Knidos, where he took command of Ekdikos' eight ships, bringing his squadron to twenty-seven in number. Thus armed with a superiority of eleven ships, he continued direct to Rhodes. En route fortune smiled upon Teleutias' audacity. He chanced upon an Athenian flotilla of ten ships under Philokrates bound for Cyprus. The Athenians were trying to repay Euagoras for his earlier help by supporting his efforts to make the entire island his. Unaware of Teleutias' presence, Philokrates and his ships easily fell into Spartan hands. After reversing course to Knidos to sell his booty and fill his coffers, Teleutias next sailed back to Rhodes to intervene against the democrats. He failed, however, to drive them from the cities, which meant that the pro-Spartans held little more than a foothold on the island.²⁷

Stung and alarmed by Teleutias' victories, the Athenians dispatched the veteran Thrasyboulos of Steiria with forty ships to Rhodes, the largest Athenian naval expedition mounted since the end of the Peloponnesian war. Once at sea, he changed his mind, and instead of challenging Teleutias, sailed off to the Hellespont. Feeling that Rhodes faced no real danger, he considered the northern Aegean a far more pressing area for his regard. On both points he was right. Thrace presented internal problems that unavoidably involved the Greek cities of the infant Chalkidian League and Thasos farther to the east. The continued Spartan presence at Sestos and Abydos demanded urgent attention, as did the concomitant status of Byzantion. The question became whether Thrasyboulos could successfully extend Konon's policies throughout the entire northern Aegean. Upon reaching the Hellespont, Thrasyboulos found nothing to fear from Derkylidas, who remained content to hold Sestos and Abydos, thus allowing the Athenian to sail unhindered through these restricted waters. That settled, Thrasyboulos turned to the pressing problem of arranging

²⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.20–25; Diod 14.97.1–4. Euagoras: Theopompos, *FGH* 115 F103; Isok. 9; Diod. 14.9.3–4; alliance: Bengtson, *StA* II² 234. Since Euagoras' war with Artaxerxes is largely irrelevant to broader Greek history, it will not be treated here. See, however, Diod. 14.98.1–4, 110; 5; 15.2–4, 8–9.2. K. Spyridakis, *Euagoras I von Salamis* (Stuttgart 1935), and in general F.G. Maier, *CAH* VI² 297–336. Beloch, *GG* III².1.88, claims that the Spartans now conquered Samos.

peace between Amadokos I, king of Odrysian Thrace, and his rival Seuthes II. Amadokos ruled the main part of the kingdom, an area stretching from the Tonzos river (modern Tundja) in the north, to the Arteskos river (modern Arda) in the south, to the Hebros river (modern Maritsa), which included the cities of Abdera, Maroneia, and Ainos on the Aegean coast. Seuthes held the coastal area and the immediate hinterland west of the Propontis from Apollonia in the north to the Chersonesos in the south. Both men had dealt with Athens and Sparta alike since the last stages of the Peloponnesian War, when they had furthered Alkibiades' ambitions. Amadokos had generally maintained good relations with Athens, but Seuthes had supported one or the other side as circumstances dictated. As recently as 398 the latter had materially aided Derkyildas in Bithynia. This and his broader ambitions made Thrasyboulos, himself a veteran of Thracian affairs, eager to win him over. Trouble between the two Thracians erupted probably around 390, when Seuthes rose in open revolt from Amadokos. The turmoil gravely threatened Athenian interests in the entire area of the western Propontis, including Byzantium; and Thrasyboulos looked to his fleet to settle the problem. He arbitrated a settlement of their differences, the details of which are unknown, and enrolled them both as Athenian allies. Chabrias swore to the alliance with Seuthes, but nothing further is known of his part in this affair. The pact also mentioned Sparta, so no one could doubt against whom this agreement was made. Thrasyboulos also hoped that the Thracian treaty, together with the King's friendship, would persuade the Greek cities of the region to side with Athens, thus securing the entire route through the Hellespont and Propontis.²⁸

²⁸ Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.26; Lysias 28.5; Arist. *Pol.* 5.8.15; Diod. 14.94.2 Derkyildas: Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.5–6, 31–32. Amadokos: Xen. *Anab.* 7.2.32–33, 3.16, 7.3; Seuthes: Thuc. 4.101.5; Diod. 13.105.3; Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.5, 9. Thrasyboulos: Thuc. 8.62, 64.2; Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.12; Diod. 13.49, 72.2. Alliances: *IG* II² 21–22. Bengtson, *SdA* II².238. Although A. Fol, *Studia in honorem Veselini Beshevliev* (Sofia 1978) 429–434, dissociates Thrasyboulos from *IG* II² 21, attributing the arrangements instead to Chabrias, in 389/8 the latter was not then in northern waters. Furthermore, the contemporary Lysias 28.5, argues against it; see also Develin, *AO*, 215–216. Tonzos river: E. Oberhummer, *RE* 6A (1937) 1714; Arteskos: G. Rawlinson, *The History of Herodotus*, III (New York 1860) 69 n. 8. Hebros: E. Oberhummer, *RE* 7 (1912) 2588–2589. S. Casson, *Macedonia Thrace and Illyria* (Oxford 1926) 198–199; Z.H. Archibald, *The Odrysian Kingdom of Thrace* (Oxford 1998) 122–125. A major problem connected with understanding Thrasyboulos' campaign involves Xenophon, who true to his word (*Hell.* 4.8.1), does not give a complete account of it.

The Greek cities whose allegiance Thrasyboulos most desired were probably Selymbria and Perinthos in Seuthes' domain and Abdera, Maroneia, and Ainos in Amadokos'. Closely associated with the latter was Thasos, where Thrasyboulos had served during the Ionian war and with which the Athenians had renewed informal ties in 394. The Athenians at the moment gained nothing concrete from the cities on the Aegean coast, but Thrasyboulos took advantage of internal turmoil in Thasos to intervene there. Led by Ekphantos, the Thasians expelled their Spartan garrison and admitted the Athenians. Thrasyboulos immediately concluded an alliance with the victors, several of whom had maintained friendly ties with Athens. They had long waited to throw off Spartan rule, the opportunity for which Thrasyboulos' appearance provided. He probably at this time won the adherence of Samothrace and other places in the region. With Athenian influence growing among their neighbors, Amadokos' Greek cities probably also began to display pro-Athenian sentiments. At any rate, Thrasyboulos had greatly strengthened Athens' hand in the region.²⁹

The alliance with Thasos put the Athenians in closer touch with their Chalkidian allies, whose capital was Olynthos. In the early years of the fourth century Olynthos, the largest Greek city on the Thracian coast, had begun to create a league with surrounding cities, the details of which remain largely unknown. The Olynthians instituted *sympoliteia* with their nearest neighbors, which meant that they shared the same laws and rights of citizenship. Larger cities later joined the league. At the outbreak of the Corinthian War, the Chalkidian League had joined the Allies against Sparta, but had taken no active part in the fighting. The Olynthians instead devoted their ambition and energy to their own region. Around 393 Olynthian power received a significant boost, when the Macedonian king Amyntas concluded a treaty with the league that ensured mutual defense and trading agreements. Vital features included free export of pitch and ship-timber from Macedonia, both quite valuable commodities for the Athenians as well. The treaty prohibited both parties from establishing friendship with Amphipolis, Bottiaia, Akanthos, and Mende without mutual agreement. About the same time the Illyrians so hard

²⁹ Thrasyboulos: Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.22. Alliances: *IG* II² 24–25; Dem. 20.59. Selymbria and Perinthos: Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.20. Samothrace: Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.7; Thasos: Dem. 20.59.

pressed Amyntas that he ceded to the Olynthians his territory that bordered theirs. A hostile version of the story claims that the Olynthians seized Amyntas' cities by force, from which they extended their holdings as far west as Pella. In all probability, Amyntas put some cities under Olynthian protection, but his new friends intended to keep them as their own. The Olynthians also gained the adherence of Poteidaia on the isthmus of Pallene and the whole isthmus of Sithone, but the Greek cities of Akanthos and Apollonia in the Chalkidike remained adamantly independent of the Chalkidian League. In 390, then, Thrasyboulos' success in Thasos put his countrymen in closer proximity to their increasingly powerful Chalkidian allies than ever before. Thrasyboulos had now formed a tenuous but nearly unbroken line of Athenian influence from the Chalkidike to the Hellespont.³⁰

Thrasyboulos concluded his work in the northern Aegean by sailing to Byzantion, the key to the Athenian grain route. With forty triremes at his back he encountered no difficulty in overthrowing the oligarchic government there, which with the local support of Archebios and Herakleides he replaced with a democracy. He next imitated Alkibiades' example by farming out the tax of 10% levied on ships passing from the Pontos. He thereby not only controlled the grain route but also procured for Athens a steady source of revenue. Further to strengthen his position he also won the allegiance of Chalkedon on the Asian side of the straits. His own status had become so magnified that Ergokles, a fellow officer, supposedly advised him to assume the powers of a local potentate by keeping Byzantion and the fleet as his own and marrying Seuthes' daughter—in short to become a second Pausanias. Although the rumor is better left to the Athenian law court than to history, Thrasyboulos' work had proven strikingly successful, changing the whole strategical complexion of the war in one campaigning-season. Only Derkylidas remained as a nuisance, but one more closely isolated than before. In the eyes of his contemporaries Thrasyboulos had made the Athenians the masters of the Hellespont.³¹

³⁰ Early Chalkidic history: Thuc. 2.95–100; Diod. 14.82.3. Larsen, *GFS*, 58–78; M. Zahrnt, *Olynth und die Chalkidier* (Munich 1971) 80–90. Amyntas and Olynthos: Bengtson, *SdA* II².231; Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.12–13; Diod. 15.19.2–3. R.M. Errington, *A History of Macedonia* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1990) 31–32.

³¹ Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.27–30; Lysias 28.5; see also Ar. *Ploutos* 550; Dem. 20.60; Diod. 14.94.3. Alkibiades: Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.22.

Leaving Derkyllidas to vegetate, in 389 Thrasyboulos took the opportunity to strengthen Athenian influence along the Ionian coast and to reinforce his fleet. He now sailed towards Rhodes, supposedly his original objective. He first reached the small island of Tenedos, the population of which joined the Athenian side, and thence to Lesbos, where only Mytilene among the cities there had revolted from Sparta after the battle of Knidos. He advanced off Eresos, the coast of which is subject to stiff northeastern winds in the summer. There a storm caught him and wrecked twenty-three triremes. Undaunted, Thrasyboulos reached Mytilene; and taking 400 hoplites from his fleet, exiles from other Lesbian cities, and a force of Mytilenians, he urged them to capture the pro-Spartan cities individually rather than give them the opportunity to unite against his force. He then led his army against the Spartan garrison at Methymna, which was under the command of Therimachos. In the ensuing battle Thrasyboulos defeated the army of Spartans, Methymnians, and Mytilenian exiles. The victory brought Eresos and Antissa over to the Athenian side, but Methymna and other cities continued to resist him. The rest of his time in Lesbos he spent ravaging the countryside and exacting money for his force. His work in Lesbos done, Thrasyboulos added much-needed allied naval reinforcement from Chios and Mytilene to his squadron of seventeen triremes before sailing down the Ionian coast. He collected large sums of money along the way, the method of financing the fleet earlier used by Konon. At this point his finances posed a greater problem to him than his enemies. From Klazomenai and its suburb Chyton he extracted a duty of 5%, for which the Athenian demos duly honored them. They were, however, free of any other taxes. Thrasyboulos also left the Klazomenians to decide whether or not to receive an Athenian military governor and garrison. Obligated to honor the same treaty with Pharnabazos that Athenians did, they were otherwise to be free. Thrasyboulos was equally effective in collecting money from Halikarnassos among other cities, but his success was soon marred, when he learned that Ergokles had embezzled over thirty talents. Lack of funds meant the neglect of normal maintenance, and accordingly the number of serviceable ships dwindled. The combination of fiscal malfeasance and weathered ships reduced the fighting ability of the squadron and threatened to undo Thrasyboulos' work. Nonetheless, he pressed on to the Eurymedon river, the site of more glorious days for Athens. Here Thrasyboulos met a shabby death in his tent at the hands of the disgruntled

Aspendians. He had outraged them by extorting money for his fleet, a practice all too reminiscent of the fifth century. His surviving commanders took the bedraggled fleet on to Rhodes, where under the command of Agyrhios they carried the war to the oligarches. Although neither Sparta nor Athens won full control of the island, Rhodes henceforth played no significant part in the rest of the Corinthian War. For all that, Spartan influence still stretched from Samos and Ephesos in the north through Knidos to Rhodes. Not that all of these states were securely in Spartan hands, but at the very least Sparta had returned to the naval war.³²

Thrasyboulos' unexpected success in the Hellespont alarmed the Spartans, who could do little more at the time than blunt the danger. They were especially concerned about the effects of the friendship of the Hellespontine cities with their enemies Athens and Pharnabazos. They were surprised to discover that these cities took quite seriously all of the Spartan—and Athenian—noise about panhellenism and the freedom of the Asiatic Greeks. The power that could combine these concepts with actual local security would easily win their enthusiastic support. In response to this new challenge, the Spartans relieved Derkylidas of command, despite his knowledge, experience, and popularity. In his stead they appointed Anaxibios, who had served as *nauarchos* at Byzantion in 401 and who had enjoyed cordial dealings with Pharnabazos. They sent him to Abydos with three triremes and money to hire 1000 mercenaries, in all a very paltry force for the job ahead of it. The decision reflects the inability and the unwillingness of the home government to risk large forces in the region, especially in view of their failure yet to master Rhodes. As a result, Anaxibios' venture was virtually doomed to failure at the outset.³³

Upon reaching Abydos, Anaxibios collected his mercenaries and drew some additional strength from the Spartan harmosts who had fled to Derkylidas after Knidos. With this force he won some Aiolian cities to the Spartan side, and attacked others that had plagued

³² Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.3–31; Diod. 14.94.4, 99.405; Nepos *Thrasyb.* 8.3. Klazomenai: *IG II²* 28 (= Rhodes-Osborne, *GHI* 18); see also Thuc. 7.28.4. Chyton: see also Arist. *Pol.* 5.2.12; Strabo 14.1.36; Paus. 7.3.9; Steph. Byz. "Chyton". Halikarnassos: Lysias 28 and 29. Ergokles: Develin, *AO*, 214. Agyrrhois: Develin, *AO*, 215; Seager, *JHS* 87 (1967) 112–113.

³³ Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.31–32; Anaxibios: Poralla, *Prosopographie²*, 21. Best, *Thracian Peltasts*, 90–92.

Abydos. The fighting consisted solely of raids and skirmishes, but Anaxibios' inadequate means prevented him from doing more. At Abydos he added three more ships to his own, which proved sufficient to harry Athenian merchant shipping in the Hellespont. The Athenians reacted quickly but indecisively by dispatching Iphikrates with eight ships and some 1200 peltasts to the Chersonesos. Iphikrates and his men, all veterans of the fighting at Corinth and victors over the Spartan mora at Lechaion, were far superior to Anaxibios' motley band. Iphikrates lost no time engaging the Spartans in minor forays. When Anaxibios marched southwards to Antandros, some eighty kilometers away by the road over Mt. Ida, some forty-five kilometers longer along the coast, to establish a garrison there, Iphikrates crossed the Hellespont to lay an ambush for him. At a spot above both Abydos and the plain of Kremaste, where ancient remains have been reported, Anaxibios carelessly walked into the trap that Iphikrates sprang on him. In the ensuing clash Iphikrates' men killed Anaxibios together with almost 200 of his troops, twelve of the Spartan harmosts, and some fifty Abydene hoplites. Even though Iphikrates failed to take Abydos, he put an end to any Spartan threat from that direction.³⁴

For the Spartans the rest of 389 was consumed by desultory fighting at Aigina and extensive planning for the future. Anaxibios' failure proved that a greater, more comprehensive, and more systematic response was needed to stem the vigorous new Athenian naval enterprise. Nothing less than a wholesale re-evaluation of Spartan policy was essential. The land war was mired at Corinth, and Sparta could not win a naval war without first reaching some accommodation with Persia. Only Antalkidas, whose peace venture in 392 had come so close to success, was capable of tipping the scales. Then Konon, Pharnabazos, and Athenian confidence in its new navy had foiled Antalkidas' aspirations. Now Konon was gone, his and Pharnabazos' war against Sparta had raised the spectre of a new Athenian maritime empire, and the defeats of Thibron and Anaxibios proved that Sparta posed little threat to major Persian interests in the west. The

³⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.33–39; Plut. *Mor.* 219C; Polyain. 3.9.44; Excerpt 24.3. Spartan harmosts: Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.5. Antandros: G. Hirschfeld, *RE* 1 (1894) 2346; Gomme *et al.*, *HCT* V.356; Manfredi, *Senofonte Anabasi*, 336 n. 6; Lendle, *Kommentar zu Xenophons Anabasis*, 479–480. Personal observations of 5 June 2002. Kremaste: Thuc. 8.108.5. W.M. Leake, *On Some Disputed Questions of Ancient Geography* (London 1857) 18; L. Büchner, *RE* 11 (1922) 1707–1708.

opportunity beckoned to Antalkidas to push his policy again, especially when the situation offered an advantage unshared by any other Spartan. He was the natural choice because of his friendship with Tiribazos and Ariobarzanes, the one still satrap of Karia and the other of Daskyleion, which he combined with holdings in Ionia. Pharnabazos, of course, remained an obstacle, but even he was only one player in a levantine political game.³⁵

Over the winter of 389–388 Antalkidas and the home government formulated their plans for victory and peace. In the Peloponnesos Sparta enjoyed security, though its army could not reduce Corinth. Some of its allies were hard pressed and all were war-weary. The need to maintain a mora at Lechaion and another at Boiotian Orchomenos strained its resources in men and money. Developments farther north lay beyond its control, and further fighting on the mainland promised virtually nothing. According to tradition, Agesilaos opposed the new peace policy without having anything better to offer. He proved more than satisfied with its results once others had done the necessary dirty work to achieve it. For that matter, he had nothing better to suggest. Antalkidas proposed that the Spartans repeat their diplomatic offerings of 392, which, as will be remembered, included their surrendering of the Asian Greeks to the Persians, eschewing all designs for a naval empire in the Aegean, and the acceptance of a general peace in Greece under the King's auspices. In return for these concessions the King would cease his support of Athens; and promise, as in the days of Lysandros, to help destroy the Athenian navy. The Spartans added another old component of their policy by including an appeal to Dionysios of Syracuse for naval reinforcements, a safeguard should the overture to Persia fail. Like Hermokrates before him, Dionysios remained a staunch Spartan ally; and despite all of their attempts to woo him to their side, the Athenians never won his trust. Even his later alliance with them came only after they had already concluded an alliance with Sparta. Perhaps he feared that any resurrection of the Athenian navy might result in another attempt on Syracuse or from a sense of revenge

³⁵ Aigina: Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.1–2. Chronology, Poralla, *Prosopographie*², 53–54, 117, 167; Develin, *AO*, 216. Antalkidas and the Persians: Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.12–15; 5.1.28. Urban, *Der Königsfrieden*, 93–100. Ariobarzanes had also served with Pharnabazos: Xen. *Hell.* 1.4.6–7.

against Athens. Whatever the reason, he clearly thought that his security lay with his firm alliance with the faithful Spartans than the devious Athenians. He responded to the Spartan appeal by agreeing to send twenty ships.³⁶

The campaigning-season of 388 opened in the Aegean with renewed fighting at Aigina and elsewhere in the Saronic Gulf, which remained, however, a secondary affair. At the end of his term of office the Spartan admiral Hierax left twelve triremes and his vice-admiral Gorgopas at Aigina, while he returned to await Antalkidas, the new admiral. Upon entering office, Antalkidas sailed first to Aigina, where he ordered Gorgopas' squadron to join his fleet, and then continued on to Ephesos. Antalkidas had already formed a plan containing two parts, more subtle than anything that his rival Agesilaos or any other Spartan commander had yet devised. Safely arrived at Ephesos, he released Gorgopas' squadron to continue his harassing operations around Aigina. These served as diversions that threatened the Athenians in their home waters. The admiral himself decided to deliver the decisive blow in the Hellespont. He took the next step by putting his remaining twenty-five ships under his vice-admiral Nikolochos with instructions to sail to the relief of Abydos. Along the way the Spartan attacked Tenedos but pressed on northwards, now with an Athenian fleet of thirty-two ships under Iphikrates and Diotimos in pursuit. Although Nikolochos reached port safely, the Athenians blockaded him there. Concurrent events in the Saronic Gulf to the west proved more obviously effective and much more lively. Gorgopas took the war to Attika itself. His contingent of twelve ships defeated the Athenian admiral Eunomos off Cape Zoster (the modern Kavouri) in Attika, but was himself killed in action, when Chabrias happened to stop at Aigina. Chabrias' duty took him southwards to aid Euagoras, so things hung in the balance until the arrival of Teleutias to replace the fallen Gorgopas. The new commander immediately began a series of daring raids along the western coast of Attika as far south as Sounion. He chose Piraeus itself for his boldest stroke. He led a raid that penetrated as deep as the Deigma in the Kophos Limen, the quay where ships' wares were displayed. To these he helped himself

³⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 1.3.12; 5.1.26, 28; 7.1.18–22, 29–32; Diod. 15.47.7, 69–70.1, 72.3. Stroheker, *Dionysios I.*, 139–140. Urban, *Der Königsfrieden*, 94–95.

with gay abandon before sailing blithely out to sea. After further such exploits he retired to Aigina with spoils enough to keep his squadron fully manned and supplied. Swashbuckling as his feats were, they created more of a nuisance and embarrassment than a serious threat to Athenian commerce.³⁷

While these daring deeds took place in the Aegean, Antalkidas journeyed from Ephesos to meet with Tiribazos. Together they discussed the situation of the war, and quickly agreed to resume where they had left off in 392. From Sardeis the two travelled together eastwards to put their proposals before Artaxerxes. Very few details survived of what happened during the negotiations among Antalkidas, Tiribazos, Ariobarzanes, and Artaxerxes, but much can reasonably be surmised. Certain is the concert of purpose among Antalkidas and the two satraps. Certain also is the warm reception that Antalkidas found with Artaxerxes. Unlike the other Spartans with whom he had dealt, indirectly or in person, here the King saw a sophisticated, clever man fully capable of clearly and persuasively putting his country's case before the court. Antalkidas could not be blamed for previous hostile Spartan policy or for the depredations of Thibron, Derkylidas, and Agesilaos. Only he could point to his previous services in the cause of peace and reconciliation with Persia. No fault his that others had ignored or rejected his earlier advice. He could also candidly, accurately, and sincerely describe Sparta's overall strategic position in the war to draw the bald conclusion that the Spartans must concede by treaty what they could not win by arms. Sparta had much to lose and nothing to gain by prolonging the war, and in fact the Persians welcomed the end of an unwelcome conflict. Artaxerxes now saw the error of his ways. What he refused to see in 392 had become all too clear by 387, and now he had absolutely no reason to support Athens and to continue the war. He had begun it in 396 to destroy Spartan ambitions in Asia Minor, and he had raised Athens from defeat to achieve that goal. He had attained the one, which meant that he no longer needed to support the other. Indeed, he now confronted the necessity to crush the Athenian naval power that he and Pharnabazos had created. Artaxerxes required a second Aigospotamoi, and once again Sparta provided the logical

³⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.6–25; Lysias 19.50–51. Chabrias: Dem. 20.76; Nepos *Chab.* 2.2. Deigma and the Kophos Limen: Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.331. J. Day, *AJA* 31 (1927) 441–449; Garland, *Piraeus*, 154, 219.

agent to achieve it. For these reasons, in 387 the King took a position opposite that of 392, and so threw his weight to Sparta.³⁸

Only one impediment blocked the way to this shift in Persian policy and that was Pharnabazos, a man too exalted and popular to be cast aside dishonorably. Even so, he was only one man, and for all of his great stature he was not the King. Moreover, an honorable way of removing him stood readily at hand. It is probably not too cynical to suggest that precisely and conveniently at this time Artaxerxes decided to recall Pharnabazos in order for him to marry Apama, one of the King's daughters, which he himself ardently desired. At court the erstwhile satrap would find himself highly honored but largely impotent regarding the Greeks. Perhaps again not by accident Artaxerxes also promised Tiribazos Amestris, another of his daughters, a promise never fulfilled. Whether these machinations be historical or not, Pharnabazos was recalled at this time, not to return to the west until well after the end of the Corinthian War. Even then he conducted the war against the rebellious Egyptians. Greek affairs no longer belonged to his sphere. In 387 Antalkidas obtained everything and indeed more than what he failed to gain in 392. Furthermore, he now enjoyed the support both of the King and his home government. He had also cut the Allies from Persian support.³⁹

C. THE WAR'S END AND THE KING'S PEACE (387–386 BC)

The terms of the alliance, the nature of the future peace, and the strategy to achieve them all now settled, Antalkidas and the two satraps returned to the coast, where they launched the last stage of the Corinthian War. Antalkidas, in many ways a second Lysandros, thought in terms as large in military matters as in diplomatic. Like Lysandros, he planned a naval concentration of strength at the point most strategically vital to Athens and also the most vulnerable—the

³⁸ Antalkidas' friendship with Tiribazos: Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.12–15; with Ariobazanes: Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.28; with Artaxerxes: Plut. *Ages.* 23.1–5; *Pel.* 30.6; *Artox.* 21.6; *Mor.* 213A–B, 713E. Hamilton, *SBV*, 297–298; Funke, *Homonoia und Arche*, 99–101; Shipley, *Plutarch's Agesilaos*, 273–274.

³⁹ Marriages: Xen. *Ages.* 3.3; *Hell.* 5.1.28; Plut. *Artox.* 27.6–7. The war with Euagoras was very unlikely to have figured in these events: Judeich, *Kleinas. Studien*, 157; Beloch, *GG III*².2.226–227.

Hellespont. He arranged to have Dionysios' Syracusan fleet dock at Abydos at a specific time at which point the naval contingents of Tiribazos from Ionia and Ariobarzanes' from Daskyleion would join it. This combined navy, which was certain to enjoy decisive numerical superiority, had the simple purpose of destroying the Athenian fleet. Upon reaching the coast, Antalkidas found Nikolochos and his ships still penned in Abydos. He first moved to lure the Athenian fleet in the Chersonesos away from Abydos so that he could bottle them in the Propontis. He put his plan into action with a ruse. He spread a rumor that the Kalchedonians had sent for him, a reasonable and unremarkable possibility. The Kalchedonians had remained loyal to Sparta from the end of the Peloponnesian War until Thrasyboulos had won them over only in 389. The strength of their new loyalty might well be suspect. Antalkidas sortied by night, but put in at Perkote (modern Bergaz) a small harbor some sixteen kilometers northeast of Abydos. Probably leaving Iphikrates and Diotimos in the Hellespont to cover Abydos, Demainetos and his fellow general pursued Antalkidas towards Prokonnesos in the Propontis. They sailed past Antalkidas unawares, but Phanokritos of Paros warned them of their mistake by giving them the correct position of the Spartan flotilla. Phanokritos had given the Athenians an excellent opportunity to strike Antalkidas with their superior force before the squadrons from Syracuse and Persia could rendezvous at Abydos. Ignoring the Parian, the Athenians sailed farther into the trap, just as other Athenian generals had ignored Alkibiades' advice before Aigospotamoi. Doubling safely back to Abydos, Antalkidas arrived in time to catch Thrasyboulos of Kollytos sailing with eight ships from Thrace to join the Athenian force in the Hellespont. Manning twelve of his fastest ships, Antalkidas again allowed the Athenians to pass unchallenged, but this time he overtook and captured the entire contingent. By now the Syracusan and Persian fleets had arrived, which brought the entire navy under Antalkidas' command to more than eighty ships. He thereby trapped Demainetos and his command in the Propontis. Greatly outnumbered and unable to fight their way out, the Athenians sailed tamely into ports allied to Sparta and there surrendered. Antalkidas had won another Aigospotamoi, and had done so without the loss of a single ship. For all practical purposes, the Corinthian War had come to its end.⁴⁰

⁴⁰ Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.25–29; Polyain. 2.24. Kalchedon: Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.1–2; 4.8.28;

Fully alive to the meaning of their defeat at Abydos, the Athenians realized the futility of further resistance. Most of all they feared a repetition of 404 that would again leave them defenseless. With their fleet lost, they nonetheless hoped at least to save their new walls and the islands leading to the Hellespont. Surrender obviously meant the loss of their newly-acquired naval empire, which they could no longer hold anyway. Their allies, however, felt less eager for peace. The Thebans remained intent on preserving their Boiotian Confederacy, so their ready acceptance of peace could not be assumed. The Argives and Corinthians were likewise determined to maintain their union. Moreover, these three allies had suffered no defeat in the recent fighting. Their strategic position stood unchanged since 392, which gave them no reason now to submit quietly to Sparta and the King. The situation provided the Spartans with the best time for peace since the very outset of the war. The loss of their fleet meant that the Athenians posed no further threat to them, so they could afford to be lenient with them. With Athens out of the war they could bring greater force against their remaining enemies, especially now that they enjoyed the full support of the King. The Spartans hoped and expected that the loss of Athens and the threat from Persia would intimidate them into peace. Peace proved additionally desirable to the Spartans, for it quit them of the burden of garrisoning Lechaion and Boiotian Orchomenos. It would also relieve their restive allies from the fatigue of a war that they increasingly felt of small significance to them. In that they shared the common exhaustion of the other belligerents who had precious little to show for nine years of fighting.⁴¹

In 386 Tiribazos arrived at Sparta bearing Artaxerxes' decree demanding the end of the war that the King himself had fomented. The document included the agreements that Tiribazos and Antalkidas had reached the previous year and endorsed by the King. The decree served as several things at once: a demand for all warring parties to lay down arms, an enumeration of articles governing the ensuing peace, and an ultimatum directed against any who would oppose

Anab. 7.1.30. Phanokritos: *IG* II² 29 = Rhodes-Osborne, *GHI* 19. Alkibiades' advice: *Xen. Hell.* 2.1.25; *Plut. Alk.* 36.6; 37.1-3; *Lys.* 10.5-11.111 Perkote: *Hdt.* 5.117; *Strabo* 13.1.20; *Pliny NH* 5.5.32; *Arr. Anab.* 1.12.6; *Skylax* 94; *Steph. Byz.* "Perkote". *W. Ruge, RE* 19 (1937) 862-865; *Bosworth, CAHA*, I.107. The Athenians punished Pamphilos for his conduct in this campaign: *Plato com. fr.* 14.

⁴¹ *Xen. Hell.* 5.1.29; *Diod.* 14.110.2; *Plut. Ages.* 23.1-3; *Artox.* 21.5-6.

the King's demands. The Spartans duly summoned all of the belligerents to send them delegates to hear and ratify the document. The number and identities of the Greek embassies that travelled to Sparta remains unknown, for all attention concentrated only on the principal combatants. Some things, however, are certain. The Spartans, as usual, spoke both for themselves and the members of the Peloponnesian League. Delegations of their allies customarily attended such congresses, and doubtless did so now. Nothing, however, suggests that the four major powers were entitled to represent their allies. That raises the question of whether states such as the Lokrians, the Chalkidian League, and the islanders who had joined Konon and Thrasyboulos also convened at Sparta. Although no definite answer is possible, likelihood suggests that these lesser states, at least of the mainland, also sent their own embassies. Not only had they fought in the war, sometimes in major battles, but they had also in some instances made territorial gains at their enemies' expense. Territorial disputes would surely arise, and no significant combatant would wish to be voiceless in an assembly where such matters would be resolved. So many states were so involved in the conflict that the resulting settlement could be called a common peace, a descriptive but not a technical term.⁴²

When the Greeks assembled at Sparta, they saw Agesilaos, not Antalkidas, presiding over the proceedings. The Spartan architect of the treaty remained in the background while his political opponent—who privately opposed the peace, or so it was loudly said—stood forth as its champion. The reasons are obvious. Agesilaos was the principal war-hero, and no one could doubt that he would rigorously enforce any order that his government issued. The scene also worked well for Antalkidas, who watched as his rival enmeshed himself in the opprobrium of the moment. Tiribazos must have savored it all. Now after fourteen years of fighting in Greece, the Aegean, and Asia, Persian interests finally prevailed, and the situation was now far more promising than in 404. Unlike the previous occasion, in 386 not one Greek state, not even the Sparta of the day, stood in the ascendant as Sparta had earlier. Now even Sparta was bound by the King's decree. The assembly convened, Tiribazos showed the

⁴² Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.30; Diod. 14.110.2; Plut. *Ages.* 23.2; Justin 6.1.1. Common Peace not a technical term: J. Buckler, *ICS* 19 (1994) 119–122.

Greeks the King's seal, then read the decree, only an epitome of which survives. The text of it as given reads: "King Artaxerxes thinks it just that the cities in Asia be his and of the islands Klazomenai and Cyprus; all Greek cities both great and small to be left autonomous except Lemnos and Imbros and Skyros. These, however, are to be Athenian as of old. Whichever side refuses the peace, against these I shall wage war with those who agree, both by land and by sea and with ships and money". Other clauses, however, are also known. The one stipulating autonomy for all cities demanded as a logical consequence the removal of all foreign garrisons from the cities. The treaty also required that the terms of the peace be inscribed on stone pillars to be erected in the major Greek sanctuaries.⁴³

The interpretations of this treaty, despite its apparent simplicity, have proven surprisingly complex and its stipulations subject to much debate. For the King the most important clause was the first, that giving him complete sovereignty over the Greeks of Asia Minor. Artaxerxes had finally settled what was left undone after the Peloponnesian War. No one could any longer doubt that the Greeks in Asia were Persian subjects and were so recognized by all Greeks. This clause above all others raised the fury and exposed the impotence of the Greeks, who railed against it until the time of Marcus Aurelius. The King could and did by right treat them as he wished, no longer obliged to speak of autonomy, as had Pharnabazos and Konon after Knidos. Some Greeks saw this clause as nothing less than license for the Persians to enslave the Greeks, who began immediately to suffer great evil at their hands. The Persians, it was claimed, razed some Ionian cities and fortified the *akropoleis* of others, the latter a policy of which Pharnabazos had proven very chary (p. 129). Only loudness matches the exaggeration of these complaints, for not until the time of the Diadochoi would these cities suffer ravages such as those perpetrated by the armies of the Spartans and Athenians that had come to liberate them. The history of the fourth century records little, if any, discontent among the Asian Greeks, from whom the Persians primarily demanded tribute and obedience. Otherwise, they

⁴³ The Peace: Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.31, 35–36; 5.3.27; Theopompus, *FGrH* 115 F103; Isok. 4.115, 120–122, 128, 137, 179–180; 14.5, 17, 43; 8.16–17, 67–68; *Epist.* 9.8; 12.59, 105–107; Dem. 23.140; 15.29; 20.54, schol. Dem. 20.54; Diod. 14.110.3; Plut. *Ages.* 23; *Artax.* 21.5–6; Arr. *Anab.* 2.1.4; 2.2.2; Ael. Arist. *Panath.* 271; *1st Leuktrian*, 20–21; *4th Leuktrian*, 13; Justin 6.1.1. Bengtson, *SdA* II².242.

interfered little in Greek local affairs. This observation should surprise no one who recalls the support that the Hellespontine Greeks gave Pharnabazos during the Corinthian War. The concrete blessings of peace and security counted for more than anguished rhetoric and self-serving propaganda. At any rate, this peace firmly and recognizably drew the line between Persian and Greek: Asia belonged to the Persians and Greece and the islands to the Greeks. Thus, the Greeks no longer had any right to interfere in Persian affairs and nothing to fear for themselves.⁴⁴

The demand to cease fighting involved disarmament and the removal of foreign garrisons from occupied cities. Such stipulations formed normal parts of peace-making, as witnessed by the Peace of Nikias, and not surprisingly they also found their place in the King's Peace. They came under the rubrics of autonomy and holding one's own territory. These clauses were quite beneficial to the Spartans, who intended to use them to dissolve the union of Argos and Corinth and the Boiotian Confederacy. The grounds were that the Argives illegally held control of Corinth and that Thebes violated the autonomy of the other Boiotian cities. Accordingly, the pact, as interpreted by Sparta, ordered the Argives to leave Corinth and the Thebans to disband the army and all other organs of the federal government. The treaty likewise required the Athenians to withdraw any garrisons remaining outside their specified territory. Once they all had honored these stipulations, the Spartans would withdraw from Lechaion, Sikyon, Phleious, and Boiotian Orchomenos. The terms would not affect the status of Sparta's Peloponnesian League.⁴⁵

Easily the most controversial of the clauses, both in antiquity and today, was that stipulating autonomy for all Greek cities, both great and small. The clause was hardly new, as seen above (p. 129), and

⁴⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.31; Diod. 14.110.3; Isok. 4.123, 137, 176, 179; *Epist.* 9.8; 12.105–107; Dem. 23. 140; schol. Dem. 20.54; Plut. *Ages.* 23.2; *Artax.* 21.6; Arr. *Anab.* 2.1.4; Ael. Arist. *Panath.* 271; *1st Leuktrian* 20–21. Hellespontine Greeks and Pharnabazos: Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.27, 31. T.T.B. Ryder, *Koine Eirene* (Oxford 1965) 34–36, 122–123; E. Badian, in M.A. Flower, ed., *Georgica* (London 1991) 35–46; Urban, *Der Königsfrieden*, 101–125; Tuplin, *Failings of Empire*, 83–85; Jehne, *Koine Eirene*, 31–47; Shipley, *Plutarch's Agesilaos*, 273–278.

⁴⁵ Disbanding armaments: Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.35; Isok. 14.17, 43; 8.16–17; Justin 6.1.1. Argos-Corinth: Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.36. Boiotian cities: Xen. *ibid.*; Isok. 14.17, 43; 8.17; Plut. *Ages.* 23.5. Foreign garrisons: Xen. *ibid.*; see 4.4.15; Isok. 14.7, 43; Diod. 15.38.2 and Philochoros, *FGrH* 328 F151, where he writes that the Peace of 375 was quite similar to that of the original King's Peace.

by 386 it already boasted a long tradition, most recently demonstrated in the abortive negotiations of 392. Even earlier, the Spartans had promised autonomy to all Peloponnesian cities, both great and small, in their treaty with Argos in 418. Moreover, they then defined the concept as freedom of government of one's own choice, the right of the cities to hold their own possessions, and to enjoy their hereditary laws. The allies of the Spartans both within and without the Peloponnesos were included in the treaty on the same terms as the Spartans, who guaranteed their safety from external invasion. During the Corinthian War they had honored their words, when they occupied Phleious by native request, during which time they refrained from interfering with its constitution, even though they disliked it. In 386 the King and the Spartans simply extended this concept of autonomy to all Greek cities. The King's Peace insisted upon the fundamental point that it included all Greek cities without exception of restriction, which meant the right of autonomy included cities that had not even participated in the war. As seen, the only exceptions included Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros for obvious reasons. Those modern historians who think that the King's Peace applied only to the combatants of the Corinthian War have failed to realize the full significance of this clause as drafted. The King intended not only to end that war, but now he also stood as the guarantor of Greek peace and autonomy in the islands and on the mainland itself. Moreover, he defined autonomy in purely Greek terms without any trace of foreign laws or customs. Artaxerxes claimed a right that no other Persian king had demanded, and by ratifying the peace the Greeks recognized his claim. Artaxerxes had hit upon a solution to Persia's endemic problem with the Greeks by trying to keep them secure and at peace, while banning them from future interference in Persian affairs.⁴⁶

The importance of the autonomy clause to the Greeks outside Asia naturally varied according to circumstances. The islanders technically no longer needed to fear Persian territorial ambitions, a situation that they shared with the mainland Greeks. The majority of

⁴⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.31; Isok. 4.115, 176, 14.5 (where liberty rather than autonomy is asserted), 17, 43; 8.16–17; Diod. 14.110.3; Plut. *Ages.* 23.5; *Artax.* 21.5, where Plutarch claims that the King made all of Greece his own, an obvious exaggeration similar to that of Ael. Arist. *4th Leuktrian* 13; Justin 6.1.1. Lemnos and Imbros: *IG* II² 30. See also Thuc. 5.77, 79.1; 8.58.1; Xen. *Hell.* 4.4.15.

the Allies had devoted little attention to Asian matters for obvious reasons, so they responded with benign indifference. Despite the ignominy it brought them, the clause spared the Spartans the further rigors of an overseas war that never repaid them for their labors and losses. The surrender of the Asian Greeks finally brought to an end the imperial designs of Lysandros and Agesilaos. The Spartans had lost the war for Asia, and for the rest of the fourth century they concentrated instead on dominating the mainland. The clause also forced the Athenians to relinquish dreams of their old fifth-century empire. Twice defeated in one generation, they faced the necessity of exercising any future naval power abroad in an entirely new fashion. Asia was now lost to them but the Aegean remained. The Athenians had finally learned a hard lesson. Of far more sweeping importance, the clauses demanding autonomy for all Greek cities swept the entire eastern Mediterranean. The pact stipulated in clear terms that the King demanded, and the Greeks were to agree, that peace would henceforth prevail as the stipulated political condition of the region.

Artaxerxes left no doubt, except in the minds of some modern historians, that he not only demanded peace but that he also intended to enforce it. When he warned that both sides, the Spartans and the Allies, faced a choice between peace and war, he issued them an ultimatum, combined with a promise that all opposition would be crushed. He obviously ended the Corinthian War, but that merely settled the immediate problem. To repeat, he wanted peace to be common in Greece. He warned that he would see that all Greeks honored his terms, which meant that he became the arbiter of Greek conduct. He would also determine how to enforce the treaty. No word in the treaty speaks of arbitration. Artaxerxes decided when the peace had been broken and he would deal with the recalcitrant party according to his pleasure. Time and again during the century he would rule on political conditions in Greece and hand down his decisions on various issues. Intimately connected with the King's

Lewis, *Sparta and Persia*, 147, echoed by Badian, *Georgica*, 37, sees this treaty primarily as the "settling of a bilateral war" between the King and the Spartans. Neither unfortunately realizes the full significance of the clause in which τὰς δὲ ἄλλας Ἑλληνίδας πόλεις καὶ μικρὰς καὶ μεγάλας αὐτονόμους ἀφεῖναι, in which ἄλλας is unmodified. Ending a "bilateral war" formed only a part of this treaty. Both Lewis and Badian have failed to understand that Artaxerxes was dictating the political norm of all Greek politics.

position is how he would actually enforce the peace, whether he would do so directly himself, as stated in the peace, or delegate his role to a Greek president (*prostates*) or vizier. From the outset the Spartans in fact acted as the King's deputy, but nothing indicates that they did so in any official capacity. Artaxerxes had said that he would wage war against all opposition, which included the Spartans. He did not make an inmate the warden of the prison. He would decide how to police the situation. The peace was not a bilateral treaty between the King and anyone else, the Spartans included. In practice, no one in 386 doubted that the Spartans enjoyed Artaxerxes' favor, but that status lasted entirely at his pleasure, as his subsequent decisions clearly indicate. Throughout the history of the King's Peace Artaxerxes remained its final arbiter. Reality told him that he could enforce his will directly only at the risk of raising all Greece against him, so he was forced to work through the Greeks themselves. The predominant power at the moment always provided the best candidate for that task. The King wanted above all a peaceful Greece that would pose no further threat to him, and he doubtless cared little how that happy situation came about. He was not interested in creating a political utopia among the Greeks but only in obtaining their quiescence. Hence, he merely wanted and needed a Greek state that could guarantee that practical result.⁴⁷

When the Greeks listened to Artaxerxes' decree, they surely heard nothing new nor surprising, and most seemed to take the pronouncement as a matter of course. The delegates of most states returned to their home states without further ado, satisfied and probably placated by its terms. After all, most of them had lost nothing, but rather now could anticipate a period of ensured peace. The Athenians did likewise, all the more inclined to do so by lenient Spartan treatment of them. Unlike 404, they kept their new walls, but these fortifications were somewhat disarmed by the removal of their gates. If the Athenians felt not totally secure, they were at least not completely vulnerable to hostile forces. Likewise, they kept their fleet without restriction of the number of triremes, which left the basis of

⁴⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.36, speaks of the Spartans becoming the leaders (*prostatai*) of the peace, but the terms of the peace itself made it clear where ultimate authority lay; and Isok. (4.120–121; see 180; 14.43) and others acknowledge the King as the *prostates* of his peace: Diod. 14.110.3; Justin 6.1.1; Plut. *Ages.* 23.5; *Artox.* 21.5; Ael. Arist. *Panath.* 275.

their national defense and future ambitions intact. Skyros, Lemnos, and Imbros remained theirs and with them their essential links to the Hellespont. The Spartans made their greatest act of reconciliation by awarding them Oropos. The reversion of the city to Athenian control strengthened their defenses in northeastern Attika while weakening those of the Thebans. Though long coveted, the Athenians had proven unable to recover it, but gratefully accepted it as a Spartan gift, the gesture greatly facilitating the Athenian ratification of the peace. Oropos gave them a tangible reason to honor their word. The Thebans, Argives, and Corinthians, however, at first stood firm, the Thebans especially maintaining their right to take the oath as the legal representatives of the Boiotian Confederacy, a political entity that the Spartans had routinely recognized throughout the Peloponnesian War. Now, however, Agesilaos demanded that every state should swear separately, conveniently ignoring the fact that Sparta alone spoke for its Peloponnesian allies.⁴⁸ When the Boiotian delegation answered that they had no instructions allowing this procedure, Agesilaos bade them to return home for further guidance, adding that if they refused compliance, he would exclude the Thebans from the treaty. Agesilaos readily welcomed the situation. While the Boiotian delegation returned to Thebes, Agesilaos immediately persuaded the ephors to muster the entire Peloponnesian army. The Thebans had given him the perfect opportunity to avenge himself for their previous insults. This constituted the first, but not the last, instance when Agesilaos let his personal venom influence his foreign policy. Agesilaos led the Spartan army to Tegea, where he awaited

⁴⁸ Xenophon and Agesilaos have neatly but needlessly obscured the technical aspect of the situation in which the Boiotian delegation found itself. Throughout his narrative of the Corinthian War Xenophon uses Theban and Boiotian interchangeably, in effect ignoring the fact that other Boiotian cities willingly and actively participated in the functioning of their confederacy. Xenophon agrees with Agesilaos that Theban leadership of the league was the pretext for its dissolution. Yet they both blithely ignore the fact that most Boiotian cities willingly supported the confederacy, as witnessed by the long history of Boiotian federalism which pre-dated and out-last-ed these events. *Hell. Ox.* 19.2–4, amply proves this point: for even though the Thebans held the preponderance of actual power within the organization, they did so legally by majority consent. The point has proven quite controversial: M.H. Hansen, in M.H. Hansen, ed., *Sources for the Ancient Greek City-State* (Copenhagen 1995) 13–63; A.G. Keen, in M.H. Hansen and K. Raaflaub, eds., *More Studies in the Ancient Greek Polis* (Stuttgart 1996) 113–125; M.H. Hansen, *ibid.*, 127–136; H. Beck, *CP* 96 (2001) 355–375.

the allied contingents. While there, Theban delegates returned agreeing to dissolve the Boiotian Confederacy. This incident not only rid the Spartans of a dangerous opponent, but it also denied federalism as a legitimate political idea and form of government. The moment proved splendid for Agesilaos and served as a sure sign to all Greeks that Sparta was in fact the real *prostates* of the King's Peace. Next came the turn of the Corinthians and Argives, who had refused to dismiss the Argive garrison. The sight of the Peloponnesian army also forced them to back down. As the Argives departed from Corinth, the Corinthians exiled those who had created the union of the two cities. They next recalled the oligarchic exiles. The Spartans then concluded an alliance with Corinth, which further removed it from its erstwhile allies. The Spartans thereby isolated Argos and strengthened their own position in the northeastern Peloponnesos. The Corinthians would remain loyal allies for the rest of the fourth century; and even when the Thebans in 365 offered them peace and alliance against Sparta, they chose only peace. If the results pleased Antalkidas, they delighted Agesilaos. He now had Thebes and the other Boiotians in his power, the Corinthians loyal, the Argives humbled, and the Athenians bereft of allies. The situation opened the way for him to punish unfriendly allies. For Agesilaos the peace enabled him to secure a Spartan empire in Greece. If Agesilaos truly opposed the peace, dubious in itself, he nonetheless used it repeatedly to justify his own policies. All opposition suppressed and the Spartans triumphant, Greece once again entered into a period of general peace.⁴⁹

The King's Peace struck hardest at the Boiotian Confederacy in general and Thebes in particular. Under the clause mandating autonomy and the concomitant return of exiles, the Spartans sponsored the return of the Plataians to the remains of the city destroyed by the Thebans in 427. Situated at the northern end of the main route through Megara to southwestern Boiotian, Plataia gave the Spartans an open road to the north. Its people, again on Boiotian soil, renewed their old friendship with Athens, and expressed their new gratitude to Sparta. As a close neighbor of Thebes, Plataia also served as a

⁴⁹ Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.32–34; *Ages.* 2.21; Dem. 20.54; Diod. 14.110.4; Plut. *Ages.* 23.5–6; Justin 6.1.1; Bengtson, *SdA* II² 242. Agesilaos and the peace: Xen. *Hell.* 5.3.27; Plut. *Ages.* 23.3–4; *Arttox.* 22.4; *Mor.* 312B.

guard against Theban territorial expansion within Boiotia. A bit farther away Thespiiai enjoyed renewed prominence, and simultaneously served to limit Theban influence in southwestern Boiotia. The strengthening of Orchomenos in the west established a major point of opposition to future Theban wishes to expand in that area. Orchomenian command of the entry westwards into Phokis kept open the route from Kirrha to Boiotia, one often taken by the Spartans in the past and destined to see more use in the future. A blow nearly as devastating to Thebes as the rebuilding of Plataia was the Spartan award of Oropos to Athens. The city had long served as an object of contention between the two, and as recently as 402 the Oropians had voluntarily joined the Boiotians, as they had earlier in 412. In all, Spartan dispositions had effectively ringed in Thebes, constricting its communications both within Boiotia itself and with the outer world. One irony of this harsh peace is that the Thebans had not been defeated in the field during the war. Nonetheless, in this connection Agesilaos and his countrymen had done their job remarkably well. So long as these arrangements held firm, Sparta had little to fear from Thebes.⁵⁰

So, for the first time in eighteen years Greece enjoyed a general peace, but from the beginning the question that must have troubled many minds was whether it would prove genuine and lasting. The situation was novel. Unlike the Truce of 445 there were not now two major powers nearly equally balanced, technically at peace with each other, but still genuine rivals. Unlike the end of the Peloponnesian War, there was not one major triumphant set of allies dedicated to a common purpose against a vanquished foe. Instead, in 386 there stood one dominant power that had defeated one of its enemies in the field, or more accurately at sea, and had disabled its other enemies by means of the peace treaty. It remained to be seen whether the Spartans would so administer affairs as to establish a genuine peace or whether it only contained the ingredients of future warfare. In all, the general situation in 386 seemed guardedly hopeful. The Athenians found themselves again defeated but in a far stronger situation than eighteen years earlier, their defenses relatively intact

⁵⁰ For Oropos see J. Buckler in P.A. Bernadini, ed., *Presenza e funzione della città di Tebe nella cultura greca* (Pisa and Rome 1997) 325–326, with earlier bibliography.

and their fleet in being. Their nascent maritime empire was gone and the Greeks of Asia were admittedly lost to them. If they still entertained dreams of power at sea, they must find a new political concept to replace imperialism. Still, the Aegean remained an open region technically unfettered by both the Persians, whose fleet remained in Levantine waters, and the Spartans, whose fleet apparently lapsed.⁵¹ With the basis of their power intact, the Athenians commanded a good position from which to improve their lot, if the circumstances permitted. Matters were far different for the Thebans. The dissolution of the Boiotian Confederacy struck at the heart of their military strength. Unable to command the resources, both in men and materiel, of all Boiotia, they were thrown back on themselves, and alone they were too feeble to play a commanding role in Greek politics. The combination of Spartan vigilance and local Boiotian antipathy could keep Thebes isolated and relatively harmless. For their part, the Argives suffered a severe military and political loss with the severance of their ties with Corinth, which led to the latter's closer ties with the Spartans. So long as those two states remained united in their policy and the Thebans and Athenians neutralized by the peace, Argos remained isolated and restricted to the narrow confines of the northeastern Peloponnesos.

The biggest winner of the Corinthian War and the King's Peace was Artaxerxes himself, their architect. Despite all the ancient Greek criticism of him as a typically supine and turbid oriental despot, he had achieved something notable of which none of his forebears could boast. Throughout the fifth century the Athenians had thwarted Persian ambitions; and even if one rejects the authenticity of the putative Peace of Kallias, actual Persian power at the time effectively stopped at the shore of Asia Minor. Persian naval forces rarely found exercise in the Aegean. In 411 the Spartans had by treaty promised to come to Dareios' aid if necessary,⁵² but in 386 Artaxerxes would assume the burden of his own defense together with those hardy enough to join him. He was more than willing to uphold his own terms. Moreover, if the Greeks abided by the treaty, he had no need

⁵¹ The sources neither mention Spartan naval activity until 377 nor list *naumarchoi* between Teleutias in 387/6 and Pollis in 377/6.

⁵² Thuc. 8.37.5; Bengtson, *SdA* II².202. F. Quass, *HZ* 252 (1991) 33–56.

for any defense against them. Unlike the situation in 392, when he allowed the Athenians to undermine his peace, he now allowed no opposition from any of the Greeks. He no longer negotiated with the Greeks, he commanded them. Furthermore, he would do so for the rest of his life. The subsequent history of the King's Peace and largely that of the Common Peace would be the story of his will as expressed in his interpretation of changing situations in Greece and how they would affect his empire. He exercised a greater real power over the Greeks than any of his predecessors, and they would not significantly disrupt his reign during his lifetime. Nor would the Persians fear the West until the time of Dareios III. By forging the King's Peace as his tool, Artaxerxes hit upon a political solution that was agreeable both to himself and most of the Greeks. He could even use them in times of necessity as a reservoir of mercenary troops and commanders. He did not intend himself to keep law and order in Greece. For their part the Greeks felt that so long as they maintained the rudiments of peace among themselves and did not seriously infringe upon the King's realm, they had honored their oaths. If Artaxerxes did not solve the Greek problem, he did more than any other Persian king to minimize it. Far more importantly, the King's Peace not only ended the Corinthian War but also formally the Persian wars against the Greeks that had begun with the Ionian Revolt of 499.

Lastly, the Spartans encountered a new, but much simpler, challenge than before. Unlike the aftermath of the Peloponnesian War, Sparta suffered no rift between those eager to follow new imperial paths and their opponents who looked no farther afield than the Greek mainland. The circumspect Antalkidas replaced the impetuous Lysandros. In 386 the Spartans concentrated their attention and energies on maintaining their position at home. The substantial reduction of Thebes, Argos, and Corinth, made that task easier. Athens, though stronger than in 403, strictly honored the peace. The abandonment of Spartan naval ambitions meant the islanders had nothing to fear from that quarter nor any reason to seek outside help. Peace left the Spartans with no considerable enemy or combination of them. All that remained was for them to govern the peace with a combination of firmness, restraint, and fairness. That was their challenge.

ANNEXE TO CH. V

Knowledge of the Coinage Alliance comes only from coins minted between 394 and 390 by Byzantion, Ephesos, Iasos, Knidos, Kyzikos, Rhodes, Samos and perhaps Lampsakos. Although Lampsakos is generally included among them, J.F. Healy has doubted that its coins belong to these issues.⁵³ He does not, however, examine in detail a possible date of 394–391 for them. The reverse of the coins bears the emblem and ethnic of the individual cities that minted their issues and the obverse the figure of the young Herakles strangling two snakes. With the exception of Rhodes and Lampsakos the obverse includes the legend ΣΥΝ. The obverse of these coins is similar to gold coins of Thebes that bear the same emblem but without the legend and minted on a different standard.⁵⁴ Scholars generally interpret the legend to mean ΣΥΝΜΑΧΙΑ or ΣΥΝΜΑΧΙΚΟΝ, hence proclaiming an alliance. They raise the historical problem of the nature of this alliance and its role in the events of these years. With the exception of Iasos these were all major cities, all of them caught up in the chief events of the time, and yet as a group they have left absolutely no other trace in the historical record. Nor is the political allegiance of this alliance known. Because many cities in the region went over to Pharnabazos and Konon after the battle of Knidos most scholars have considered this alliance as an immediate result of that victory.⁵⁵ The emblem of Herakles and the snakes symbolizes their liberation from Spartan domination. Of these states Ephesos is specifically known to have sided with the victors of the battle of Knidos, while Kyzikos and Lampsakos probably remained neutral or inclined towards Athens. Of Iasos nothing is known. Although still at war with Sparta, the Thebans probably took no part in these affairs owing to geographical location and the different standard of their coins. So, there is nothing inherently improbable about the others having formed an alliance under the aegis of

⁵³ J.F. Healy, in L.A. Carradine *et al.* eds., *Proceedings of the 10th International Congress of Numismatics* (Wetteren 1989) 47–48.

⁵⁴ B.V. Head, *On the Chronological Sequence of the Coins of Boeotia* (London 1881) 400–41.

⁵⁵ G.L. Cawkwell, *NC* 6, 16 (1956) 69–75; *JHS* 83 (1963) 152–154, provides the best discussion of the topic. See also Hamilton, *SBV*, 230; Funke, *Homonoia und Arche*, 120 n. 51.

Pharnabazos and Konon. That would account for subsequent Spartan efforts against Knidos, Rhodes, Ephesos, and Samos but not for Thrasyboulos' actions against a friendly Byzantion.⁵⁶

Another theory postulates that the alliance inclined to the Spartans and that its formation dates to 391–390.⁵⁷ According to this view Thibron created it and its coinage to pay his soldiers and sailors for the campaigns of those years. The Spartans had indeed recovered a number of the allied cities by that date, but not Byzantion, Kyzikos, and Lampsakos, which alone dooms this interpretation. Lastly, a totally different suggestion, one offered without significant argument, holds that its members created a monetary alliance for the purpose of commerce.⁵⁸ The idea is not so outlandish. The legend could in fact mean ΣΥΝΒΟΛΑ or ΣΥΝΒΟΛΙΚΑ, a commercial union. That would explain the common standard of the coins and the distribution of the member states, all of which were located athwart the major shipping lanes and within convenient reach of one another. Although they had previously felt no need to coin money to proclaim a political alliance, the expediency of announcing a new mercantile union is at least understandable. Perhaps these states took their newly-proclaimed autonomy seriously. At a time when the entire eastern Aegean suffered from disturbances that saw cities becoming the targets of Sparta, Athens, and Persia, perhaps this coinage denotes an economic association that was neutral and meant to maintain a stable economy useful to all sides. That could explain the lack of any political action to which these cities can be associated. Perhaps one last idea suggests itself, one that blends the political with the diplomatic. These states may have attempted to create their own political and economic sphere independent of the nuisances of the Athenians, Spartans, and Persians alike. If so, the grim realities of fourth-century life stifled their aspirations.

⁵⁶ Byzantion: Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.1–2; 4.8.27. Ephesos: Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.4; 4.8.3; 5.1.6–7. Knidos: Xen. *Hell.* 4.3.12; 4.8.1, 24; Diod. 14.97.4. Kyzikos: Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.10. Lampsakos: Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.1–2; 4.8.26; Diod. 14.94.2. Rhodes: Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.20–30; 5.1.5; Diod. 14.97.2–4. Samos: Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.3; 4.8.23; Diod. 14.97.3–4.

⁵⁷ J.M. Cook, *JHS* 81 (1961) 56–72, who addresses neither most of the arguments of Cawkwell nor the suggestion of Accame below, which makes one wonder why he bothered to broach the topic at all. See also H.A. Cahn, *Knidos, Die Münzen des sechsten und des fünften Jahrhunderts v. Chr.* (Berlin 1970) 173–174.

⁵⁸ S. Accame, *Ricerche intorno alla Guerra Corinzia* (Naples 1951) 99 n. 2.

For all of the speculation certain reasonable conclusions can be drawn. Its members created this alliance immediately after the battle of Knidos with their intentions favorably inclined towards the ideals proclaimed by Pharnabazos and Konon.⁵⁹ They also formed a bond that endured throughout the fourth century, and the significance of their association would make itself felt thereafter. For the first but not the last time many of these cities banded together to pursue their own interests. In 364 Rhodes, Chios, Byzantion, and Knidos received Epameinondas favorably, when he tried to raise them against Athens; and in 357 three of these same states, together with Kos, actually seceded from the Athenian League in the Social War. The union of eight states in 394 demonstrates an independence of political thinking and policy that would later manifest itself in Aegean affairs forcefully and successfully. In that respect the union known from this coinage presented a small sign of things to come.

⁵⁹ Cawkwell, *NC*, 72–73; J.H. Nordbø, in Carradier *et al.*, *Proceedings*, 51–52, who further points out that these issues are on the Rhodian standard, which is equivalent to that of the Persian double *siglos*. Although Chios did not join this group in 394, it expelled its garrison after the battle and remained at least neutral.

CHAPTER SIX

THE APOGEE OF SPARTA (386–377 BC)

A. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE KING'S PEACE (386–382 BC)

Despite its many promises, the King's Peace brought peace neither to the King nor the Greeks, but proved instead only a brief respite from war. Artaxerxes immediately turned his attention to his conflicts with Euagoras of Cyprus and the Egyptians. The recognition in the treaty of Cyprus as a Persian possession signalled the King's intention to recover his authority over the island. Command of it was vital, if he wanted to retain firm control of the Levant and marshal his forces against Egypt. In this connection he demanded that the Athenians recall Chabrias and his hoplites from Euagoras' service. For the next six years the Persians fought the Cyprian king, until finally forcing his surrender but one that allowed him to keep his kingdom of Salamis. Euagoras spent his remaining years as a subject of the King. The situation in Egypt posed far greater problems for Artaxerxes. His admiral Glos had mutinied and urged the Egyptians and Spartans to join him in his efforts. The Spartans wisely refused to become involved, and Glos' successor Tachos soon met with defeat. The pharaoh Achoris, however, continued to resist the Persians. In addition to supporting Euagoras before his downfall, he allied himself with the Pisidians in an effort to deny southern Asia Minor to the Persians. In connection with that alliance the pharaoh also sought to win the adherence of Aspendos, the wealthy and strategically important harbor-city of Pamphylia. A vigorous coalition of these powers could complicate Persian communications between Asia Minor and the Phoenician coast; and if successful, even isolate the latter completely. Achoris seems also to have concluded an alliance with Athens before the King's Peace; but that connection, like that of Athens with Euagoras, lapsed with the peace. Nonetheless, the pharaoh may have repulsed a major invasion under Abrokomas, Tithraustes, and Pharnabazos that lasted three years. Evidence for all of these events remains scant and murky, but enough survives to indicate that the Egyptians under their pharaohs Achoris and Tachos suc-

ceeded in remaining independent during the first part of the fourth century. The struggle between the Persians and Egyptians lasted intermittently from about 385 to 341, when the Persians again gained control of the rebellious satrapy. In the process, the rebels diverted Persian attention from the Greeks. So long as they honored their treaty with him, he harbored no further ambitions against them.¹

For the various peoples of Asian Minor, whatever their ethnic origins, the peace made their legal position clear and unmistakable, however unpalatable to some. That should not suggest that the treaty was uniformly honored. Rather, in the course of the fourth century Greeks, Persians themselves, and natives alike turned convenient situations to their own advantage regardless of its clauses. Nonetheless, in terms of territory people literally knew where they stood. By the terms of the pact Artaxerxes' control, with a few specific exceptions, stopped at the shore, but the shore was his. That withal, at the end of the Corinthian War the situation on the littoral remained in some cases unsettled. A detailed picture being beyond recovery, a few examples at least suggest the types of problems involved. At Klazomenai the people had agreed to continue paying to Athens the tax originally established by Thrasyboulos, and in turn the Athenians had agreed not to interfere in the matter of some exiles from Chyton on the shore opposite. The Athenians had further left the matter of whether to maintain an Athenian garrison there to the Klazomenians. After the peace the tax was either negated or went to the King, who also determined the status of the Chytian exiles and the future of any garrison. In a different matter the citizens of Klazomenai and Kyme disputed the presidency of Apollo's shrine at Leuke, which Pythian Apollo settled without the help of the Persians. A bit earlier the satrap Southes had settled a somewhat similar territorial dispute between Miletos and Myus. In another dispute Erythrai, like Klazomenai, was riven by stasis, with one party calling upon the

¹ Euagoras: Theopompos, *FGH* 115 F103; Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.10; Diod. 14.110.5; 15.8–9, 38. H. Swoboda, *RE* 6 (1907) 820–828; M. Dunand in W.A. Ward, ed., *The Role of the Phoenicians in the Interaction of Mediterranean Civilizations*, (Beirut 1968) 45–49; E.A. Costa, Jr., *Historia* 23 (1974) 40–56; F.G. Maier in D.M. Lewis *et al.*, *CAH* VI² (Cambridge 1994) 312–329. Glos: Diod. 15.18.1; Polyain. 7.20. Egypt: Theopompos F103; Ar. *Plut.* 178; Isok. 4.140. See also A.B. Lloyd in I. Shaw, ed., *The Oxford History of Ancient Egypt* (Oxford 2000) 385–390, who also stresses the paucity of native Egyptian sources. Aspendos: G.W. Bean, *Turkey's Southern Shore*², (London and New York 1979) 46–55; S. Jameson, *RE* sup. 12 (1970) 99–109.

Athenians to endorse any resolution between the antagonists. They also expressed the fear that one group would be surrendered to the Persians, but left ultimate decisions to the Athenians. The peace took the decision from the hands of the Athenians. By its terms Eurythrai was Persian, not Athenian, and the King's men would make the final decision on this and all similar matters. In general, after the treaty the King tightened his control of the cities, supposedly razing the walls of some and fortifying others. He thereby either removed the Greek garrisons or installed others of his own. Whatever the details, the King did not hesitate to treat the Asian Greeks just like his other subjects, a fact that both Sparta and Athens duly accepted.²

Among Sparta's antagonists in the late war, only Athens and Thebes remained in any position to pursue significant foreign policies, but even their opportunities, especially for Thebes, were limited. The Athenians, however, immediately looked to the northern Aegean to confirm their preponderance there. They strengthened their ties with the *klerouchoi* in Lemnos in 387/6, and enough evidence survives to prove that their settlements on Imbros and Skyros remained equally strong, both in pursuit of their traditional policy of ensuring the safety of their grain route. At the same time the Athenians also strengthened their ties with the Odrysian Thracians, when in 386 they granted honors to king Hebryzelmis. Apparently at his request, they had sent a naval squadron to the Thracian coast, another sign of their continued weight in the region. Athenian friendship with the Thracians, while further protecting their essential route to the Crimea, also maintained their influence in the region that Thrasyboulos had won. Acting perfectly legally under the treaty, the Athenians nonetheless proceeded cautiously, as witnessed by the fact that their honors to Hebryzelmis did not include alliance. Rather, they unobtrusively pursued their own vital interests in a traditionally important area. These stirrings in the north show, however, that they chose not to follow a passive foreign policy, the pursuit of which was made the easier by the retention of their fleet.³

² Klazomenai: *IG* II² 28 = Rhodes-Osborne, *GHI* 18. Shrine at Leuke: Diod. 15.18.2–4; for numismatic evidence: P. Kinns, *REA* 91 (1989) 185–186. Strouthes: *SIG*³ 134. Erythrai: *SEG* XXVI 1282; Hornblower, *Mausolus*, 108–109; and in general Isok. 4.137.

³ Lemnos and Imbros: *IG* II² 30; R. Stroud, *Hesperia* 40 (1971) 162 no. 23; see also *Hesperia* 29 (1960) 25–28; *IG* XII (8) 84–85; *IG* II² 1952a. Cargill, *Athenian*

For the Thebans, however, the options were more limited. Ringed in by strong and hostile Plataia, Thespiiai, and Orchomenos, the Thebans lacked the access to the outer world enjoyed by the Athenians. Furthermore, Theban politics itself proved the arena of a struggle between one faction led by Hismenias that still strove for a strong Thebes capable of pursuing an independent policy. Opposed stood that of Leontiades which considered its own power and Theban security possible only by strict obedience to Spartan leadership. Although Hismenias' group enjoyed a slight ascendancy, they could in fact do little with their advantage. For the moment, their only realistic policy lay in quiescence, but their dedication to Boiotian federalism remained firm, if for the moment restrained. In broader terms Leontiades obviously looked to Sparta for support, while Hismenias favored Athens.⁴

For the second time in one generation the Spartans confronted a decision of momentous proportions, but in many ways the challenges facing them in 386 proved much simpler. Unlike the days after the Peloponnesian War, they need no longer dream of an Asian empire. If the defeat at Knidos had taught them a lesson, so had the victory in the Hellespont: they themselves lacked the funds to win hegemony at sea, and the King entertained no desire to see any Greek power, even an ally, ascendant in the Aegean. By abandoning their naval policy, the Spartans returned to the one that their forefathers had adopted about a century earlier after Pausanias' exploits. Once again they concentrated their energies on the mainland and left the East to others. The foremost question then became how Sparta would exercise its power in Greece itself. Whereas after the Peloponnesian War the Spartans had contended with sharply opposing policies of several powerful allies, no such obstacles now hindered them. No Boiotia or Corinth stood in the way, and Athens was again obedient. In 386 more so than in 403 the Spartans could realistically boast of their leadership of Greece. The King's Peace having settled the status and conditions of the major powers, it remained for the Spartans to determine how to exercise actual power at their discretion. Two strongly opposed points of view emerged at the outset, usually typified

Settlements, 12–15, 84–86. Thrace: *IG* II² 31; Xen. *Anab.* 7.6.43. Archibald, *Odrysian Kingdom*, 129.

⁴ Hismenias and Leontiades as leaders of an oligarchical *hetaireia*: Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.25; *Hell.Ox.* 20.1–2; 21.1. Bruce, *HCHO*, 110–113; M.L. Cook, *TAPA* 118 (1988) 57–85; Georgiadou, *Plutarch's Pelopidas*, 83–84.

by the figures of Kings Agesipolis and Agesilaos. Enough evidence, however, exists to indicate that these two men represented in at least broad terms the views of their countrymen.

Agesipolis stood for strict observance of the King's Peace. For him that meant honoring its clauses respecting the autonomy of the Greek cities, while rejecting the use of force against them. In that he agreed with Antalkidas and the others who had negotiated the treaty. Antalkidas added another element, for he too disliked a king whose potential abuse of his peace could destroy it and possibly Sparta with it. The policy of Agesipolis and Antalkidas would result in a Sparta dedicated to tranquility and the *status quo*, not empire, a situation quite similar to that sought by the Spartans after the Persian War. This policy appealed to Sparta's Peloponnesian allies, who had seen scant respite from war since 431. Put quite simply, the allies had grown increasingly tired of the continuing conflict, as many of the Spartans themselves realized. Peace and stability, moreover, would justify Spartan hegemony, they being the prizes for which they had all fought for so long.⁵

In direct and violent opposition to this view of Spartan policy stood Agesilaos, an arrogant, malicious, and stupid man who saw in the peace the instrument by which he and Sparta could win in Europe what proved beyond them in Asia. Future events will more than justify this harsh but fair judgement. For Agesilaos and the like-minded the peace was but a cloak for aggression, war, and domination. Just as the king had used the peace to intimidate Corinth and Thebes into submission, so he would now press it further against former allies, at first Mantinea and Phleious and later such old enemies as Thebes, Olynthos, and Athens. Agesilaos saw in the situation an opportunity unique in Greek history for Spartan domination of the mainland. Just as Lysandros had detected the possibility of Spartan empire in the Aegean after the Peloponnesian War, so now Agesilaos saw similar, but more limited, possibilities closer to home,

⁵ Personal antagonism also influenced issues. Agesipolis and Agesilaos were personal rivals as well as political opponents. Although Xenophon (*Hell.* 4.7.5; 5.3.20) represents Agesilaos as entertaining a respect for his opponent as an honorable adversary, as in a wrestling match, the lame king resorted to questionable means to best Agesipolis, which added internal political tension to the debate over foreign policy. Antalkidas and Agesilaos: Plut. *Ages.* 26.2–5; *Pel.* 15.3; *Lyk.* 13.8–10; *Mor.* 189F; 213F; 217D; 227D; Polyain. 1.16.2. Cartledge, *Agesilaos*, 195–196; D.C. Rice, *Historia* 23 (1974) 164–182; Urban, *Königsfrieden*, 115–116.

possibilities unfettered by reliance on Persian gold and indeed without need of it. The opportunity would neither challenge nor strain the traditional system of Spartan government, as had the innovations required after the Peloponnesian War. There would be no harbors or garrisons overseas or the danger of conflict with distant powers. Persia, the most significant of them, was now a friend. Instead of foreign adventures, Sparta would revert to its traditional role as hegemon of Greece, this time more so in reality than ever before. Nothing, however, suggests that he concocted a master-plan of conquest. Too much lay beyond his view and his power of intellect for that, but he could readily begin at home in the Peloponnesos to re-establish discipline among those Peloponnesian allies who had become discontented, resentful, and refractory because of constant Spartan demands. At first he intended only to retaliate against those neighbors who had openly defied Spartan ambitions during the recent war. Agesilaos would probably have said in his defense that he was only restoring order. He supposedly claimed that he acted only in a spirit of love for his colleagues, a clause and concept not found in the King's Peace. Agesilaos' manipulation of the treaty would prove a brutal transgression of it that would inexorably lead to an obscure field named Leuktra. Yet the Spartans themselves must also share hugely in the blame; they made it their own by lending their king virtually full support. Agesilaos' failure was likewise theirs.⁶ The immediate goal of Spartan policy, then, aimed to punish their allies who had shown hostility towards them during the war and render them powerless to disobey orders in the future. The Spartans flagrantly abused the treaty, not to establish peace but to dominate the Peloponnesos, and by so interpreting the King's Peace they doomed it to failure at the outset. From all of the fighting in the Peloponnesian and Corinthian Wars, they had learned fully well their dependence on the obedience of their allies. Now they tried to retain it, not through allied loyalty and respect but through violence and the threat of force. No other policy could more surely alienate the allies, destroy mutual sympathy, and undermine any unity of purpose. The Spartans had learned all the wrong lessons from these long, hard experiences.⁷

⁶ Xen. *Ages.* 2.21; Diod. 15.1.3. Spartan support of Agesilaos: Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.1, 3, 5.3.13, 17.24; 5.4.13, 32. J. Buckler in G. Speake, ed., *Encyclopedia of Greece and the Hellenic Tradition*, I (London and Chicago 2000) 35–36.

⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.1; see 3.5.23; Diod. 15.5.1–3.

Their policy determined, the Spartans applied it first to Mantinea. In 385 they sent envoys to the Mantineians ordering them to tear down their walls. Several factors influenced their demand, including their fear that the Mantineians would shortly resume hostilities. Vague rumors circulated that the Mantineians considered that the Thirty Years' Truce between them made after the battle of Mantinea in 418/7 expired that year. Great uncertainty clouds this truce and its circumstances. The conundrum stems from an almost bewildering series of treaties concluded among the Spartans, Mantineians, Argives, and other states, the Athenians included, between 421 and 418. These other states come seldom into this tangled web of diplomatic arrangements. The first in 421 bound the Mantineians, Argives, and others in alliance through fear of the Spartans. In 420 the Argives and Spartans established a treaty that did not include the Mantineians. Still that same year the Mantineians, Argives, and again others concluded a One-Hundred-Year Alliance specifically aimed against Sparta. Two years later the Spartans and Argives reached an agreement, while the Mantineians still abided by their previous alliance against the Spartans. In that same year of 418 the Spartans, Argives, and some northern states entered into alliance. The Spartans and Mantineians at nearly the same time made a Thirty-Year Peace because the Argives had already abandoned the One-Hundred-Year Alliance with the Mantineians and the others made in 420. This accords a date for the agreement between the Spartans and Mantineians to sometime in the winter of 418/7, probably in 418, but certainty remains beyond reach. This detail would later cause considerable, but unnecessary, confusion. Questions include whether the Mantineians remained at least notionally associated with the Argives. The Thirty-Year Peace does not preclude Mantineian amity with the Argives, even though the latter had already abandoned their agreement against the Spartans two years earlier. The peace between the Spartans and the Mantineians provides the simplest answer. Whatever their other ties with the Argives, the Mantineians had entered into a formal compact with the Spartans that precluded all hostile designs against them, including armed co-operation with the Argives. No subsequent evidence even suggests anything to the contrary. Any official connections between the Mantineians and the Argives remained irrelevant to the former's treaty with the Spartans. The proliferation of treaties and the shifting of allegiances made the question of loyalties nugatory. From all this, the Mantineians' observance of their formal peace with

the Spartans provides the one lasting result. So the official political relations between the Spartans and Mantineians in 386 stood thus: their Thirty-Year Peace had expired, but both had bound themselves together with all other Greeks under the King's Peace of 386. Nonetheless, the Spartans claimed to fear renewed Mantineian hostilities after the expiration of their previous mutual treaty. Under these circumstances the Mantineians had no reason to renew their separate peace with the Spartans. The principal reason for the Mantineian truce with the Spartans in 418/7 was their lack of allies, and in 386/5 they were even more bereft of them than thirty-two years before. Spartan fears really sound more like a specious pretext and lame excuse to cloak their supposed alarm in a diaphanous cloak of legality than a legitimate cause for concern.⁸

The Spartans advanced several formal reasons for their complaints that included their distrust of the Mantineians and fears that they would side with the enemy, perhaps an echo of their concern over the truce. In reality, however, now that the King's Peace had ended hostilities no enemies formally existed. All parties had agreed to sink their differences. The Spartans accused the Mantineians of having sent grain to Argos during the recent war. They also claimed that the Mantineians used the excuse of sacred truces to avoid serving on campaigns; and when they did take the field, they did so badly and without spirit. These two points doubtless refer to their refusal to defend their land from Iphikrates' attack and their defeat at Lechaion, both of which were true. The Spartans were especially incensed by the Mantineian envy of any good fortune enjoyed by

⁸ Bengtson, *SdA* II², provides the best guide through this diplomatic labyrinth, made all the more valuable because of its full citation of sources. Its no. 190 records the alliance among the Mantineians and the rest, no. 192 the relations between the Spartans and Argives, no. 193 the One-Hundred-Year Alliance linking the Mantineians, Argives, and others, no. 194 the alliance among the Spartans, Argives, and the northern powers, and no. 195 the peace between the Spartans and Mantineians.

A. Andrewes, in Gomme, *HCT* IV, 148, suggests that the Mantineians could have joined the treaty between Spartans and Argives (no. 192) on the basis of a clause mentioned by Thuc. 1.81, yet little commends the idea. As seen, the Mantineians were already allied (no. 193) with those opposing the Spartans. Yet the Argives fell out of the latter after two years. The Mantineians thus could no longer trust the Argives, and found themselves without other allies. Therefore they made a separate peace (n. 195) with the Spartans. Nothing else sufficiently explains the Mantineian accord with the Spartans. Elapsed truce: Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.2: αἱ σπονδαὶ ἐξεληλυθῆναι τοῖς Μαντινεῦσι; Diod. 15.5.3.

the Spartans and glad of Spartan discomfits. This referred to their reaction to the march of the defeated Spartan mora past their city. This event also insulted Agesilaos, who had led the march, and he surely had reminded his countrymen of this particular affront. The Spartans made no open objection against the democratic leadership of Mantinea, but that also must have stuck in their minds. All of these grievances were actually irrelevant and before the fact of the peace. They had all occurred during the late war that the peace had recently settled. If the Spartans had had grievances, they should have raised them during the peace conference. Since then the Mantineians had faithfully honored the peace, and therefore the Spartans lacked any legitimate complaints against them. Moreover, the demand for them to dismantle their walls flagrantly violated the autonomy-clause of the peace. The Spartans had absolutely no legal right in 385 to raise any of these issues. They themselves were breaking the very peace that they had sponsored.⁹

When the Mantineians refused to comply with the Spartan demands, as was their right, the Spartan government ordered a full-scale campaign against them. Now began an instructive political ballet in which Agesilaos, having created the problem, avoided the unpleasantness of solving it. That onus he preferred Agesipolis to bear. The question at the outset involved command of the field-army. He asked not to be given it. He gave the paltry excuse that the Mantineians had helped his father in some obscure way against the Messenians. The command consequently fell to Agesipolis, which formed part of his designs. Some suggestions can explain Agesilaos' conduct. As mentioned, if he had ample personal reasons for wanting the Mantineians punished, he may nonetheless not have wanted to be the man who violated the peace. Always careful of his reputation, he could attain his goal, and keep his honor unsullied by having Agesipolis put in command. He could thereby gain some local political advantage as well. First, he would force his rival, who opposed abusing the peace in this fashion, to implement a policy distasteful to him. If any of the Greeks condemned Spartan action, the name of Agesipolis, not that of Agesilaos, would receive the opprobrium. Agesipolis' very implementation of this aggressive policy would show the world at home and abroad that he was not powerful enough to thwart it, but

⁹ Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.1–2; Mantineian military conduct: 5.4.16–17; mora: 5.4.18.

that Agesilaos' view of the peace, not his, prevailed at Sparta. He would especially weaken Agesipolis' status among the Peloponnesian allies, who all knew of his and his father Pausanias' traditional friendship with the Arkadians. His father had received asylum at Tegea, and counted Mantineian democratic leaders among his friends. Yet Agesipolis could do nothing to help the Mantineians. Not an honor, this command for Agesipolis posed something of an affront and sent a clear message to the Peloponnesians as to who actually controlled Spartan politics.¹⁰

In 385 Agesipolis dutifully led the Spartan and allied army into Mantineian territory without incident, which indicates that Tegea to the south obeyed Spartan orders. His strategy avoided numerous campaigns in favor of reducing Mantinea immediately by siege. He began by ravaging the land, forcing the defenders to rely upon their previous year's plentiful crop. The land through which Agesipolis wreaked havoc rolls so very gently that it is almost flat, presenting no natural obstacles to the easy movement in any direct even of heavy-armed troops. In the absence of a strong contingent of cavalry, the Mantineians could not disrupt the work of the despoilers. Despite some dubious evidence that Agesipolis suffered defeat in a major battle, on the contrary he met with no reverses. Instead, remaining on the defensive, the Mantineians sent an embassy to Athens requesting aid. The Athenians wisely refused, not strong enough to repel the Spartan army and unwilling to risk their own security. His devastation of the countryside complete, Agesipolis beleaguered the city with a ditch and wall, while damming the Ophis River that flowed through it. Rising above the stone socle of the walls, the water began to dissolve the sun-dried bricks of the wall itself. With their defenses literally melting before their eyes, the Mantineians surrendered and agreed themselves to pull down the rest of their walls.¹¹

¹⁰ Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.3. Pausanias: Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.25; 5.2.3, see also Tod, *GHI* 120, in which Pausanias celebrates his son's excellent reputation in Greece. G. Fougères, *Mantinee et l'Arcadie orientale* (Paris 1898) 415–416; Cartledge, *Agesilaos*, 259–261; Tuplin, *Failings of Empire*, 89–90; Stylianou, *HCD*, 188–190, fails to understand the legal and diplomatic rights of Mantinea.

¹¹ Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.4–5; Diod. 15.5, 15.12.1–3; Paus. 8.8.6–9, 12.7; Polyain. 2.25. Plut. *Pel.* 4.5–8 and Paus. 8.8.7; 9.13.1, claim that a major battle occurred during this campaign, which Hamilton, *Agesilaos*, 142 n. 82, accepts; opposing views can be found in J. Buckler, *Erano*s 78 (1980) 184–185, and A. Georgiadou, *Plutarch's*

The terms of the surrender proved draconian, especially in a culture that considered the destruction of a polis abnormal. The Spartans ordered most of the city of Mantinea to be razed with only some of its inhabitants remaining on the site, while the others were divided into four villages considered ancestral, the five settlements corresponding to the five original tribes. The Spartans forced most inhabitants to tear down their houses, leave the city, and build their homes anew. The victors claimed that they did nothing unjust by dividing one city into its basic components. This decision pleased the land-owning aristocrats because they now lived closer to their estates, but the burden of it fell upon the common folk. In addition to the rest, winter approached, a season of cold, hard rain in the Mantineian plain, which increased the misery of the displaced. Agesipolis dissolved the democratic government, established an aristocratic in its place, but showed leniency to the democratic leadership. These men were dangerous because in their foreign affairs they remained pro-Argive and pro-Athenian. The Spartans had achieved more than settling old grudges; they had removed a possible enemy in their own neighborhood. Having eliminated Argive influence in Corinth, thanks to the King's Peace, now they had removed it from Mantinea under the same aegis. Agesipolis allowed sixty democratic leaders to depart unharmed. Unable to help in war, the Athenians now gave refuge to these exiles. The Spartans last demanded that henceforth the military contingents of the five villages would serve under Spartan officers. Autonomous Mantinea had ceased to exist.¹²

Despite the Spartan denial that their conduct was unjust, it clearly violated the peace, because it annihilated the autonomy of a polis by destroying its walls, taking from some of its citizens their possessions, abolishing its preferred form of government, and putting its armed forces under the command of foreign officers—all without

Pelopidas (Stuttgart and Leipzig 1997) 80–81. Topography: Pritchett, *Topography* II, 59–61; personal observations of 8 November 1970; 5–7 August 1971; 13 September 1971; 16 August 1978.

¹² Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.5–7; Isok. 4.126; 8.100; Ephoros, *FGH* 70 F79; Polyb. 4.27.6; 38.2.11; Diod. 15.12.2; Paus. 8.8.7. Early Mantinea: Strabo 8.3.2. Bursian, *GG* II.209; J. Hejnic, *Pausanias the Perieget*, M. Amit, *Great and Small Poleis* (Brussels 1973) 121–168; T.H. Nielsen in M.H. Hansen, ed., *Introduction to an Inventory of Poleis* (Copenhagen 1996) 123–124; T.H. Nielsen and J. Roy, eds. *Defining Ancient Arkadia* (Copenhagen 1999). Athenian asylum to the Mantineians: *IG* II² 33 lines 6–8. Seibert, *Flüchtlinge*, I.111.

provocation or justification. All this constituted naked imperialism. It sent a message to the Greek world, which interpreted it in much the same way but in varying forms. It intimidated some, drove others to resistance, and convinced still others that Sparta must be stopped. Most of these responses lay in the future, some in the near, but the Athenian reaction was the first sign of their expression. When the Spartans had driven the Corinthian democrats from the city, the exiles found ready refuge in Athens, now followed by their Mantineian counterparts. Athens quietly, humanely, and conveniently established connections with groups that were at once anti-Spartan and pro-democratic. Without infringing upon the peace in the slightest way the Athenians began to form the embryo of resistance to Sparta. As the face of Spartan aggression became increasingly unpleasant, this embryo began to grow, but its inception can be seen two years after the conclusion of the peace. Its birth came not long after.¹³

The fate of Mantinea emboldened exiles from Phleious to press their case before a friendly Sparta, vengeful against its enemies. Stasis had plagued Phleious since sometime in the Corinthian War, and there the conflict stood between opposing groups of oligarchs, one quite pro-Spartan, the other independently minded. Uncertainty shrouds the precise cause for the friction, but a reasonable surmise is possible. Phleious had served as a loyal Spartan ally during the Peloponnesian War, from its support of Corinth during the Epidamnian crisis to its service with picked men at the battle of Mantinea in 418 and beyond. During that conflict the Phleisians had pursued a consistent Argive policy that had favored the aristocrats there against the democratic majority, so the subject of democracy did not enter into local Phleisian politics. Ideology cannot provide the best explanation, nor can anti-Spartanism, as witnessed by the unbidden plea of the Phleisian majority for the Spartans to garrison their city during the Corinthian War. War-weariness provides the best explanation. After the long strain of the Peloponnesian War, which entailed extensive military service and friction with Argos, most Phleisians just wanted peace. Thus they declined to fight at the battle of the Nemea River on the pretext of a sacred truce, and are never mentioned in connection with the protracted fighting around Lechaion.

¹³ Corinthian democrats: Dem. 20.54–55; Mantineians: *IG* II² 33; two years: Diod. 15.5.3. Fougères, *Mantinee*, 420–423; Beloch, *GG* III².1.99–100.

A minority disagreed, for which they were expelled. The exiles' own public complaints lend some support to this conclusion. In Sparta they pointed out that while they resided in Phleious, its citizens received the Spartans within their walls; and though not recorded, probably mentioned how they had done so when Agis conducted the Mantineian campaign. The exiles reminded the Spartans that they had always accompanied the Spartans on their campaigns, and several known proofs could be adduced from the Peloponnesian War. They contrasted their conduct with that of the majority now in power, who stopped serving in the field and who no longer permitted the Spartans within their gates—a bald-faced lie, as proven by the events of 391–387. The use of the sacred truce and refusal to take the field constituted two of the major complaints of the Spartans against their allies, as seen most recently in the case of Mantinea. These points angered them now against the majority in Phleious. Yet the case of these exiles lacks some strength in that even after 391 the Phleisians do not appear actively to have supported the Spartans on campaign, even in the presence of the Spartan garrison. Only Agesipolis' choice of Phleious as the place of muster in 388 argues against doubt. Yet the city often served this military purpose; and held by a Spartan garrison, the Phleisians could raise no objections. The absence of any further known active Phleisian participation in the war raises at least some suspicion that even the enthusiasm of the pro-Spartans had waned. These doubts notwithstanding, the Spartans looked upon these exiles as their friends and comrades, while considering their domestic opponents nearly as guilty as the Mantineians of disloyalty and enmity.¹⁴

Without hesitation the Spartan government in 384 granted their petition. They sent an embassy to the Phleisians informing them that the exiles were their friends who had suffered unjust banishment. The Phleisians had therefore decided that they would voluntarily restore them and their property. With the example of Mantinea fresh before them and realizing their impotence, the Phleisian major-

¹⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.8–9; *Ag.* 2.21. Peloponnesian War: Thuc. 1.27.2; 5.60.3, 83, 115.1. Corinthian War: Xen. *Hell.* 4.4.15; Nemea River: Xen. *Hell.* 4.2.16. The last known Phleisian military action against the Allies came in 391 before the installation of the Spartan garrison: Xen. *Hell.* 4.4.15; Front. *Strat.* 1.6.3; Polyain. 3.9.54. R.P. Legon, *Historia* 16 (1967) 324–337; Buckler, *CP* 94 (1999) 213–214. Agesipolis in 388: Xen. *Hell.* 4.7.3.

ity bowed gracefully before the ultimatum. In addition to the fear of Spartan might, they further feared lest disloyal kinsmen of the exiles and other discontented elements would allow the enemy entry, a common concern in the fourth century, therefore they acquiesced. In instances of confiscated property having subsequently been resold, the government would redeem it at public expense, a mild effort to ensure that all Phleisians would share the burden. In all disputes between the new buyer and the previous owner, law would settle the dispute. The peace justified none of this, so all of these proceedings transgressed it. The Spartans had absolutely no right to interfere with the internal affairs of Phleious at any time, especially during peace, when the turmoil at Phleious did not threaten war. It was and should have remained entirely a Phleisian internal affair. The external ultimatum, hypocritically and cynically styled as a request for voluntary compliance, degraded the Spartans as much as it insulted the Phleisians. The whole incident proves once again that the Spartans intended to punish those guilty of disloyalty, hostility, all of which violated Sparta's own oaths given to the King and the Greek world. Once again, the Spartans had specifically violated the autonomy-clause by their denial of the right of each polis to possess its own according to its ancestral custom. Only the good sense and the forbearance of the Phleisians prevented a second Mantinea, but the warning stood there for all to see.¹⁵

Although the Spartans had either provoked or encouraged the first two incidents, they only responded to the third. The focus now shifted to the north, specifically to Macedonia and the Chalkidike. The Spartans had shown great interest in this region since the early years of the Peloponnesian War, when Brasidas had captured Amphipolis. The Spartans renewed ties in 418, when they made an alliance with the Macedonian king Perdikkas and the Chalkidians. During the fourth century the situation in the north had remained unsettled, as witnessed by the Illyrian invasion of Epeiros in 393. That disruption further complicated matters in that events in the northwest took a course independent of those in the northeast until Olynthian ambitions linked the two. To start with the west. During the next Illyrian invasion of 385 the Spartans had intervened briefly—despite their siege of Mantinea—in the defense of the Molossians against

¹⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.10; Ain. Takt. 17. Beloch, *GG* III².1.100.

the intruders prompted by the ambitions of Dionysios of Syracuse. The incident was itself rather minor except that it saw Alketas, who would later play his own part in broader Greek events, return to the throne of the Molossians. The immediate significance of the affair for the Spartans was Alketas' friendship with them, for the Molossians bordered on Kerkyra, the strategical position of which impinged upon the safety of western Lakonia itself. The outcome of these events strengthened Sparta's position in the area by having a safe Kerkyra and a friendly dynast in northern Epeiros. From Molossis the Illyrians next turned eastwards against Amyntas, king of Macedonia. They pressed him so hard that they nearly drove him from his kingdom. The precise course of subsequent events remains unclear. According to one version. Amyntas made a gift of his eastern territory to the neighboring Olynthians, thereby freeing himself to throw his entire weight against the Illyrians. Some Chalkidian neighbors of Olynthos, however, claimed that the Olynthians had taken advantage of the king's plight to annex his land bordering theirs. If Amyntas did indeed cede lands to the Olynthians, he surely did so under duress. At any rate, the Olynthians advanced as far west as Pella and its environs. Command of the area opened the route through the Haliakmon River valley southwestwards to Elimia. Although the channel of the river was not a route of communications, a road runs through the valley in the same direction. The strategical situation posed an ominous threat to Amyntas. He in the meantime rallied, repulsed the Illyrians, and recovered his entire kingdom except for the lands still held by the Olynthians. He next marched east and asked for their return. Upon the Olynthian refusal to comply, he gathered his forces and made an alliance with the Spartans. He also found Derdas, ruler of Elimia, willing to co-operate, for his territory now lay in the path of Olynthian expansion. With Amyntas' fortunes restored, the Chalkidian cities of Akanthos and Apollonia, themselves fearful of Olynthian aggression, decided in 382 to send ambassadors to Sparta seeking help.¹⁶

When the ambassadors from Akanthos and Apollonia, two of the largest Greek cities in the Chalkidike, arrived in Sparta to complain

¹⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.12–13; Diod. 15.13.3, 19.2–3. E. Oberhummer, *RE* 5 (1905) 2367–2368; S. Casson, *Macedonia, Thrace and Illyria* (Oxford 1926) 14; Zahrt, *Olynth*, 83–86. N.G.L. Hammond and G.T. Griffith, *A History of Macedonia*, II (Oxford 1979) 172–175 (hereafter cited as “Griffith, *HM*”); J. Wilkes, *The Illyrians* (Oxford 1995) 117–119; Stylianou, *HCD*, 211–219. Personal observations of 8–10 July 1996.

of their powerful neighbor Olynthos, they rehearsed both the situation to their west, already described, and explained new developments to the south and east. Speaking of their own plight, the Chalkidians described the growth of Olynthian power, and how it affected the broader world. The Olynthians, they said, procured their neighboring cities for themselves so that they all shared the same laws and citizenship, *sympoliteia*. The Olynthians had issued to the envoys' own cities an ultimatum either to campaign with them or face invasion themselves. The envoys declared that they preferred their ancestral laws to joining the league. After a statement of Olynthian military and economic strength, they mentioned that the Olynthians already held Poteidaia and would soon add the entire peninsula of Pallene. They next turned to conditions in the east, where instability favored Olynthian ambitions. The Thracians, then without a king, courted the Olynthians; but if they fell under Olynthian control, the gold mines of Mt. Pangaion would equally fall to them. So, at the moment, nothing in the north could prevent the Olynthians from strengthening their hold on Macedonia and establishing one in Thrace. More ominous was their news that the Olynthians were already looking farther afield by entertaining Athenian and Boiotian ambassadors even then in the city to discuss an alliance. The Olynthians in turn had voted to reciprocate by sending embassies of their own. In this entire tangled matter the northerners cast the worst light on their neighbor to establish their case of Olynthian aggression, but even so the purity of Olynthian motives can be doubted. Athenian evidence proves the truth of an alliance between Olynthos and Athens, which had already honored the Thracian king Hebryzelmis. The Spartans could reasonably fear a new and undesirable expansion of Athenian influence in the north. The accusation that the Thebans were even then negotiating with the Olynthians likewise received support. Yet neither contravened the peace. Only the allegation that the Olynthians had tried to dragoon Akanthos and Apollonia into its league violated the autonomy-clause of the peace. The ambassadors asked how the Spartans, who had taken such pains to keep Boiotia from being united, could allow Olynthos to build a much stronger, united Chalkidike. That much said, the envoys retired to leave the Spartans and their allies to reach their decision.¹⁷

¹⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.14–19. Diod. 15.13.1–3; see also Aelian, *VH* 6.1.7. Theban alliance: *POxy.* I.13. Alketas: J. Kaerst, *RE* I (1894) 1514; Wilkes, *Illyrians*, 118–119.

The Spartans took this appeal quite seriously, for it stirred them fully to recognize the potential danger of a strong Olynthos, a Thebes seeking to rebuild its power, and an Athens making quiet progress in re-establishing its influence in the north. Above all, the notion of Thebes revived raised the greatest of Spartan fears. Athenian ambitions worried them, but a renascent Thebes endangered them. Now the Chalkidians gave them the opportunity to intervene not only against Olynthos but also Thebes. The Spartans next turned to their allies with the simple admonition to say what they thought was best for the Peloponnesos. The ensuing deliberations revealed both a division of opinion among them and their first overt expression of disagreement with Spartan policy. Many of them urged that a full field-army of 10,000 men be raised, which would presumably more than suffice for an enemy whose estimated strength amounted to little more than 2600 men and horses or so. Most allies were eager to please the Spartans, a sure sign that they fully understood the meaning of Mantinea and Phleious. Others, however, preferred to raise money rather than men, taxing themselves to pay mercenaries for their service instead of levying their proper proportion of troops. These Peloponnesians were clearly tired of contributing their own levies to Spartan armies for operations that did them no immediate and palpable good. Here arises the first indication of Peloponnesian war-weariness and displeasure with continual Spartan military operations. First the Peloponnesian War, next the Corinthian, and now this far-off Chalkidike. The whole situation indicates that some Peloponnesians at least no longer saw Spartan policy as reflecting their own. It also suggests their doubts about the wisdom of Spartan leadership. Yet this mood and response also worked to the advantage of the Spartans in that these mixed armies became more Spartan than Peloponnesian in the sense that the mercenaries obeyed their Spartan officers who served as their paymasters. So, the Peloponnesians quietly refused to put their manpower at the disposal of the Spartans, but instead they contributed their resources, which enabled the Spartans to create an army over which their allies exercised decreased control. The financial assessment settled upon called for states con-

Chronology: Diodoros links the siege of Mantinea (15.12.1), the fighting in Epeiros (15.13.1.), and the founding of Pharos (15.13.4; see also Ephoros *FGH* 70 F89) in 385. Beloch, *GG* III².1.118, places the first two in 385, but the last (III² 2.453) in 384.

tributing money to pay three Aiginetan obols per day for each man, and for the states accustomed to send cavalry money equivalent to the pay of four hoplites. If any state failed to send its proper muster, it suffered a fine of two drachmas a day for each man absent.¹⁸

The decision made, the Akanthians strongly urged that the Spartan army be mustered with all speed. Everything urged speed, if not actual haste. They further advised that the Spartans send an advanced force to forestall Olynthian counter-measures. Speed was so critical that those troops that could be most quickly gathered should set out as a vanguard before the entire force could assemble. The Spartans accordingly in mid-summer 382 dispatched a contingent of 2000 men under the command of Eudamidas with orders to march forthwith. The Spartans ordered his brother Phoibidas to assemble the rest of the force to follow. The move was dangerous, for Eudamidas' out-numbered men risked being cut off and destroyed piecemeal before they could be reinforced. Eudamidas lost no time in marching to coastal Thrace, where he gained control of Poteidaia, which he made his base of operations. Under orders to make contact with Amyntas for a joint campaign, Eudamidas, being out-numbered and far from home, could instead take only cautious measures while awaiting the arrival of Phoibidas. Having gathered the remaining troops, Phoibidas followed his brother northwards. He marched through Megara along the main road towards the modern Kriekouki (now renamed Erythrai) near ancient Erythrai in Boiotia. The route runs along a pleasant and gentle upland valley through which the walking is easy, past the ruins of ancient towers, until reaching the crests of Mt. Kithairon, where there are the remains of two towers. From and below this point the plains of southwestern Boiotia spread, with one road leading northwards to Thebes and another northwards towards the foothills of Mt. Helikon. The latter is the shorter and more direct route north, one leading through gently rolling land that presents no natural obstacles to the movement of even large armies. Along this route stand first Plataia at the foot of Kithairon and Thespiiai farther to the northwest, from which a road leads easily to Haliartos. Both of these routes lay open to Phoibidas, but instead of taking that to Thespiiai, he made a long detour to Thebes.¹⁹

¹⁸ Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.20–22; Diod. 15.31.2.

¹⁹ Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.23; the appearance of *tache* three times in eight lines emphasizes

At Thebes Phoibidas encamped outside the city walls near the gymnasium, situated south of Thebes on the road to Plataia and Athens. The site lies at the modern Kolonaki Hill. He arrived on the eve of the Thesmophoria, the traditional date of its celebration in midsummer being generally known. He found there a body politic still divided against itself, as he already knew. Not much had changed since the Peloponnesian War. Hismenias and Androkleidas persisted in their anti-Spartan policy, while Leontiades remained staunchly pro-Spartan. At the time both Hismenias and Leontiades were *polemarchoi*, which suggests at first sight at least a tenuous balance between their two policies. Recent events, however, proved that Hismenias' aims were ascendant, as proven by the current negotiations with Olynthos and Athens. Another proof came from the Theban decree forbidding anyone from taking service with the Spartans against Olynthos. The Thebans stood within their rights to make that decision, for the autonomy-clause entitled them to decide their own foreign policy. No law or treaty legally obliged them to follow Spartan leadership. Leontiades was neither powerful nor influential enough to carry his policy with his countrymen, who were largely alienated by the dissolution of the Boiotian Confederacy and subsequent Spartan treatment of them. If these facts were not previously known in Sparta, which is unlikely, the Chalkidian ambassadors surely gave them enough information to cause concern and inspire a desire to eliminate future danger. Not surprisingly, Agesilaos instructed Phoibidas to seize Thebes if the opportunity offered, and that alone provides the reason for Phoibidas' detour at Mt. Kithairon. So, when Leontiades approached Phoibidas with a scheme to seize the Kadmeia during a commonly reputed festival, the Spartan expressed neither surprise

the need for speed; Diod. 15.19.3. See also Xen. *Hell.* 15.2.25; Diod. 15.20.1. Route through Megara: N.G.L. Hammond, *Studies in Greek History* (Oxford 1973) 417–446; J. Ober, *Fortress Attica* (Leiden 1985) 106–107; 118–121; S. van de Maele, *Classical Views* 33 (1989) 183–188; 36 (1992) 171–179; personal observations of 16 October 1998. Passes above Plataia: G.B. Grundy, *The Great Persian War and its Preliminaries* (London 1901) 445–448; Pritchett, *Topography*, I.103–121; IV.88–101; V.99–103; M.H. Munn, *The Defense of Attica* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1993) 140; personal observations of 30 January 1971, when with Dr. E. Vanderpool and some others we examined the upper reaches of the roads described by K. Zikos, Καθορισμός τῶν Θέσεων τῆς ἐν Πλαταιαῖς Μάχης (Athens 1905) 19; and again on 16 October 1998. F. Bölte, *RE* 9 (1914) 1172, and the so-called Quarry Road south of the saddle between the heights of Loukisthi and Lestori. Plataia-Thespiai route: Menelaos, *FGrH* 384 F4; Ps.-Plut. *Mor.* 773C.

nor hesitation to co-operate. In all likelihood, though proof remains irrecoverable, Leontiades had already broached this possibility to the Spartans; and Eudamidas' recent march had provided an easy opportunity to lay the groundwork for the plot.²⁰

Leontiades proposed and Phoibidas agreed, as ordered, that after the Spartan column had marched off to Haliartos on the morning of the Thesmophoria, Phoibidas would suddenly and unexpectedly return to Thebes, where Leontiades himself would let him into the city. While the Theban men amused themselves in the agora, where the boule also met, the women performed the sacred rites on the Kadmeia. Under these circumstances, Leontiades carried the plot to easy success. As expected, the departure of the Spartans lured the Thebans into an unfounded sense of security. Once the Spartans securely held the Kadmeia and the women there, Leontiades went to the agora, announced the news, and arrested Hismenias. When word reached Hismenias' followers, a good number fled to Athens, Androkleidas, Pelopidas, soon to become famous, together with more than 300 others. Epameinondas, an obscure and unimportant philosopher, remained behind. The Thebans, taken completely by surprise, found their akropolis occupied and their womenfolk held hostage—for Leontiades had given Phoibidas the keys to the Kadmeia. All of this happened in time of peace. While the Spartans established a permanent garrison in the city, Leontiades hurried to Sparta to justify the coup. The reception surprised him. A great number of Spartans felt only anger at the treachery. In a speech before the assembly, Leontiades justified Phoibidas' actions by detailing past Theban antagonisms and emphasizing recent hostile policy. He reminded his audience of their own fear that this policy would lead the Thebans to attempt to reunite Boiotia under their leadership. More decisive than the oratory of Leontiades loomed the influence of Agesilaos, who vigorously, publicly, and successfully defended Phoibidas' stroke. The commander received a huge fine that he never paid,

²⁰ Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.25, 29; Diod. 15.20.1–2; Plut. *Pel.* 5.1–3. Gymnasium: Paus. 9.23.1. S. Symeonoglou, *The Topography of Thebes* (Princeton 1985) 108, 140. The Theban prohibition against serving with the Spartans, provided by a well-informed contemporary source, suffices to refute Plutarch's claim (*Pel.* 5.1) that the Thebans at the time were friends and allies of the Spartans, for the latter had already convened at Sparta, where they made their decision. Georgiadou, *Plutarch's Pelopidas*, 91–93. Thesmophoria: A. Schachter, *Cults of Boiotia*, I (London 1981) 165–168.

and continued to hold command in the Spartan army. More importantly, Agesilaos persuaded his countrymen to keep military control of Thebes. He had attained his long-cherished goal at virtually no cost. The only ill effect was the growing fear of Agesilaos and the Spartans that increasingly and lawlessly supported his policies.²¹

Leontiades and Hismenias, accompanied by the judges, returned to Thebes, Leontiades and his followers to form a puppet-government that gave full obedience to Spartan wishes and orders for Hismenias to stand trial. Leontiades now enjoyed the opportunity to retaliate against the enemy whose policies he had unsuccessfully opposed for so long. The formal indictment claimed that Hismenias favored the Persians—Antalkidas may have chuckled at that—and was a guest-friend of a satrap to the harm of the Greeks. He had received Persian money and together with Androkleidas bore the chief responsibilities for all of the disasters of the Corinthian War. None of this had anything to do with anything that had happened since the conclusion of the King's Peace. This was simple revenge scantily clad as justice; and it reflected Spartan wishes and policy, most especially Agesilaos'. The seizure of the Kadmeia was itself the most naked Spartan violation of the peace that they had so piously sponsored. The Thebans had honored its clauses, had left their neighbors in peace, and were within their rights to make defensive treaties with whomever they wished. Reality, however, mattered little to Agesilaos and the Spartans. By 382 the Greek world realized that the Spartans saw and used the peace as the most efficient tool of their aggression. They had used it before to oppress their neighbors and allies; now by the occupation of the Kadmeia they used it for imperialism. Not only did they thereby antagonize the other Greeks, but they also made a mockery of the very concept of a common peace as conceived under the principles—to which they themselves had sworn—agreed upon in 386.²²

Thebes was now Spartan, but not entirely. One sidelight of this incident held major implications for the future, and that involves the exiles in Athens. First, the Thebans formed the spearhead of a group

²¹ Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.25–36; *IG* II² 37, which lists the names of thirty-two exiles, all of them unknown from literary sources; Androtion, *FGtH* 324 F50; Isok. 4.126; 14.19, 28; Diod. 15.20.2; Polyb. 4.27.4; Nepos, *Pel.* 1–4; Plut. *Ages.* 23.5–24.1; *Pel.* 5–6.2; *Mor.* 56A; Aristeid. 12.2; 22.7; see also *SEG* XVII 396.

²² Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.35–36; Diod. 15.20.2–3; Polyb. 4.27.4; Plut. *Pel.* 5.3.

that would liberate Thebes in 379. They also played a significant part in an Athenian policy that made its first appearance at the conclusion of the King's Peace, when the Athenians had granted asylum first to the pro-Athenian Corinthians and next to the Mantineians. About the same time they did the same for Thasian exiles. They took the most momentous step in 384, when they concluded an alliance with the Chians. The two took great pains to emphasize the fact that they concluded the alliance in full accordance with their oaths given in ratification of the King's Peace. They left the Spartans with no legitimate grievance. The move held even greater import. The Athenians and Chians realized the opportunities open to the people of the Aegean by the King's Peace. Artaxerxes, as will be remembered, had left the region autonomous. Therefore, so long as the Greeks there made no inroads into Asia Minor, they enjoyed the freedom to do as they wished. The Athenians and Chians in 384 thus sank the foundations of a policy that would unite the Aegean Greeks under Athenian leadership without violating the peace. Almost before their oaths in 386 had ceased to echo, the Athenians began planning a new anti-Spartan front with three components: the support of democracy elsewhere in Greece; the cultivation of other anti-Spartan elements, whether democratic or not; and the first steps to rebuild a maritime league. In 382 the overwhelming superiority of Sparta prevented open defiance, but the basic policy was already taking solid form.²³

With the Theban affair settled, the Spartans turned their full and energetic attention to the war with Olynthos. They appointed Teleutias, Agesilaos' half-brother, as harmost, and gave him command of the main force of the full army of 10,000. The ephors also, but only now, sent dispatches to the allies informing them of Teleutias' appointment and summoning their contingents. The allies responded with alacrity, given the commander's reputation and familial connections. Teleutias himself sent a message to Amyntas urging him to collect mercenaries for the campaign and to incite neighboring kings to join him. He sent another to Derdas of Elimia, warning him of the Olynthian danger and inviting his support. His preparations made, Teleutias set off on a surprisingly leisurely march to Olynthos.²⁴

²³ Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.31; *Hell.Ox.* 21.1; *IG* II² 34–35 (= Rhodes-Osborne, *GHI* 20). R. Stroud, *Hesperia* 40 (1971) 149–150; Develin, *AO*, 219–220.

²⁴ Bengtson, *SdA* II² 249.

With these facts established, the whole chain of events, from Eudamidas' march, to Phoibidas' detour, to the seizure of the Kadmeia invites closer scrutiny. In their appeal to the Spartans the Chalkidian envoys repeatedly emphasized the need for haste to which the Spartans responded by immediately dispatching a vanguard to the north. The Spartans by then knew that Thebes and Athens had already entered into negotiations with the Olynthians and that Hismenias and the majority of Thebans had forbade their countrymen from joining hostilities. Theban animosity, as demonstrated by the Corinthian War and its antecedents, was a fresh memory. With Eudamidas' outnumbered vanguard at peril far from home and in danger of being overwhelmed, Phoibidas led the rest of the advanced force to reinforce him. Yet at the crest of the pass on Mt. Kithairon that led directly northwards, Phoibidas took—supposedly on his own initiative—a longer route that wasted valuable time. There is no logical reason for this detour, except one. He could not find additional troops at Thebes, as he well knew, and did not need the city for supplies. Plataia and Thespiiai lay along the easy and direct line of march, and as Spartan friends they would enthusiastically have satisfied his needs. Eudamidas' earlier march sufficiently broadcast the seriousness and nature of Sparta's commitment to the operations in the north, the success of which depended upon a secure overland route through Boiotia. Eudamidas' presence on the scene had provided the opportunity for Leontiades to make contact with the Spartan and concoct his conspiracy. He could easily then have explained his ideas and suggested the date of the Thesmophoria for the coup. Phoibidas' conduct is also curious. Spartan officers were hardly an imaginative or inventive lot, and certainly not given to individual initiative. The man was purportedly under orders to reach Eudamidas quickly. Those orders were not complicated and their execution not difficult. After the success of the stroke, Phoibidas' troops remained in Thebes as a garrison instead of continuing to Olynthos, where they were supposedly so badly needed. Then afterwards, Thebes securely in the Spartan grip, Teleutias almost dawdled on his way to save Eudamidas from peril. Nothing other than the seizure of Thebes provided him with the luxury of this leisurely stroll. Seen in this light, the reasons for the whole episode become simple and obvious. The road from Plataia to the foot of Mt. Helikon towards Olynthos runs still today not more than twelve kilometers across open ground from Thebes, which stood in an excellent position to

cut or at least endanger communications. The fate of a field-army of 10,000 men could be imperilled unless Thebes was rendered harmless at least, secure at best. Not a great politician and never a statesman, Agesilaos was nonetheless soldier enough to appreciate the strategical danger that Thebes presented to the Olynthian campaign. That consideration added to his personal and abiding hatred of Thebes. Unable to persuade the Thebans to co-operate with Sparta, he still enjoyed an excellent opportunity treacherously to overpower them. As he publicly said, if the deed benefitted Sparta, then it was honorable. He would shortly say something similar of Sphodrias. Expediency, in fine, was Agesilaos' political philosophy. Only he commanded the actual power to authorize the plot, to select the man to perform it, and to protect him afterwards. There should be no reasonable doubt that Agesilaos ordered Phoibidas to seize Thebes, and that order gave Teleutias the freedom to conduct his campaign without urgency—and with a Theban contingent to boot. Agesilaos was responsible for a cynical and premeditated act of aggression against a state then at peace with his.²⁵

In summer 382 Teleutias arrived at Poteidaia, where he relieved Eudamidas and met Amyntas' Macedonian forces and Derdas' Elimian cavalry. Thence the combined army marched northeastwards over open country to Olynthos, some ten kilometers distant. The akropolis of Olynthos stands on two hills, pronounced but not precipitous, that dominate along the way the western, northern, and eastern sides of a broad, rolling valley that ends in a chain of low mountains. The Sandanos River, the modern Resetnikia, runs past the site on the west. To the south the sea separated the akropolis from a large, relatively level plain, bounded from north to southeast by a line of mountains. Teleutias halted when somewhat more than a kilometer from the city, and skirmished with Olynthian cavalry before retiring to Poteidaia, ravaging the countryside in his retreat. Desultory raids consumed the rest of the summer, wasting the land and inflicting some casualties but achieving nothing of importance. The early spring of 381 saw the resumption of fighting in the Chalkidike, when about 600 Olynthian cavalry raided Apollonia in the north. The city lies

²⁵ Topography: personal observations of 30 January 1971; 16 July 1994; 16 October 1998. J. Buckler, *TH*, 15–16; J. de Voto, in R.F. Sutton, ed., *Daidalikon* (Wauconda, IL 1989) 101–116; D.G. Rice, *JCS* 24 (1975) 95–130; R.J. Buck, *Boiotia and the Boiotian League* (Alberta 1994) 64–69.

in a broad, fertile valley ringed by low hills, open land and vulnerable to attack. Apart from the city itself, no strong point dominates the landscape, no place from which the defenders could rally against invaders. At midday the Olynthian cavalry began pillaging the area, some scattering throughout the plain, others riding as far as the city gates, where a surprise awaited them. Derdas had arrived in Apollonia that morning; and keeping his horsemen in formation, he counter-attacked and drove the enemy back to the walls of Olynthos. Thereafter, the Olynthians concentrated on defense and cultivation of a small part of their land. Teleutias meanwhile spread his devastation of Olynthian territory as far as the city itself. Driven to action, a troop of Olynthian cavalry quietly crossed the Sandanos River and advanced westwards against the Spartans whom they surprised. An enraged Teleutias ordered Tlemonidas, commander of his peltasts, to attack, in the face of which the Olynthians, retiring in good order, recrossed the river and awaited the pursuing Spartans. Once they were across and without support, the Olynthian cavalry rushed upon them inflicting severe casualties, among whom was Tlemonidas. When Teleutias led a general attack with his hoplites, they suffered heavy casualties under the city walls. A counter-attack by Olynthian hoplites killed Teleutias and crushed his army, which broke and scattered in all directions. Teleutias' rashness had caused disaster for the Spartans, who could do nothing more than reassemble the remains of their beaten army and wait for reinforcements.²⁶

The Spartan government reacted calmly, firmly, and swiftly to the news. The Spartans mustered a second large army which they put under the command of the veteran Agesipolis. Most curiously Agesilaos did not undertake this dangerous command against a victorious, distant enemy, even to avenge his half-brother. He was familiar with the area, having marched through it on his return from Asia Minor, but the mission fell to Agesipolis, to whom everything there was unknown. Yet the Spartan choice of a king to lead the expedition attests their determination to subdue Olynthos. They gathered Spar-

²⁶ Xen. *Hell* 5.2.39–3.9. Diod. 15.21.1–22.2; see also Dem. 19.263–264. Compare Thuc. 1.62–63. The numeral at Xen. *Hell.* 5.3.2 is corrupt; and Hude's emendation, though palaeographically convincing, does not help. The distance between Apollonia and Olynthos is more than forty kilometers by the straightest line possible, not the ninety stadia of the text. Sandanos: Plut. *Mor.* 307D. D.M. Robertson, *RE* 18 (1939) 330–331; Gomme, *HCT* 1.219–221; personal observations of 9–10 July 1996. Parke, *GMS*, 112–115; Best, *Thracian Peltasts*, 112–115.

tiatai, many perioikic volunteers, Spartans of inferior status, others trained in the Spartan regimen, and many allies. The Phleiasians sent the Spartans money instead of troops in accordance with the earlier agreement on quotas. They also found it useful to be on good terms with a Spartan king known to oppose Agesilaos' aggressive policy. The Thessalians sent cavalry because of their desire to establish friendly relations with Agesipolis. Since they had in 394 contested Agesilaos' march through their land, they considered it expedient to establish friendly terms with the other king. Amyntas and Derdas once again contributed their contingents, even more eagerly now that the specter of Olynthos had risen again. While the Spartans made their preparations, the Olynthians gathered quantities of much-needed grain and equally needed troops from their allies, among whom apparently an Athenian contingent could not be found. At the very least the Athenians never subsequently boasted of having helped Olynthos during this emergency. Since the Olynthians could bring in supplies, they still commanded their harbor of Mekyberna, some four kilometers distant. That in turn means that the Athenians could readily have sent the aid by sea. If the Athenians thought that the recent Olynthian victory had removed them from danger, the Olynthians did not share their optimism. The most obvious explanation for the lack of an Athenian response is fear of antagonizing the Spartans, just as they would later hesitate before Philip. They simply shrank at this point from openly challenging the Spartans.²⁷

In 380 Agesipolis marched first to Macedonia probably by way of Pella before advancing farther to Olynthos. The Olynthians had probably lost the Macedonian city at least the year before, when Derdas had marched from Elimia to Apollonia undetected. Agesipolis probably made Poteidaia his base; and when the Olynthians dared not confront his new army, he began to destroy the season's crop of grain, both that remaining in Olynthian territory and that of its allies. His visit to the sanctuary of Dionysos at Aphytis suggests that he further isolated Olynthos by securing the peninsula of Pallene.

²⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 5.3.8–9; Diod. 15.21.3, 22.2. Agesilaos and Thessaly: Xen. *Hell.* 4.3.3–9. Sparta: S. Link, *Der Kosmos Sparta* (Darmstadt 1994) 25–27, 108 n. 202, 109 n. 204; L. Thommen, *Lakedaimonion Politeia* (Stuttgart 1996) 90; S. Rebenich, *Xenophon, die Verfassung der Spartaner* (Darmstadt 1998) 140. Mekyberna: Hdt. 7.122; Thuc. 5.39.1; Strabo 7 (330) fr. 29; Diod. 12.77.5; Souda, *s.v.* Mekyberna. Zahrnt, *Olynth*, 203–204; personal observations of 9 July 1996.

He tightened his grip still harder by storming Torone on the south-western coast of the peninsula of Sithone. Probably at this time he captured the port town of Mekyberna, thereby completely isolating Olynthos from the outside. In the midst of these successes at mid-summer Agesipolis fell victim to a fever from which he died. The Spartans immediately replaced him with the harmost Polybiades, who completed the work of the seige. Finally in 379, after Polybiades' vigorous prosecution of the war, starvation forced the Olynthians to ask for terms. By the instrument of surrender the Olynthians and other Chalkidians were enrolled as subject-allies under Spartan hegemony, bound to obey directives just as did the Mantineians and Thebans. They soon found their place in the Spartan military reorganization in which they were obliged to provide a tenth part of the allied army. This northern region now saw peace but without anything having been settled. It still offered rich opportunities to any power capable of exploiting them.²⁸

The Phleisians meanwhile, having done their duty as loyal Spartan allies by contributing to Agesipolis' war chest, coped with their more immediate and pressing internal problems. They received the exiles as agreed, but the settlement of claims to confiscated property caused serious contention. The former exiles complained bitterly that they did not receive justice at the hands of the local courts, even though they had agreed to return on the clear understanding that these courts had jurisdiction over all disputes. They again took their complaints to Sparta, where Agesilaos gave them a very sympathetic hearing. Their number included the friends of Podanemos, a guest-friend of Agesilaos' father, Archidamos. A personal friend of his was Prokles, who would henceforth figure in Agesilaos' foreign policy. These people were wealthy, aristocratic, and intensely pro-Spartan, just the sort of Peloponnesians whom Agesilaos—and Xenophon—esteemed most highly. The government of Phleious retaliated by fining the erstwhile exiles for having appealed to Sparta without permission. In return Agesilaos easily persuaded the Spartans to agree that the Phleisians were acting haughtily by exercising their own laws according to their views, as their right under the autonomy-clause. The subject of the previously alleged Phleisian disloyalty to Sparta

²⁸ Xen. *Hell.* 5.3.18–20, 26; Isok. 4.126; Diod. 15.22.2, 23.2–3, 31–2; Paus. 3.5.9. Personal observations of 9, 11 July 1996. Zahrt, *Olynth*, 91–97; Cartledge, *Agesilaos*, 271–273.

resurfaced, once again presenting Agesilaos and his countrymen with the opportunity for revenge. The Spartans readily seized the opportunity by calling out the ban and entrusting Agesilaos with command. He led his troops towards the supposedly recalcitrant city, only to be met along the way by numerous embassies that agreed to follow his wishes in order to avert an invasion. He answered by demanding that they give him full control of their city, all on the sanctimonious pretext that he could not trust their word. He magnanimously promised that they would suffer no wrong at his hands. The examples of Mantinea and Thebes gave them ample reason to doubt both his honesty and his honor. Upon reaching Phleious, Agesilaos began a siege that would last one year and eight months. Phleious sits in a small plain surrounded by low hills, which gives access to the north. A modest akropolis rises above it. Although the city cannot boast of considerable strength, its agricultural resources made it a comfortable polis. Under these unpretentious circumstances 5000 Phleisian hoplites and their fellow countrymen withstood close beleaguerment, frequent skirmishes, and finally near-starvation before finally admitting defeat. At the end they asked permission to send envoys to Sparta for terms of surrender. Angered by what he considered their slight, Agesilaos allowed them to proceed but only when he had also sent to his supporters at home bidding them to leave the ultimate decision to him. The Spartan government complied, another indication of where the actual power in Sparta lay in these years.²⁹

When given authority to determine the peace, Agesilaos acted with surprising restraint and perspicacity. He established a board of fifty exiles and fifty of those in the city with plenary powers to decide whom should be executed and whom allowed to live, and next to draw up a new constitution for the city—this still another measure against the peace's guarantee that states could live under their ancestral laws. He garrisoned the city for six months, but himself left the money necessary to pay the troops. One need not ascribe these humane measures to some new-found enlightenment on the king's part. The answer lies in the deepening and widespreading resentment among the allies and the Spartans themselves for Agesilaos' policy. Many of his own men openly questioned his wisdom, and

²⁹ Xen. *Hell.* 5.3.1–17, 21–24; Isok. 4.126; Diod. 15.19.3. Phleious: personal observations of 22 July 1994. Beloch, *GG* III².1.107; Tuplin, *Failings of Empire*, 90–93.

criticized his treatment of such a valiant neighbor and erstwhile ally. Even his friend Xenophon could scarcely say anything laudatory about this episode. Agesilaos and the Spartans had once again trampled upon the key clauses of the treaty as the right to autonomy, to the enjoyment of customary laws, and to secure possession of one's own property. They had in the process made a mockery of the peace itself. Yet for the moment success smiled upon Agesilaos' efforts. Olynthos had surrendered, Mantinea, Thebes, and now Phleious had experienced humiliation. Athens had remained quiet through it all. If the Spartan hegemony now seemed secure, it nonetheless suffered from considerable weaknesses. The Peloponnesians had become manifestly discontented with Spartan leadership; the Spartans themselves had spread their power too broadly and thinly, especially in the north; and the rest of Greece had become distrustful and even hostile to them. The edifice of Spartan power was not as solid as it appeared.³⁰

With the victories over Olynthos and Phleious still fresh, Nemesis intervened. Since their flight in 382 the large group of Theban exiles had spent their time in Athens working towards their return. They made themselves popular among both the people and the nobility, and Pelopidas especially courted Attic orators. They all attempted to win official support for their restoration. They succeeded in gaining it from Kephalos, one of the most eminent politicians of the fourth century, and other leading figures in the city, including at a crucial moment that of two generals. Because the hopes and designs were public, notice of them came to the Spartans, who officially warned the Athenians to expel them as common enemies of the alliance. Since the Athenians were not members of the Spartan alliance, and the King's Peace had not entailed alliance, they merely ignored the messages. The authorities at Thebes also kept watch on the exiles, even going so far as to assassinate Androkleidas, Hismenias' old associate. These unwarranted intrusions into Athenian affairs only increased sympathy and support for the exiles. These hostile acts also revealed a sinister attitude towards Athens itself. The Athenians realized fully that for all diplomatic purposes they lacked any powerful friend in Greece. They were as isolated as the Theban exiles themselves. Practical reasons alone impelled them to aid the Thebans,

³⁰ Xen. *Hell.* 5.3.25; *Ages.* 2.21.

who, if successful in returning to their homes, could provide them with their best chance of building a strong neighbor and a much needed ally.³¹

In Thebes meanwhile the Spartan occupation continued without incident. The presence of the Spartan garrison of 1500 troops enabled the local government of three polemarchoi and a secretary, the most influential of them being Leontiades, to rule the city despotically. They drew intense hostility; but with Hismenias and Androkleidas dead, they felt themselves relatively secure. Within the city, however, an influential group of men, some forty principals, actively plotted to overthrow the tyranny and to expel the garrison. The scheme was not so foolhardy as it first appeared. The conspirators kept in touch with the exiles, and well knew that they could expect at least some Athenian support. In 379 Phillidas, secretary of the polemarchoi but all the while a patriot, travelled to Athens to make the idea a reality. He met with Pelopidas, Pherenikos, Melon, and others to hatch a plot whereby a small body of them would steal into Thebes. The twelve exiles, together with their co-conspirators, would strike down the polemarchoi while they celebrated the festival of Aphrodite at the expiration of their term of office. The festival being commonly known, the conspirators could synchronize all movements at one place and time. A large band of exiles advanced as far as the Thriasian plain, while twelve of them entered Thebes on a snowy night. Two Athenian generals also stationed their troops on the border, ready to intervene if the plot succeeded. Chabrias also held Eleutheria on the road between Athens and Thebes with a force of peltasts. Since he remained in Attika, his presence was neither illegal nor overtly hostile; but he could keep the road open if anything went wrong. Although the Athenians surely knew what their generals intended, they did nothing to stop them. That amounted to tacit consent. Word of these movements circulated; and Archias, the chief priest of the Eleusinian Mysteries, sent a message of warning to one of the Theban polemarchoi. Nonetheless, the plot succeeded with amazing speed and ease. Pelopidas and the others, fifty-two in all, murdered the polemarchoi; and Epameinondas, soon to become one

³¹ Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.1; Dein. 1.38; Diod. 15.25; Nepos *Pel.* 1.4–2.4; Plut. *Pel.* 6.2–5. W. Kroll, *RE* 11 (1921) 221–222. H.M. Hack, *AJP* 99 (1978) 210–227; Cartledge, *Agasilaos*, 282–283; Georgiadou, *Plutarch's Pelopidas*, 97–100.

of the most famous men in Greek history, and his friend Gorgidas organized an attack on the Kadmeia at dawn. A general uprising, supported by the Athenian troops from the border, took the Spartan garrison by surprise. Its commander, Lysanoridas, vainly sent to Plataia and Thespiiai for help. The ferocity of the attack and the presence of the Athenians rattled the Spartan, who offered to surrender the Kadmeia, if granted safe conduct from the city. The terms accepted, he, his fellow harmosts, the garrison, and some Theban collaborators marched off. The Athenians returned home, leaving a free Thebes behind them.³²

Although the Spartans had dispatched a relief-force, it never reached Thebes, but only escorted the garrison back to Sparta. Having punished the harmosts in command, the Spartans called out the ban, despite the depth of winter, for the combination of Thebes and Athens could not be ignored. If the entire levy were summoned, the muster must have consumed some time, especially given the weather. When the ephors called upon Agesilaos to lead the expedition, he begged off on account of his age. He supposedly feared that his presence would be interpreted as support for tyrants, which had not troubled him before, but a more plausible explanation is less flattering. His anti-Theban policy had become an untidy problem, and a winter campaign promised more hardship than success, as indeed events would prove. In his stead marched Kleombrotos on his first campaign. He forced the pass over Mt. Kithairon at Dryos Kephalaï—that earlier used by Phoibidas—west of Eleutheraï, still held by Chabrias. Having wiped out a sizeable Theban guard, he descended onto Plataia, thence marching to Thespiiai and then to Kynoskephalaï, near modern Loutoufion, some six kilometers west of Thebes. There he encamped to await events.³³

³² Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.2–12; Ain. Takt. 31.34; Dein. 1.38–39; Diod. 15.25.4; Nepos, *Pel.* 2–4; Plut. *Pel.* 8.1, 12–14; *Mor.* 575B–598F. Although Poralla, *Prosopographie*², 89, 91, distinguishes the Lysanoridas of Theopompos, *FGH* 115 F240, from the Lysanoridas of Plut. *Pel.* 13.3; *Mor.* 576A, 594D, 598F, they are probably the same man: U. Karstedt, *RE* 13 (1927) 2503. Symeonoglou, *The Topography of Thebes*, 12; R.M. Kallet-Marx, *CA* 4 (1985) 140–147; Urban, *Königsfrieden*, 161–163; I. Worthington, *A Historical Commentary on Dinarchus* (Ann Arbor 1992) 192–196; M.H. Munn, *The Defense of Attica* (Berkeley, Los Angeles 1993) 216–224; M. Sordi, in I. Gallo and B. Sacradigli, eds., *Teori e Prassi politica nelle opere di Plutarco* (Naples 1995) 415–423.

³³ Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.13–14; Diod. 15.27.2–4; Plut. *Pel.* 13–14; *Ages.* 24.1–3. There exists a small chronological problem. Xenophon clearly states that the Spartans first sent a relief-force but that the garrison at Thebes had departed before its arrival,

Kleombrotos spent the next sixteen days awaiting a Theban and Athenian response that never came. He doubtless spent some of the time negotiating with the Thebans, but they had already set their course of action. Instead of capitulating in their hour of liberation, they boldly elected four of the liberators boiotarchoi, not polemarchoi. The decision declared that the Thebans intended to re-establish the Boiotian Confederacy, something that Agesilaos and the Spartans would never allow. Since the Thebans had nothing to lose, they had nothing to discuss. Instead they launched Boiotian politics in a new direction. Abandoning their oligarchical past, they determined to steer to democracy. They established a new federal body in which individual cities retained their local autonomy while surrendering some of their authority to a central federal body which conducted policy in the name of all Boiotia. In that respect the parts and the whole resembled modern federal governments such as Germany and the United States. At the local level cities and smaller communities governed their ordinary affairs, including their form of government, property rights, and the rules of law. The internal conduct of government remained their own prerogative outside the jurisdiction of the federal government. The criteria for citizenship, whether local or federal, remains unknown. The precise institutional links among cities and between them and the federal government spawn more speculation than certainty. The existence of seven federal boiotarchoi argues that the local units, as earlier, formed larger political bodies that contributed levies to federal armies and paid taxes to a federal treasury. No evidence indicates the existence of their contributing delegates to a federal boule, yet all citizens could vote in their local and a federal assembly. The new federal government in reality had neither the desire nor the need to interfere in local affairs with the notable exceptions of Plataia, Thespiiai, and Orchomenos, all of which had welcomed the invaders. For the most part other Boiotians went about their private lives as usual and without interference from the federal government.³⁴

with which Plutarch agrees. Diodoros, however, confuses the original relief-force with Kleombrotos' later campaign. By the time of Kleombrotos' arrival, the Athenians had returned home, *pace* Munn, *Defense*, 142. Kyoskephalai: Frazer, *Paus.* V.135; H. von Geisau, *RE Sup.* 10 (1965) 355; Munn, *CA* 18 (1987) 111–114; personal observations of 16 October 1998.

³⁴ Buckler, *TH*, 19–24; Hansen, in Hansen, ed., *Sources for the Ancient Greek City-State*, 13–63; Keen, in Hansen and Raafaub, eds., *More Studies in the Ancient Greek*

The structure of the federal government differed substantially from that of its predecessor. Seven boiotarchoi constituted its executive branch, their very titles testifying to their authority over the entire land. Their executive power included above all leadership of the government in peace and war. They presided over the new assembly and took command in the field. Nothing proves the existence of a federal boule, yet the size of the assembly suggests that the boiotarchoi themselves may have filled that role. Their small and uneven number argues for the ability of these executives to confront and solve major problems efficiently and without lengthy debate. If so, it follows that the boiotarchoi ordinarily prepared the agenda for the assembly to consider and vote upon. The assembly met at Thebes, which meant that the Thebans, like the Athenians in their democracy, could expect a majority vote in all federal matters. In both cases the capital governed the whole system. The assembly enjoyed sovereignty in all federal matters, including selection of ambassadors in diplomacy and governance of the coinage, which lay in the hands of separate officers. Citizens also served as jurors in the federal court, which held no authority in local matters. Sortition probably determined the composition of the jury with all citizens eligible for jury duty. The sources do not record whether the assembly appointed lesser officials or whether candidates stood for election. In sum, the Thebans created a new federal system based on democratic principles with due respect to federal units that appear to have enjoyed administrative rights, duties, and autonomy in local affairs. This system functioned effectively both at the local and federal levels until Alexander later dissolved it. Those modern scholars who rail against it as only a “Theban League” have uniformly failed to explain why it proved so stable and apparently popular until external destruction. The obvious, but sometimes unappreciated, truth comes from the fact that it met the needs of local communities and the whole union.

The only question remaining at the moment concerned the direction of any future Athenian course of action. All knew that Kleombrotos’ campaign simply marked things to come, and that the Spartan army would return in the spring. It remained for the moment to learn whether the Thebans would then stand alone or find the Athen-

Polis, 113–125; Beck, *Polis und Koinon*, 100–104; CP 96 (2001) 355–375; Jehne, *Klio* 81 (1999) 328–337; Knoepfler, in Bernadini, ed., *Presenze e funzione*, 355–359.

ians beside them. Given the situation, Kleombrotos could do little beyond devastating the Theban countryside, which he refused to do. When at length he realized that neither the Thebans nor the Athenians would oppose him in the field, he retired by way of Kreusis and Aigosthena along a very difficult pass. Although the ascent rises steeply, it poses no particular hardships. Unsuitable for wheeled traffic, defenders could easily have blocked it, but none disputed the Spartan passage. He probably took this course because either snow or mud had closed the main pass over Mt. Kithairon. Before leaving Boiotia, however, he established Sphodrias at Thespiiai, which henceforth served as the main Spartan base in the region. He left his harmost with a third of the complement of each contingent, which means that if the full ban had taken the field, Sphodrias commanded some 3000 men, which he could augment with mercenaries.³⁵

Although Kleombrotos' expedition produced no military results, the very presence of the Spartan army in Boiotia thoroughly alarmed the Athenians. They immediately punished the two generals who had given aid to the Thebans, thus publicly disavowing their acts. They also refrained from opposing Kleombrotos' operations in Boiotia. Their penitence and restraint sent a clear message to Sparta that they did not want war. Yet at the same time they actively pursued diplomatic affairs elsewhere in the Greek world. The events of 379 and before impressed upon the Athenians both the danger posed by a Sparta unrestrained by general diplomatic agreements and their own isolation in the Greek world. They had compromised themselves in the Theban affair, and were well aware of Agesilaos' enmity towards all who opposed his foreign policy. Thebes at the moment was a liability, as Kleombrotos' campaign had indicated, so they

³⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.15–18; Diod. 15.28.1, 29.5; Plut. *Pel.* 14.1. Route from Kreusis to Aigosthena: *British Admiralty Handbook of Greece*, I.215; A.W. Gomme, *BSA* 18 (1911/12) 205; W.H. Heurtley, *BSA* 26 (1923/25) 38–45; A. Philippson and E. Kirsten, *Die griechische Landschaften*, I.2 (Frankfurt am Main 1950) 505–506; N.G.L. Hammond, *BSA* 49 (1954) 103–122; S. van de Maele, *Classical Views* 36 (1992) 171–179; personal observations of 11 October 1998. Munn's (*Defense*, 222–223) interpretation of Isok. 14.27, inadequately answers J. Buckler, *Eranos* 78 (1980) 179–185, especially because of his excessive reliance on the argument from “common knowledge” of the audience, on which see instead L. Pearson, *CP* 36 (1941) 209–229; M. Nouhaud, *L'Utilisation de l'histoire par les orateurs attiques* (Paris 1982) 262; J. Buckler in I. Worthington, ed., *Demosthenes* (London and New York 2000) 148–153. Sphodrias' contingent: although Munn, 225–226, accepts Diod. 15.29.5 at face-value, the normal strength of the ban was now 10,000 (Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.20–22, 37).

could look for support nowhere but the Aegean. During these months the Athenians openly accelerated their policy of seeking maritime allies, a continuation of that policy first seen in their alliance with Chios in 384 (see p. 205 above). They sent a number of diplomatic missions at the same time with the same message—peace and alliance on the same terms as those shared with Chios. The aggressive conduct of Sparta ostensibly necessitated these pacts of mutual security; yet more was at work here, since none of the islanders approached had suffered at Spartan hands. The Athenians obviously pressed by necessity and desire, seized the opportunity to rebuild their maritime hegemony. Although the precise course of events is irrecoverable, a satisfactory general picture nonetheless emerges. A striking aspect of these formal agreements is the speed with which they were made, itself explained by their dangerous involvement in Theban affairs. Byzantion probably first responded to the Athenian appeal, a formal continuation of amicable relations that had existed since the Corinthian War. Quite significantly they joined an alliance with Athens and the other allies. The pact between Athens and Byzantion went beyond usual bilateral treaties. Rather these diplomatic arrangements formed the first step towards creating a league of allied states. Mytilene and Methymna on Lesbos then joined this growing general alliance, all of them first as allies of Athens and next as allies of the others. Rhodes soon joined them. No evidence, however, exists for a formal synod at this stage. Nonetheless, a network of alliances that would soon constitute a maritime league rapidly evolved, the entire process taking place within the framework of the King's Peace.³⁶

³⁶ Diod. 15.28; see also W.K. Pritchett, *CSCA* 5 (1972) 164–169, for an inscription of 379/8 mentioning unidentified allies (line 8). Clarity demands an epigraphical history of these developments. The Atheno-Chian alliance (*IG* II² 34/35 = Rhodes-Osborne, *GHI* 20) begins the sequence. Concluded in 384, it stipulated adherence to the King's Peace and all current treaty obligations (34 lines 6–8; 35 lines 2–6). Athens and Chios promised each other freedom (*eleutheria*) and autonomy, the terms of the accord being inscribed on a stone to be erected on the Athenian akropolis (lines 20–21). The pact created a bilateral defensive alliance within the framework of the King's Peace. The next document, *IG* II² 36 (384/3), records an Athenian alliance with Olynthos, or more accurately the Chalkidians of Thrace. Little of it survives, but nothing connects it with the Chian treaty, nor does it include a synod. Next comes the curious *IG* II² 40, an alliance between Athens and Thebes with some odd but instructive details. Line one mentions seventeen oath-receivers, which strongly indicates that twelve Athenians and five of their allies had entered into this agreement: J. Buckler, *Historia* 20 (1971) 506–508. Lines

The Spartans responded to this activity by sending an embassy to Athens probably in early spring to obtain an explanation of Athenian conduct and future plans. The hurried diplomatic activity of Athens doubtless worried the Spartans. Some evidence indicates that Agesilaos initiated the venture. Spartan ambassadors included his friend Etymokles. Given his presence on the Spartan embassy to Athens in 370 after the death of Kleombrotos and at the time of Agesilaos'

15–16 refer to *στήληι τῶν συμμάχων*, which can be compared to *IG II² 41* line 7: *καθάπερ Χίοις*, a reference to *IG II² 34* lines 20–21. Proof comes from line 17, which mentions the stele on the akropolis. This clause proves that the Thebans swore on the same terms as the Chians in order to harmonize with previous agreements. Line 11 supports the idea that Athens had already begun to build a group of allies, for a Mytilenean was invited *ἐπὶ δεῖπνον*, not *ἐπὶ ξένια*. Once again, no allusion to a synod yet appears. The mason carved the stone hastily, as witnessed by the fact that many *hastae* of the letters were not inscribed. That suggests that greater events were even then under way. Those five others than the Athenians are mentioned, but no reference to a synod appears on the stone.

Next comes the Athenian alliance with Byzantion (*IG II² 41*), wherein lines 5–7 state *συμμάχος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων συμμάχων . . . καθάπερ Χίοις*. Reference to other allies proves that more than the Chians were involved, but the stoichedon-count does not allow any restoration of “synedroi” or “synedrion”. There emerges the picture of a group of like-minded allies who agreed upon a common goal according to a common principle. Yet still nothing suggests a formal institutional bond among them. Methymna (*IG II² 42*) next joined the others *τοῖς τε συνέδρους τῶν συμμάχων*. The inscription provides very instructive details about the course of this diplomatic evolution. First, lines 4–6, the Methymnians were already Athenian allies, but they now entered into treaty obligations with other Athenian allies (lines 6–8, 13–15). Lines 20–21 mention the synedroi aboard the ships, confirmation that even then they were all building a league by attracting other states to the alliance. Additional weight for this view comes from the fact that the stonemason who carved *IG II² 42* also inscribed *IG II² 43*, Tod, *GHI* 122 = Rhodes-Osborne, *GHI* 22. Line 8 confirms the formation of a general alliance in agreement with the provisions already sworn by other allies. Lastly, in *IG II² 43* lines 43–46 there stand *πρὸς τὸς συνέδρους τῶν συμμάχων* and *τὸ δὲ ἄλλο κοινὸν ἔστω τῶν συμμάχων*. The allies have now created a formal synedrion not found earlier; and as *IG II² 44* lines 25–26 testify, the allies had already begun to pass *dogmata*. The Chalkidians of Euboea made their treaty with Athens and its existing allies shortly after the creation of the Athenian League. They concluded the pact in the same year, when the Athenian Aristoteles still held the position of secretary. Proof of their later inclusion comes from the fact that a mason other than that who carved the original text of *IG II² 43* included their names.

These documents prove two stages in the evolution of the Athenian League, in the first of which individual states allied themselves with Athens on the same terms as had the Chians and the Thebans. Next a number of other states created a broad alliance on equal terms (*IG II² 43* lines 24–25) to establish a formal league that provided them with rights, responsibilities, and a central organ for joint consultation. This body functioned independently of Athens but in co-operation with it. Finally, the evidence points to a flurry of Athenian diplomatic activity between the recovery of the Kadmeia and Sphodrias' raid.

domestic supremacy, Okyllos was probably another friend. Of Aristoboulos, the third ambassador, nothing more is known, which at least suggests that he was a non-entity, capable of being swayed by the king. Owing to the certainty of a Spartan invasion of Boiotia in the coming spring, Agesilaos will have wanted to learn what to expect from Athens. Even then events beyond the ambassadors' control were literally afoot. Against this diplomatic backdrop Sphodrias' raid on Attika must be placed, one of the most curious incidents in the history of fourth-century Greece. The details of the following events belong more to the realm of romance than history; but the evidence, some of it suspect, suggests this reconstruction and the motives for it all. According to the sources, the Theban boiotarchoi sent their friend Diemporos to the Spartan Sphodrias at Thespiiai with a bribe to attack Athens. The Thebans knew full well what to expect from Agesilaos, but could perhaps find an ally in Kleombrotos, who was his acknowledged political opponent. A Theban understanding with Kleombrotos offered substantial dividends to them both, and the Theban officials advancing the offer possessed the power to translate such a private agreement into a public reality. In fact, the Thebans could prove vital to the success of any Spartan forays into Attika, simply because they could close the passes against a returning Spartan force. If they helped Kleombrotos bring Athens to heel, they would strengthen their new friend's position in Sparta at the expense of Agesilaos. That in turn would make possible a separate peace with Sparta under Kleombrotos' sponsorship. If the adventure failed and the Athenians were instead provoked to war, the Thebans would be their natural allies. The entire scheme reached from ambition to recklessness, just the thing that one would expect from a combination of a young and inexperienced king, an ambitious subordinate, and self-serving accessories. At any rate, the Thebans successfully played upon Kleombrotos' hopes and Sphodrias' vanity; for though he was a distinguished soldier, he was otherwise a man more ambitious than intelligent. His orders from Kleombrotos allegedly included the admonition to lend all aid to discontented and rebellious Thebans. The ephors should know nothing of any such scheme. Sphodrias accordingly ordered his troops to take an early dinner for a night-time march on Piraeus, which they would reach by the next morning. Some travellers, happening upon them during the night, sent a warning to Athens that allowed defenses to be prepared. Dawn found the Spartans in the Thriasian plain, whereupon Sphodrias

seized cattle and plundered houses before retracing his steps to Thespiai.³⁷

Such are the principal details of the story, which suffice only to raise more questions than they answer. Sphodrias' intentions may point the best way to an acceptable explanation of the matter. He alleged that his target was Piraeus, some ninety-six linear kilometers from Thespiai, a distance that he claimed he would cover in one night. An esteemed soldier, he had marched over Mt. Kithairon with Kleombrotos, so he knew the physical conditions obtaining there. Moreover, at Thespiai he had experienced mid-winter in the region. He knew that such a march was physically impossible, so Piraeus as a target was the merest pretence. Unnecessary for the knowledge of his soldiers, who had shared the march, the ploy was intended for the Athenians. Having duly set his men in motion, morning found him well within Attika but in no position to threaten Athens. He could have made some feeble excuse for his presence, but instead inflicted some minor depredations that only demonstrated hostile intent—hostile but not enough to harm Athens. His goal was not to seize Piraeus but to create an incident, in which he succeeded admirably. Only naivety demands the conclusion that he acted alone and without authority, for personal initiative was not a hallmark of Spartan officers, no matter how ambitious they were. Seen in this light, other possibilities offer themselves. Once again Piraeus provides the clue, for it immediately brings to mind the sudden growth of Athenian maritime activity. That alone provides the real reason

³⁷ Chronology: (1) The Kadmeia fell in early January 378; (2) the muster of the ban and march to Boiotia thereafter, would have consumed more time than normal because of the winter and the state of the roads, probably consuming much and perhaps all of February; (3) Kleombrotos' operations in Boiotia and difficult return to the Peloponnesos occurred in March; (4) punishment of the two Athenian generals in late March or early April; (5) which means that Sphodrias' attack could be dated anytime between April and the beginning of the campaigning-season in May. The evidence does not allow greater certainty.

Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.20–21; Kallisthenes, *FGH* 124 F9; Diod. 15.29.5–6, who implicates Kleombrotos in these events, as does Plut. *Pel.* 14.2–6; *Ages.* 24.4–8. R.M. Kallet-Marx, *CA* 4 (1985) 151, rejects C. Keil's emendation of ἔμπορον to Διέμπορον at Plut. *Pel.* 14.4 on the strength of the Boiotian name Ἐμπορος in *SEG* III.333 line 51. K. Ziegler, *Hermes* 83 (1934) 238–239 accepts Keil's emendation on the basis of Plutarch's avoidance of hiatus. Furthermore, Emporos is hardly an aristocratic name and one not to be expected at this time: see Arist. *Pol.* 3.3.4; 6.4.5, a law still in effect only a few years before this incident. Under these circumstances, an aristocrat, rather than even a wealthy merchant, would enjoy the social prestige to persuade Sphodrias that he represented official policy.

for Sphodrias' raid. Someone needed to do something to halt or at least curtail the open Athenian effort to rebuild its power in the Aegean. The Athenians had so concluded their treaty obligations with the other states as to leave them free, autonomous, and loyal to the terms of the King's Peace. Nor had the Spartans any legal means of stopping them. Only a desperate measure might succeed. Here Kleombrotos finds his place in the incident. His own experiences on Mt. Kithairon informed him that Sphodrias could never reach Piraeus under the particular circumstances, but a raid on Attika could so intimidate the Athenians as to warn them against further pursuit of their reinvigorated maritime policy. That policy, which reminded the Spartans of old Athenian hegemonic ambitions seen as recently as the Corinthian War, suggested that they still had something to fear from their traditional rival. Kleombrotos realized that the political climate in Sparta did not entirely favor Agesilaos' interpretation of the King's Peace and that the Peloponnesian allies increasingly showed signs of discontent with it. He also knew of the Spartan embassy to Athens, which was surely Agesilaos' idea. A military provocation made while Spartan envoys were actually engaged in negotiations would embarrass Agesilaos, increase foreign distrust of his honesty—already in question—cast doubt on his control of Spartan politics, and signal a return to the old policy of Spartan opposition to the growth of Athenian naval power.³⁸

³⁸ No one has as yet satisfactorily explained this puzzling event. Details of it present such several problems as the date of the march, its duration, length, and the nature of the terrain covered. Most of those who have discussed it have never personally examined the route from Thespiiai over Mt. Kithairon through Eleusis to Piraeus. Most have instead made much of A.W. Gomme's (*Essays in Greek History*, [Oxford 1937] 22), observations that snow frequently blocks the road between Eleutherai and Eleusis. Personal experiences in 30 January 1971 indicated that even without snow, mud would have made walking bad enough. See also R.M. Kallet-Marx, *CA* 4 (1985) 149. Note 37 above gives the date of the incident. The next problem involves the very length of the march, which many scholars have not troubled to calculate. The comments of the very eminent scholar, E. Badian in W. Eder, ed., *Die athenische Demokratie im 4. Jahrhundert v.Chr.* (Stuttgart 1995) 89, n. 33, amply proves this point. He claims that Sphodrias departed from Kreusis, while the Spartan instead commanded the garrison at Thespiiai. Badian gives the length of the road from Kreusis to Piraeus as over fifty miles or a bit more than eighty kilometers, while the actual distance from Thespiiai alone to the harbor is at least ninety-six kilometers. He remarks upon the easy terrain, a surprise to any topographer who has climbed Mt. Kithairon. Lastly, even allowing twelve hours of darkness, which is improbable, such a rate of march over this terrain is quite unlikely. These comments arise not from any desire to embarrass, but rather to express vividly the pre-

So much for the peculiar origin of this march, its farcical execution, and its momentous results. The Athenians responded by guarding their city, and apprehending the Spartans already there. They accused the men of being Sphodrias' accomplices, but the dismayed Spartans professed their ignorance of the whole thing. They added that had they known of it, they would not even be in Athens, much less in the house of their *proxenos*. The curious detail here is the general knowledge, even at this early date, that the alleged target was Piraeus. That could only have come from Sphodrias' announcement immediately before his departure, which again suggests that he actually meant no surprise. Now the Spartan ambassadors themselves averred that their government knew nothing about it, and promised that it would punish Sphodrias with death. Satisfied with their protestations, the Athenians released them, but next took official action. They sent an embassy to Sparta to denounce Sphodrias, pointing out that peace still existed between the two states. In shame the Spartans disavowed the act, and informed the Athenians that they had already indicted Sphodrias, adding that the penalty would be death. The response mollified the Athenians. If they seemed restrained,

cise nature of the problems involved. Even ninety-six linear kilometers do not, of course include the distance added by ascending and descending Mt. Kithairon. No such night march occurred before the Hellenistic period. Epameinondas in 362 trekked about sixty-one kilometers from Tegea to Sparta (Xen. *Hell.* 7.5.9–10); Polyb. 9.8.4; F.W. Walbank, *A Historical Commentary on Polybius* II (Oxford 1957–1979) 129, and Alexander in his pursuit of Dareios made some seventy kilometers between evening and dawn, but his were elite mounted troops: Arr. *Anab.* 3.21.9; for doubts, A.B. Bosworth, *A Historical Commentary on Arrian's History of Alexander*, I (Oxford 1980) 341. N.G.L. Hammond, *JHS* 38 (1968) walked from Athens to Thebes by way of Phyle in sixteen hours. Other evidence from modern history sustains doubts about a march of over eighty kilometers over such terrain and under these conditions. P.H. Sheridan, *Personal Memoirs*, I (New York 1888) 99, considered a cavalry march of over sixty-four kilometers in one day a remarkable feat. W.T. Sherman, *Memoirs*, II (New York 1875) 388 considered thirty-eight kilometers a day normal; and lastly, D.S. Freeman, *Lee's Lieutenants*, I (New York 1942) 639 comments on the hard march of sixty-seven kilometers by cavalry on a single day. Sphodrias commanded garrison-troops who were neither cavalry nor elite.

A philological consideration also strongly indicts that Sphodrias himself never intended to attack Piraeus. Xenophon often uses *προσποιέω* (*Hell.* 5.4.20) to mean to pretend to go to one place but actually to go elsewhere: *Hell.* 5.4.48; *Anab.* 1.3.14; 4.3.20; *Cav.* 5.12, and often to mean to pretend: *Hell.* 5.2.29; *Kyrourp.* 2.2.5, 12; 5.3.12; 6.1.39; *Cav.* 5.15; *Hieron* 2.16, which alone disproves Badian's (*loc. cit.*) contention that no source doubts Sphodrias' stated intention. Kleombrotos' and Sphodrias' political opposition to Agesilaos: Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.25; Plut. *Ages.* 25.2, which was a continuation of Agesipolis' position: Diod. 15.19.4.

they could afford to be generous. Sphodrias had already given them an excellent reason to expand their maritime league without going to war with the Spartans, to whom it could be presented as justifiable under the circumstances.³⁹

In Sparta the incident surrounding Sphodrias divided counsels. Kleombrotos and his followers naturally wanted to acquit him, which further suggests his hand in the affair. Against them stood Agesilaos and his friends, who on this issue enjoyed the support of those who belonged to neither group. Added to the political came a personal element, a romantic touch worthy of a comic opera, but this one with serious overtones. Kleonymos son of Sphodrias and Archidamos son of Agesilaos were lovers, their fathers' political animosity notwithstanding. Sphodrias, who refused to return to Sparta for trial, nonetheless told his son to save him by persuading Agesilaos to take his side at the trial. The easiest way to do so was for Kleonymos to ask Archidamos to intervene with Agesilaos on his father's behalf. Archidamos reluctantly put the question to his father, who at first refused. Yet a far more serious side to this little melodrama emerges, because it becomes clear that the political friends of Sphodrias and Agesilaos also became involved, not so much in the matter of the lovers' happiness, nor even of Sphodrias' fate, but in terms of a new political alignment. Agesilaos stated that the man was guilty and should be punished. Archidamos yielded to the justice of the point, but asked whether Agesilaos could nonetheless pardon him. He did so on the excuse that Sparta needed such men as Sphodrias, a telling indication of the king's morals, judgement, and local political ambitions. When Archidamos gave the news to Kleonymos, the young man responded that henceforth he and his father would so conduct themselves that Archidamos and his father would never be ashamed on account of their friendship. They thus formed a political alliance. In the process Agesilaos had significantly weakened Kleombrotos at home, and for the first time since the death of Agesipolis he encountered no other significant political opposition in Sparta. Agesilaos won acquittal for Sphodrias, fully knowing that one of the consequences of this travesty of justice entailed war with Athens. That

³⁹ Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.21–24; Diod. 15.29.6; Plut. *Ages.* 24.9; 26.1. A. McDonald, *Historia* 21 (1972) 38–44; G.L. Cawkwell, *CQ* 23 (1973) 47–60; Rice, *YCS* 24 (1974) 111–119; C.D. Hamilton, *AHB* 3 (1989) 93–101; Shipley, *Plutarch's Agesilaos*, 283–291.

mattered little, for he had never favored Sparta's naval ventures, none of which had ultimately succeeded. Since the King's Peace, as already seen, he preferred to concentrate Spartan efforts towards dominating the Greek mainland. He considered the loss of naval hegemony a small price to pay for two things that he wanted far more dearly. The first was supremacy in local Spartan politics and the other war with the detested Thebans. His decision would almost immediately prove itself a huge blunder, an instance when personal ambition and stupidity would ultimately result in catastrophe for his Sparta.⁴⁰

Word of the acquittal caused outrage in Athens, and the pro-Theban element decried the fact that Agesilaos and his followers praised Sphodrias for his intentions. In this instance, just outrage combined with easy expediency to justify the acceleration of the policy that the Athenians had carefully begun. They immediately fitted the Piraeus with gates and increased the pace of their ship-building. By the end of 376 they had readied at least 100 ships, old and new, for service. They quickly concluded an alliance with the Thebans in which the latter also became allies of the Mytilenians and the other four states already aligned with Athens. By the end of 378 Chios, as seen above, Thebes, Mytilene, Methymna, Rhodes, and Byzantion had all cemented alliances with Athens and one another to create the nucleus of a league that was primarily naval in nature. They had in fact turned a congeries of bilateral treaties into joint commitments aimed at a common goal, ostensibly peace, but also one that assumed that Sparta posed the principal threat to those goals. The composition of the group, however, indicates an ambition that went far beyond the desire to check Spartan aggression. These states now took the first step towards filling the naval vacuum in the Aegean left by the King's Peace. The adherence of Byzantion and Chios, leading members of the old Coinage-Alliance, and Rhodes, the three of them later partners in the Social War, and with Chios as the strategical centerpiece, formed a line of powerful maritime states stretching across the entire length of the eastern Aegean, a line invulnerable to Sparta at the moment. Without a single act of violence

⁴⁰ Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.25–33, an episode not mentioned in his *Ages*; Plut. *Ages.* 25.2, 9. Involvement of friends: Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.32. Shipley, *Plutarch's Agesilaos*, 291–299; Stylianou, *HCD*, 263–265.

these states created a new political and naval block. If Thebes was the anomaly of this coalition, it nonetheless served its own quite useful purpose by distracting the Spartans, who could not in 378 fight both Thebes and Athens on the mainland and Athens and the Easterners at sea. This body promised the Spartans a larger and graver war than they had anticipated. The Spartan conflict with Thebes would win the Athenians the time and security to increase the strength of their fleet to 100 ships and enlarge their ranks beyond the possibility of Sparta to prevail against them.⁴¹

The fighting in Greece in 378 will shortly find its place here, but the progress of these events demands further attention. When the Thebans and Athenians weathered the campaigning-season of 378, they proved that they could stand against Sparta. Thus encouraged, the Athenians and their small band of allies took the next bold step of proclaiming the creation of a broad confederacy. They broadcast to all of the Greeks, all those living on the mainland and the islands, all those who were not subject to the King to join them in alliance. They declared that they acted together so that the Spartans would allow the Greeks to be free and autonomous, to live in peace, and to possess in security their own land. Being free and autonomous meant living under whatever constitution and by whatever ancestral laws the allies themselves determined, neither receiving a garrison nor having one imposed, and having no tribute forced upon them. All new allies enrolled on the same terms as those binding the Chians and Thebans and shared by the other original allies. The Athenians of their own accord proclaimed that they would relinquish all properties, public and private, however many they were, held by them in the lands of those who joined the alliance. The Athenians next declared that in the case of property disputes they would destroy the markers at Athens that were unfavorable to the new allies, thus negating the deeds or liens on those properties. After 377 they forbade all of their countrymen to own allied land by any means. If an Athenian should illegally acquire land, he could be indicted, the property sold, and the proceeds going half to the plaintiff and the rest to the allies. Next came the clause that established a simple defensive alliance in which all contracting parties agreed to come to

⁴¹ Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.34; Isok. 14.28; Diod. 15.28.3–4, 29.5–7; Plut. *Pel.* 15.1. One hundred ships: *IG* II² 1604.

the aid, to the best of their ability, of any victim of aggression. There followed a restriction against dissolving the alliance and abrogating any of its articles, all of which applied equally to all previous and future members.⁴²

The new Athenian League marks a decided, if not always properly appreciated, departure in Athenian foreign policy, at least at the outset. The fifth century saw the creation of the Delian League and its transformation into the Athenian Empire. After the Peloponnesian War the Athenians clung to their dreams of and aspirations for domination. Yet in 394 circumstances forced Konon to curtail Athenian ambitions by recognizing the autonomy of the Greeks and their right of freedom from garrisons, both of which marked a dramatic change from the fifth-century Athenian concept of domination. Later in the fourth century, as will be seen, they would revert to their old ways; but in 378/7 that option did not yet exist. The King's Peace had changed everything, which the Athenians formally and officially recognized when they established the new confederacy. They responded to the new situation in several noteworthy ways, not the least important of which was to forsake their dream of liberating the Asian Greeks. They publicly repudiated the notion in their alliance with the Chians. Indeed, for the rest of the fourth century the Athenians and their allies respected the King's claim to Asia and its peoples. Next, they formally abandoned the concept of rule of the allies (*arche*) in favor of leadership (*hegemonia*). Going beyond empty pronouncements, they signalled the change in political philosophy by actual institutional innovations. They established a synod of allies who by treaty co-operated in planning, implementing, and financing allied policy. The Athenians renounced military governors, garrisons, and military colonists (*klerouchoi*). Unlike the Athenian Empire, when the will of the Demos was supreme, the allies now played an active, formal, and legal role in the conduct of joint affairs, while enjoying certain treaty rights that the Athenians could not lawfully transgress. At least in its original formal organization the Athenian League formed a body in which its members enjoyed greater rights and protection than did their counterparts in the fifth-century Empire.

⁴² IG II² 43; Bengtson, *SdA* II².257. G. Busolt, *Der zweite athenische Bund* (Leipzig 1874); S. Accame, *La lega ateniese* (Rome 1941); Cawkwell, *CQ* 23 (1973) 47–60; J. Cargill, *The Second Athenian League*; M. Dreher, *Hegemon und Symmachoi* (Berlin and New York 1995).

From the outset the allies accepted Athenian leadership of the League for several compelling and legitimate reasons. Only Athens had the long experience of command of many states of different sorts, strengths, weaknesses, backgrounds, and interests over long periods of time. Only Athens had the prestige and the general respect of even the most powerful of the allies. The Athenians had also conducted complex negotiations on equal terms with the most powerful Greek states, notably Sparta, and far more importantly only Athens enjoyed a long and often successful tradition of dealing direct with the King himself. Only Athens had the experience of routinely organizing large armaments drawn from various states, and directing them often victoriously in action. Athens also knew how to marshal the economic resources of a congeries of allies to a specific end. Only Athens had produced the men who were accustomed to lead on the grand scale, men to whom command of large armies and fleets was habitual and presupposed. If Athens had failed in the past, many monuments testified to its triumphs. Only Athens was qualified to lead.

One of the most successful practical innovations of the League was the creation of an effective organ by which Athens could lead the allies. The Athenians and their first allies agreed to establish a synedrion of allied delegates who met separately from the Athenian Demos, elected its own officers, and passed its own resolutions, all independently of the Athenians. Hence, the League possessed two deliberative bodies, nominally of equal authority, the synod of the allies and the Athenian Demos. The synedrion elected its own president, who apparently changed annually, from among its members. He presided over the meetings of the synedroi, his principal function, but no evidence indicates how often the members met. The synedrion sent its own ambassador on all diplomatic negotiations, and its envoy exchanged oaths for the body. In pan-hellenic agreements like the King's or Common Peace the allies swore together with the Athenians. The synedrion dealt with confederate matters, deciding upon policy, the conduct of war, and questions of peace, and only on them. It could not legally intervene in the local affairs of its members, and for the most part Athens and its allies seem to have honored their pledges in this regard. The synedrion's role in the financial functioning of the League remains largely unknown. Kallistratos of Aphidna, then early in his illustrious career, established contributions from the confederates to a common war chest.

Athens collected the contributions, and in many instances Athenian officers in command of naval squadrons did so in person, which echoed fifth-century practices. Athenian commanders also disbursed money as needed. A great deal about the financial management of the League is still unknown, such as whether at first money was levied when needed and only later became an annual assessment. Noticeable, however, is the absence of an intricate and well-developed system of quotas and collections reminiscent of the Athenian Tribute Lists of the fifth century. It is probable, but unprovable, that at least in the early years the allies had a voice in the amount of assessment, and entirely unknown is what proportion the members of the League were assessed. Complicating matters include ample indications that Athens took an increasingly imperial attitude towards the allies in the course of the century. From the outset, however, the Athenians clearly encountered trouble extracting money from refractory allies. Later in the century Athenian officers resorted to force to collect assessments. The allies seem routinely to have participated in person in confederate operations, but information is again scanty. They sometimes manned Athenian ships, but also contributed their own naval and maritime contingents, which served immediately under their own officers but under the general command of Athenian strategoi.⁴³

This league further parted ways from the Delian by its official recognition of the members' right not only to autonomy but also liberty. That by definition meant that the Athenians eschewed measures such as the Coinage Decree, whereby the allies or subjects were forced at great expense and inconvenience to exchange local coins for Athenian. The economic hardships apart, the suppression of local coinage had delivered a blow to the symbol of an ally's sovereignty. This league on the contrary honored the circulation of allied currency. The Athenians of the Empire had frequently and unabashedly dictated the form of some allied governments, notably those of Erythrai, Kolophon, Eretria, and Chalkis. Not one such case can be advanced against the fourth-century confederacy. Property

⁴³ Kallistratos: Theopompos, *FGrH* 115 F98. Disbursement of money: Ps.-Dem. 49.14, 16, 21, 48; 50.14. Quotas and tribute lists: *IG* I³ 34, 68, 259; Meiggs-Lewis, *GHI*² 75. Collection of money: Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.1, 11; Ps.-Dem. 58.37. Allied crews: *IG* II² 1605 lines 12–13; 1607 lines 155–156. Athenian commanders: *IG* II² 1607 lines 158–159; Ps.-Dem. 49.14, 21, 48, 50.14.

rights were fundamental parts of freedom and autonomy, and here again this league differed markedly from the Empire. The copious evidence on Athenian relations with the allies during the span of the new League contains not a mention of Athenian violation of allied property. Nor does anything indicate the presence of Athenian military colonies (*klerouchiai*) on allied territory. Samos in 365 provides no exception because it had never joined the League. Although Athenian garrisons figured prominently in the fifth century, few can be found on confederate land in the fourth, nor were they necessarily imposed by force. Athenian garrisons held Andros and Arkesine on Amorgos in 356, but it is unclear whether they were unwelcome. At least in the case of Arkesine the people so esteemed Androtion, the historian and their garrison commander, that they crowned him and awarded him *proxenia*. Moreover, the Athenians installed both garrisons during the tense days of the Social War, when both islands held special strategical importance. Hence, these instances could have been atypical and dictated more by military necessity than the desire to dominate these places. Garrisons can protect as well as suppress.⁴⁴

At the outset the Athenians of the fourth century did not repeat various other previous abuses. Unlike Perikles with his grand building program, no fourth-century Athenian diverted allied money to the adornment of Athens. The Athenians struck no blows at confederate religious sentiments similar to that of 425, when their forefathers required allies to present a cow and a panoply of armor at the Great Panathenaia. No Melian massacres occurred. Nothing in the fourth century matched the foolhardy attempt on Syracuse; and even if the efforts to regain Amphipolis appear as unrealistic as they proved futile, at least the Athenians had some reasonable claim on the city. In foreign affairs, the fourth-century Athenians followed Perikles' advice more faithfully than did his contemporaries. Whether the Athenians were tempered by the lessons of history or the simple realization that they were unable to repeat the past no matter how obsolete old men like Isokrates dreamed of it, cannot be determined. Most importantly, they did not try. At this point, at least, the Athenians conducted themselves as leaders, not as masters.⁴⁵

⁴⁴ Coinage: Meiggs-Lewis, *GHI*² 45; R.S. Stroud, *Hesperia* 43 (1974) 157–161; Samos: Cargill, *Settlements*, 17–21, 34–40.

⁴⁵ Perikles' building-program: C.W. Fornara, *Archaic Times to the End of the Peloponnesian War*² (Cambridge 2000), 94, Plut. *Per.* 12; 16, 1–2. Panathenaia: *IG* I³ 71.

Whether the League served as a consistently popular political organization is another matter, but it was undeniably effective. In general, the confederates seemed usually to have willingly followed the Athenian lead until tensions with Thebes arose in the 370s. Yet evidence of widespread discontent with Athenian leadership does not appear until the 350s. Not until the situation in the Aegean became unsettled, first with the Athenian attempt to regain Amphipolis, next with the Satraps' Revolt, and finally with the rise of Philip II can serious strains be seen among the allies. By that time Athens had begun to pursue a dual course of action, maintaining the League as usual and creating a separate empire for itself, especially in Thrace. It appears that so long as Athens and the allies secured the Aegean relations remained amicable. Only when Athens pursued its own ambitions did the confederates feel that they were becoming involved in problems of no particular meaning to themselves and not of their own making. The balance of power on the mainland did not primarily concern the islanders, who cared little which state held the ascendancy there. They looked more to the continuance of proper relations with the King and his satraps who exerted far more actual influence on their lives. So long as Athens adhered to its original goals, it had little or no trouble with the allies. Whatever historians wish to make of its evolution, the Athenian League never became an Athenian empire, and in fact the long harmony between Athens and allies indicates mutual content with the compact.

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE BOIOTIAN WAR (378–371 BC)

A. THEBES AND THE DEFENSE OF BOIOTIA (378–375 BC)

Faced with a war of greater proportions than they had originally anticipated, the Spartans prepared for it first by refining their military organization. They now transformed the levy used before the Olynthian campaign into a formal system of muster and deployment. In place of the earlier conscription of 10,000 for that expedition, the Spartans divided themselves and their allies into ten territorial groups, each expected to produce a certain quota of infantry and cavalry. The allies again possessed the opportunity to fill their ranks by hiring mercenaries. The evidence strongly points to each of these divisions being at least nominally equal in numbers. The Lakedaimonians formed the first unit, which at full muster stood 6000 strong. The Arkadians constituted the second and third units, which provided at least 5000 troops. The Eleians composed the fourth with 3000 troops, but the strength of the Achaian fifth is unknown. The sixth, filled by the Corinthians and Megarians, stood at least 3000 strong. The seventh unit, one of the strongest, included the Sikyonians, who could field 1500 combatants, the Phleiasians 5000, and the people of the Akte 3000. The Akarnanians made up the eighth unit, their numbers also irrecoverable. Equally uncertain is the strength of the ninth, composed of the Phokians and Lokrians, the possibility of whose sending 3000 is at least made plausible on the analogy of the Euboians. The Olynthians and the Chalkidians of Thrace, who counted some 3400 in 382, formed the tenth. Since five certainly and three others probably of the ten units could marshal 3000 men, that was probably the official strength of each unit, which combined units formed the entire pool of 30,000 foot and horse. In practice, however, the Spartans seem to have preferred to call up armies of 10,000 infantry and 1000 cavalry, which could be manageably commanded and feasibly supplied. This reform spread the burden of military service rather equitably among the allies without necessarily demanding that the full levy of them be summoned for each campaign. The

Spartans supposedly began to treat their allies with greater consideration, but that seems the result of Kleombrotos' influence rather than Agesilaos'.¹

In 378 the Spartans had determined the direction and had largely put into place the means of pursuing their strategy for the Boiotian campaign. They already held Plataia at the northern foot of Mt. Kithairon and Thespiiai not far removed from Thebes. They may also already have installed a garrison at Orchomenos, as they had during the Corinthian War, and certainly by 377 they held Tanagra with a force. In them they installed tyrannical governments such as that in Thebes between 382 and 378, which Spartan garrisons upheld. The flight of democrats to Thebes made their task the easier. So, the conflict between Sparta and Thebes now included the element of tyranny against democracy. To many in Boiotia the Spartans came more as invaders than as liberators from the Thebans. That withal, even though the Spartans had almost effortlessly hemmed Thebes within its plains, they had still failed totally to blockade it. The routes south from Thebes through Eleutherai, Panakton, and Phyle still linked it with Attika, and Spartan occupation of Thespiiai could only hinder, but not close, communications with Haliartos and Chaironeia. The roads to Anthedon and Larymna remained open, which allowed access to the Aegean. For all that, Thebes found its situation precarious, and its need to maintain direct contact with Athens became essential. Sparta enjoyed nearly all of the military advantages. The Spartans determined to crush Thebes by direct attack, which meant either victory in the field or successful siege. Theban determination and military prowess, together with substantial Athenian aid, would daunt both options.²

¹ Diod. 15.31.1–2; Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.20. The units: (1) Spartans, 6000: Xen. *Hell.* 4.2.16, with two-thirds serving at Leuktra: *ibid.* 6.4.17 (2 and 3) Arkadians, Mantineians, 3000: Diod. 12.78.4; Thuc. 5.29.1, 33.1; Lys. 34.7; Arkadians combined, 5000: Diod. 15.62.2–4; (4) Elis, 3000: Thuc. 5.58.1; Xen. *Hell.* 4.2.16. (5) Achaiaans: Beloch, *GG III*².1.280–281. (6) Corinthians, 2000–3000: Thuc. 5.57.2, 60.3; Xen. *Hell.* 4.2.17; Megara, 3000: Hdt. 9.28, or 1200 according to R.P. Legon, *Megara* (Ithaca 1981) 269–271. (7) Sikyon, 1500: Xen. *Hell.* 4.2.16; Phleious, 5000: Xen. *Hell.* 5.3.16; Akte, 3000: Xen. *Hell.* 4.2.16. (8) Akarnania, 300 casualties: Xen. *Hell.* 4.6.11, otherwise unknown; see Beloch, *GG III*².1.310. (9) Phokis, 1000: Hdt. 9.31, not the entire levy; Opountian Lokris, 50: Xen. *Hell.* 4.2.17; Beloch, *GG III*².1.311. (10) Olynthos, 3400: Xen. *Hell.* 5.3.16.

² Plataia: Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.10, 48; Plut. *Pel.* 15.6. Thespiiai: Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.10, 38, 41; Plut. *Ages.* 24.8; *Pel.* 15.6. Tanagra *IG VII* 1903–1904; Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.49; Plut.

This year also saw far-ranging Athenian preparations for the future. While the Athenians busied themselves with the expansion of the League, they also re-organized their finances to prepare themselves for the increased burdens of leadership that they had assumed. Although the details of the system still stir debate, the Athenians made a valuation of property in Attika on the basis of a levy on private capital, from which that of the polis and sacred establishments were obviously exempt. All the rateable property, real and movable, was assessed at a figure of some 6000 talents. Unknown is the method of levying this tax (*eisphora*), as is whether land below a certain value was excepted from it. Nonetheless, it provided the Athenians with a steady source of internal income for its routine costs of operations. The measure tried to put Athenian finances on a sound basis that would be unaffected by external factors. With the combination of the revenues from this tax and the contributions of the allies to the common operational fund the Athenians no longer needed to rely on the grace of the Persians for subsidies. They were now better able to conduct large-scale operations than they had been since the end of the Peloponnesian War.³

These preliminaries over, the belligerents began the grim work of war in spring 378. The area over which the major fighting took place between 378 and 375 stretched south of Thebes from Plataia in southwestern Boiotia to Tanagra in the southeast. Between and after the large-scale campaigns many minor Theban raids struck nearby Thespiiai and even more distant Orchomenos in the northwest. Thebes stands in the north of this area on a low ridge that divides two distinct plains, one to the north and west and the other to the south and east. South of the city spreads open, rolling coun-

Pel. 15.6. Orchomenos: *Plut. Pel.* 16.2. Tyranny and democracy *Xen. Hell.* 5.4.46; 6.3.1. J. Buckler, *AJAH* 4 (1979) 50–64; Beck, *Polis und Koinon*, 98–106; *CP* 96 (2001) 355–375.

³ Philochoros, *FGrH* 328 FF41, 45–46; Kleidemos, *FGrH* 323 F8; *Isok.* 15.145; *Dem.* 14.17, 19; 27.7; *Polyb.* 2.62.7. M.H. Hansen, *The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes*² (Norman 1999) 112–116.

One aspect of Athenian military preparations, that of a new defensive mentality, must be rejected at the outset. J. Ober, *Fortress Attica*, (Leiden 1985) 65, has written: “It seems clear that through the fourth century an increasing emphasis was being placed on the protection of Attica and that this new focus tended to eclipse the Athenian resolve to engage in long-distance wars”. See also P. Harding, *Klio* 77 (1995) 107–113. A brief survey of Athenian military engagements or campaigns in the fifty-one years between 391 and 340 includes (1) Iphikrates in Phleious and Mantinea, 391: *Xen. Hell.* 4.4.15–16; (2) the Athenians at Kalydon, 389: *Xen. Hell.*

try marked by low hills. Movement throughout it is easy, and major natural obstacles largely lacking. An army, especially one with good cavalry support, could move at will. The hills can serve as good places of refuge for small armies in the face of larger; but they are not lofty or abrupt enough and are too exposed to offer any real hope of stopping a superior force. In the direction of Tanagra the land opens out even more spaciouly in slightly rolling swells. A weaker army dared not risk pitched battle in the open, but must content itself with holding the hills from which it could harass its opponent.⁴

In Sparta the government preferred to entrust command of the army to Agesilaos rather than Kleombrotos, whose judgement and probably dedication to the cause were alike suspect. Now given a favorable chance with good weather and a major field-army, Agesilaos willingly undertook the campaign against his arch enemies. The size of his force, not surely known, included the full ban; and because of the threat of combined Atheno-Theban opposition, it may well have numbered more than the usual 11,000. He declared in accordance with a resolution of the allies a general peace among them for the course of the war, and threatened punishment to any state that violated this order. His next concern was to secure the main pass over Mt. Kithairon that descended onto Plataia, already in

4.6.1–2; (3) Thrasyboulos in Thrace, Byzantion, and Aspendos, 390–389: Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.25–30; (4) Iphikrates in the Chersonesos, 389: Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.35–39; (5) Demainetos and others in the Hellespont, 387: Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.25–29; (6) Chabrias at Naxos, 375: Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.61; Diod. 15.34.3–6; (7) Timotheos at Alyzeia, 375: Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.64; Ps.-Arist. *Oik.* 1350a30; Diod. 15.46.1–3; Polyain. 3.10.4; (8) Iphikrates at Kerkyra, 373: Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.33; (9) Iphikrates in Arkadia, 369: Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.51; (10) Athenians at Phleious, 368: Xen. *Hell.* 7.2.10; (11) Chares at Phleious, 366: Xen. *Hell.* 7.2.19–23; 7.4.1; (12) Timotheos at Samos, 365: Isok. 15.111; (13) Athenians at Mantinea, 362: Xen. *Hell.* 7.5.3–25; (14) Athenians at Peparathos, 361: Diod. 15.95.4; (15) Chares and Chabrias at Chios, 357: Diod. 16.7.3; (16) Chares, Iphikrates, and Timotheos in the Hellespont 356: Diod. 16.21.3; (17) Chares at Sestos, 353: Diod. 16.34.3; (18) Chares at the Crocus Plain, 353: Diod. 16.35.5–6; (19) Proxenos at Thermopylai, 346: Aischin. 2.134; (20) Athenians at Byzantion, 340: Diod. 16.77.2. Thus, within these fifty-one years a major foreign expedition occurred once in every 2.5 years. These exclude all battles fought in Boiotia and the Corinthia, which were seven: Haliartos, Nemea River, Koroneia, Lechaion, Chaironeia, and Chabrias' Boiotian campaigns of 378 and 377, which if added would result in one in every 1.9 years. This is pretty active defensive mentality. Ober's great failure is his derivation of evidence primarily from the Attic orators instead of the historians of the period. His theory should simply be dismissed.

⁴ Personal observations of 30 September 1970, 17 August 1980, and 21 October 1998.

Spartan hands. He recruited a band of mercenaries, presumably peltasts, from Kleitor whom he ordered to seize Kithairon in advance of his march. He thereby crossed the mountains without opposition, and marched farther to Thespiiai. Making the city his principal base, he rested his troops, while acquainting himself with the enemy's defenses. He learned that an Athenian force of some 5000 infantry and 200 cavalry under Chabrias had come to the aid of the Thebans, whose army, under the command of the liberator Gorgidas, may have numbered 4000, as they did later at Leuktra. Realizing their numerical inferiority, Chabrias and Gorgidas planned a defensive strategy of protecting Thebes and its immediate environs with a ditch and stockade, no traces of which survive, thus relying on a static defense instead of venturing to meet Agesilaos in the field. They planned to harry his forces and disrupt his devastation of the countryside. Chabrias, recently returned from service in Egypt where he had successfully constructed field-fortifications, inspired this strategy. Now he constructed a fortified line from Kynoskephalai, probably the modern Rakhi Kendani near the village of Loutoufi, in the west along the northern bank of the Asopos river to a point east of Skolos, located south of Neokhoraki. This field-work also fixed Agesilaos' attention on this sector of Theban territory. He became so determined to penetrate it that he failed to use his superior forces to thrust northeastwards into the Teneric and Aonian plains, where he could have struck at the heart of Theban agriculture. The route north of the Thespios river, the modern Kanavari, is narrower than the southern but farther from Thespiiai. Nonetheless, he could have used it to avoid Chabrias entirely, thereby rendering his defenses otiose. In short, he could then have repeated his performance in Akarnania and that of Agesipolis and Polybiades against Olynthos. Instead of showing any strategic ability he did precisely what Chabrias wanted him to do. By drawing Agesilaos' attention to these defenses, Chabrias thwarted Agesilaos' campaign before the first blow was even struck.⁵

⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.35–38; Diod. 15.31.4–32.2; Plut. *Ages.* 22.6; *Pel.* 15.1. Although Diodoros' figure of 18,000 troops in Agesilaos' army sounds exaggerated, the presence of five of the six of Sparta's morai suggests a larger army than usual. Kleitor: F. Geiger, *RE* 11 (1921) 661–664; see also Frazer, *Pausanias*, IV.266–268. Theban strength: Buckler, *TH*, 290 n.27. Gorgidas: E. Swoboda, *RE* 7 (1912) 1620; M.H. Munn, *The Defense of Attica* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1993) 152–155.

Faced with this barrier, Agesilaos moved along it looking for weak points, frequently changing his campsites and systematically devastating the land outside it. The Thebans and Athenians responded by quick, small forays that harassed rather than harmed the Spartans. The closest thing to a genuine confrontation took place on an oblong hill some three and one-half kilometers from Thebes, probably that of modern Konizos southwest of the city. Having penetrated the stockade, Agesilaos encountered the main force of Chabrias and Gorgidas occupying the crest of the hill, which served as a natural barrier. After testing the position with his light-armed troops, the king ordered his hoplite phalanx to advance uphill in the face of the enemy. His opponents coolly ordered their heavy-armed to await him while standing at ease. His bluff called, Agesilaos retreated with all the dignity he could. When he failed to lure them into pitched battle in the plain, he continued his course of devastation, at one point even approaching the walls of Thebes. Yet since he could neither take the city nor force the main body to join battle, he returned to Thespiai, leaving behind a good deal of scorched earth south of Thebes. The Aonian and Teneric plains, however, remained untouched. Having fortified Thespiai, in which he left a garrison under Phoibidas, he returned to Sparta. His campaign, despite his numerical superiority, had failed to land a serious blow on the enemy and had achieved comparatively little, for which his own Spartan advisors openly criticized him. Although he put the best face on his poor showing, he clearly had no sound idea of how to inflict upon the Thebans and Athenians a decisive defeat. At the end of the campaigning-season he was no closer to victory than he had been at the outset.⁶

⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.38–41; Dem. 20.76; Diod. 15.32.3–33–4; Nepos *Chab.* 1; Plut. *Ages.* 26.2; *Pel.* 15.2; Polyain. 2.1.21. A.P. Burnett and C.N. Edmonson, *Hesperia* 30 (1961) 74–91; J.K. Anderson, *AJA* 67 (1963) 411–413; J. Buckler, *Hesperia* 41 (1972) 466–474; M.N. Munn, *CA* 18 (1987) 106–121; *Defense of Attika*, 152–161. The personal observations noted above (p. 235 n. 4), endorse Munn's topographical interpretation of these events. Yet Diodoros' πρόβλημα at 15.32.3 means only "barrier", which need denote only a natural obstacle: 17.55.1; 19.93.3; see also 1.50.5. Nothing recommends Munn's suggestion that the Dema wall between Mt. Aigaleos and Mt. Parnes in Attika belongs to these events for the simple reason that he lacks archaeological evidence. Although he found sherds in an independent structure, that means unconnected to the wall itself, he found nothing to date the wall itself. Thus, absolutely no evidence supports his interpretation of the Dema wall and the course of the Boiotian War; see also J. Buckler, *Ploutarchos* 11 (1995) 13–14.

After Agesilaos' departure Phoibidas continued to harass Theban territory by making frequent raids, a reversion to the Spartan strategy of the Dekeleian War. In this case it only provoked a major counter-attack. Gorgidas led the entire Theban army against Thespiiai, the lands of which he thoroughly plundered until Phoibidas struck back. Catching the Thebans by surprise, he pressed them through the Thespian valley, but his peltasts out-distanced the Thespian hoplites who followed in support. Towards Thebes the valley narrows, its banks become steeper and the surface slightly rolls the entire distance. When Gorgidas reached a ravine, where today only a narrow bridge provides a crossing, Gorgidas gave the signal for his troops to turn upon their pursuers. Taking Phoibidas unawares, the Thebans killed him and drove the rest of his army headlong back to Thespiiai. They inflicted significant casualties on the Spartans, while avenging themselves upon a special enemy. Gorgidas' victory forced the Spartans to replace Phoibidas' depleted garrison with a polemarchos and mora of troops, a sore demand on their manpower. The incident also typified the sort of warfare that the Thebans pursued until they drove the Spartan garrisons from Boiotia. Between the major campaigns they struck at isolated Spartan posts, these generally being small raids. Although the Thebans inflicted annoying losses on the Spartans and successfully pressed a war of attrition that wore them down and kept them on the defensive, they normally refused to engage in general actions.⁷

If, over the winter of 378–377 Agesilaos devoted any serious thought how best to defeat the Thebans, he evinced very little evidence of it in the spring. The stockade still protected Thebes, and every likelihood suggested that the Athenians would again come to their ally's defense, especially now that they had enrolled them as charter members of their new League. Yet Agesilaos still had formulated no methodical, coherent means by which either to reduce Thebes or to bring his enemies to decisive battle. He again took the precaution of seizing the pass over Mt. Kithairon in 377, but this time he relied upon the Thespian garrison commander to secure the route, which suggests that Plataia already suffered pressure from

⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.42–46; Diod. 15.33.5–6; Plut. *Pel.* 15.6–8; Polyain. 2.5.21. Best, *Thracian Peltasts*, 98–99; Buckler, *AJAH* 4 (1979) 54–55; personal observations of 6 August 1980.

Thebes. Having easily crossed to Plataia, he employed a ruse to strike unexpectedly inland along the road to Erythrai instead of proceeding first to Thespiiai, as he had publicly announced. He had reached Skolos, south of modern Neokhoraki, before the Thebans understood his intentions. Thence ravaging Theban land untouched the previous year, he marched as far as the territory of Tanagra, which was already under Spartan control. He then retraced his steps westwards in the face of the Thebans, who formed up against him at the hill named Graos Stethos, most probably the modern Golemi, in an attempt to restrict him to narrow ground. Agesilaos responded by striking direct for Thebes itself, which forced the Thebans to abandon the hill and fall back on the city by way of Potniai at modern Takhi. Minor skirmishing caused some casualties on both sides but did not prevent the Thebans from reaching the walls first, whereupon Agesilaos retreated to Graos Stethos. This dash proved as close as Agesilaos ever came to seizing Thebes, and the bald fact remains that in this campaign again he had failed, despite the odds in his favor, to defeat Thebes and Athens. Nonetheless, Agesilaos' depredations had so hard pressed the Thebans that they suffered from shortage of grain. They had not yet reduced Thebes to starvation, simply because the Aonian and Teneric plains had still escaped damage. The report of Theban hardship sounds like a weak excuse to mask Agesilaos' real military failures.⁸

Agesilaos' operations in 378 and 377 cost him few casualties but also brought him few gains given the time and effort expended. They were also too few to out-weigh the increasing disaffection of the Spartan allies, whose patience had noticeably worn thinner since the King's Peace. Disapproval of Agesilaos added to their displeasure with this continued, bootless campaigning. They had seen it take him a year and eight months to reduce Phleious, and now two consecutive years of full-scale invasions of Boiotia had produced no appreciable results. They had laboriously seen for themselves that he had no coherent, effective strategy for winning the war that he had so ardently wanted, which resulted in their loss of confidence in his

⁸ Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.47–57; *Ages.* 2.22; Diod. 15.34.1–2; Plut. *Ages.* 26.5; Polyain. 2.1.11–12, 25. Personal observations of 17 August 1980; 21 October 1998. R.E. Smith, *Historia* 2 (1953–4) 274–288; R.K. Sinclair, *Chiron* 8 (1978) 29–54; R.M. Kallet-Marx, *CA* 4 (1985) 127–151; J. de Voto, *AHB* 1 (1987) 75–82; Munn, *CA* 6 (1987) 124–133; *Defense of Attica*, 162–167.,

leadership. Early in 378 he had feared that the allies would consider the Theban campaign his private vendetta, and now they said so openly. Their public complaints brought a confrontation with him in which they accused him of private motives and stated baldly that they were heartily tired of the annual and futile campaigns. They also pointed out how the allies so greatly out-numbered the Spartans. Agesilaos wittily, if unpersuasively, answered them, stilling for the moment their expressed discontent, but the sign was ominous. Only the light casualties and the theater of war outside the Peloponnesos gave them solace. Otherwise, future prospects looked decidedly unpromising.⁹

Opposition to Agesilaos was also growing in Sparta itself. His domestic enemies Kleombrotos and Antalkidas not only openly criticized him but they also mocked his failure. Antalkidas taunted him about tutoring the Thebans in the art of war, even against their wishes. Despite his apparent levity, Antalkidas made an excellent point in that the king abetted the training and increased combat experience of a formidable Theban army whose day would come on the field of Leuktra. Equally significant, his garrisons had failed to prevent the Thebans from gaining strength in Boiotia. Furthermore, Agesilaos ignored the growing challenge rising from Athens, which was becoming an even more formidable threat than Thebes. These criticisms of Agesilaos thus went beyond personal dislike to reflect a far more significant disagreement with his entire foreign policy. Konon and Thrasyboulos had shown the Spartans that Athenian seapower was not just an unpleasant memory, a relic from the fifth century, but that by late 377 it was again becoming a palpable reality. Yet Agesilaos had done nothing about it. The dire results of his protection of Sphodrias became alarmingly obvious. An unexpected opportunity to avoid open political confrontation came from Agesilaos' leg, not his brain. While returning from Boiotia in 377, he suffered from thrombophlebitis at Megara, from which he nearly died. His ailment left him incapacitated until 371, by which time he had sufficiently recovered to resume an active part in Spartan politics. His illness opened the way for Kleombrotos and to shift the focus of Spartan concerns from Thebes to Athens.¹⁰

⁹ Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.13, 60; Plut. *Ages.* 26.6–9; *Mor.* 214A; *Lyk.* 24.2; Polyain. 2.1.7. Shipley, *Plutarch's Agesilaos*, 300–305.

¹⁰ Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.58–60; Diod. 15.34.3; Plut. *Ages.* 26.3; 27.1–3; *Lyk.* 13.8–10;

So, in 376 the Spartans unexpectedly left Boiotia to the Thebans, who eagerly took up the demanding challenge of reducing their various garrisons there. One mora held Thespiiai and another Orchomenos, which constituted one-third of total Spartan strength, and both Plataia and Tanagra quartered garrisons of unknown strength. Details of the Theban counter-attacks are generally lacking, but a pattern emerges. At some time between 376 and 375 Charon, a major hero of the liberation, defeated the Spartans in a cavalry battle at Plataia; and a blow at Tanagra routed a large number, including the harmost Panthoidas. The most notable of these successes came with Pelopidas' attempt to seize Orchomenos in 375. Early in the spring Pelopidas learned that the Spartan garrison in the city had made a foray into eastern Lokris across Mt. Hydelion through Abai and Hyampolis. Hoping to catch Orchomenos undefended, Pelopidas led the elite Sacred Band, 300 strong, and 200 cavalry along the southern shore of Lake Kopais, reaching the city from the west. Unbeknownst to him, a second Spartan garrison had relieved the first. Unable either to force the issue or to retrace his steps, Pelopidas retired eastwards along the northern rim above the lake until he reached Tegyra, located at Polygyra, a deserted place north-north-east of the modern village of Dionysos. Here the ridge of Polygyra drops precipitously to the road that divides it from a curious outcrop of rocks above the lake. There Pelopidas suddenly encountered the first Spartan mora returning from Lokris. He quickly ordered an attack over the level area immediately west of the pass. He struck the position of the Spartan commanders, who fell first in the fighting. Discomfited, the Spartans opened a lane for the Thebans, which Pelopidas used to assault those who still maintained their tight order. The Spartan survivors broke for Orchomenos, leaving Pelopidas safely to retire homewards.¹¹

Mor. 189F, 213F, 217D, 227D; Polyain. 1.16.2. Thrombophlebitis: M. Michler, *Sudhoffs Archiv für Geschichte der Medizin* 47 (1963) 179–183. J.L. Moles, *JHS* 95 (2000) 367–390; Shipley, *Plutarch's Agesilaos*, 306–308.

¹¹ Theban raids: Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.46, 63; *IG* VII 1903–1904; Plut. *Pel.* 15.6–8; 25.7–12. Tegyra, Plut. *Pel.* 16–17; *Mor.* 412B; Diod. 15.37, 81.2; Steph. Byz., *s.v.* Tegyra; see Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.10. J. Buckler, *GRBS* 12 (1971) 356–358; *BA* 5 (1995) 43–58; personal observations of 26–30 July 1980, and five other visits between 30 July 1980 and 10 October 1998. With great diffidence I must disagree with Prof. Dr. J. Knauss, who kindly visited Polygyra with me on 9 September 1992, about the existence of two springs on the site. My later visits revealed traces of one, and

Itself a minor affair, the battle of Tegyra demonstrated the increased military skill, hardiness, confidence, and discipline of Theban troops and their officers. It testified that a Theban force inferior in numbers could defeat a seasoned superior force. Of far more importance it proved that Spartan occupation of Boiotian cities had become increasingly difficult and costly both in terms of officers and men. The Spartans faced a war of attrition in which they could never marshal their entire might in order to strike a decisive blow against their enemy. Their garrisons, separated and isolated, so vulnerable to attack in detail, could do little more than protect themselves, much less lend efficient support to the others. While the Spartans suffered losses, the Thebans gained in strength. By 375 these outposts had clearly become a liability, the instruments of a policy that was visibly failing. Unable to defeat the Thebans in the field, the Spartans needed to reach some political accommodation with them that would entail nothing less than acceptance in fact of the existence of the Boiotian Confederacy, an unpleasant thought that they must nonetheless tolerate.¹²

B. EXPANSION OF THE ATHENIAN CONFEDERACY (377–375 BC)

In 377 the Athenians followed their success in Boiotia with progress in expanding their new League. Having in late 378 and early spring 377 transformed the original congeries of alliances into a constitutional body, they next began to recruit new members into it on equal terms. The League being primarily naval in character, the Athenians needed to secure their own maritime communications with the broader world, but most immediately in their home waters.

I must trust the farmer who told me that the spring on his land “has always been there”. I also found at Polygyra a carved block, apparently ancient. See also Pritchett, *Topography*, IV.103–122; S. Lauffer, *KOPAIS I* (Frankfurt a.M. 1986) 149–152; Fossey, *Ancient Boiotia*, 367–373, who still locates Tegyra at modern Pyrgos; M. Sordi, in H. Beister and J. Buckler, eds., *BOIOTIKA* (Munich 1989) 123–130; J. Knauss, *Die Melioration des Kopaïsbeckens durch die Mäyer im 2. Jt. v. Chr.* (Munich-Obernach 1987) 68–79; *Wasserbau und Geschichte Mäynsche Epoche-Bayerische Zeit* (Munich 1990) 196–199.

¹² Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.63 is wrong, when he writes that the Thebans had regained the Boiotian cities by 375. Plataia, Thespiei, and Orchomenos still remained independent.

They accordingly put members of the new synod aboard ships and dispatched them to the islanders. The first ports of call were the cities on southern Euboia, the adherence of which would secure their links with Skyros, Lemnos, and Imbros together with other places in the central and northern Aegean. Southwestern Euboia, especially the cities of Chalkis and Eretria, were likewise vital to the security of Thebes. By May or June of 377 at the latest the four Euboian cities of Chalkis, Eretria, Arethousa, and Karystos with the islanders of Ikos had joined their ranks, all of this coming before Agesilaos' Boiotian campaign. These four cities situated on the southern and southwestern coast of the island together with Aulis in Boiotia and Rhamnous in Attika commanded the southern Gulf of Euboia, while Karystos further protected Athenian communications with the northern Aegean. When Agesilaos retired from Boiotia in early summer, the Athenians sent Chabrias with a naval force to protect their new Euboian allies. Euboia had become all the more important because first Jason of Pherai and next the Spartans had previously intervened at Histiaia on the northern tip of the island. Sometime between 382 and 379, quite early in his career, Jason had provided Neogenes, otherwise unknown, with mercenaries, whom he used to seize the akropolis of Histiaia and make himself tyrant. Standing near the mouth of the Gulf of Pagasai, Histiaia enjoyed good communications with Pagasai, the harbor of Pherai. Jason obviously wanted the Euboian city in friendly hands. Yet with the coming of the Boiotian War this area gained new significance for the Spartans, who responded to Neogenes by sending Herippidas, back in their good graces after the fiasco at the Kadmeia, and a small force against him. By 377 Herippidas had driven out the tyrant, and installed Alketas with a garrison in the city. The Spartan presence there thus posed an inconvenience to the Athenians, many Euboians, and Jason, which made it all the more urgent for them to secure Euboia for their own interests.¹³

¹³ Athenian League established in the seventh prytany of 378/7: *IG* II² 43. Euboian states joined by May/June 378/7: Cargill, *Second Athenian Confederacy*, 32–44; see also *IG* II² 42 lines 20–21; Diod. 15.30.1. Agesilaos; campaign from spring to early summer 377: Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.47, 58, when Chabrias was still in Boiotia: Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.54. Chabrias sent afterwards to protect the Euboians, not to enroll them: Diod. 15.30.2, 5. Histiaia: Diod. 15.30.5; Theopompos, *FGrH* 115 F387; Plut. *Mor.* 578A; 773F–774A; Front. *Strat.* 4.7.19; Polyain. 2.7. F. Geyer, *RE* Sup. 4 (1924) 749–753; Freund in Lauffer, *Griechenland*, 269–270, 495. Equation of Diodoros' Therippidas with

Striking Alketas at Histiaia, Chabrias ravaged the land but could not dislodge the Spartan garrison in the city. He then fortified a steep hill called Metropolis, the site of which is unknown, which he in turn garrisoned. His perfunctory effort can perhaps be explained by his desire to isolate the place rather than consume time reducing it by siege. From Histiaia he sailed instead to the nearby islands of Peparethos and Skiathos, which shortly joined the League. By their adherence he further protected Ikos, the small ally theretofore isolated off the coast of Euboia. Far more importantly, he gained full control of Euboia and its approaches, which meant as well access to the Gulf of Pagasai and the northern Gulf of Euboia. Although classical Greek fleets could not seal large stretches of sea as British squadrons did the French ports in the Napoleonic Wars, Chabrias had made the passage of hostile warships through these waters more risky. Chabrias' voyage now took him farther afield to Maroneia in western Thrace and perhaps farther to Perinthos. Both joined the League at generally the same time as Peparethos and Skiathos, but Byzantine enthusiasm for the union may have strongly influenced Perinthos' decision. The consistent Athenian efforts to maintain good relations with Odrysian Thracian kings may have prompted Maroneia to strengthen its ties with both neighbor and newcomer, while winning some political independence without giving offense to either. Seen in this light, the decisions of Perinthos and Maroneia to join the League stemmed from the new opportunities offered by Chabrias' success of 377, which had significantly strengthened the reach of Athenian seapower in the area. There remained the problem of the beleaguered Histiaia. Undaunted by the garrison at Metropolis, Alketas used his seapower to disrupt a Theban grain shipment from Pegasai. After the loss of some crops for two years, the Thebans sent two triremes to the Thessalian harbor to supplement their stores. As they returned past Histiaia, Alketas captured them, all without hindrance from the Athenians. The Theban prisoners succeeded in escaping, seized the akropolis of Histiaia, and re-opened the sea-route. They removed the last obstacle to full confederate control of Euboia. One last success awaited them. Now that Dion, located between Histiaia and Aulis, no longer feared the Spartan presence, it too joined the

Plutarch's Herippidas: Stylianou, *HCD* 279, given Sparta's increased need for experienced officers, the re-instatement need cause no surprise.

League. Before 376 Histiaia itself would also become a member. For all practical purposes, all of Euboia had become an Athenian ally. The campaigning-season of 377, then, yielded dramatic results. To the six major states that had created the nucleus of the League at the beginning of the year five more joined their ranks by or shortly after its end. The confederates had expelled the Spartans from the area, with the presumably unintended result of forcing the rising Jason of Pherai to decide which of the two major powers to humor. By the end of the year the Athenian League had become a potent force in Greek politics.¹⁴

Although the spring of 376 at Sparta appeared normal, appearances deceived. The ephors again called out the ban; but owing to Agesilaos' illness they put command of it in the hands of Kleombrotos, who was notoriously unenthusiastic about the war. He nonetheless dutifully led the army northwards, but the peltasts whom he had sent ahead to secure the pass over Mt. Kithairon were repulsed with loss. Thus balked, he immediately retired and disbanded the army. Yet for some unexplained reason the allies re-assembled at Sparta, complained about the annual campaigns, urging in their place a naval effort aimed at both Thebes and Athens. This story as it stands is deceptively simple, but ultimately unsatisfactory, and in need of further scrutiny. The most obvious explanation comes from the consideration that over the winter the Spartans and allies made a dramatic re-assessment of their strategy, one prompted by several factors. Combined were Agesilaos' illness and the obvious failure of his anti-Theban policy that not only left Thebes relatively unscathed but also saw the loss of Boiotia. The next was the vociferous allied discontent with the war. The allies complained that the Spartans were wearing them down by these endless and ineffectual campaigns. Faced

¹⁴ Metropolis: Diod. 15.30.5; Steph. Byz. *s.v.* Metropolis. F. Geyer, *RE* Sup. 4 (1924) 752–753. Adherence of the five new states: *IG* II² 43 lines 848–8. Busolt, *Der zweite athenische Bund*, 746–748; E. Fabricius, *RhM* 46 (1891) 597; Accame, *La lega Ateniese*, 76–77; Cargill, *SAL*, 34, 61–64. These names were inscribed as a group in three divisions, first Perinthos, next Peparethos and Skiathos, and lastly Maroneia and Dion, the evidence for the divisions being differences in letter-forms. Maroneia, the Odrysian kings, and Athens: *IG* II² 31; Archibald, *Odrysian Kingdom*, 145–148, 220. Capture of Histiaia: Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.56–57; Front. 4.7.19; Plut. *Mor.* 773F–774A; Polyain. 2.7. Lastly, although Plut. *Mor.* 350F credits Timotheos with liberating Euboia, Diodoros' testimony is preferred because of Isokrates' (15.101–139) failure to mention any exploit of Timotheos there, which would have strengthened his case, had one occurred.

with these realities, the Spartans and their allies, supposedly at the instigation of the latter, made a conscious and mutual decision to shift the principal emphasis of the war to Athens, for which a fleet was necessary and which the allies agreed to supply. This idea surely sprang from Antalkidas, the veteran of naval warfare who had defeated the Athenians in 387. The decision possessed great merit, for the dramatic growth of Athenian power in 377 reawakened visions of the fifth-century empire. Besides leaving Thebes undisturbed while challenging Athenian aspirations, Kleombrotos' plan eclipsed Agesilaos in Spartan politics. The older king's hoplite supporters would stand idly by while other men carried on the war, men who owed Agesilaos nothing. For the Peloponnesian hoplites this approach entailed financial contributions to a navy manned by others—money rather than men, a system already in place. When its proponents suggested that the fleet could always convoy an army to Boiotia, they offered a palliation to Agesilaos and his supporters to the effect that they had not abandoned the war against Thebes. They did in fact transport reinforcements to Orchomenos in 375, but in reality the change in war-aims effectively cancelled the war in Boiotia. It relieved the allies of an onerous land war against an enemy whose ambitions seemed limited to Boiotia and of no particular threat to the Peloponnesos. Not until the summer of 371 would the Peloponnesian army again see service in Boiotia. In the place of the Boiotian war Spartan efforts henceforth concentrated on the defeat of Athens. Seen in this light, the events of spring 376 did not happen spontaneously or randomly. The Spartans needed time and money to prepare for the naval war, beginning with the outfitting and assembly of the fleet. An admiral must be found for it and a strategy devised. Kleombrotos' attempt to cross Mt. Kithairon served merely as a feint to deceive the Athenians and to fix the attention of the Thebans.¹⁵

By spring 376 the Spartans had appointed the veteran Pollis to command the new fleet of sixty-five triremes then forming in the Ionian Sea. The mere fact that this fleet already existed amply proves

¹⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.59–60. Xenophon has consciously tried to obscure the deliberate change of Spartan policy by making it look accidental. He remarks (5.4.63) that one result of it cost the Spartans Boiotia, an obvious exaggeration, for by 375 they still held Plataia, Thespiei, and Orchomenos. He feebly defends Agesilaos by pointing out that Kleombrotos' alternative brought no greater success. Munn, *Defense of Attica*, 167–170.

that no one had thought of it at the last moment. The Spartans must first deploy it in the Aegean, but how they did so is unknown. Like Teleutias earlier, Pollis could have circumnavigated the Peloponnesos or instead used the *diolkos* at Corinth, as the Spartans had in 428. In either case, Kleombrotos' abortive thrust at Boiotia could buy some time for the first or provide cover for the second. At any rate, once in the Aegean Pollis pursued a strategy of close blockade of Attika to deny the grain-route to Piraeus. He established a chain of bases stretching from Andros in the northeast through Keos in the south to Aegina in the southwest. Once again, Teleutias' exploits in the Corinthian War had easily demonstrated how effective such direct pressure could be. Nor was it accidental that Aigina, as before, played such a prominent part in this initially successful strategy. Food became so scarce in Athens that people ate vetches, normally used for forage. Pollis ultimately trapped the grain fleet at Gerastos at the southern tip of Euboia. Although Gerastos commands a small but secure inlet near modern Porto Kastri, it remains somewhat isolated. Furthermore, the grain ships themselves were of a type that could neither enter nor leave harbor without a tow. Even with assistance they were vulnerable upon leaving the shelter of the inlet and easy prey to Pollis' faster and more maneuverable triremes. The Athenians responded by supplying Chabrias with eighty-three triremes with which he broke the blockade and safely escorted the merchantmen to Piraeus.¹⁶

Chabrias next took the offensive by sailing to Naxos, the largest and most prosperous island of the Cyclades, the strongest city of which, also named Naxos, he beleaguered. The incident is curious, and no one has yet offered a truly satisfactory explanation of his conduct. Chabrias had shaken the city walls with his siege machinery before preparing to storm them, when Pollis appeared with his fleet. The question becomes whom did Chabrias attack. In accordance with the King's Peace, Naxos should have enjoyed autonomy and thus not be subject to any foreign garrison. Since Pollis sailed

¹⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.61; Diod. 15.34.3. Teleutias: Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.23. Diolkos: Thuc. 3.15. W. Werner, *Nürnberger Blätter zur Archäologie*, 10 (1995) 103–118; *International Journal of Nautical and Underwater Exploration* 26 (1997) 98–119; personal observations of 24 November 1970. Gerastos: F. Bölte, *RE* 7 (1910) 1233–1234. Ships: J.S. Morrison and R.T. Williams, *Greek Oared Ships, 900–322 B.C.* (Cambridge 1968) 244–245.

to the relief of the island, it does not appear that the Spartans then held it, which leads to the conclusion that the Naxians were defending their autonomy against the Athenians. Happy with the existing situation, they did not want to join the Athenian League or again to become involved in the chaos of mainland Greek politics. Nor does any evidence exist that they subsequently joined the League. The question is complicated by the fact that Naxos at the time was a faithful member of the Delian Amphiktyony, but religious sentiment need not be confounded with political loyalty. The admittedly scanty evidence indicates that as early as a year after proclaiming the need to protect Greek autonomy, the Athenians themselves began violating it. The incident certainly suggests that despite their pious proclamation the Athenians had not forgotten their imperial past. The incident leaves open the possibility that as early as 376 they began to make a distinction between those states that had willingly joined the League, and thus enjoyed its rights and privileges, and those that resisted. The latter, once forcibly reduced, subsequently became subjects.¹⁷

The appearance of Pollis' fleet sparked the battle that resulted in the greatest Athenian naval victory of the fourth century. In the narrow waters between Naxos and Paros probably in late September 376 Pollis drew up his numerically inferior fleet in line of battle, he leading from his right wing. Against him Chabrias deployed his ships, he holding his own right and Kedon the left. Under Kedon served Phokion, a young follower of Chabrias who probably held the rank of *trierarchos*. Pollis bore down on Kedon's wing, killing him and inflicting serious losses on the Athenians until Chabrias brought the ships under his immediate command to bear on the Spartans. His attack caught Pollis before he could disengage from the Athenian fleet, and at the loss of eighteen triremes Chabrias sank twenty-four Spartan ships, while capturing eight others. Strong winds often bedevil these waters, as do adverse currents, and to worsen matters at the

¹⁷ Delian Amphiktyony: *IG II*² 1635 = *Inscriptions de Delos* 98. Stylianou, *HCD* 305–308, whose arguments from epigraphical silence weaken his case. Importance to the islanders of autonomy and freedom from garrisons: Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.1. Although Cargill, *SAL*, 37 points to *IG II*² 179 (mid-fourth century) to suggest that the Athenians did not violate Naxos' autonomy, and denies that the island became an Athenian possession, he admits (137) that it probably did not become a confederate. No one can deny that the Naxians forcibly resisted Chabrias in 376.

time of the battle the weather had begun to deteriorate. Rather than risk another Arginousai, Chabrias broke off the action to rescue survivors and recover the dead. Even without pursuit he had won a decisive victory that ended Spartan naval power in the Aegean. Unlike Knidos, this was a purely Athenian victory that left the League in undisputed control of the seas, untethered by Persian satraps and their political designs. The Athenians were now free to use their victory as they wished. Chabrias used this opportunity to enlarge the League, but precisely how he did so is unclear. The strong possibility exists, but is incapable of proof, that he brought Syros, Seriphos, Kos, Ios, and the cities of Oine, or Thermai or both into the fold. Paros, Tenedos, long an Athenian friend, and Poiessa on Keos also enrolled at this time. The facts record that by 375 twenty-eight states had voluntarily become members, and that they constituted most of the leading states in the Aegean. They did so for a variety of reasons, not all of them certainly recoverable. They may genuinely have believed in the sincerity of the principles enunciated at the founding of the League. Or, the unsuccessful Naxian resistance to Chabrias may already have persuaded them that co-operation with Athens was healthier than defiance. At least, the Athenian League, made within the terms of the King's Peace, provided the most reliable instrument for protecting the autonomy of the islanders. Whatever the details, after the battle of Naxos Athens had clearly re-established itself as the leading naval power in the Greek world, and its success brought with it a dramatic shift in the balance of power, one unfavorable to Sparta and likely to provoke Persian vigilance.¹⁸

¹⁸ Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.61; Chabrias monument: A.P. Burnett and C. Edmonson, *Hesperia* 30 (1961) 79, fr. A; *IG* II² 1606 lines 82–84; Ephoros, *FGH* 70 F80, which provides the date; Dem. 20.77; Diod. 15.34.3–35.2; Plut. *Phok.* 6.5–7; *Mor.* 349F. Waters off Naxos: Derham, *The Aegean*, 209–210.

The difficulty of determining the history of the League after Naxos stems from lacunose sources. *IG* II² 43 lines 85–90 on the right side of the front face of the stele are almost entirely lost. Lines 91–96, a rider of Aristoteles, states that other islanders have now voluntarily joined the alliance. The names above the rider were inscribed either before or far more probably shortly after the battle of Naxos and certainly before the rider. Two other inscriptions, *IG* II² 1635 and the Chabrias Monument, fr. L, taken with the trace of a rounded letter in line 89 of the Aristoteles Decree, suggest that the names Syros and the other states named in the text could have stood in the missing lines, but suggestion is not proof. The example of Naxos warns caution. Dem. 20.77, states that Chabrias took some nearby islands after the battle, which he made friendly, either a tribute to his charm or the response to necessity. Plut. *Phok.* 7.1–2, states instead that Phokion, like a latter-day Aristides,

The campaigning-season of 375 augured well for the Athenians and their allies. After the battle of Naxos the Spartan fleet retired to the Ionian Sea, leaving the Aegean uncontested. Concerned by the return of the Peloponnesian ships to their home waters, the Thebans asked their allies to send a naval expedition to prevent the Spartans from invading across the Corinthian Gulf. The Athenians decided to pursue strategies in both the east and west. Chabrias with an unknown number of ships resumed his work in the Aegean, this time concentrating on the north, while Timotheos mounted a major expedition into the Adriatic. In a campaign reminiscent of Thrasyboulos in 390–389, Chabrias swept from Olynthos in the northwest as far east and south as Mytilene. The Olynthians eagerly renewed their alliance with Athens, as did the neighboring Thasians. At Abdera Chabrias intervened in time to prevent the city from being completely overwhelmed by the Triballians, whom famine had driven to the area for plunder. Although Chabrias could not prevent the decimation of the Abderites, he saved the survivors, who also joined the League. Dikaia and Ainos, both neighbors of Maroneia, already an Athenian ally, likewise became members, as did Samothrace in the southeast. Again, like Thrasyboulos, Chabrias next sailed to the Hellespont, where his conduct became somewhat more adventurous. Although details are largely lacking, unrest reigned in northwestern Asia Minor, perhaps because of the major preparations for the King's massive attack on Egypt. Hellespontine Phrygia suffered from local disturbances, and in this restless situation Chabrias intervened to help Philiskos, the Greek subordinate of Ariobarzanes at Abydos. He also lent some unknown, but significant, assistance to the Persian garrison at Aiantion at Cape Rhoiteion near Sigeion. Although these places lay in Persian territory beyond the legal boundaries of the Greeks, Chabrias arrived as a friend in support of local Persian authorities. Politically adroit, the move suggested to the Persians that they had nothing to fear from Athenian maritime ambitions. From the Hellespont Chabrias sailed to Mytilene on Lesbos, where he again rendered unknown services to the people and the garrison of the city. During this voyage, which apparently entailed little effort and no danger, Chabrias brought this northern area into the Athenian camp, just

won their allegiance by his consideration and sincerity, which at least agrees with the statement of the rider of voluntary enrollment.

as he had the Cyclades the year before. His activity in the Hellespont strengthened friendly ties there, while further securing the grain route and communications with Byzantion. By the end of 375 Chabrias had largely restored Athenian fortunes in the Aegean without having violated the King's Peace.¹⁹

Chabrias' work in the north coincided with the rise to power of Jason, tyrant of Pherai, who did not confine his ambition to Thessaly. His early career remains obscure, but his father was possibly Lykophron, the wealthy tyrant of Pherai who was prominent until 390. By 375 Jason had well entrenched himself in Pherai, his power sustained by a large, well-drilled mercenary army. Pherai provided him with a strong akropolis that dominated a very rich plain, the city also enjoying easy access to the sea through its harbor Pagasai, its akropolis also commanding a strong position above the gulf to which it gave its name. The natural advantages of Pherai and Pagasai cannot of themselves, of course, account for Jason's success. In addition to the distinct possibility of a fortuitous birth came the endemic political turmoil of Thessaly itself, a wealthy region of several nearly equally balanced and equally contentious cities. Central authority there being tenuous and temporary, by 375 Jason had turned mutual animosities to his own successful ends. He had militarily subdued most of the largest Thessalian cities, but still faced the resistance of Pharsalos, itself divided by internal turmoil. The Pharsalians voluntarily put their city into the hands of Polydamas, whom Jason confronted with the ultimatum either to recognize his suzerainty over Thessaly or oppose him in the field. Thus challenged, Polydamas sought help from the Spartans, who were incapable of doing more than defending their immediate neighbors. Polydamas realistically bowed to Jason's might; and with Pharsalos now in his power, he became *tagos*, supreme ruler, of all Thessaly. As such, he was capable of fielding an army of 16,000 hoplites and cavalry and numerous peltasts in addition to his own mercenary force of 6000 men.²⁰

¹⁹ Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.62–63; *IG* II² 43 lines 99–105; Ain. Takt. 15.8–10; Diod. 15.36.1–4. Thrasybulos: Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.26–30 (see Ch. 00). Chabrias in the Hellespont: Chabrias Monument frs. D–E; Nepos *Datames* 3.5–4; Aianteion: Strabo 13.1.30; Pliny *NH* 5.33.125. Beloch, *GG* III².1.153–154; V.J. Gray, *CQ* 30 (1980) 306–326.

²⁰ Xen. *Hell.* 6.1.2–19, 4.21–32; Diod. 15.60. Helly, *L'État thessalien*, 345–351; Westlake, *Thessaly*, 67–71; S. Sprawski, *Jason of Pherae* (Krakow 1999) *passim*. Pherai and Pagasai: Stählin, *Das hellenische Thessalien*, 65–68, 104–108; personal observations of 23, 29 May 1983.

With little notice from the larger Greek world Jason had made himself the most formidable land power in northern Greece, but no one at the time could fathom his ultimate goals. He had extended his reach westwards to Aitolia and Epeiros in the process of making Alketas, dynast of the Molossians, his friend and subject. The connection with the Molossians was new for the Thessalians, whose reach had never before touched the Adriatic. No friend of the Spartans, whom Jason had just quietly defied, Alketas was an inoffensive neighbor of Kerkyra, powerful in itself and strategically important to the Peloponnesos. Animosity prompted Jason's friendship with Kerkyra, which also led him into alliance with Thebes and nearly all of the other enemies of Sparta. His relations with Athens, however, remained questionable, for its traditional northern policy challenged his own aims there. Yet Alketas, himself a member of the Athenian League, could perhaps serve him in seeking some accommodation with the Athenians. The matter demanded delicacy. Chabrias' success in Chalkidian Thrace complicated matters by putting the Athenians on Macedonia's doorstep, and the destinies of Thessaly and Macedonia were usually tightly intertwined. Strong Macedonian kings had often played commanding roles in Thessalian politics by taking the side of one or another of the bickering families. Jason had successfully reversed this situation by gaining a measure of control or at least influence over Macedonia. As earlier in his reign, Amyntas again found himself threatened by his neighbors, this time the Thessalians from the south and Olynthos and its Athenian allies to the east. The situation became all the more sensitive by Macedonia's importance to Athens as its principal source of ship-timber. Jason allegedly indicated that he would solve things by using Macedonian and Thessalian wood to build a fleet solely to destroy Athenian naval hegemony. Little recommends that anyone believe his sincerity inasmuch as he never made any significant naval preparations at all, preferring instead in good Thessalian fashion to build up his land forces. Whatever his ultimate designs, in 375 he lacked a fleet, without which he could do nothing against Athens. For the moment he concentrated on consolidating his position in Thessaly and pondering his future.²¹

²¹ Alketas: Diod. 15.13.2–3; *IG* II² 43 line 109; Ps.-Dem. 49.10. J. Mandel, *RS4* 10 (1980) 47–77; Sprawski, *Jason*, 88–89.

Chabrias' remarkable achievements led the Athenians and Thebans to make even more ambitious plans in 375 to complete the destruction of the Spartan fleet. Success would also lead to the extension of confederate power into the Ionian Sea. The Thebans claimed that in their present state the Spartans could not defend themselves and their neighbors and in addition use their fleet to convoy the Peloponnesian army to Boiotia. The Spartans proved them wrong, when in that same year they sent a *mora* by sea to reinforce Orchomenos. Yet the evaluation of the general weakness of Spartan power and lack of resources remained sound. Geography scattered the core of Sparta's naval strength across the western seaboard. Elis, Achaia, and Zakynthos and farther north Ambrakia and Leukas supplied the bulk of it. Corinth, the strongest of Sparta's maritime allies, stood the most removed from the likeliest scene of operations. The immediate keys to confederate strategy were Kerkyra and Kephallenia. Kerkyra dominated the entire littoral, and Kephallenia stood as the warder of the Corinthian Gulf and its approaches. Both Kerkyra and Kephallenia had long maintained friendly relations with Athens, as had Zakynthos, which was far more strategically important than Kephallenia. Yet in 375 Zakynthos was predominantly loyal to Sparta, despite some internal discord. Nonetheless, these islands and their maritime neighbors differed from the mainland naval states in that they possessed their own interests, a degree of independence, and both a geographical and political entity unto themselves, one that was demonstrated as late as 1800, when they formed the Septinsular Republic. Nonetheless, the islanders enjoyed a great deal of freedom in their own policies, which made allegiance to Sparta a light burden. Thus, if the Athenians wanted to expand their influence in the area, thereby reducing Sparta to a purely Peloponnesian land power, they must either win the adherence of these western states or neutralize their fleets.²²

In early summer 375 Timotheos circumnavigated the Peloponnesos with sixty ships to arrive at Kerkyra, which he easily overpowered but whose population he treated generously. Significantly enough,

²² Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.63; Diod. 15.36.5. Importance of Kerkyra, Kephallenia, and Zakynthos: Thuc. 1.47.2; 2.7.2, 9.4–5, 30.2, 80.1; Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.4, 9; Isok. 15.108; Diod. 15.46.1. Gomme, *HCT* II.214, and in general K. Freitag, *Der Golf von Korinth* (Munich 2000). Septinsular Republic: R.A. McNeal, *Nicholas Biddle in Greece* (University Park, Penn. 1993) 82–88.

he did not change the constitution, and his conduct made such a generally favorable impression that he won the goodwill of surrounding states. Although their resources were heavily stretched at the time, the Spartans responded by manning a fleet of fifty-five triremes that they entrusted to the veteran Nikolochos, who in 388 had held naval command under Antalkidas. In June he found Timotheos' fleet in the sheltered waters off Alyzeia (modern Mytikas) in Akarnania. On the day of the festival of the Skira Timotheos bade his men to garland themselves with myrtle and then rowed to victory. Although Nikolochos soon received reinforcements from Ambrakia, Timotheos refused to join battle again. Instead he strengthened his fleet with ships from Kerkyra until his force numbered more than seventy. So greatly out-numbered, Nikolochos could only retire to leave Timotheos to win Kephallenia and Akarnania to the Athenian side. The victory at Alyzeia not being decisive, Athenian work in the area remained undone. Matters worsened when lack of funds to pay his sailors prevented further action. The basic problem of financing the fleet plagued the Athenians for the rest of the fourth century. It accordingly limited the effectiveness of the navy.²³

Timotheos, like Chabrias, used his victory to strengthen the League; and although he confronted some of the same challenges as had his colleague, in addition he faced many new ones. Of primary concern were relations with Kerkyra, Kephallenia, and Zakynthos that were so complex and incompletely recorded that their details remain irrecoverable. Enough evidence survives, however, to indicate that local response to the coming of the Athenians aroused decidedly mixed feelings for several excellent reasons. Pertinent at the outset is Kerkyra's traditional preference for neutrality. Involvement in the larger affairs of the Greek world during the Peloponnesian War had brought the Kerkyraians only misery, and Timotheos' arrival promised more of the same. The war between the Spartan bloc and the confederates had not been their affair, they had nothing substantial to gain by it, and in fact it was irrelevant to them. The Athenians and

²³ Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.64–66; Isok. 15.109; Aischin. 3.243; Ps.-Arist. *Econ.* 2.2.23; Diod. 15.36.5–6; Nepos *Tim.* 2.1–2; Polyain. 3.10.4, which gives the date. The Athenians celebrated the Skira on the twelfth day of the month to which it gave its name, and the following month of Hekatombaion began after the summer solstice, which in 375 occurred on 27 June: Ginzl, *Chronologie*, II.579; J.D. Mikalson, *The Sacred and Civil Calendar of the Athenian Year* (Princeton 1975) 170; Buckler, *GRBS* 12 (1971) 353–354.

Thebans had involved them in it for their own selfish, if understandable, reasons. Some democratic elements in these states welcomed the Athenians, but others saw them as unwelcome intruders. These islands also sat in the lap of Spartan seapower to which Zakynthos was a major contributor. Antagonism of Sparta would surely bring a reaction to which Athens could not quickly or perhaps even effectively respond. These states had far better reason to continue friendly relations with the Peloponnesians than to join the Athenian League, which in fact had virtually nothing valuable to offer them. Nor was the manner of Timotheos' arrival reassuring. He had captured Kerkyra, just as Chabrias had Naxos, which was of itself a violation of the King's Peace. That spoke ill of the Athens that had publicly proclaimed its intention to uphold that very treaty. Yet unlike Chabrias with Naxos, Timotheos tried to enroll these states in the League. He succeeded to the point where ambassadors from Kerkyra, Kephallenia, and Akarnania sent ambassadors to Athens to negotiate membership. The Athenian boule seconded their desire to join them and recommended that the customary oaths be given to the envoys, after which the names of these states were to be duly carved on the stele of the allies. Nonetheless, ample reason indicates that these intentions were not then realized, the cause of which was probably the Peace of 375. Concluded a month after the victory at Alyzeia, the treaty put a temporary end to these proceedings. Even so, all three of these states remained friendly to Athens, and after the failure of that peace would formally align themselves with it and its allies.²⁴

²⁴ Conquest of Kerkyra: Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.63–66; Isok. 15.109; Aischin. 3.243; Diod. 15.36.5–6; Nepos *Tim.* 2.1–1. Kerkyraian neutrality: Thuc. 1.32.4. Embassy to Athens: *IG II*² 262. The interpretation that the alliances proposed in this inscription did not take effect at the time may prove controversial, and certainly demands an explanation. For the background, see Cargill, *SAL*, 68–75, and C.H. Fauber, *CQ* 48 (1998) 110–116. Badian in *Die athenische Demokratie*, 95, unfortunately takes no notice of the following details. First, although the Athenian boule and demos had accepted the applications of these states, all of the enabling clauses in the rest of the inscription are in the future tense. Important is line 21 in which it is specifically stated that the names of their states are to be inscribed on the stele of the allies (*IG II*² 43). Yet when one examines that stone, Kerkyra is absent, and no epigraphical evidence has yet been presented to prove that it was ever there (see n. 25 below). On *IG II*² 43 only Pronnoi (lines 107–108) is listed; but all of the Kephallenians are included in *IG II*² 96, not just the Pronnoi. Nor should one assume that Pronnoi was meant to represent all of Kephallenia because of the simple fact it was not mentioned on *IG II*² 96. The specificity of the entries on *IG II*² 43 (e.g. lines 97–98

Timotheos' success in the northwest resounded beyond the immediate region, for he succeeded in bring the Chaones, Epeirotes, Athamanes, and others into alliance with Athens. The Chaones were Illyrians who bordered Epeiros on the north and the Molossians on their west, all three peoples being Kerkyra's closest mainland neighbors. As noted above (pp. 197–198), in 385 the Spartans had defended the Molossians from an Illyrian invasion, and afterwards endorsed Alketas' position as ruler of them, thereby stabilizing the situation in the area. Now Timotheos had wrested it all from Sparta. The alliance with the Athamanes seems at first sight inexplicable and insignificant. These Epeirotes lived in the interior of the mainland between Thessaly in the east and the western slope of Mt. Pindos, and because of their geographical location feared nothing from Timotheos' fleet, which could neither harm nor help them. Yet they formed a vital link between Jason and Alketas. Jason extended his direct influence as far west as Dolopia bordering on Athamania, which seems at the time to have been subject to Alketas. This geographical situation explains the importance of Athamania to Timotheos, Alketas, and Jason by forming the essential link among the three. That suggests the very purpose for the Athenian alliance with the Athamanes. Jason and Alketas now had several good reasons for coming to terms with the Athenians, all of them having to do with the situation in the west. Distance and lack of a fleet meant that Jason could not protect him, which gave Alketas good reasons to accommodate Timotheos. Owing to that same lack of naval power, Jason found it more prudent to join the Athenians, who had become so prominent in both areas of his major interests, than ineffectually to oppose them. Although it is very doubtful that the two became Athenian allies at this point, their willingness to support Athens facilitated its policy and alleviated concerns about their intentions. In all, Timotheos achieved nearly as much in the west as had Chabrias the year before in the east. The official friendliness of Jason and Alketas with Athens together with Jason's influence over the Macedonian king Amyntas greatly strengthened Athens' position in the north. At no previous time in the fourth century was Athens as strong as in

and 131–134) argues against it. The most reasonable interpretation of these facts is that the Peace of 375, which the Athenians most heartily welcomed, rendered these proceedings nugatory at that time, but that they were immediately resumed upon the quick failure of that treaty.

the summer of 375, and at no other time in that period was Sparta so confined to the Peloponnesos. Nor were the two as mighty or as equally matched as they had been in 431. Moreover, the Spartan hegemony, however defined, had effectively come to its end.²⁵

C. THE PEACE OF 375 BC AND ITS AFTERMATH

While Timotheos refitted his fleet at Alyzeia, the King intervened in Greek affairs by demanding a general cessation of hostilities. Then preparing a massive effort to reconquer rebellious Egypt, Artaxerxes wanted a peaceful Greece in the general theater of war. An end of

²⁵ Athamanes: Theopompos, *FGrH* 115 F382; Nepos *Tim.* 2.1–2; Strabo 7.7.1; Plut. *Pyrr.* 1.5. A Schäfer, *Demosthenes und seine Zeit*, I² (Leipzig 1885) 46–47; E. Oberhummer, *RE* 2 (1896) 1926. Dolopes: Xen. *Hell.* 6.1.7. Alketas and Jason: the latter probably exaggerated his influence over the former, for Molossia was too distant for him to have exerted effective control over it. Amyntas was another, and far more important, matter.

Two related problems involve the nature of the Athenian alliance with Jason and the Kerkyraians. For Jason, see Ps.-Dem. 49.10; Nepos *Tim.* 4.2; Polyain. 3.9.40. Imperfectly preserved inscriptions vastly complicate the whole question. They are three Athenian treaties: *IG* II² 43, 96 (discussed above in n.24), and 97 (discussed below). At the outset attention can center on *IG* II² 43. The pertinent parts of it are lines 97–98 (or B1–2) and line 111 (or B15), the first of which is incomplete and the latter an erasure. Yet scholarship has often tried to find on the stone places for both Jason and Kerkyra as members of the Athenian League. To begin with line 111: of the erased name only one mark remains at the end of the line. Many epigraphers restore the name of Jason, but those who have most closely examined the stone itself cannot agree on whether the final letter of this entry is and I or N or whether the mark is a hasta of a letter at all. Nothing on the stone supports any restoration; the letters are simply lost. Given these uncertainties, one must honestly admit ignorance and conclude that no one knows what name stood in this line.

Lines 97–98 of this inscription, which read [...]ραίων | [ο δ]ῆμος, present their own problems. Epigraphers long restored the missing letters by printing [Κερκυ]ραίων | [ὁ δ]ῆμος, which is epigraphically impossible, because space will not permit so many letters. Having realized this fact, J. Coleman and D.W. Bradeen, *Hesperia* 36 (1967) 104–106, suggest that [Θη]ραίων be restored in line 97, to which Cargill, *SAL*, 40–41, originally inclined, only later, *AncW* 27 (1996) 45, to doubt it. F.W. Mitchel, *AncW* 9 (1984) 39–58, argues forcefully for [Φε]ραίων on the grounds that democratic Athens would have been embarrassed to add the name of a tyrant to a document declaring its support of autonomy. He adds various other historical and epigraphical reasons. Mitchel's interpretation makes Jason a member of the League before spring 375, which directly contradicts Xenophon's statement (*Hell.* 6.1.10) that at that point he was not even an Athenian ally. No modern statement of fact should be based on a restoration, however attractive, especially in the face of the contemporary evidence of one who was singularly well informed about Jason. On the principle, see E. Badian and T. Martin, *ZPE* 61 (1985) 172; E. Badian,

the Athenian expansion of the League, at least in the Aegean, constituted part of that objective. Even though the Athenians had consistently proclaimed that they acted in strict accordance with his Peace, their actions at Naxos proved otherwise. In reality they had by then regained their naval hegemony of the Aegean, and, as just seen, extended their power into the Adriatic. A quiet Athens would cause him one less worry. He also hoped that peace in Greece would enable him to tap a reservoir of Greeks willing to provide him with mercenary service. The King's command also came at a good time for the Greeks, the Athenians included. Timotheos' fleet proved incapable of further operations owing to lack of funds, and one can easily wonder how readily the Aegean allies contributed money for campaigns that did them no obvious good. Though accused of not paying their contributions to the League, the Thebans had served in the naval campaigns, had independently carried on the war against the Spartans by harassing their garrisons in Boiotia, and were for those reasons perhaps not even obliged to make monetary contributions. For all that, their efforts also troubled the Athenians. They had also carried the war to Phokis, albeit for good reasons. The Phokians served as Spartan allies who provided constant support for the Spartan garrison in Orchomenos. Phokis thus constituted a legitimate Theban target, its traditional friendship with Athens notwithstanding. Athenian fear of the growing power of the Thebans, as most recently demonstrated by their victory at Tegyra, may very well have struck them with some foreboding. While the Athenians massed their power, so did the Thebans, whose need for the League diminished with each of their local successes. The Athenians also paid the *eisphora*, the capital tax that fell upon citizens and metics to finance the war. As immediately, they needed to guard Attika, which yet again suffered from raiding expeditions staged from Aigina. As in the days of Teleutias, Spartan naval power annoyed Athens without being able to challenge its naval ascendancy. The Thebans probably found peace inconvenient. They had regained most of

ZPE 95 (1993) 139. Lastly, *IG* II² 97 records a bilateral alliance between Athens and its allies and Kerkyra, which further argues against the name of the island appearing in *IG* II² 43 line 97. Nor can it be found anywhere else on the stone. One must conclude that although Kerkyra became an Athenian ally, it did not join the League. The case of Jason is identical. Although Alketas enrolled in the League, Jason did not. Yet he too later became an Athenian ally: Ps.-Dem. 49.10.

Boiotia, and pressed Sparta hard and usually successfully for the rest of it. In no position yet to achieve that goal, they perforce submitted to the King's demand. Of all the belligerents, the Spartans most obviously and badly needed peace. In three years they had lost most of Boiotia, had failed to retrieve their Aegean empire, and were seriously threatened in their home waters. They had suffered heavy casualties, which put heavier burdens on their remaining manpower, and could scarcely hold their remaining, expensive foreign garrisons. Their Peloponnesian allies were war-weary and verging on unreliability. In 375 most Greeks, the Thebans excepted, welcomed the King's summons to peace.²⁶

The King's messenger arrived at Sparta in early or mid-summer 375 to reaffirm his general peace. Although this peace is usually and reasonably seen as a renewal of the King's Peace of 386, Artaxerxes saw it rather as his enforcement of the original pact. He actually invoked the clause in it in which he declared that he would wage war against those who refused to honor it. The presence of the Persian envoy there meant that Artaxerxes still placed his faith in the Spartan ability to implement his decree. Yet in 375 the Spartans could no longer wield their power as earlier. Instead of repeating the victory of Antalkidas in the Hellespont, they had lost both at Naxos and Alyzeia. The situation in 375 differed significantly from that of 386 for the simple fact that the Athenian fleet was still intact, effective, and able to defend the League. Unable to destroy the Athenian navy in battle, the Spartans could not harm it by treaty. The content of the peace repeated or nearly so its predecessor. The principles that all cities, great and small, were to be autonomous and free of foreign garrisons were repeated. Although the prohibition against garrisons specifically occurs here for the first time, the idea had certainly formed part of the original. If not, it appeared as the only new clause. If the terms of the two treaties remained essentially the same, their implementation did not. The Spartans said nothing about the new Long Walls, and as importantly they did not challenge the right of the Athenian League to exist. The tacit recognition of the latter resulted from hard necessity. Even had the Spartans

²⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.66; 6.2.1; Isok. 14.37; Diod. 15.38.1–2. Theban naval participation: *IG* II² 1605 line 12, 1607 line 155; Ps.-Dem. 49.14–15, 21, 48–51, 54, the last from 373. For sources see V. Parker, *Klio* 83 (2001) 353–368.

condemned it, the Athenians could always justify it on the grounds that they had formed it in accordance with the King's Peace, thus disallowing any legal objection to it. Nor would the Spartans wish to be reminded in the presence of all the Greeks and the King's emissary that their transgression lay behind its foundation. Good sense bowed quietly to reality. The Spartans similarly did not demand the dissolution of the nascent Boiotian Confederacy. Unlike 386, in 375 the Spartans and in particular Agesilaos—especially after his mediocre campaigns—were in no position to demand anything of the Thebans. Likewise, the Spartans raised no objections to Jason's success in Thessaly. In fact, rather than dispute individual cases the Spartans seemed relieved again to receive the King's endorsement of their leadership. All states accepted the peace without objection. The King again emerged as the arbiter of Greek affairs, and this time he did so without effort or expense. Rather, the Greeks proved willing to accept his decisions and the very notion of his peace. He could now continue his ambitions without fear of Greek interference.²⁷

The Peace of 375 by any account constituted an Athenian victory, a public acknowledgement of their triumphs from 378 until then and with it a formal, legal recognition of the political legitimacy of their League. The Athenians celebrated by establishing a cult to Eirene and erecting both an altar to the goddess and a statue of her holding Ploutos in the agora. The figure of Ploutos probably represented the wealth that the Athenians expected the peace to bring, including the end of taxes, naval raids, and financing of their own operations. Yet an unexpected problem rises immediately. As will shortly be seen, this peace did not last the entire year; and the charming statue, now in Munich, must have taken longer than that to sculpt. Furthermore, the Athenians continued annually to celebrate this peace

²⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.1; Isok. 7.12; 14.10; 15.19–110; Philochoros, *FGrH* 328 F151, who states that this peace was very similar to the Peace of Antalkidas; Dem. 22.15; Diod. 15.38.1–2; Nepos *Tim.* 2.2; Bengtson, *SdA* II².265. Date of the peace: schol. Ar. *Peace* 1019, which places the creation of the cult of Eirene, which celebrated it, on 16 Hekatombaion, the summer solstice of 375 having occurred on Julian 27 June, so Ginzel, *Chronologie*, II.579; see also Buckler, *GRBS* 12 (1971) 353–361; *ICS* 19 (1994) 119–122; Mikalson, *Calendar*, 29–31. For the Spartan disagreements between Agesilaos and his supporters, whether or not the king had regained his health, and those of Kleombrotos and Antalkidas probably played little part in these decisions, given the failure of the policies of them all. Necessity in 375 governed Spartan politics. See also Urban, *Königsfrieden*, 169–171; Jehne, *Koine Eirene*, 57–64; Stylianou, *HCD* 349–351.

long after it had become a dead letter. So the question becomes what so endeared this treaty to the Athenians. The answer clearly cannot be the response of the Spartans, who in 375 no longer posed as great a threat as earlier in the century. Hence, the success or failure of the compact mattered little. The answer instead lies in the significance of the Persian response to it. When the King's emissary accepted the oaths of the Greeks, the act declared that Artaxerxes formally recognized the fact and validity of the Athenian League. This was the first diplomatic occasion on which he took official notice of it, and judged that it lay within the scope of his Peace. From the fifth century to this point Persia had posed the deadliest threat to Athenian policy in the Aegean, but his acceptance of the League left the Athenians free from worry of any future opposition from that quarter. Artaxerxes had accepted their claim, supported by deeds, that they had complied with his peace. He also recognized that they had truly abandoned all claims to Asia. Within the bounds of the Peace of 375 the King permitted the Athenians to pursue their policies in the Aegean. Indeed, throughout the rest of the century he and the Athenians refrained from coming to blows over these issues. The old rivalry resolved, the achievement merited the enthusiastic expression of Athenian joy.²⁸

The Athenians immediately dispatched two envoys by sea to order Timotheos to cease operations and return home, which he obeyed. While returning to Piraeus, however, he landed some democratic Zakynthian exiles from Nellois, an unknown place, at a fort named Arkadia, again otherwise unknown, in their homeland before sailing on, an incident that would soon provoke the renewal of war. The Spartans promptly honored the peace that relieved them of so many burdens. Like the Athenians, the Thebans also benefitted from Sparta's compliance with the treaty. The Spartans duly withdrew their garrisons from Plataia, Thespiiai, and Orchomenos, in effect admitting that they had lost the Boiotian War. For the Thebans, then, their fledgling confederacy remained intact with the rest of Boiotia open to them. Sparta could no longer protect the three cities, and Athens declined to interfere with their powerful ally. The peace gave the

²⁸ Cult of Eirene: Isok. 15.109–110; schol. Ar. *Peace* 1019. H.W. Parke, *Festivals of the Athenians* (London 1977) 32. Altar and statue; Paus. 1.8.2, 18.3. D. Ohly, *Glyptothek München* (Munich 1997) 37–38.

Thebans a reprieve to devote all of their energies to local matters and thereby further build their power. If Athens and to a lesser extent Thebes were the real victors of the Peace of 375, Sparta was the real loser. In broader affairs only the knowledge that they had fulfilled the King's expectations of peace consoled the Spartans.²⁹

Peace reigned only briefly in Greece until word of Timotheos' interference in Zakynthos reached Sparta. The oligarchic Zakynthians in the city asked the Spartans for help, to which they responded by sending envoys to Athens complaining about Timotheos' conduct. Now the Athenians in their turn condoned him just as the Spartans earlier had Sphodrias with the same results. Receiving no satisfaction, the Spartans ruled that the Athenians had violated the newly-concluded peace, in which accusation they were fully justified. Timotheos had violated the autonomy-clause by gratuitously interfering in the internal affairs of Zakynthos, which had sworn to the peace. His desire to place a democratic government in the island differed in no way from Agesilaos' to establish oligarchic power in Mantinea and Phleious. The conscious Athenian decision to exonerate Timotheos proves that they feared Sparta not at all. The Peace of 375 had given them all they wanted in the Aegean, and now came the time to finish the naval war in the west. Even had he learned of these events, the King showed indifference. At least it removed them all from the Aegean. As a result, the Spartans assembled a fleet of twenty-five ships in the Adriatic, placing it under the nauarchos Aristokrates. The course of the fighting is unknown, but Aristokrates easily foiled the democrats, who lacked Athenian support and found themselves overwhelmed by the oligarchic counter-attack. They retained a foothold on the island, but were too few to cause serious trouble. They did, however, enroll as members of the Athenian League, one of only four Adriatic political bodies known to have done so. Despite their defeat at Alyzeia, the Spartans still constituted a presence in the Ionian Sea.³⁰

²⁹ Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.2–3; Diod. 15.45.2–4. Nellos: *IG* II² 43 lines 132–134 (= B35–38). See also Bursian, *GG* II.379; F.W. Mitchel, *Chiron* 11 (1981) 73–77.

³⁰ Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.3; Diod. 15.45.4; *IG* II² 43 lines 131–134 (= B35–38). Beloch, *GG* II².2.281. Although Diodoros (15.46.3) claims that the Athenians sent Ktesikles to Zakynthos, Xenophon (*Hell.* 6.2.10), whose testimony is to be preferred, states that he was actually sent to Kerkyra. Confusion marks Diodoros' entire account of these events, which is echoed in Stylianou's (*HCD* 349–351) discussion of them. See instead Tuplin, *Failings of Empire*, 185.

Similar but far larger political convulsions shook Kerkyra in that same summer, when the democrats there rose against the oligarchs. Timotheos had stirred things in 375 that the peace had not settled; and as in 427 this local conflict soon drew in the Spartans and Athenians. Both reacted quickly, the Spartans especially because of Timotheos' recent exploits. In anticipation of Athenian action they organized their navy, just as they had earlier their army, by determining quotas of ships to be contributed proportional to the strength of their allies. Ten states constituted the naval branch of the Peloponnesian armed forces: Corinth, Leukas, Ambrakia, Elis, Zakynthos, Achaia, Epidauros, Troizen, Hermaion, and Halieis, the last four located on the Akte facing the Aegean, and together they were required to provide sixty ships. Of these allies Leukas and Ambrakia were closest to Kerkyra, but were themselves vulnerable to attack from Alketas, the Akarnanians, Ambrakians, and to a certain extent the Athamanes. Zakynthos still suffered from its own distraction. More secure and far more powerful were Elis, Achaia, and Corinth, the latter two more impervious to the Athenian fleet than Elis and the two more northerly allies. Although farthest removed from the immediate theater of war, the states of the Akte could readily use the diolkos at Corinth to enter the scene of action, thus obviating the geographical difficulties of circumnavigating the Peloponnesos. The Spartans also arranged to send a force of 1500 mercenaries, these financed by the monetary contributions of the other members of the Peloponnesian League, some of whom also added contingents of their own troops. Depending on their traditional friendship with the Syracusans, the Spartans also sent word of events to the tyrant Dionysios, whose interest in the northeastern Adriatic they well knew. They declared that Kerkyra, so important to them all, should not be allowed to fall to Athens. Although during the Corinthian War the Athenians had wooed him with great honors (pp. 138–139, above) his loyalty remained with Sparta; but his squadron of ten ships needed some time to reach Kerkyra. The Spartans put the nauarchos Mnasippos in command of the expedition.³¹

In 393 Mnasippos landed at Kerkyra, and immediately seized control of the countryside. His men thoroughly plundered the rich and

³¹ Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.3–5; Diod. 15.47.1. Peloponnesians sending money: Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.16. Kerkyra in 427: Thuc. 3.70–84. Stroheker, *Dionysios I.*, 141–142; M. Sordi, *La Dynasteia in Occidente* (Padua 1992) 88.

theretofore unspoiled land. They took special pleasure in enjoying the local wines, of which they quickly became connoisseurs. Mnasippos next moved to a hill some 500 meters from the city of Kerkyra, probably the modern Lofos Avrani, where he encamped. From there he beleaguered the city, denying the Kerkyraians access to their fields, while his superior fleet closed their harbor in the north. He also posted sailors at a point on the northern side of the city overlooking the Hyllaia, the modern harbor, whence he could observe and intercept any incoming vessels. His naval force blockaded the main harbor on Kastrades or Garitsa Bay, when weather permitted, for from this direction would come any relief from Athens. Mnasippos' dispositions soon reduced the Kerkyraians to privation, forcing them to send an embassy to Athens pleading for help. Their ambassadors argued that aid to them would greatly benefit the Athenians themselves. They reminded them of the many strategic advantages of their island, its importance in relation to operations in the Corinthian Gulf, its utility as a base from which to damage the Lakonian coast, its proximity to Epeiros, and its position athwart the coastal route between Sicily and the Peloponnesos. Quite significantly, they did not ask the Athenians for help on the grounds that they were both allies. This argues most forcibly in favor of the view that the intended alliance of 375 was never consummated.³²

The Athenians eagerly resumed their Kerkyraian policy by immediately sending their general Ktesikles with 600 peltasts to the island, while they assembled their fleet. His journey holds broader interest than first appears. The Athenians begged Alketas to ferry him and his force to Kerkyra, which indicates that he travelled by land before the fleet was fully ready. It also suggests that Alketas was not yet a formal ally, for the Athenians did not invoke any treaty obligations in their request. His itinerary took him first to Pagasai, which means that the Athenians also needed the help of Jason. Whether, however, he was already an Athenian ally cannot be established, for, like Alketas, he may have been well-disposed towards Athens at the time but nothing more. From Pagasai Ktesikles marched overland to modern Igoumenitsa, which is still the main route across this part

³² Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.5–9; Diod. 15.46.3. Topography of Kerkyra: Ps.-Skyl. 29. L. Büchner, *RE* 11 (1922) 1410–1412; Gomme, *HCT* II.370–372; G.S. Dontas, *AE* (1965) 139–144; Stylianou, *HCD*, 369–371.

of Greece. Alketas successfully carried him over the strait to the city of Kerkyra, which he entered easily by night. His few troops could not suffice to turn the scales against Mnasippos' superior army, but at least they gave the local garrison some reinforcement and encouragement.³³

Meanwhile, by late spring or early summer 373 the Athenians had assembled their fleet of sixty ships, which they put under the command of Timotheos. At the outset he faced the serious problems of financing and manning it. Even before sailing, Timotheos borrowed money privately to meet some of the immediate expenses. He officially confronted both difficulties by sailing the Aegean attempting to fill his complements and his coffers. He also gave orders for the rest of the League's squadrons to rendezvous at Kalaurea off Akte. His voyage through the islands necessarily consumed time, but after some delay he reached the mustering-point to find the Athenian army and the Boiotian naval contingent. He found them unpaid and lacking even in daily rations, which further testifies to the inadequacy of Athenian financial planning. Despite his best efforts, the Athenians, irked by the delay and alarmed because the sailing-season daily slipped away, recalled him to Athens in response to the prosecution of Iphikrates and Kallistratos for dereliction of duty. Timotheos and Iphikrates had quarreled earlier, but the latter had now made a political pact with Chabrias and Kallistratos. Iphikrates had thereby joined Athens' other ablest general and a prominent politician to his side, which left him without significant political opposition in the city. The Athenians removed Timotheos from office, scheduled his trial for mid-winter 373/2, and replaced him with his accusers. Although the charge possessed some merit, the Athenians themselves cannot be exonerated from blame. They, not Timotheos, were responsible for the failure to provide properly for the fleet and its mission.³⁴

³³ Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.9–11; Diod. 15.46.3. Ktesikles' itinerary: if he had sailed to Kerkyra, he would have had no need of Alketas' services to reach his destination. The same reason argues against the Athenians depending upon the Boiotian naval squadrons based at Kreusis or Siphai. Alketas: Ἀλκέτου δὲ ἐδεήθησαν συνδιαβίβασαι τούτους, not ordinarily the language of one ally, especially the stronger, to the weaker, but he nonetheless εἰσῆλθον [τούτους] εἰς τὴν πόλιν. Alketas had good reason to await the outcome of events before committing himself to one side or the other, especially in the absence of the Athenian fleet. Pace Stylianou, *HCD*, 365–366.

³⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.11–113, 39; *IG* II² 1606 lines 155–156; Isok. 15.108, 118–124;

This incident portended more such things yet to come. It marks the first sign of financial problems confronting the Athenians and their allies that they never solved. It would plague them for the rest of the century. For the first time since the founding of the League the Athenians confronted the problem of inadequate funding for their operations. This defect in turn limited the effectiveness of their armed forces because they could not reliably be deployed readily or on any extensive scale. In 373 the army and navy of the League assembled at Kalaureia unpaid and lacking even in daily rations. Iphikrates himself would shortly grapple with this problem, which he temporarily solved by hiring his sailors out to work as day-laborers, not a very efficient way to maintain a fleet. Unlike the Delian League with its fixed tribute and rigorous method of collection, this League lacked a sound, proper, and efficient financial basis, which forced it instead to function on a haphazard and tenuous one.

Once in office, Iphikrates quickly manned his ships, gave his captains their orders, and expropriated to his command all available unattached Athenian ships, including the *Paralos* and *Salaminia*, not ordinarily employed as combatants. These measures brought his fleet to seventy in number. He took the opportunity of the long voyage to train his crews, but events at Kerkyra sped ahead of him. Mnasippos' siege caused such great hardship in the city that the Spartan relaxed the discipline of his army and denied his mercenaries their pay. When the beleaguered observed the laxness of Mnasippos' troops, they launched a sudden sally that took the enemy by surprise. Although Mnasippos drew his men into a phalanx and repulsed the attackers in his immediate front, his advance carried him into the range of missile weapons from the walls of the city. A Kerkyraian counter-attack from the gates struck the left of his line then trying to double its depth by withdrawing from the enemy in good order and next facing left to take station behind those then on their left. At this critical moment the vulnerable Spartan wing was caught before it could complete its maneuver, broke under the attack, and fled. A final assault on Mnasippos' troops, out-numbered and now

Ps.-Dem. 49.6, 9, 44, 49, 66; Diod. 15.47.2–6. Although Diodoros claims that Timotheos spent his time in the Aegean winning over Thracian cities, he is wrong, as proven by the absence of any Thracian names on this part of *IG II²* 43. The names above B10 (= 106) belong to Chabrias' campaign: (cf. pp. 243–245) and the names below line B15 (= 111) to B32–34 (= 127–129) belong to Aegean states.

out-flanked, destroyed him and the rest of his army. Although some survivors reached camp, which remained in their hands, the Kerkyraians with the slight help of Ktesikles' troops had lifted the siege of their city. The report that Iphikrates had reached the area also heartened the victors. He was actually far from the scene, having only reached Sphagiai, three islands near Messenian Pylos. Nonetheless, the Kerkyraians immediately manned ships to break the naval blockade. Hypermenes, Mnasippos' vice-admiral, realized the magnitude of the defeat and took quick and effective measure to save the remnants of the Spartan force, which he did by embarking the survivors and as much booty as possible. He safely slipped off to Leukas. With no significant outside help, the Kerkyraians had won a major victory, one stemming from a combination of Mnasippos' stupidity and their own courage.³⁵

Having sailed past Elis to Kephallenia, Iphikrates then received reliable news of Mnasippos' death. His fleet no longer immediately needed at Kerkyra, he attacked the cities of Kephallenia, definite proof that they had not become members of the League in 375. Thence he sailed to Kerkyra in time to intercept the squadron of ten ships sent by Dionysios in response to the Spartan appeal. Nine of the ships he captured, the crews of which he ransomed for a much-needed sixty talents. Further to earn money he hired his crews to the Kerkyraians to work their fields, but the hoplites he took to Akarnania, which at least proves that the Athenians had already extended their influence to the southern part of the region. In Akarnania he confronted the Thyreians, whose city of Thyreion with its harbor of Echinon enjoyed a strong position in northwestern Akarnania from which they raided to the south. Stopping their depredations, Iphikrates brought the Akarnanians into the League. From Akarnania he returned to Kerkyra, added its fleet to his own, bringing his numbers nearly to ninety, and returned to Kephallenia. He also collected money from the cities, sometimes forcibly, which proves that the considerate methods of the Aegean did not extend to the west. Whatever his previous successes, he clearly had failed to win complete control of the island, and of the four major cities

³⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.15–26; Diod 15.47.4–6. L. Büchner, *RE* 3A (1929) 1679–1680. No detailed description of the battle is possible because the modern city stands over the battlefield. See Gomme, *HCT* II.372. Dontas, *AE* (1965) 139–144.

there only Pronnoi joined the League. Conspicuously absent is Same, the leading city of the island. On his return to Athens he raided hostile parts of the Peloponnesos, but apparently inflicted little serious damage.³⁶

The credit for Iphikrates' own modest achievements in 373 actually belong largely to the Kerkyraians. Their victory cleared the seas of the Spartan fleet, after which he met with no opposition to his movements. Despite his success in Akarnania, he failed to win complete control of either Kephallenia or Zakynthos. Probably at this time, however, Alketas and Jason became formal Athenian allies, with the former and his son Neoptolemos also joining the League. No evidence suggests that Jason followed his example, which is understandable in that he had nothing to gain by it and his ambitions could actually be checked by membership in it. A simple bilateral alliance ideally served his purposes by providing him with protection without involving him in extraneous affairs of no use to him but possibly entailing some onerous obligations. The adherence of these two powers, whatever their precise status, nonetheless strengthened the Athenian position first in the west and next in the northeast. Athenian relations with Kerkyra shifted significantly in 373. Having freed themselves from the Spartan menace largely without Athenian help, the Kerkyraians took a more independent position towards them. While still friendly, they refused to join the Athenian League which served them no useful purpose. Their victory restored them as the major power in the region where their principal interests lay. The Aegean held no import to them, and they wanted no entanglements there. They responded by allying themselves bilaterally to Athens and its allies of the League. They, however, agreed not to wage war without the approval of the Athenians and their allies of the League and also not to make peace without them. This pact gave the Kerkyraians a great deal of safety and latitude. With little reason to wage offensive war, they could revert to their traditional policy of neutrality. As importantly, they were not obliged to support Athenian offensive operations. Yet if they were themselves attacked, they held the right to demand Athenian help. In this way,

³⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.31–39; *IG* II² 43 B11–12 (= 107–108); Androtion, *FGrH* 324 F65; Diod. 15.47.7; Polyain. 3.9.30, 55. G. Klaffenbach, *RE* 23 (1957) 742–744; L. Büchner, *RE* 11 (1921) 209–210; K. Fiehn, *RE* 6A (1936) 744–747; A. Philippson, *RE* 5 (1905) 1921.

they had no reason to bother with the distractions of irrelevant League policies.³⁷

This agreement suggests a shift in Athenian thinking, one first indicated by events at Naxos in 375. After Chabrias had reduced the island by force, nothing suggests that it entered the League. The Athenians instead apparently held it by right of conquest, as they later would Samos. Furthermore, some evidence survives to prove that all was not well in that neighborhood. Although Paros had joined the League after the battle, by 373 for reasons unknown it had seceded only to be readmitted. Athenian treatment of Naxos could have frightened the Parians, who suddenly harbored second thoughts about entrusting their autonomy to others. One of the requirements of its re-instatement was the duty to send a cow and panoply to the Panathenaia and a cow and phallos to the Dionysia, which reverberates with echoes of the fifth-century Athenian Empire. No other member of the League labored under these burdens, leaving the distinct impression that the Athenians now treated Paros as much as a colony as an ally. Even so, the Athenians dealt with the Parians mildly, which can be interpreted either as a sign of their leniency or of expedience. The last thing that Athens wanted in 373, only four years after the creation of the League, was even to hint at the resurrection of the old empire. Into that context Naxos certainly, though not quite Paros, fitted the situation. Jason obviously wanted nothing to do with the League. His links remained between himself and Athens and its allies. As seen above, he harbored excellent reasons for remaining aloof from wider, irrelevant commitments, but which also means that Athens had established official relations with him independent of the League. The same held true of Athenian connections with the Kerkyraians, whose treaty obligations to the League were limited and strictly defined. Equally pertinent is that fact that after 373 the Athenians admitted no new members to the League. Enough testimony exists strongly to indicate that by this date the Athenians had begun to pursue two parallel policies, first the maintenance of the League as it then existed and second the conclusion of treaties independent of the League into which Athens and the other party entered bilaterally. The impression lingers that

³⁷ *IG* II² 96–97; Bengtson, *SdA* II².262–263; Rhodes-Osborne, *GHI* 24; Accame, *La lega ateniese*, 86–87; Cargill, *SAL*, 109–114.

Athens considered some states either so powerful or so strategically well placed that it wanted unfettered freedom to deal with them without the interference of other allies. Athens thereby created both a League and the beginnings of an empire, neither group connected directly with the other but only indirectly through Athens. By 373 Athens pursued its own policy that gave it a freer hand in the larger world than that permitted by its formal relation to League members.³⁸

D. THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE BOIOTIAN CONFEDERACY (374–371 BC)

The collapse of the Peace of 375 also held its repercussions in Boiotia. By 373 the Thebans had watched the Spartans and Athenians resume hostilities in western waters, in which they had participated as loyal members of the Athenian League. Yet they had neither initiated the Athenian interference in Zakynthos nor the Spartan response to it. They now declared that they too considered the Spartans to have broken the peace, which therefore became void, and that none of the participants in it were any longer bound by its terms. Their position differed not at all from that originally taken by the Athenians, when at the creation of their League they accused the Spartans of having violated the King's Peace. So nothing unreasonable accompanied their adoption of an interpretation of events that others, including their own allies, had already embraced. Just as Sparta and Athens had resumed the pursuit of their own ambitions, the Thebans now did the same in Boiotia. They were entirely justified in resuming their policy fully to re-establish the Boiotian Confederacy under their leadership. They immediately turned their attention to Plataia and Thespiiai, no longer protected by the peace, and intermittently to Orchomenos.³⁹

In 373 Neokles, a boiotarchos of the Confederacy, ordered the citizens of Thebes to attend the assembly fully armed, not for heated

³⁸ Paros: *IG* II² 43 line 89; Bengtson, *SdA* II².268; the fifth century: *IG* I³ 34 lines 41–42, 71 lines 55–58. Accame, *La lega ateniese*, 230, 236–244; O. Rubensohn, *RE* 18 (1949) 1820; Cargill, *SdA*, 163–164. Jason: Sprawski, *Jason*, 84–89 with earlier bibliography. No one can reasonably doubt the beginnings and growth of Athenian imperialism at this point, on which see P. Harding, *Klio* 77 (1995) 105–125.

³⁹ *IG* II² 43 lines 9–12. P. Roesch, *Thespias et la confédération béotienne* (Paris 1965) 45; L. Prandi, *Platea* (Padua 1988) 127–132.

debate but for a surprise attack on Plataia. In accordance with the terms of the peace the Spartans had dutifully withdrawn their garrisons from Plataia, Thespiiai, and Orchomenos, leaving them all vulnerable to Thebes. Plataia and Thespiiai were particularly vulnerable, for each lay within easy reach of Thebes, in neither case even so much as a full day's march. After the peace the Plataians may have appealed to Athens for a garrison because of their traditional friendship, but they were not members of the League, and the peace forbade foreign garrisons. Harboring no wish to provoke the Thebans, Athens refused to succor Plataia. Aware of their danger, the Plataians kept a strict guard over their city, not daring to tend their fields, especially the more distant ones, except when the Thebans held their long and windy assemblies. Neokles had observed their precaution, and led the Thebans against them immediately from the assembly. Instead of taking the direct road south from Thebes to Plataia, the approach most expected, Neokles instead marched to the southeast in the direction of Hysiai, the modern Erythrai, and Eleutherai well away from it. He found the route unwatched, and from Hysiai he swung westwards along the foothills of Mt. Kithairon. He fell upon Plataia around noon as planned. The Thebans found many Plataians out in the fields, quite surprised by and utterly helpless against the Theban cavalry. The main Theban force easily seized the city, and Neokles came to terms with the captives that were lenient by classical Greek standards. Refraining from killing the population or selling them into slavery, he allowed them to leave the city unharmed and with the meagre possessions that they could carry. The Thebans ordered them never again to step foot in Boiotia, an order that they obeyed until Philip of Macedonia restored their descendants to their city after the battle of Chaironeia. These unfortunates made their way to Athens unhindered, and there the Athenians gave them sanctuary and bestowed upon them equality of citizenship, a repetition of their previous magnanimous conduct. The Thebans thereupon razed the walls of the city, destroyed all of the buildings except for the temples and shrines, and portioned the land out to their fellow citizens for pasturage, as they had done upon the fall of Plataia in 427.⁴⁰

⁴⁰ Xen. *Hell.* 6.3.1; Isok. 14; Diod. 15.46.4–6; Paus. 9.1.4–8. Plataia in 427: Thuc. 3.68. Topography: Fossey, *Boiotia*, 112–115; personal observations of 29 September 1970; 14 July 1994; 21 October 1998. M. Sordi, *Athenaeum* 51 (1973)

Later that same summer the Thebans pillaged Thespiiai, which they treated more leniently than Plataia. They razed the walls, but did not destroy the city, which was still standing in 371. Although as at Mantinea in 385 some Thespians received permission to remain in the city, the Thebans scattered others over the countryside but did not expel them from Boiotia. They forced the population to join the Boiotian Confederacy, but they put them under Theban jurisdiction. Nonetheless, the Thespians considered themselves without a city and their political rights more restricted than those of other Boiotian cities. The conditions of Plataia, Thespiiai, and later Orchomenos indeed differed from those obtaining elsewhere in Boiotia because of their long-standing hostility to Thebes and their willingness to invite foreign powers to interfere in Boiotian affairs. Ample evidence attests that cities elsewhere in the region kept their walls and went free of Theban garrisons. The reduction of these two cities left Thebes in full control of all Boiotia except for the formidable Orchomenos, which the Spartans probably strengthened with a new garrison. During the next two years the Thebans carried the war to western Boiotia, applying pressure on Orchomenos and launching raids into Phokis. The Phokians had provoked the resumption of war by supporting Orchomenos and serving as a link for Spartan reinforcements coming from Kirrha. So long as these three opposed Thebes, they exposed all of western Boiotia to Spartan attack. In 373 for the first time since the end of the Corinthian War all Boiotia, with the exception of Orchomenos, stood united under one leader. A nearly unified Boiotia was both prepared and capable of playing a larger and more independent role in Greek affairs than at any time since 386.⁴¹

The Athenians responded to the destruction of Plataia and the reduction of Thespiiai with anger and hostility towards their ally. Yet

84; C.J. Tuplin, *Athenaeum* 64 (1986) 327–334; Buck, *Boiotia*, 104; Urban, *Königsfrieden*, 170–171.

⁴¹ Xen. *Hell.* 6.3.1; Isok. 14.9; Diod. 15.46.6. Thespiiai in 371: Paus. 9.14.2; Orchomenos in 370: Diod. 15.57.1. Although Isokrates claims that the Thebans forced Tanagra into the Confederacy, ample reason exists to reject his biased testimony, including the Tanagraians' possession of their walls throughout the fourth century. Equally false is Isok. 14.19, the accusation that the Thebans razed the walls of Boiotian cities, thereby implying a general policy, on which see Buckler, *TH* 22, 282 n. 19. Only those of Plataia, Thespiiai, and later—after the *Plataikos*—those of Orchomenos were affected.

the Thebans continued to be loyal allies and members of the League. Nonetheless, the situation called for an explanation, at least to the Athenians, which the Thebans successfully provided. Since neither Plataia nor Thespiiai shared membership in the Athenian League, nothing demanded that the Athenians bring the matter before that body. The Thebans presented as their irrefutable argument the undeniable fact that the Peace of 375 had failed and was therefore no longer valid, as the Athenians had in fact admitted by their recent actions. Moreover, the Thebans had even greater right to act against Plataia and Thespiiai in 373 than had the Athenians against Kerkyra in 375. Whereas Kerkyra had originally remained aloof from the contest between the two belligerents, Plataia and Thespiiai, by actively aiding Sparta, had posed an actual threat to Theban security. The Thebans apparently reminded the Athenians of these facts; and now that hostilities had resumed, they could justly harbor concern that the Spartans would re-introduce harmosts and garrisons to these cities. Necessity compelled this Theban reaction to a problem not of their making, a response that proves far less opportunistic than Athenian actions at Naxos and Kephallenia. The Athenians responded by avoiding an open breach with their powerful ally, which had become too dangerous to offend. They could not afford to go to war with Thebes at the moment, especially over lost causes. Instead, as noted, they gave the Plataians refuge and their citizenship. Nonetheless, Theban conduct rankled the Athenians, and the suppression of Plataia and Thespiiai definitely soured Atheno-Theban relations. From 373 the Athenians grew wary of an ally that they now began to fear.⁴²

The Thebans took advantage of this steady success in liberating Boiotia from Spartan occupation virtually to complete a political renovation that would strongly influence the future development of Greek federalism. Immediately after the liberation of the Kadmeia, they had proclaimed the re-establishment of the Boiotian Confederacy, more of a hope than a reality at the time. With the occupation of Plataia and Thespiiai they had largely fulfilled their aspirations, and had created all of the essentials of their new polity. Although it resembled the old confederacy abolished by the King's Peace, it also

⁴² Isok. 14.3, 21, 34–36. G. Mathieu, *Les Idées politiques d'Isocrate* (Paris 1925) 85–92; Buckler, in Bernadini, ed., *Presenza e funzione*, 326; Beck in *idem*, 337–338.

included some startling innovations. The new government in antiquity bore the names of *koinon*, or league, *synteleia*, or union of communities grouped together or united by a larger state, and *symmachia*, or alliance. The new Boiotian Confederacy can be more easily described than defined. It actually constituted a complex combination of rights and responsibilities shared by the federal and local governments and all the citizens of Boiotia. The federal government represented all of Boiotia in external affairs, chiefly those of peace, war, and diplomacy. The new federal government differed from its predecessor in several fundamental features. First, a new federal citizenship replaced the old. Even though citizens remained Haliartians, Tanagraians, and the like, they were first officially Boiotians, just as all of the citizens in Attic demes were Athenians. All Boiotian citizens participated directly in federal affairs by discussing policies in assembly and then voting upon them. This explains why this government, unlike the previous, now dispensed with a federal synedrion. Although certainty is impossible, the old federal units perhaps continued to function in reduced capacity as regional mechanisms for mustering the army and perhaps the collection of federal taxes, including those needed to finance the small Boiotian navy; but about the latter nothing is known. The federal government also issued a common coinage, but details of the functioning of the mint are lacking, except that the Thebans administered it. With the old units either abolished or truncated, Thebes served more centrally than before as the capital of Boiotia, at which all official business was conducted. The capital having become the most important place in the land, its population legally and actually achieved a position to dominate policy.⁴³

At the head of the government stood the eponymous archon, a ceremonial figure without political power but possessing some religious duties. He also symbolized Boiotian unity. Seven boiotarchoi, not the old eleven, exercised the executive functions of the confederacy. Their number comes not only from the elimination of the old federal units of Plataia, Thespiei, and Orchomenos, but also in

⁴³ *Koinon*: Diod. 16.25.1; 85.3; *synteleia*: Diod. 15.38.3, 50.4, 70.21 *symmachia*: Diod. 15.28.1. Buckler, *TH* 282 n. 8; Roesch, *Études*, 415–416; Buck, *Boiotia*, 104–110; Beck, *Polis und Koinon*, 97–106; Stylianou, *HCD*, 23–33. For the lack of a federal synedrion, which D.M. Lewis, *Teiresias* Sup. 3 (1990) 71–73, mistakenly claims to have existed, see J. Buckler in T.H. Nielsen, ed., *Polis and Politics* (Copenhagen 2000) 431–446. Coinage: B.V. Head, *Coins of Boeotia* (London 1881) 61–72. See Also Beck, 332–339, and Knoepfler, 357–361, in Bernadini, ed., *Presenza e funzione*.

response to the opposition of these cities to Thebes and therefore to the best interests of Boiotia itself. The boiotarchoi served as the chief civil magistrates, the principal diplomats, and above all the leaders of the armed forces. They met in committee in which majority vote decided proposed policy. Unlike their predecessors in office, they supposedly represented not local units but all of Boiotia. Nonetheless, until Chaironeia everything indicates that only Thebans held the boiotarchia. The theory doubtless suggests that since every citizen was a Boiotian first, every citizen, regardless of place of birth, had the right to election. Since the federal government held the elections in Thebes, the Thebans could dominate the results. The power and the ease with which seven men could make decisions enabled them to handle even complex issues much more quickly and efficiently than could a cumbersome boule. In the civil sphere they performed the probouleutic function of introducing bills to the assembly; but their recommendations on legislative matters, though quite influential, did not bind the people, who remained free to reject them. The boiotarchoi similarly introduced foreign ambassadors to the assembly, usually with an endorsement of their mission, but again the people assembled made the binding decision. When on diplomatic missions, the boiotarchoi executed the instructions of the home government, but they could make independent adjustments to them in response to new situations. In this respect, they could make their own foreign policy. No such agreement however, bound the government until ratified by the federal assembly. Not so fettered in the field, the boiotarchoi alone decided the order of battle and the strategy of campaigns. The assembly must allow them this discretion, for it could not foresee all of the problems and unexpected developments that would confront them. The boiotarchoi, who could repeatedly be re-elected to office, largely accounted for the success of the Boiotian Confederacy, simply because they could remain in office for consecutive terms. They could and thereby did obtain expertise in both local and broader affairs. The possibility of re-election provided at least the possibility of continuity of policy, much as did the Athenian *strategia*. It enabled them to garner a wealth of experience and prestige among their fellow citizens that enhanced their ability to shape and execute federal policy.⁴⁴

⁴⁴ Buckler, *TH*, 24–30; Beck, *Polis und Koinon*, 98–104.

Virtually nothing is known about the formal relations between the federal and local governments, and precise links among them remain a mystery, unless, as tenuously suggested earlier, attenuated federal units survived for some few purposes. Local archons existed, presumably with religious duties similar to those of their federal counterpart. Polemarchoi, a boule, and dikasteria, or law courts, presided over local governments. They enforced civil and criminal law, except that pertaining to the federal, and saw to their own civic expenses. The cities, like the Athenian demes, may have kept census lists of citizens, but evidence fails. Despite the danger of arguments from silence, impressions suggest that the federal government largely left the communities alone. Plataia, Thespiiai, and Orchomenos, however, form considerable exceptions to this pattern, which alone merits some attention. The case of Plataia is simplicity itself: it ceased to be a Boiotian city, its people expelled from the region, its land appropriated by the Thebans, as it had been in 427. The situation in Thespiiai is less clear. As already seen, the Thespians were allowed to return home, but chose instead to take refuge at a place named Keressos. Although Epameinondas captured it after the battle of Leuktra, its subsequent fate is unknown; but the man who a year later refused to treat the Orchomenians harshly was unlikely to have shown severity to the Thespians. His forbearance towards them before the battle reinforces the point. The accusations of some Attic orators, an unsavory lot and Theban enemies, further cloud their subsequent fate. They claim that the Thebans expelled the Thespians from Boiotia, just as they had the Plataians, but ample reason indicates their continued presence in Boiotia. The subsequent fate of Orchomenos, which is admittedly proleptic, pertinently illustrates the Thespian situation. After the Theban reduction of Orchomenos in 370, the Thebans put the inhabitants under the jurisdiction of their neighbors. Proof to support this interpretation comes from the events of 364. Then after an alleged Orchomenian plot to rebel from the Boiotian Confederacy, the Thebans allegedly razed the city, massacred the men, and sold the women and children into slavery. Yet the Orchomenians still lived on their Boiotian land as late as 343. The comparison is valuable for several reasons. First, it warns that the words of Theban enemies must not be accepted as automatically true and accurate. Next, it raises the question of why the Thebans should have treated the Orchomenians more leniently than the Thespians. Orchomenos occupied a far stronger geographical and strategical position than Thespiiai, and had staunchly opposed

the Thebans for far longer. Orchomenos was farther removed from Thebes than was Thespiiai and thus harder to control. A reasonable explanation of Theban conduct towards Thespiiai and Orchomenos comes readily from the facts that they were too strong and antagonistic to be entrusted with citizenship, and yet were needed for the safety and welfare of Boiotia. Nonetheless, they must also be carefully controlled. Theban enemies easily lumped all three cities together as victims of one policy, but that policy consisted of maintaining the security of all Boiotia against external threat. Nowhere else in the region did the Thebans treat their neighbors as they did these three who sought foreign help to further their own goals. As previously seen, foreign intrusion led to greater hardships than the leadership of a largely protective Thebes. Often forgotten also is that Theban treatment of these cities stands unparalleled elsewhere during the life of this confederacy. Even the Athenians did not accuse the Thebans of maintaining garrisons in Boiotian cities, the vast majority of which retained their walls throughout the fourth century. In short, Plataia, Thespiiai, and Orchomenos cannot, or should not, be taken as typical examples of Theban dealings with the confederated cities. Most Boiotians were content with a federal government that protected them from foreign invasion, honored their rights of local autonomy, and provided them with a voice in federal affairs. Even in the darkest days of the Sacred War (356–346 BC), when Thebes often found itself hard pressed and frequently defeated in the field, the other Boiotian cities refused to rebel. Nor in 338, when threatened by the menace of Philip of Macedonia, did they wince or abandon the confederacy.⁴⁵

In fine, the new Boiotian Confederacy constituted a highly centralized federal government in which the principle of direct democracy replaced that of indirect, sectional representation. In that respect, this government corresponded more closely to the organization of the Athenian democracy in Attika than it did to its predecessor in Boiotia. Although the cities, or perhaps the federal units, retained

⁴⁵ Continued existence of Thespiiai: Paus. 9.14.2, 4, despite Isok. 6.27. See also Tuplin, *Failings of Empire*, 321–341, especially 327. See also Dem. 5.10; 6.30; 16.4, 25–28; 19.21, 37 *et al.* and Aischin. 2.104, 116, 237, all written at the agitated time of the Sacred War (see 10.13). Orchomenos: Diod. 15.57.1, 79.5–6; later Orchomenian inhabitants: Aischin. 2.141. Buckler, *Sacred War*, 55–56. Lack of garrisons: Isok. 14.19; Buckler, *TH*, 283 n. 19.

authority over their local affairs, they in effect played a very small role in the functioning of the federal government. All Boiotians theoretically possessed equal federal rights, but in fact they could not exercise them except at the capital of Thebes, which obviously means that the citizenry of Thebes largely determined leadership and policy. While this form of government effectively but legally limited the voice of other Boiotians in practical affairs, it at the same time produced an efficient polity that could easily muster the resources of the entire region to be applied to a goal that benefitted them all. For this confederacy truly to be effective, it must work for the common good; and in general it succeeded quite well in doing just that.

E. THE PEACE OF SPARTA AND THE BATTLE OF LEUKTRA (371 BC)

The sound defeat of Mnasippos in 373 and the subsequent victories of Iphikrates in the west caused the Spartans grave concern. The naval war against Athens had once again proven costly in ships, men, and money. Nor had the Spartan army fared well against the Thebans. Now even the Peloponnesos itself faced direct threat, all of which finally persuaded the Spartans that they must renew the peace. Sometime over the winter of 373/2 they sent their distinguished diplomat Antalkidas to the King to arrange another endorsement of his peace and to seek money to enforce it. Although the mission of itself admitted that Sparta alone could no longer ensure obedience to the King's commands, Artaxerxes had little real choice about continuing his support of the one major power in Greece that harbored no designs on his realm. Athens still could not be trusted, and Thebes proved too inconsequential for serious consideration. Once again Artaxerxes sent ambassadors to the Greeks demanding that they settle their differences and honor the peace that he had twice before commanded. Antalkidas' mission to Persia frightened the Athenians, who wanted to keep their newly-won gains. Consequently, they preferred to make a settlement with Sparta than face both them and the King. They realized that a renewal of peace now advanced their best interests, the necessity of which became all the more urgent because of their straitened finances. Their resources could not sustain prolonged naval expeditions, as already noted, but the problem became all the graver owing to an incident off Kerkyra. Iphikrates had intercepted a naval force sent by Dionysios of Syracuse

carrying precious statues to be offered at the sanctuaries of Zeus at Olympia and Apollo at Delphi. With the full knowledge and actual approval of the Athenians Iphikrates sold them as booty to pay his men. An outraged Dionysios accused the Athenians of sacrilege, and the episode soured relations with a potentate whom the Athenians had courted since the Corinthian War. Athenian financial troubles had begun adversely to affect foreign dealings in a sensitive region where the tyrant was capable of intervening against them. Since Dionysios had declared himself for the Spartans, the Athenians were perhaps technically within their rights, but the adventure boded ill should hostilities continue. The presence of Kleombrotos with the Spartan field-army in Phokis at this very moment added a factor of great significance. This force, far stronger than needed merely to defend Orchomenos, stood instead poised for a major invasion of Boiotia, the first since 377. In addition, peace would stop further Theban advances in Boiotia. Unless the Athenians consented to peace, they would again be called upon to defend their now unpopular ally. For all of these reasons the Athenians needed peace nearly as badly as the Spartans, and at this point they found more in common with the hostile Spartans than with the allied Thebans. Despite their displeasure with their neighbors, they admitted that Thebes was too powerful to command and too dangerous to ignore. They accordingly sent ambassadors to their allies inviting them to follow the Athenians to Sparta to renew the peace. Athenian impatience with the Thebans was unmistakable, as was their intention to make peace with Sparta regardless of their response. Expecting only a renewal of the previous treaty, the Thebans agreed to send an embassy, among which they included Epameinondas, yet untried in public affairs. So, in early summer 371 ambassadors not only from Athens and Thebes but also from the rest of Greece convened at Sparta to try again to establish a peace that would apply equally to all.⁴⁶

Their unusual embassy, marked by its odd composition, illustrates the gravity of the Athenian situation. They often dispatched ten ambassadors on peace missions, and they probably did so now,

⁴⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 6.3.1–2; Diod. 15.40.4; Dion. Halik. *Lys.* 12; Nepos *Epam.* 6.4; Plut. *Ages.* 27.5. Iphikrates and Dionysios' offerings: Diod. 16.57.2–4. Stroheker, *Dionysios I*, 141–142; Sordi, *Diodori Siculi*, 100 n. 57. The letter of Dionysios to Athens cannot be authentic because of its allusion to the Spartans having become partners of those who pillaged Delphi in the Sacred War, by which time he was dead.

though the names of only seven are recorded. Kallistratos also served as ambassador, his experience in such peace conferences dating to the abortive Peace of 392. His political position explains his presence. His practical alliance with Iphikrates and Chabrias still functioned, as witnessed by his promise to the hard-pressed Iphikrates that he would either send him money for the fleet or make peace. This episode also marks an early example of Athenian generals making alliances with popular speakers so that the military and political aspects of Athenian policy could be pursued together. The composition of the embassy likewise illuminates Athenian thinking. Prominent was Kallias, proxenos of the Spartans, and for all his pomposity a man trusted there and alive to their interests. He had twice before in 386 and 375 travelled to Sparta in quest of peace, and had succeeded on both occasions. Of the others, Melanopos, though a political opponent of Kallistratos, often took his side, supposedly for the good of Athens. Kephisodotos, another member, willingly sought accommodation with Sparta but only if accorded the recognition of Athenian equality with Sparta. Nothing is known of the earlier careers of the others. The composition of this embassy indicates that the Athenians had selected ambassadors who reflected various shades of opinion, but they all agreed upon the need for reconciliation with Sparta. To that end they had devised a plan that unfolded in their well-orchestrated public speeches delivered at the peace conference.⁴⁷

No single surviving account gives a complete record of the proceedings of this intricate peace conference, but the Athenian delegation adroitly presented their countrymen's position. Every reason suggests that the Athenian ambassadors had spoken privately with the Spartan authorities before they made their public statements. Given the unanimity of concerns, both had far more in common than before and fewer differences between them. In a series of three speeches that summarize the full presentation of the entire Athenian embassy, Kallias began on a note of friendship and conciliation by stating that the Athenians, like the Spartans, felt great displeasure by Theban treatment of Plataia and Thespiiai. He pointed out that

⁴⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 6.3.2–3; Diod. 15.50.4. Melanopos and Kallistratos: Arist. *Rhet.* 1.14.1; Plut. *Dem.* 13.3. Develin, *AO*, 247–248. Numbers of envoys: D.J. Mosley, *Envoys and Diplomacy in Ancient Greece* (Wiesbaden 1973) 55–61. Stylianou, *HCD*, 382–385; Beck, *CP* 96 (2001) 364–365.

since they agreed upon this point, they had no reason to be enemies. He left unmentioned matters like Kerkyra, Zakynthos, and other Athenian activity in the west, ignoring everything but the problem with Thebes. His message immediately portrayed Sparta and Athens as equals on the same side, while excluding Thebes. Autokles, the next speaker, was at the time as unknown to history as were his personal attitudes towards Sparta and Thebes. He echoed and elaborated upon Kallias' indication of a new direction in Athenian policy, which he advanced by advising friendship between Sparta and Athens. In fourth-century Greece, as elsewhere in the classical world, friendship usually carried with it the connotation of alliance. He next defined the Athenian conditions for the re-establishment of cordial relations with Sparta, beginning with the firm insistence that the Spartans, like everyone else, must observe the autonomy-clause as the King had prescribed. He restated the demand and the political principle that the Athenians had proclaimed at the founding of their League. Autokles again called upon the Spartans to honor it as the price of reconciliation. It would also demonstrate Spartan recognition of the justice of Athens' original insistence upon this issue. He then enumerated the most glaring Spartan infractions of that clause. He claimed that the Spartans, without consultation with their allies, demanded them to follow wherever the Spartans led, even though the enemy was often a friend of the allies. This allegation was not strictly true, for the Spartans had routinely convened the Peloponnesian League before going to war. If the Peloponnesians meekly, if understandably, endorsed Spartan policy, they were themselves partly to blame. More to the immediate point, he gave a clear warning that the Athenians would not honor a Spartan summons to contribute forces to any future Spartan expedition. In legal terms, the Athenians publicly abjured the terms of their instrument of surrender to the Spartans that ended the Peloponnesian War. Kallistratos repeated generally and briefly the Spartan practice of installing governments of their own liking and even supporting despots, but by 371 this accusation referred to a receding past. He used the example of the seizure of the Kadmeia starkly to make his point. He recalled that the Spartans had seized it on the pretext that the Thebans had not left the Boiotian cities autonomous, but the Spartans themselves had not permitted the Thebans to possess their own autonomy. Nothing new appeared here, but Autokles demanded that friends should not insist upon their full rights while denying them to others. Here

reverberated another call of equality between Sparta and Athens, warning that Athens would tolerate nothing less.⁴⁸

Kallistratos' speech, the last recorded, summarized the Athenian position as previously presented. He conciliatorily admitted that both Sparta and Athens had alike made mistakes, which for the latter may have made a vague allusion to the treatment of Naxos, Zakynthos, and Kerkyra. He repeated Autokles' allusion to Spartan treatment of Thebes as a failure of its duty justly to implement the King's Peace, but he did so not through any concern for Theban welfare. Instead, it served notice that Athenian and Spartan friendship was impossible, if the Spartans tried to take unfair advantage of it. This note simply repeated the demand for equality between the two powers. Kallistratos further claimed that the Athenians had no reason to fear the King because they had agreed with him in word and deed, an obvious but defensible exaggeration. He then stated categorically that the Athenians wanted peace with Sparta because of the anger with Thebes, and that if the two of them made peace, no one else in Greece could successfully oppose them. Kallistratos expressed most clearly the need of Athens and Sparta to unite on equal terms against Thebes, which had risen to a power dangerous to them both. All other issues became secondary. Thus, the message of the Athenian legation, as summarized in these speeches, entailed four major items: the understanding that Thebes was the common enemy of Athens and Sparta alike; the need for Athenian and Spartan amity; the requirement of equality of status between the two, which included Spartan recognition of the Athenian League and respect for each one's sphere of influence; and finally full Spartan adherence to the clauses of the King's Peace. The Athenians now as equals held Sparta directly accountable for its management of Greek affairs, and refused any longer to tolerate the notion that Sparta stood above the peace.⁴⁹

When the Spartans, Athenians, and Persians came to agreement, they drew up a document that Agesilaos, as in 386, presented to the congress. Though similar to its forbears, it differed slightly from

⁴⁸ Xen. *Hell.* 6.3.4. J. Buckler, *Athenaeum* 60 (1982) 198–200; J. Dillery, *Xenophon and the History of His Times* (London 1995); Beck, *CP* 96 (2001) 363–365.

⁴⁹ Xen. *Hell.* 6.3.10–17; Buckler, *Athenaeum* 60 (1982) 182–183; V. Gray, *The Character of Xenophon's Hellenica* (London 1989) 123–131; Tuplin, *Failings of Empire*, 101–110.

them by the inclusion of at least one new clause. Once again, all cities were enjoined to leave all the others autonomous; and, as in earlier treaties, this clause applied to all cities, great and small. The peace further demanded that all states disband their armaments on land and sea, which if a novelty only made explicit conditions already implied in earlier treaties. The Persians were presumably responsible for this clause, which aimed at reducing the ability of all Greek states to wage war. Since with the exception of the Spartans, Greek states normally relied essentially on a militia, this clause made very little difference in the actual conduct of military affairs. The same, however, did not hold true of naval warfare. Fleets could not be disbanded as easily as citizen armies. This clause favored the Spartans and the Persians. The Spartan reconciliation rendered the Athenian fleet unnecessary in that it posed no immediate threat to themselves or their allies. Nor would the Persians need fear the Athenian naval ambitions in the Aegean. The disarmament of the Athenian fleet also removed a significant burden from Spartan naval allies. The same obviously did not hold true of the Athenians against whom it was aimed. If honored, the Athenians must dock their fleet, which would constrict the reach of their power throughout the Aegean, while removing pressure on Persian Asia Minor. Not surprisingly, the Athenians did not implement this clause. Next, all states must withdraw harmosts and garrisons from the cities, which certainly applied to Sparta and Athens but not to Thebes, which had none in the Boiotian cities. As in the case of the Corinthian War, the Spartans found garrisons such as that then in Orchomenos expensive and vulnerable, a liability of which they were eager to be quit. Easily the most striking change in the treaty came with the new enabling clause. Whereas the King had previously stated that he and those who accepted the peace would wage war against those who rejected it, the revised clause stipulated that every state had the right to decide for itself whether or not to take action against any recalcitrant state. This provides firm evidence of a bargain made between the Spartans and the Athenians that legally allowed the latter to ignore their treaty obligations to Thebes. Having thus dissociated themselves, they could safely avoid any further conflict between Thebes and Sparta. They had without effort effectively rid themselves of an inconvenient alliance. Other Greek cities, however, doubtless greeted the clause with relief because it gave them the right to abstain from conflicts irrelevant to their own interests. Nonetheless,

this enabling clause reduced the King's Peace to little more than an instrument of political advancement to be used by any state that could wield it. In fact, if not in nomenclature, the King's Peace had with this treaty ceased to be a genuine peace. It would shortly become a blunt instrument of war.⁵⁰

The treaty when presented took the Thebans entirely off guard. They failed to grasp the full significance of the Athenian inclination towards Sparta and away from them. Nothing else adequately explains why the Theban embassy routinely signed the peace as "Thebans" on that day. Second thoughts quickly beset the envoys, who overnight fully realized their precarious position, which was nothing other than a return to 386. Their situation was dire. Kleombrotos stood poised in Phokis and the Athenians would not now come to their aid. Unless they found a diplomatic way out of this crisis, they faced alone a certain war. Epameinondas persuaded them to extricate themselves from this predicament by urging that on the morrow they request to sign the treaty as "Boiotians" instead of "Thebans". His solution was clumsy and unacceptable for the simple reason that one could not change an oath. Even though the Thebans considered themselves the official representatives of the Boiotian Confederacy, no one else did, least of all Agesilaos. Nonetheless, on the following day Epameinondas received permission to address the congress on this point. He used the opportunity to accuse the Spartans of making war for their own advantage and to declare that genuine peace could prevail only when all states enjoyed it on terms of equality and justice. Agesilaos angrily challenged him by demanding whether on those very terms the cities of Boiotia should be autonomous of Thebes. Unintimidated, Epameinondas answered by asking whether the same principle should apply to the cities of Lakonia. Epameinondas' position required the Spartans to respect the same principle that they demanded of Thebes, while also exposing the Athenian collusion with the Spartans. After all, Agesilaos had not demanded the dissolution of the Athenian League. An infuriated Agesilaos demanded whether Epameinondas intended to make the Boiotian cities autonomous, to which the Theban again replied with the question of whether the Spartans would do the same for Lakonian cities. Nothing novel marked Epameinondas' challenge. In 431 Perikles had suggested that

⁵⁰ Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.35; 6.3.18–20; Diod. 15.38.2–4, 50.4–6. Ryder, *Koine Eirene*, 127–130; Urban, *Königsfrieden*, 174–175; Jehne, *Koine Eirene*, 65–74.

the Athenians would willingly leave their allies autonomous, if the Spartans proved equally willing to allow the same rights to their own allies. In 399 the Eleians had similarly agreed to grant autonomy to the Lepreians and any other of their neighbors, when the Spartans would free their perioikic cities. Despite the lack of novelty, Epameinondas had directly challenged Sparta's very status of ascendancy in Greece. His words marked the first sign of his thinking, soon to be realized with his invasion of Lakonia, of eliminating that position from the political scene. Now thoroughly enraged, Agesilaos erased the name of Thebes from the treaty, and with full right according to the terms of the treaty declared war on Thebes for having rejected the peace. The rest of the Greeks accepted the pact on the Athenian date of 14 Skirophorion, which fell in the Julian calendar shortly before the summer solstice of 371, which occurred on 27 June.⁵¹

Several aspects of these proceedings deserve further consideration. To begin, the information available suffices to indicate beyond reasonable doubt that hostility towards Thebes opened the door to Spartan and Athenian reconciliation. Here arose the first real opportunity since the end of the Peloponnesian War for them to re-establish the fifth-century bipolarity of power, but unlike previous instances both parties now agreed not to destroy it by mutual rivalry. Even more so than in 375 they not only recognized each other's sphere of influence but they also refined it. For their part, the Athenians contented themselves with their gains and admitted no new members to the League after 373. The Spartans in turn were spared from further Athenian intervention in the Peloponnesos, and unlike the situations in 378 and 377 Athens would no longer stand in the way of their defeating Thebes. The peace shone as a triumph for Antalkidas, who again achieved a major pan-hellenic treaty; for Agesilaos, who received another opportunity to pursue his animus against Thebes; and Kallistratos, who had honored his pledge to Iphikrates to end the war. If in 371, as in 378, Thebes proposed to defy the treaty, it must do so alone.

⁵¹ Xen. *Hell.* 6.3.18–20; Diod. 15.50.4–6; Plut. *Ages.* 27.6–28.4; Bengtson, *SdA* II².269. Date: Ginzler, *Chronologie*, II.579. Cartledge, *Agesilaos*, 379–380; Hamilton, *Agesilaos*, 194–195; Jehne, *Koine Eirene*, 69–74; Shipley, *Plutarch's Agesilaos*; Hansen, in Hansen, ed., *Sources for the Ancient City-State*, 13–16; *idem*, in Hansen and Raafaub, eds., *Studies in the Ancient Greek Polis*, 21–43; Keen, in Hansen and Raafaub, *More Studies in the Ancient Greek Polis*, 113–125.

A final matter concerns Athenian appreciation of the Greek political scene in 371. Athenian ambassadors stoutly maintained the position that if Athens and Sparta stood as one, no other state could successfully oppose them. The flaw in this thinking is its assumption that Theban policies were inimical to theirs. Nothing necessarily points in that direction, and because of the misinterpretation of the general situation the Athenians made a grievous blunder in the shaping of their foreign policy. The Spartans and Athenians presented the only impediment to a new and unparalleled realignment of the major powers, the result of their own lack of vision and restraint. Once secure in Boiotia, Thebes was content to remain a loyal member of the Athenian League. Nor did it demonstrate any intention again to become involved in the Peloponnesos, as in the case of the Corinthian War. For that matter, Sparta had nothing more to fear from Thebes, and could have more profitably devoted its attention to restoring the confidence and loyalty—both so worn by years of desultory fighting—of its Peloponnesian allies who formed the very foundation of its broader power. When Athens proclaimed before all the Greeks its intention to remain aloof from the looming conflict, it gave that much additional encouragement to Sparta. Thus Athens cannot be absolved from some responsibility for the fresh outbreak of war. Even so, primary blame can be placed only with Sparta's miscalculation that it could defeat an isolated Thebes, not necessarily unreasonable in itself. Nor can Agesilaos escape blame for his unabated hatred of Thebes and his own stupidity that pushed Sparta into the renewal of war. The Peace of 371 hardly formed the high-water mark either of intelligent Sparto-Athenian politics or sound strategical evaluation of current events. This interpretation rests on the conclusion that Sparta and Athens failed to understand a number of factors about the Theban position, the first and easily the most important being its desire for Boiotian security rather than for foreign adventures. Next, by 371 Boiotia again enjoyed unity for the first time since the King's Peace with concomitant economic and political power. Lastly, not only had Theban armies proven successful from Haliartos to Tegyra, but they had also developed an enviable experience in the combined use of arms, one unmatched either by Sparta or Athens.

The Greek ambassadors left Sparta knowing that the treaty was a travesty that draped war in the tattered garb of peace. The Athenians returned home smugly expecting Sparta to do for them what they

shrank from attempting themselves. The Thebans planned how best to meet the crisis, a subject to which Epameinondas and Pelopidas had already given considerable thought. They first mobilized the entire army of the Confederacy, which totalled some 7000 infantry and 700 cavalry. Not all contingents were, however, equal in fighting ability owing either to lack of combat experience or, as in the case of the Thespians, of enthusiasm. The Orchomenians, still outside the Confederacy, remained in the Spartan camp. The boiotarchoi correctly began the campaign by deciding to meet the enemy in the field rather than to waste their field-army by defending a beleaguered city. One unit under Bakchylidas guarded the main pass over Mt. Kithairon, while Epameinondas and the other boiotarchoi took station at Koroneia, where the slopes of Mt. Helikon dropped down to Lake Kopais. They also entrusted a small detachment under Chaireas with the task of blocking the highland routes over the mountain, placing him in a position from which he could communicate down the Phalaros valley with the main body at Koroneia.⁵²

Meanwhile the Athenians immediately complied with the terms of the peace by withdrawing their garrisons from cities and recalling Iphikrates, while the Spartans did the same except that they left Kleombrotos' army in place in Phokis. When asking the home government for instructions, he sparked a lively debate. Prothoos, perhaps an ephor who supported Kleombrotos, urged strict adherence to the peace including the recall of Kleombrotos, an appeal to states to contribute to a common war fund, and lastly a muster of the armed forces of those cities willing to punish Thebes. His proposal would have resulted in no action at all, and Agesilaos easily prevailed against it. The king's own conduct, however, was itself curious. Although many of his countrymen urged him to lead the campaign, he refused, nor was this the first time since 394 that he had declined a dangerous or unpopular command. He had balked at waging war against Mantinea in 385, saw no action in the Olynthian campaigns in which two Spartan commanders had died, refused to confront the Thebans in early 378, and conducted very cautious operations in Boiotia during 378 and 377. Perhaps wounds suffered at Koroneia went beyond the physical. At any rate, the Spartans rejected all

⁵² Xen. *Hell.* 6.3.20; Diod. 15.51.1–3. Initial Theban positions: Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.4; Diod. 15.52.7; Paus. 9.13.3, 7. Buckler, *TH*, 55–57.

counsel for caution, and instead ordered Kleombrotos to move against the Thebans unless they left the Boiotian cities autonomous. When the king found that the Thebans refused to relent, but instead even then prepared to oppose him, he marched into Boiotia.⁵³

The campaign culminating in the battle of Leuktra has proven one of the most controversial in Greek military history; but despite some uncertainties, the principal details of events remain clear. Unknown, however, is Kleombrotos' position in Phokis at the outset of operations. Since his army had encamped in the region for over a month at least, it needed an urban center for its support, one located where the Spartans could support Orchomenos, if necessary but more importantly where it could move easily into the heart of Boiotia. The ideal spot for both is Daulis, some eight kilometers northeast of the Cleft Way, made famous as the site where Oedipus murdered his father, a hub of communications that connects the Kephisos valley with Delphi to the west and Lebadeia and Thebes to the southeast. No equally suitable location for the camp of a large army exists along the foot of Mt. Parnassos. From Daulis Kleombrotos advanced to Chaironeia, where he learned that the Boiotians already held the main road to Thebes against him. Instead of attempting to storm their strong point at Koroneia, the Spartan turned west towards Ambrossos (modern Distomon) in a brilliant flanking movement that took the enemy entirely by surprise. Thence he swung back eastwards past Stiris below the ascent of Mt. Helikon, reached the heights just west of modern Kyriakion, and continued unimpeded along an easy upland route to the vale below modern Palaiovouna. There he met and swept aside Chaireas' guard before descending unopposed direct upon Thisbe. Not only had he successfully outflanked the Thebans, but he had also left them well behind him. Yet instead of challenging his enemy to a footrace to the now vulnerable Thebes, from modern Xeronomi he turned southwards to Siphai (modern Aliki) on the coast of the Corinthian Gulf, turned eastwards once again along a very taxing track, now partially washed out, to Kreusis (modern Livadhostra), the major Boiotian harbor and naval base on this coast. A march inland of some four

⁵³ Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.1; Diod. 15.51.1–3; Nepos *Ages.* 6.1; Plut. *Ages.* 28.5–8; *Pel.* 20.1. Since Agesilaos was some seventy-four years old in 371, six years after having suffered from thrombophlebitis, the query about his courage and motives may seem as unfair as harsh, but authors in antiquity asked the same question.

hours brought him to the southern rim of the plain of Leuktra. Had Thebes been Kleombrotos' primary objective, this last march would have proven entirely unnecessary, but at least Kleombrotos had captured the Boiotian ports in the region, destroyed the enemy's naval contingents there, and opened direct communications with the Peloponnesos. From Leuktra Thespiiai, the old Spartan military base, could be reached within an hour's walk. Though then unwallled, Thespiiai remained a prosperous place that enjoyed excellent communications with the rest of Boiotia, Attika, and through Plataia along the main route to the Peloponnesos. However alluring the idea of a fast thrust to Thebes may have appeared, an army without siege machinery and a dependable source of supplies ran a huge risk by penetrating more deeply against an enemy already aware of its danger and their invaders' position. Kleombrotos determined instead to settle the matter on the field of his own choice, and for that reason rested his army after its very arduous march.⁵⁴

When the Thebans learned the fate of Chaireas, whose position was not farther than three hours away, they quickly withdrew towards Thespiiai to intercept Kleombrotos' line of march. They also sent word to Bakchylidas on Mt. Kithairon to join them at Leuktra. From Thespiiai they marched southwards onto Leuktra, where they encamped on a low ridge about a half-hour's unhurried walk north of Kleombrotos' camp. Between them stretched the small level field of Leuktra, less than two kilometers broad in most places, sloping somewhat to the south. Although debate as to whether Kleombrotos would fight the Thebans disturbed the Spartan camp, he could realistically only join battle or retreat—even another flanking movement eastwards towards Plataia would only delay a decision. The Theban camp itself suffered from divided counsels. Three of the boiotarchoi, intimidated by the superior Spartan numbers, advised the evacuation of women and children to Athens and for the entire army then to retire to the deserted city to stand siege. Unwilling to squander a good field-army

⁵⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.3–4; Diod. 15.52.7–53.2; Paus. 9.13.3. Kleombrotos' route: C. Mazzucchi, *RIL* 107 (1973) 671–675; C.J. Tuplin, *Klio* 69 (1978) 72–77; *CQ* 79 (1979) 347–357; *Failings of Empire*, 135; H. Beister, *Untersuchungen zu der Zeit der Thebanischen Hegemonie* (Munich 1970) 13–72; J. Buckler, in A. Hurst and A. Schachter, eds., *La Montagne des Muses* (Geneva 1996) 127–139; B. Sergeant, *Rivista Storica dell'Antichità* 21 (1991) 137–143; personal observations of six visits between 24 December 1970 and 13–16 August 1980. Cleft Way: J.G. Frazer, *Pausanias and Other Greek Sketches* (London 1900) 373–374.


by reducing it to a garrison-force, Epameinondas and Pelopidas argued for immediate battle. They had already laid their general plans of engagement. Bakchylidas' return and his vote for battle settled the matter. Epameinondas resorted to various religious stratagems to inspire his troops and alleviate their fears, but the decisive advantage of the Thebans lay in their experience, good discipline, and confidence in their officers. Nonetheless, other problems also vexed the Thebans. Epameinondas learned that the Thespian contingent understandably had no stomach for a battle the victory in which would prove less useful to them than defeat. He accordingly allowed them and all other Boiotians unwilling to face the enemy to depart before the battle. Kleombrotos was doubtless glad to see them go. Preliminary skirmishing began when the sutlers and camp-followers tried to follow the Thespian example. A Spartan force of light-armed mercenaries, allied peltasts and cavalry under Hieron turned them back to camp, but Hieron himself fell in the action.⁵⁵

Nothing remained but the decisive engagement. By noon both armies had readied themselves for battle. The Spartans stood 11,000 strong, of which 1000 were cavalry. The size of the Theban army cannot be determined, owing to the departure of the Thespians, but a total of 7000 and additional cavalry is reasonable. Both armies moved down the hillsides onto the plain to deploy in broad view of each other. Kleombrotos unexpectedly posted his cavalry in front of his phalanx, supposedly because of the narrow terrain, which fails to convince. Although the distance between the two armies from north to south, where both cavalry contingents were deployed, is indeed narrow, the plain stretches eastwards from the site of the battle for over four kilometers, more than ample room for the stationing of cavalry to protect the right flank of his wing. Perhaps at the outset Kleombrotos proposed a flanking movement against an enemy wing that he could reasonably expect to be deeper than usual. If so, the cavalry could shield the maneuver. The answer died with the king. Kleombrotos drew up his phalanx in two wings, a Spartan right of some twelve-men deep and an allied left. To the north Epameinondas simultaneously deployed the Boiotian army with the

⁵⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.4–9; Diod. 15.53.2–54, 7; Plut. *Pel.* 20.4–22–4; *Mor.* 397E. Topography: personal observations of 12 March 1971, 12 August 1977, 8 August 1980; Buckler, *TH*, 61.

Scale 1:50

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5. The Battlefield of Leuktra, 371 BC.

Thebans massed in a column or block on the left some fifty shields deep at the head of which stood the elite Sacred Band under Pelopidas. The other Boiotians, presumably in a normal line of eight or twelve, held the right. These troops, inferior in number to the enemy and in combat experience to the Thebans, he ordered to advance at a slower rate than their comrades on the left, thus intentionally creating an oblique phalanx. The reasons for these orders were for the Boiotians to fix the attention of the Spartan allies, preventing them from taking Epameinondas' striking wing in flank and delaying their own engagement until the last possible moment. Epameinondas' order of battle clearly showed Kleombrotos that the Thebans intended to decide the battle on the Spartan right. The move was novel and unexpected, unlike Theban arrangements made at Delion, Nemea River, or Koroneia. Kleombrotos must now strengthen his own phalanx and extend it eastwards to a point where it could overlap and then envelop Epameinondas' attacking wing. He ordered his cavalry into the plain against their counterparts both to gain time for the movement and to prevent the enemy from interfering with it. Kleombrotos next began to move units from the left of his own wing, and march them behind and around other units still facing forward. He tried to bring them far beyond the left of the Theban attackers, whence they could circle and take the enemy in flank. Time, however, proved a luxury that Kleombrotos could not afford, especially on such a restricted field. Epameinondas had meanwhile ordered his own line forward but not in a typical attack. Fully realizing the urgency of speed, he suddenly led his men on the run obliquely to their left to prevent Kleombrotos successfully from changing his formation, to nullify the advantage of the longer length of his line, and to counter the usual rightward drift of the opposing phalanx. All these novel moves caught Kleombrotos unprepared. Epameinondas expected to drive Kleombrotos' wing as far as possible from the rest of his line. These simultaneous events saw Kleombrotos open a gap between his and the allied line. At that very time the Theban cavalry defeated and drove the Spartan horsemen back onto their own phalanx, which prevented anyone from closing the gap. At the head of the Theban charge, Pelopidas, seeing the confusion before him, immediately ordered the Sacred Band to dart forth independently to hit the Spartan line. He thereby denied Kleombrotos the opportunity either to restore order or to complete his movements. The king responded by ordering his entire phalanx, even with

some hoplites still milling around unaware of his order, forward to meet the enemy. Kleombrotos, however, had run out of time. Pelopidas slammed into the Spartan line, crushing its front ranks, mortally wounding Kleombrotos, killing Sphodrias, and allowing Epameinondas to bring the full weight of his phalanx to bear. In a hard battle of attrition, Pelopidas, Epameinondas, and their troops cut through the Spartan line, killing more than half of the Spartiatas and about one hundred Lakedaimonians in all. The unengaged allied left wing retired without coming to blows with the Boiotians opposite them. The shattered Spartan army managed to reach its camp. In about one hour or so from deployment to decision Epameinondas had broken the Spartan army in a decisive victory that ended the notion of Spartan military invincibility.⁵⁶

⁵⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.10–19; Ages. 2.24; Isok. 6.9; Diod. 15.55–56; Nepos *Pel.* 4.2; Polyb. 12.25f.3–4; Plut. *Pel.* 23; Ages. 28.8; *Mor.* 193B; Paus. 3.6.1; 9.13.9–12; Arr. *Takt.* 11.2; Polyain. 3.10; 2.3.4, 15.

V.D. Hanson, *CA* 7 (1988) 190–207, totally misunderstands the significance of Epameinondas' innovations at Leuktra, but advances five points to establish his case. He argues that (1) Epameinondas did not invent the deep Theban phalanx, in which he is correct and already understood by previous scholars. Yet no other general had massed his troops more deeply in pitched battle. (2) Hanson maintains that Epameinondas was not the first to base his attack on the left. In support he cites the battles of Solymeia (Thuc. 4.43), Teleutias' actions at Olynthos (Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.40–43; see pp. 207–208), Pelopidas at Tegira (Plut. *Pel.* 16–17), and Koroneia (see above pp. 92–95). At Solymeia the Corinthians simply responded to an Athenian amphibious attack by striking from the left to drive the enemy back onto their ships. Only afterwards (ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τῷ ἅλλῳ στρατεύματι) did the Corinthians attack the rest of the Athenian army. This action was an unplanned skirmish, not a set battle. At Olynthos Teleutias attacked from the left because he decided to rush the enemy who then issued from the gate at that point. The left in this instance put him on the only immediate line of attack. At Tegira topography, as seen, proves Hanson wrong. The land allowed Pelopidas to attack only on the right. Hanson completely misunderstands Koroneia, for Xenophon makes it abundantly clear that the Thebans originally held the right of their line. Hanson fails to understand that from the outset Epameinondas decided to launch his strength from the left to overwhelm the Spartan deployment opposite. This movement was in fact novel, the result of the idea that one army should use its might to crush its opponents. Epameinondas' thinking was indeed tactical; but as he subsequently demonstrated, it formed part of his strategical concept of defeating the enemy. (3) Hanson denies that at Leuktra Epameinondas introduced any innovations regarding cavalry. On this point he is doubtless right. Epameinondas responded to Kleombrotos' disposition; but the Theban remembered the effect, which he repeated at Mantinea. The novelty of this instance is Epameinondas' recognition of the value of the unexpected opportunity afforded him. (4) Hanson seems entirely to have misunderstood the nature and reason for Epameinondas' oblique attack. If, as Hanson assumes, the Spartan line had extended beyond that of Epameinondas, Kleombrotos would

Despite the temporary refuge of their camp, the Spartans faced a grim situation. In addition to their casualties and the commanding position of their enemy, they encountered disaffection among their own allies. Some of them had already made contact with the victorious Thebans, an omen of things to come, while most refused to renew battle. The surviving Spartan polemarchoi bowed to the hard necessity of asking the Thebans for a truce to take up their dead. They also sent a messenger to Sparta with the grim news and a request for relief, answered by the dispatch of a force under Archidamos. The Thebans meanwhile sent a garlanded herald to the Athenians announcing the victory calling for them to lend their aid. Dismayed by the unwelcome report, the Athenians sent the Theban away without any answer. Better results came from the Theban appeal to their ally Jason of Pherai, who marshalled his forces for a forced march to Leuktra. There he negotiated a truce that allowed the Spartans to retire without hindrance, and in so doing put himself in the good graces of both sides. On his return march he demonstrated that he had not acted out of pure altruism. In Phokis he captured the suburbs of Hyampolis in the plain and destroyed Herakleia Trachinia. Rather than wanton acts of violence, his damage to the one and reduction of the other opened the easiest and fastest route between Pherai and the western border of Boiotia. Jason

have had no reason to extend his line. Far worse is Hanson's failure to realize that Epameinondas' movement to the left thwarted the usual and expected drift of the enemy's phalanx to the right. Epameinondas, if not Hanson, had learned the lesson of the Nemea River. Nor does he understand that a slower advance of the Theban right wing than a quicker movement of the left creates an oblique phalanx that does not demand that the right actually retreat. Hanson's objections to the reality of the oblique phalanx contradicts the sources that he interprets. (5) Next, when Hanson attributes (196 n. 17) the idea of a reserve to J. Buckler, he misreads *SO* 55 (1980) 92 n. 51; and *Phoenix* 39 (1985) 141 n. 24, both of which he cites. Buckler actually argues against the notion. Lastly, Hanson's worst failing is easily his inability to comprehend the true contribution of Epameinondas to Greek warfare: the Theban combined several elements into a single method of attack that was unlike anything seen before on any battlefield. The innovation can with some cogency be likened to the German concept of the *Blitzkrieg*. In 1939 the tank, mechanized infantry, airplane, and field telephone had already been used in World War I, but they had never before been co-ordinated and aimed at a single purpose: H. Guderian, *Erinnerungen eines Soldaten*¹² (Stuttgart 1986) 32–39. On a far lesser scale Epameinondas had simply done the same thing, a fact that V.D. Hanson, *The Soul of Battle* (New York 1999) 46, seems later to have recognized, when he referred to "Epameinondas' novel tactical innovations" at Leuktra. See also J.F. Lazenby, *The Spartan Army*, 151–162.

saw in Leuktra an instrument for his own ambition. His subsequent career promised much but yielded little, thereby serving only as an epilogue to these events. He became much too concerned with local affairs to broader ambitions that he never fulfilled to play a significant role in Greece. Although he probably participated in the ensuing Peace of 371 at Athens later that year, he primarily consolidated his power in Thessaly. That done, he prepared to present a dominating presence at the Pythian Games of 370, much as Adolf Hitler would later do at the Olympic Games of 1936. Circumstances, however, overtook his ambitions; and before the games began in August 370, he was assassinated, which both relieved Greece of any fear of his goals and left Thessaly in turmoil. The battle of Leuktra undeniably proved decisive, but in 371 no one knew who would turn the victory to his advantage. For the moment, all was in flux.⁵⁷

⁵⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.19–28; Diod. 15.57.2; Paus. 9.13.11–14. Buckler, *TH*, 291 n. 37. S. van de Maele, *REG* 93 (1980) 204–205; *Cahiers des Études anciennes* 38 (2001) 113–118; Sprawski, *Jason*, 118–124.

CHAPTER EIGHT

THEBES COMES TO THE FORE (371–362 BC)

A. THE AFTERMATH OF LEUKTRA (371–369 BC)

Few battles in Greek history caused wider or more immediate repercussions than Leuktra. For the Spartans it spelled disaster. It released the tension that had grown up in Greece since the Spartan assumption and subsequent abuse of its ascendancy. It permitted the Thebans to complete the construction of the Boiotian Confederacy and to consolidate the defense of their homeland. The Athenians reacted with consternation at the news of the unexpected and unwelcome event, but they quickly saw it as an invitation to assume the position that Sparta had so dramatically lost. For the Peloponnesians it meant release from the oppression of an aggressive and suspicious neighbor. Nothing like it had happened since the defeat of Athens in the Peloponnesian War. No one in 371 could have foreseen the consequences of this one day. The Spartans bore their catastrophe with their usual stoicism, which they displayed in their treatment of the survivors. Owing to their numbers, political, and social status the remnants of Kleombrotos' army could not usefully be publicly humiliated more than they already were. More importantly the losses sustained in the battle gave them an increased importance in the defense of the city. In their perplexity the Spartans made Agesilaos law-giver, even though many now recalled the warning about crowning a lame king. His simple and effective solution permitted the laws to sleep for a day, thereby pardoning those who would otherwise have been punished. For the moment, however, the plight of Sparta, though dire, was ameliorated by some sparks of hope. The Thebans did not immediately pursue their advantage which afforded the Spartans some time to recuperate. Many of their Peloponnesian allies remained obedient, and Athens quickly attempted to salvage the King's Peace that had lasted only twenty days. The bleak situation suggested at least that Sparta had weathered the worst of the blast, but the serious loss of trained and experienced men boded ill for the future.¹

¹ Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.16–18; Plut. *Ages.* 29. Buckler, *TH*, 66–68; E. David, *Sparta between*

The victors meanwhile dealt with more serious and nearer concerns than then the distant and vanquished Spartans. They first completed the expansion and consolidation of the Boiotian Confederacy, which opened the opportunity to spread their influence throughout the rest of central Greece. Success in this venture meant that they could make this region a center of strength capable of preventing the intrusion of either Spartan or Athenian, a situation previously unknown in classical Greek history. First, however, the problem of the Thespians demanded immediate attention. Upon their withdrawal before Leuktra the Thespian hoplites retired to the strong position at Keressos, the location of which is still unknown, where they took refuge. Epameinondas drove them from the spot; but given his unwillingness to shed the blood of fellow citizens, he probably allowed them to remain on the land in political subservience to Thebes and their immediate neighbors. The Orchomenians, long faithful allies of the Spartans, again found themselves exposed to retribution. Epameinondas successfully led his victorious army against the city but refused to reduce it to slavery. It too he placed under the jurisdiction of its neighbors while denying it any political power. As clement as these gestures were, they also served Theban purposes; for the neighbors who assumed control over Thespiiai and Orchomenos now depended more heavily upon Thebes to shield them from insurrection. It proved an easy way to draw closer ties between the western Boiotian states and Thebes.²

With Boiotia secured, the Thebans next established a system of alliances in central Greece. Epameinondas moved first against the Phokians, now isolated from their allies and vulnerable to attack through the Kephisos valley. Content to use his army as an instrument of belligerent diplomacy, he concluded a defensive alliance with them. At the same time the Euboians—Chalkis, Eretria, Karystos, and Histiaia—seceded from the Athenian League and took the Theban side. Even though Thebes and Athens were still at peace and nominally allies, the defection of Euboea struck a grave blow at Athens,

Empire and Revolution (New York 1981) 78–82; M. Clauss, *Sparta* (Munich 1983) 1156–159; Shipley, *Plutarch's Agesilaos*, 323–328; Jehne, *Klio* 81 (1999) 317–321.

² Thespiiai: Paus. 9.13.8, 14.2–4; cp. Hdt. 1.36.2. Keressos: F. Bölte, *RE* 11 (1921) 286–287; Fossey, *Boiotia*, 163. Orchomenos: Diod. 15.57.1; Plut. *Comp. Pel. & Marc.* 1.3. C.J. Tuplin, *Athenaeum* 64 (1986) 321–341; M.H. Hansen in M.H. Hansen, ed., *Sources for the Ancient Greek City-State* (Copenhagen 1995) 13–63; Beck, *Polis und Koinon*, 208–210.

given its vital importance to the security of the Athenian grain trade. It also made the sensitive problem of Oropos all the more acute, for Eretria had previously supported the Theban claim to the place. On a much broader scale the Euboian decision raised the question of whether it resulted from unique considerations or whether it was a sign that the Athenian League had already begun to lose its popularity. The answer to that question lay in the future, but this first sign was ominous. Epameinondas meanwhile in a campaign reminiscent of Hismenias' in 395, advanced northwards, bringing both Ozolian and Opountian Lokris into alliance, a return to the union established before the Corinthian War. He moved beyond into Malia and Oite, where he gained not only alliance but also control of Herakleia Trachinia, which ensured the all-weather route across the mainland, while giving him control of Thermopylai. Malia and the passes opened the way to Thessaly, which also joined the Thebans. Epameinondas' string of successes in this region eclipsed those of Myronides in 456. His march next took him westwards, presumably along the corridor that connected Herakleia to Amphissa and Naupaktos. Thence the road led to Aitolia and the seeds of future problems. The Aitolians joined the Thebans who offered them the best opportunity to regain Naupaktos from the Achaian League, which was still allied with Sparta. It remained to be seen how the Thebans would deal with this obvious tension between Naupaktos and the Aitolians. Lastly, the Akarnanians, harboring no fond memories of Agesilaos' campaign of 389, also concluded an alliance with Thebes. In the space of one campaigning-season Epameinondas had created a bloc of power that stretched from Thessaly in the north to Euboea in the east to Aitolia and Akarnania in the west.³

These dramatic events resulted in a major shift in the whole balance of power that came at the expense of Sparta and Athens alike. The numerous alliances with Thebes often provided states the opportunity to resolve old grudges that reached back at least to the Corinthian War. They confined the Spartans to the Peloponnesos, and some of them deprived the Athenians of several important allies,

³ Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.23; *Ages.* 2.24; Diod. 15.57.1; Plut. *Ages.* 30.1; Bengtson, *SdA* II².271. Pass between Herakleia and Amphissa: Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.27; Paus. 10.22.1–5. E.W. Kase *et al.*, *The Great Isthmus Corridor Route*, I (Dubuque 1991) 22–45; G.J. Szemler *et al.*, *Thermopylai* (Chicago 1996) 92–94; personal observations of 4 July 1996; 19 October 1998; 15 August 2000.

which dealt a serious blow to the strength of their League on the mainland. With the exception of Kerkyra northwestern Greece was lost to them. Yet Epameinondas and the Thebans made no effort to combine these separate alliances into a formal league with a common synedrion to facilitate joint allied operations. From the outset the Thebans preferred to rely upon their hegemony rather than any formal institutions like the Peloponnesian and Athenian Leagues with which to direct and implement their foreign designs. In central and northern Greece this loose association caused the Thebans little inconvenience, and a closer bond may have seemed unnecessary to all allies so long as they were secure from external threat. The disregard of federalism as an instrument to consolidate these alliances in one system moreover indicates at the outset that the Thebans had no desire to create an empire.⁴

The Athenians made the most immediately effective use of Leuktra in wider affairs by convening still another peace conference to endorse the treaty that the Greeks had ratified only some weeks earlier. Their primary purpose was to determine whether the Peloponnesians intended to remain loyal to Sparta, but they also saw the opportunity to regain the formal leadership of Greece, an object greatly desired since the end of the Peloponnesian War. Despite the inconvenience of travel and the brief interval between congresses, most Greeks responded, itself a testimony to the seriousness of this unexpected turn of events. The Spartans from necessity sent a delegation, a sobering experience for those accustomed to dictating peace to others. The Peloponnesians responded with alacrity, for now had come the moment to air their grievances freely and without fear of Spartan displeasure. The Athenian allies, of course, sent their delegation, but whether King Amyntas of Macedonia was among them poses a problem. His status as an Athenian ally is probable, but his membership in the League is quite uncertain. Although there is nothing inherently implausible about his participation, his subsequent conduct will call for some comment. The states of central and northern Greece presumably attended as well, especially since they had nothing to lose by reaffirming their support for it. Furthermore, the peace did not prohibit extraneous alliances. Jason of Pherai presumably sent an envoy,

⁴ Buckler, *TH*, 66–68. See also D.M. Lewis, *Teiresias*, Sup. 3 (1990) 71–73; Buckler in P. Flensted-Jensen *et al.*, eds., *Polis and Politics* (Copenhagen 2000) 431–438.

particularly now when in addition to his friendship with Athens he had acted as arbiter between Thebes and Sparta on the battlefield. Here was his opportunity to make his local Thessalian power felt on the broader field of Greek politics. Only the Thebans refused to respond for the obvious reason that they were now bent on achieving the aims forbidden them by previous treaties. Nor did they entertain any doubts about the Athenian attitude towards them, which would surely prove hostile. Whether formally or not, Thebes also abandoned the Athenian League that had refused to protect it in the face of the Spartan threat. That decision, however, was not a Theban declaration of war on Athens or any other state. Although Thebes obviously did not ratify the peace then under discussion, it did not defy its terms. Yet the abstention of Thebes raised the question of whether this treaty would be any more successful than its predecessors. Less dramatic but nonetheless noticeable was the absence of Dionysios of Syracuse, who momentarily remained aloof from Greek affairs. Nor was the King officially represented, a matter insignificant since the Athenians proclaimed that they were acting according to his diktat.⁵

The Athenians presented to those assembled a treaty somewhat different from the one ratified at Sparta earlier that year. The basic clauses remained unchanged, but that governing its enforcement was strengthened. Whereas at Sparta the participants could decide for themselves whether they would enforce the treaty, the Athenians stipulated that all signatories must aid those unlawfully injured. This clause was little more than a refinement of the King's original pronouncement that he and all those who agreed with him would take action against those who violated the peace. Yet it also turned the peace into something very akin to a defensive alliance. Moreover, the Athenians now took upon themselves the duty, honor, and burden of policing Greek affairs, an unmistakable claim that Athens had become the actual *prostates* of the peace. One clause, if authentic, actually violated that guaranteeing the autonomy of the signatories. The Athenians later claimed that Amyntas then recognized the Athenian right to Amphipolis, which had been independent of Athens

⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.1–3, 36; Isok. *Letter to Dionysios* 8; *IG* II² 103 lines 24–26 (= Rhodes-Osborne, *GHI* 33); Bengtson, *SdA* II².270. M. Sordi, *RFIC* 79 (1951) 34–64; Ryder, *Koine Eirene*, 71–74; Seager, *Athenaeum*, NS 52 (1974) 54–55; Buckler, *TH*, 68–69; Jehne, *Koine Eirene*, 74–79.

since 421. If true, that would have amounted to a cynical and unjustified travesty of one of the fundamental principles of the peace. If Amyntas did in fact make this concession, it was surely under duress, for no one in Greece was likely to defend his claim. Nor would it have pleased either the Macedonians or the Amphipolitans. Another refinement to the stipulations of this treaty has sometimes been misunderstood. All participants swore that they would abide by the treaty that the King had sent down and by the decrees of the Athenians and their allies. Although some modern scholars have interpreted this clause as a requirement that all of the adherents to the peace would thereby become members of the Athenian League, they mistake its true meaning. Since 384 the Athenians had consistently pointed out to all that their treaties were concluded in conformity with the King's Peace, not in contradiction of or contrary to it. They were now in fact asserting their right to be *prostates* of the peace because they had so scrupulously honored it. The subtle criticism of Sparta's conduct during its ascendancy is unmistakable, but the Athenian position on this point actually introduced nothing new. Under these terms the Athenians and the others proclaimed the Peace of Athens in 371.⁶

All of this notwithstanding, an early sign of the changed times came from the Eleian response to the new treaty. Whereas in Sparta the Eleians could not effectively or safely voice their complaints, they now flatly rejected the autonomy of Marganeis, Skillous, and Triphylia, all of which the Spartans had wrenched from them in 399 and which had served them faithfully thereafter (see p. 20). Instead they claimed that these cities were theirs. No one else endorsed their claim, whereupon they refused to accept the treaty. Far more than a simple desire to retrieve lost territory, theirs was the first significant warning of the looming reaction to the Spartan policy that had prevailed since the Peloponnesian War. The response of Athens, the newly self-styled *prostates* of the peace, underlined the banality of the whole exhibition. Unlike Agesilaos only shortly before, no Athenian threatened to discipline the Eleians, and no signatory demanded that they comply, much less volunteered to bring them to heel. Nothing could

⁶ Amyntas and Amphipolis: Aischin. 2.32–33. J. Papastravru, *Amphipolis* (Leipzig 1936) 22, 25; Ryder, *Koine Eirene*, 131–133; Cargill, *Athenian League*, 85–87; Jehne, *Koine Eirene*, 76–77.

have more poignantly demonstrated that the peace, whether called the King's or the Common, was practically defunct. In this ominous atmosphere the delegates dispersed and their cities subsequently ratified a peace the future of which appeared bleak.⁷

Other signs of political turmoil quickly appeared in several prominent Peloponnesian cities, with Argos contributing substantially to the ferment. The Argives saw in Leuktra the perfect opportunity to undermine Spartan influence in the Peloponnesos. They exploited the anti-Spartan sentiment spawned by Sparta's persistent, imperious, and deleterious policies. In Argos itself political enmity left unresolved by the Corinthian War exploded in a civil bloodbath in which anti-Spartan democrats massacred oligarchs who had long supported Sparta. The democrats soon lost control of the situation, and the people ran amok, finally turning their rage against the democrats themselves. At last cooler heads restored a stable government that proved democratic and anti-Spartan. Exiled Corinthian democrats returned home from this carnage in Argos to instigate their own rampage. Only after heavy losses did their countrymen suppress them. The dirge was repeated at Phleious, where Agesilaos' interference had only nurtured a murderous political atmosphere (see pp. 195–197). Agesilaos' failure to restore political stability there resulted in the exile of an anti-Spartan body that occupied a fort, probably that on Mt. Trikaranon, from which they attacked the city. In the ensuing violence the pro-Spartan Phleisians defeated the exiles and executed some 600 of them, the survivors fleeing to Argos. The sorry tale echoes at Sikyon, which had served as the major Spartan base during the Corinthian War, but the absence of details prevents any real understanding of the uprising. When all of these events and the major participants in them are considered, it becomes obvious that the Spartans had pushed their Peloponnesian allies too far and too often. They had interefered in the internal affairs of these states and had made onerous demands on their military strength, generally in contempt of the treaties that the Spartans themselves had sponsored. The Peloponnesians accordingly rose in a spontaneous revulsion of

⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.1–3; see also 3.2.25; 4.2.16; Diod. 14.17.4, 34.1; Strabo 8.3.10; Paus. 6.22.8. Meyer, *Theopomps Hellenika*, 114–115; F. Böhle, *RE* 14 (1930) 1680–1682; *RE* 7A (1939) 186–201; F. Geyer, *RE* 3A (1927) 526; E. Meyer, *Neue peloponnesische Wanderungen* (Bern 1957) 40–52. T.H. Nielsen in T.H. Nielsen, ed., *Yet More Studies in the Ancient Greek Polis* (Stuttgart 1997) 129–162.

Spartan leadership. These facts must also be taken with Sparta's earlier treatment of Elis and Mantinea. With few friends left in the Peloponnesos, the Spartans were about to reap the harvest that they had sown since the end of the Peloponnesian War.⁸

Of vaster significance than these assorted outbursts of violence were the calculated efforts of Elis, Arkadia, and Argos to undermine Spartan power in the Peloponnesos. Activity began in Arkadia, where in 371/0 the Mantineians decided to abandon the five villages imposed upon them in 385 in order to rebuild and re-fortify their city. Harboring no love of the Spartans, they determined to create a democracy. They also looked for support to their neighbors who were equally disenchanted with Sparta. The work found a champion in Lykomedes of Mantinea, a wealthy aristocrat who had embraced democracy as a political tool against his southern neighbors. The new Mantinea presented both an affront and a danger to Sparta, which sent Agesilaos as ambassador with a request that the work be stopped until he could obtain Spartan endorsement of it. Nothing could more starkly illustrate the humiliation of Sparta than this request and the difference between Agesilaos' posture in 370 and that of 385. Rebuffing him, the Mantineian magistrates announced that the people refused to stop construction. The resolve of the Mantineians sparked a general Arkadian response in which some cities sent men to help in the work. Perhaps even more pointedly, the Eleians sent a contribution of three talents to defray the cost of the work. The Eleians obviously courted a new friend who could ultimately help them regain their lost territory.⁹

⁸ Isok. 5 (*Philip*) 52; 6 (*Archidamos*) 64–67; Diod. 15.40, 57.3–58.3; Dion. Hal. *RA* 7.66.5; Plut. *Mor.* 814B. E. David, *AJP* 107 (1986) 343–349; Stylianou, *HDC*, 330–332, argues in favor of accepting Diodoros' date (15.40) of 375/4 for one set of Peloponnesian disturbances and 370/69 (125.58) for another, but his view suffers from serious faults. His reliance upon 15.5.2 more reasonably fits the aftermath of the King's Peace of 386 than it does of 374 (see pp. 188–197). Although Stylianou refers to 15.45.2 to support his position, Diodoros' only specific examples of general anarchy refer to Zakynthos and at 15.46.1–3 Kerkyra, the latter receiving the support of Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.1–4 and *IG* II² 43 lines 131–134. The reference to a bygone Spartan hegemony, which was certainly not true of 374, proves that Diodoros has confused events, as he had various aspects of the peace treaties of 375 and 371. In his abbreviation of Ephoros Diodoros has written another of his doublets. Only in 371/0 could the Spartan hegemony be referred to as in the past. It is pointless to be "tolerant" of these inconsistencies, as Stylianou urges: Diodoros has simply muddled the chronology of these years.

⁹ Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.3–5; Isok. 8 (*Peace*) 100; Diod. 15.59.1. E. von Stern, *Geschichte*

From this pan-Arkadian movement Tegea, large, rich, and strategically vital to the security of the region, could not be omitted. Although in Tegea the democratic element shared its neighbors' sentiments towards unity, the oligarchs resisted so strongly that the Mantineians and other democrats violently suppressed them. In this brutal fashion the Arkadians moved closer to unity but without Orchomenos, which preferred loyalty to Sparta to a league dominated by its Mantineian enemy. The majority of Arkadians, however, formed a federation united on the principle of democracy in which the ultimate sanction for legislation lay with a primary assembly known as the Ten Thousand. Although some scholars have considered this government oligarchical, 10,000 strongly indicates a broader representation than the contemporary Athenian citizen quorum of 6000. The federal government also included a boule in which the cities held seats approximately in proportion to their population. The approval of the boule and the Ten Thousand was necessary to enact legislation. A body of *damiorgoi*, a certain number from each city, probably corresponded to the *pytaneis* who formed a committee of the boule. A strategos exercised the executive function of the league, which included commanding its standing army, the *Eparittoi*, consisting of 5000 regular, paid soldiers. Citizen levies from the cities sometimes supplemented the Eparittoi, in which case they too fell under the command of the strategos. The strategos was not the sole executive, for a body of magistrates enjoying wide discretionary powers also existed. Whether they should be identified with the *Damiorgoi* is unknown.¹⁰

During the formation of the league the Eleians had remained in diplomatic contact with the Arkadians principally to gain allies who would help them retrieve Triphylia and other territory near Olympia. They fully appreciated that their efforts would lead to war with

der spartanischen und thebanischen Hegemonie (Dorpat 1884); G. Fougères, *Mantinee et l'Arcadie orientale* (Paris 1898) 430–434; Roy, *Historia* 20 (1971) 570; Buckler, *TH* 70–72. S. Dušanić, *Arkadski savez IV Veka* (Belgrade 1970) 290–292; K. Trampedach, *Platon, die Akademie und die zeitgenössische Politik* (Stuttgart 1994) 27–37; Stylianou, *HCD*, 415–418; Beck, *Polis und Koinon*, 75–77.

¹⁰ Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.6–11; 7.4.22; Rhodes–Osborne *GHI* 32. Larsen, *Greek Federal States*, 180–189; Dušanić, *Arkadski Savez IV Veka*, 290–292; Beck, *Polis und Koinon*, 75–83; M.H. Hansen in T.H. Nielsen and J. Roy, *Defining Ancient Arkadia* (Copenhagen 1999) 80–88. Athenian citizen-quorum: M.H. Hansen, *The Athenian Assembly* (Oxford 1987) 16–19.

Sparta, one that they could not win alone. The new Arkadian League appeared an ideal ally. Communications between the two were direct, and Sparta had proven the enemy of both. The alliance between them concluded, they next approached the Argives, who welcomed a broad Peloponnesian accord against Sparta as eagerly as they had supported the Eleians and Mantineians in 418. The triple alliance spanned the Peloponnesos; and as it did, Arkadia's central position became increasingly important. This combination of powers so threatened Sparta that a conflict loomed. As in 418 and again in 399 the Eleians fully appreciated their predicament; and as before during the Peloponnesian War, they and their allies sent ambassadors to Athens seeking an alliance against Sparta. The Athenians received them coldly for several reasons, including the Eleian rejection of the recent peace. No longer seeing Sparta as a major threat, they now actually considered it a potentially useful ally against Thebes. Furthermore, they had sworn oaths to defend Sparta, a signatory of the Peace of Athens in 371, in the event of an unprovoked attack. For all of these reasons the Athenians rejected the overture.¹¹

From Athens the envoys travelled north to Thebes, where they met with an uncertain reception, owing to apparent Theban indifference to Peloponnesian affairs. In reality the Thebans could not look that far afield until they had secured central Greece and until the Pheraian assassins had removed Jason of Pherai permanently from consideration. All that done, they were now free to venture southwards. The offer of alliance by the three Peloponnesian states provided them with the first reasonable hope of successful intervention there. Unlike a similar situation in 421, when the Thebans had rejected a Peloponnesian overture because of Argive democracy, that political concept left the now-democratic Boiotian Confederacy undaunted. The allied appeal meant that the Thebans would come as saviors not invaders. Even so, the Peloponnesians met with some unexpected opposition because of divided counsels. Some Thebans genuinely felt it foolhardy to risk the present and long-desired security of Boiotia for dangerous adventures so far from home. The potential gains did not out-weigh the possible losses. Yet to men like Epameinondas and Pelopidas, both boiotarchoi in 370, aid to these

¹¹ Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.19; *Ages.* 2.23; Dem. 16.12, 20; Diod. 15.62.3. Elis in 418: Bengtson, *SdA* II².193, and II.190, when in 421 they had also participated in an anti-Spartan alliance; 399: Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.24–25.

states and the extension of the war to Sparta itself was the logical consequence of Leuktra. The Eleians furthered their own cause by lending the Thebans ten talents to cover the expenses of any expedition to the Peloponnesos. All of these factors carried the day that saw the Thebans accepting the alliance.¹²

The agreement concluded between the Boiotian Confederacy and the Peloponnesians was a typical defensive alliance in which the members, once at war, could not legally conclude a separate peace without the approval of the others. For a power that would be hegemonial the pact suffered from two fundamental weaknesses. The first was the failure formally to recognize Thebes as the hegemon of the alliance, as were Sparta in the Peloponnesian League and Athens in both the Delian and the fourth-century leagues. For all practical purposes, at least at the outset, Thebes filled that capacity because of its prestige and ability, but not by any treaty rights. This defect allowed the possibility that another member might claim that prerogative. Another serious flaw was the failure or refusal of the Thebans to establish a common synedrion of the allies that could have served as an organ for central planning and for the resolution of disputes among allies. The Thebans refused to create a synedrion perhaps as a result of their own experiences as allies of the Spartans and the Athenians. Especially regarding the Athenian League, they had witnessed at first hand the inconvenience of a formal synod. Some members refused to fund or co-operate in confederate operations and others balked at Athenian leadership. Furthermore, as leaders of the Boiotian Confederacy, the Thebans knew the advantage of direct authority that was lightly expressed, and then only under necessity. Rather than establish regular meetings of a synod drawn from various places throughout Greece, all of them with their individual designs and policies, the Thebans felt that a direct military hegemony was the simpler and more effective form of administration. Even though these defects would later spell doom for the alliance, for the moment the pact was practical and workable.¹³

¹² Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.16–19; 7.4.40; Diod. 15.62.3; Plut. *Mor.* 193C–D; Paus. 8.6.2, 8.10, 27.2; 9.14.1; Nepos *Epam.* 6.1–4; Bengtson, *SdA* II².273; Cawkwell, *CQ* 66 (1972) 265–267; Buckler, *TH*, 71–73.

¹³ Bengtson, *SdA* II².273. Buckler, *TH*, 73–74, 292 n.6. Although D.M. Lewis, *Teiresias* sup. 3 (1990) 71–73, followed by Stylianou, *HDC*, 412–412, argues that the Thebans did create an allied synedrion, the point is easily refuted: J. Buckler

The armed Mantineian interference in Tegea, the civil disorder there, and the plight of the exiled oligarchs all gave the Spartans the legal pretext needed for an attack on Arkadia. In the winter of 370 they sent Agesilaos to ravage the barren fields of Mantinea and to do anything else necessary to disrupt the new Arkadian League. The Eleians and Argives immediately came to the support of their allies and summoned the Thebans to honor their treaty obligations. Despite the winter season the Thebans mobilized their army, some 5000–6000 strong, and contingents from their allies in central Greece, placed them under the boiotarchoi, and dispatched them to Arkadia. After fortifying some strategical places in the Corinthia, they advanced to Mantinea, where they found Agesilaos gone and their allies eager for an attack on Sparta itself. The ensuing campaign was not so spontaneous as it may at first appear, but rather the consummation of Epameinondas' intention to crush Sparta. The Thebans paused briefly to plan the operation, primarily to gain information about the passes into Lakonia, to assemble supplies, and to learn what additional resources could be had along the way. Only then did they assign specific duties to the various allied contingents. Epameinondas, Pelopidas, and their fellow boiotarchoi faced a political problem involving the expiration of their term of office before the expedition could be completed, but the opportunity was too attractive to be lost because of a technicality.¹⁴

These matters settled, Epameinondas launched a four-pronged attack that concentrated on Sellasia, the threshold of Sparta. Descending onto Sparta itself, he ravaged the countryside with impunity. Rallying the defense, Agesilaos wisely stood solely on the defensive, which was all the more necessary because morale among the Spartans themselves had dramatically sunk. In this moment of crisis the Spartans emancipated 6000 helots, whose ultimate question of loyalty distracted the Spartans nearly as much as did the threat of the invaders. The Spartans also sent a plea to the Corinthians and their remaining

in P. Flensted-Jensen *et al.* eds, *Polis and Politics* (Copenhagen 2000) 431–446. See also J. Buckler, *Ancient World* 5 (1982) 86, for the Theban propensity to keep separate their northern and Peloponnesian alliances.

¹⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.23–24; *Ages.* 2.24; Theopompos, *FGrH* 115 F322; Diod. 15.62.5, 64.2; Plut. *Pel.* 24.2–4; *Comp. Pel. & Marc.* 2.1–2; *Ages.* 31.1–2; *Comp. Ages. & Pomp.* 3.5; *Mor.* 788A. Stern, *Hegemonie*, 169; A. Bauer, *HZ* 65 (1890) 243–245; W.M. Leake, *Travels in the Morea* (London 1830) II.322; W. Loring, *JHS* 15 (1895) 63; Buckler, *TH*, 74–77. Georgiadou, *Plutarch's Pelopidas*, 181–182; Stylianou, *HCD*, 430.

allies to send help. Although they quickly responded, their forces were inadequate to hinder Epameinondas, who methodically moved along the eastern bank of the Eurotas destroying everything in his path. Except for one thrust into the suburbs, Epameinondas made no serious attempt to capture the city itself. Instead he intended to let it wither on the vine as he continued his unopposed devastation of Lakonia. From Sparta he marched southwards to Gytheion, ravaging a land that had not seen ruin since the coming of the Dorians. Retracing his steps past Sparta, he plundered what remained until he reached Arkadia. Throughout the campaign the invaders had met with no serious resistance and had left a shattered Lakonia behind them. Agesilaos' policies had led to this.¹⁵

The helots and perioikoi responded to the invasion in a striking, almost predictable, way. Although some joined their masters, many even of these proved disloyal. A great many others welcomed the invaders as liberators. Of the 6000 helots who had taken up arms in Sparta's defense, so many deserted that Agesilaos resorted to a stratagem to hide their defection. The social unrest in Lakonia impeded the Spartan defense, and to some degree it explains the Spartan reluctance to engage Epameinondas' army. Since the lot of the helots had never been happy, their eagerness to abandon Sparta is readily understandable. Because their labor helped to sustain the way of life that permitted the Spartans to be soldiers and nothing else, their desertion was especially serious, constituting as it did a further blow to the entire Spartan economy. Many perioikoi had also grown tired of Spartan domination. For too long, like other Peloponnesians, they had contributed large numbers of fighting men to Spartan armies, only to be rewarded by increased arrogance and interference in their internal affairs. Many of them no longer looked upon the Spartans as the defenders of their security and their homes but as their oppressors. Their resentment had grown to such heights that they threw in their lot with the invaders. The adherence of large numbers of helots and perioikoi to Epameinondas' army was

¹⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.25–29; Ages. 2.24; Arist. *Pol.* 2.6.7; Diod. 15.63–64.6; Nepos Ages. 6.2–3; Epam. 7.3; Polyb. 5.22.1–4, 32.12; Dion Chrys. 15.28; Plut. Ages. 31–32; Comp. Ages. & Pomp. 4.7; Paus. 2.38.7; 3.10.7–8; 8.45.1–4; Ael. *VH* 6.3; Polyain. 2.1.14; Steph. Byz. “Helos”, “Gytheion”, “Krokeai”. Buckler, *TH*, 74–85; Cartledge, *Agesilaos*, 234–236; Hamilton, *Agesilaos*, 223–230. Topography: personal observations of 4–10 September 1971, 17–19 August 1977; and 19 August 1978.

itself a serious blow to Sparta, for it diminished its dwindling human resources.¹⁶

Epameinondas now delivered the decisive stroke against Sparta. Instead of returing home, despite the rigors of winter, he led the triumphant army into Messene, which he freed from Spartan domination. Its extensive and fertile land had for generations provided many choice allotments for the sustenance of full Spartan citizens and their families. Its liberation would leave them virtually impoverished, thus decreasing Spartan military and economic strength. Without Messene the Spartans would find themselves amply occupied with holding their own in Lakonia. The Messenians could also serve a second and enduring purpose for the Thebans. By liberating the Messenian helots and presenting them, the Lakonian helots, and the perioikoi with the land that had previously sustained the Spartans, Epameinondas could build a polis to counter-balance Sparta. This new state would not initially be strong enough to dispense with Theban protection, so there was no immediate fear of its launching a policy independent of Theban wishes. It would also allow Epameinondas to close the ring more tightly around Sparta, shutting it in on the west by Messene and Elis, on the north by Arkadia, and on the northeast by Argos. A free Messene, vigilant and hostile to Sparta, provided the ideal agent for guaranteeing Sparta's permanent decline. Epameinondas chose Mt. Ithome as the site of the new polis, a logical decision for both strategical and national reasons. Located on a high lone hill, the city secured its domination of the rich Pamisos valley, and the place itself had been associated with Messenian aspirations of freedom since at least the Second Messenian War of ca. 600. The Arkadians and especially the Argives gladly received the plan, and work began at once on the city and the great circuit wall, imposing even in ruins, that rose along the slopes of the mountain. While work progressed, Epameinondas recalled from abroad the scattered remnants of the Messenian people who had fled throughout the western Mediterranean. Epameinondas thereby increased the population of the new state while preserving Messenian traditions.¹⁷

¹⁶ Xen. *Ages.* 2.24 *Hell.* 6.5.25, 32; 7.2.2; Plut. *Ages.* 32.12. P. Oliva, *Sparta and Her Social Problems* (Amsterdam and Prague 1971) 195; E. David, *Athenaeum* 68 (1980) 299–308; H. Bengtson, *Griechische Staatsmänner* (Munich 1983) 213–215; R.J.A. Talbert, *Historia* 38 (1989) 22–40; Hamilton, *Agesilaus*, 227–228.

¹⁷ Isok. 5.49; 6.28; Dein. 1.73; Lykourgos *Against Leokrates* 62; Diod. 15.65.5–66.1;

While the polis of Messene became a reality, Agesilaos persuaded the Spartans and their remaining allies, Corinth and Phleious most prominent among them, to send embassies to Athens. The Athenians were the only other major power in Greece not aligned with Thebes and were themselves hostile to the new Theban ascendancy. The defection of many of their mainland allies and their spurning of Elis, Arkadia, and Argos left them somewhat isolated in Greece. They now faced a serious dilemma. They must decide whether to forgo their dreams of hegemony or to devote their energies to maintain the balance of power in Greece. They must also ponder the effects of this effort on their League, already weakened by the defection of Euboia. The question became whether they could do both simultaneously. The Thebans too sent a delegation to persuade the Athenians to remain aloof from the conflict but to no avail, despite the scant support of some Athenians. The Spartans and their allies invoked the guarantee-clause of the Peace of Athens and laid the blame for the renewed conflict on the Mantineians. Kallistratos, who ardently desired to see Athens supreme in Greece, championed the Spartan cause. He felt it urgent to save Sparta by using Athenian military might to stop Thebes. His policy was short-sighted, wasteful, and potentially dangerous, and from it Athens gained nothing but some regrets. The Athenians would expend their human and material resources against Thebes without receiving territory, tribute, or significant success in return, but all the while risk Theban retaliation. The Athenians utterly failed to realize that Sparta had become a relative cipher and that they were incapable, even with feeble Spartan help, of defeating Thebes. Furthermore, the Thebans had theretofore displayed no hostile intentions towards Athens. Nonetheless, the Athenians rallied to Kallistratos' arguments.¹⁸

Plut. *Ages.* 34.1–2; Paus. 4.26.5–27; 10.10.5; *SIG*³ 161; Dion. Chrys. 15.28. C.A. Roebuck, *CP* 40 (1945) 151–152; P. Oliva, *Sparta and Her Social Problems* (Prague 1971) 194–197; G. Shipley in M.H. Hansen, ed., *The Polis as an Urban Centre and as a Political Community* (Copenhagen 1997) 189–291; S. Hodkinson, *Property and Wealth in Classical Sparta* (London 2000) 437. Messene: M.N. Valmin, *Études topographiques sur la Messénie ancienne* (Lund 1930) 67–125; E.W. Marsden, *Greek and Roman Artillery* (Oxford 1969) 126–163; A.W. Lawrence, *Greek Aims in Fortification* (Oxford 1979) 382–385. Personal observations of 12 September 1971.

¹⁸ Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.33–39; see also 5.3.13; Kallisthenes, *FGrH* 124 F8; Arist. *Nik. Eth.* 4.3.25; Isok. 5.44, 159; 7.7, 69; 8.105; Aischin. 2.164; Dem. 16.12 with schol.; 18.98 with schol.; 19.75; Dein. 1.76; *FGrH* 105 F5 (lines 24–28 which are reminiscent of Isok. 5.44–45); Paus. 1.3.4. Kallistratos and Xenokleides: Ps.-Dem. 59.26–27; see also Rhodes-Osborne *GHI* 31. R. Sealey, *Historia* 5 (1956) 193; Stern, *Hegemonie*, 178–179; Seager, *Athenaeum*, 56–57.

In 369 Iphikrates led the full Athenian levy past Corinth and into northern Arkadia, hoping that his presence on their line of march would hasten the departure of the Thebans. With the coming of spring many Theban allies began to melt away to their homes. With his work at Messene substantially done, Epameinondas also retired homewards, having dwelt in enemy territory for some four months. During that time he had thoroughly ravaged Lakonia in a manner reminiscent of Agis' campaign in Elis of 399 and established Messene as a bulwark against Sparta. Iphikrates fell back before him without offering active resistance, not wishing to pit his raw levy against Epameinondas' veterans. Epameinondas returned to Boiotia unhindered, having conducted a campaign of unparalleled success. His operations had resulted in widespread destruction of enemy territory with little loss to the attackers. As important was the damage done to the defensive position of Sparta. During the invasion Skiritis revolted from the Spartans. Its hardy mountaineers, such good soldiers that they had formed an elite unit in the Spartan army, now ranked themselves with the Thebans and Arkadians. Karyai too had joined the Thebans. The defection of these two places threw open the route to Sparta. The loss of Sellasia, the last natural strongpoint at which the Spartans could bar the routes from Tegea and Argos, further imperilled their position. So long as an Arkadian garrison held the ruins of Sellasia, the enemies of Sparta could burst into Lakonia with little warning. The invasion also inflicted irreparable damage on Sparta's economy. Epameinondas' liberation of Messene had doomed the entire Spartan military system. Peripherally connected with the invasion was the union of Arkadian states, the defense of which had triggered the campaign. Arkadian unity eliminated the weakness of confusion there, upon which the Spartans had so often preyed, and replaced it with a polity that constituted a standing menace to Spartan security and a serious check to its ambitions. The invasion swept away so much that had been stable in the Spartan way of life. It was the most disastrous winter in Spartan history, and one from which the city failed to recover.¹⁹

¹⁹ Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.5–52; see also 3.2.26; Theopompos, *FGrH* 115 F323; Diod. 15.65.6–67.1; Plut. *Pel.* 24.9–10; *Ages.* 32.14; Paus. 9.14.6; Polyain. 3.9.28. Skiritis: F. Geyer, *RE* 3A (1927) 536–537; Karyai: H. von Geisau, *RE* 10 (1919) 2244–2246; Sellasia: Pritchett, *Topography*, 1.59–70; Buckler, *TH* 89–90. Hanson, *Soul of Battle*, 82–94.

B. EPAMEINONDAS' SECOND INVASION AND SPARTAN
COUNTER-ATTACK (369–368 BC)

In the summer of 369 the Spartans, Athenians, and the allies of both convened in Athens to discuss the terms of alliance between the two major powers. The Spartans doubtless recognized the Athenian claims to Amphipolis and the Athenians Sparta's to Messene. Upon Athenian demand they decided that each side would hold command of all forces for alternate periods of five days. The decision made little more military sense than did the alliance itself. The pact was a strikingly one-sided affair, with the Spartans reaping the real advantages without offering the Athenians much more than glory in return. The single greatest weakness of this alliance was the radical divergence of the strategical concerns of the two states. Athens had nothing of importance to gain by committing itself against Thebes, which even if victorious on land could not harm its maritime interests. Moreover, Boiotia was relatively invulnerable to seapower because its mountains hindered penetration from the sea. Athens could not exercise both an active military and naval policy without impoverishing itself, as the fighting between 378 and 371 clearly demonstrated. Nevertheless, the Athenians threw their weight to Sparta in order to maintain a balance of power that was rather meaningless so long as they commanded the sea. The Athenians gained only the glory of the formal and public acknowledgement of the Spartans that they shared equality in hegemony. Yet this and their sponsorship of the recent Common Peace put the Athenians closer to general recognition as the hegemons of Greece.

The Theban allies did not long remain quiet in the Peloponnesos. After an Arkadian raid as far south as Messene, the Arkadians, Argives, and Eleians sent envoys to Thebes urging another Peloponnesian campaign. The appeal itself further reinforced the position of Thebes as leader of the alliance and allowed it to re-enter the Peloponnesos as its champion, not as an invader. No one welcomed the embassy more than Epameinondas, who saw the proposed operation as the opportunity to further his work of the preceding winter. Although he could inflict little more damage on Lakonia, he could strike Sparta's remaining allies in the northern Peloponnesos. The Corinthians, Epidaurians, and Sikyonians formed an integral bloc of power stretching from Troizen in the east to Pellene in the west. Their weakness lay in their very sprawl that left them exposed to piecemeal destruction. Of them all Corinth, the gateway of the

Peloponnesos, was the strongest and strategically the one most vital. As such, it became Epameinondas' primary target. In July 369 the opposing armies converged on Corinth, Thebes' Peloponnesian allies stopping at Nemea and Epameinondas' Thebans marching along the usual route through the Megarid. The Corinthians and Athenians under Chabrias occupied Corinth itself, while the Spartans and Pelleneians held a strong position at Mt. Oneion east of the city. Despite the strength of the Spartan position, Epameinondas forced a passage more by stratagem than might, broke into the Peloponnesos, and joined his allies at Nemea. They thence moved on to Phleious and Sikyon, carving a straight route northwards to the Corinthian Gulf. Epameinondas and his young subordinate Pammenes captured Sikyon and its harbor, which they garrisoned under the command of a harmost. Although Epameinondas enrolled the city as a member of the Boiotio-Peloponnesian alliance, he left its oligarchic constitution intact. Sikyon gave the Thebans their only support on the northern coast of the Peloponnesos. They used it as had the Spartans during the Corinthian War as a base of operations against Corinth. It also served as a new link in the chain of communications between Boiotia and Arkadia. From Sikyon the Thebans marched westwards to Pellene in Achaia, which quietly went over to them. Once again Epameinondas refused to interfere in the internal affairs of the city.²⁰

From the Corinthian Gulf Epameinondas ravaged the countryside as far to the east and south as Epidauros, avoiding Corinth for the moment. He planned to isolate the city from its allies. He pursued his line of devastation from Epidauros to Troizen, long an Athenian friend. His attacks on these areas wasted their wealth and prevented their inhabitants from giving Corinth any significant assistance. At the same time he removed any threat that they could mount against his Argive allies. His march back to Corinth proved uneventful. The defense was ready. Having decided to repeat his strategy of 378–377 against Agesilaos, Chabrias held his men behind fieldworks and posted

²⁰ Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.15–18, 25; 7.2.5–9, 11; Aineias 29.12; Diod. 15.67.2, 68.1–5, 72.1–2; Front. 2.5.26; Paus. 6.3.2; 9.15.4; Polyain. 2.3.9–10, 5.26; Steph Byz. "Phoibia", "Bouphia". Topography of Corinth and the passes: Xen. *Hell.* 4.4.19; 6.5.52; *Ages.* 2.17; Ptolemaios Euergetes, *FGrH* 234 F6; Polyb. 2.52.5; Plut. *Kleo.* 20.1. R. Carpenter and A. Bon, *Corinth*, III (Cambridge, Mass. 1936) 2.44–127; R. Stroud, *Hesperia* 40 (1971) 127, 139; Wiseman, *Ancient Corinthians*, 52–56; Buckler, *TH*, 92–99; Freitag, *Der Golf von Korinth*, 237–240; personal observations of 22 November 1970, 18–19 September 1971, 13 October 1998.

them on high ground rather than commit them to pitched battle. In 369 he concentrated solely on holding Corinth. Meanwhile, Epameinondas' army, moving along the main road from Argos, arrived, whereupon the Thebans once tested the defenses before reverting to the traditional devastation of the countryside, itself a repetition of the Spartan strategy of the Corinthian War. During the fighting a relief-force from Dionysios of Syracuse, still true to his old Spartan alliance, arrived to annoy the invaders, but without doing any real harm. The work of destruction done, Epameinondas dismissed his Peloponnesian contingents before leading his men homewards.²¹

Epameinondas' second invasion spawned one incident that illustrates the new shape of Peloponnesian politics. Euphron of Sikyon, a wealthy, influential, and powerful supporter of the Spartans, already understood the changed situation produced by Theban victory. Sparta's day was done and a new one at hand. He approached the Arkadians and Argives with an offer to establish a democracy in Sikyon, if they would support him. They agreed, entered into a separate alliance with him, and committed their forces to overthrowing the oligarchic government. The Theban harmost stood idly by, even though this stroke violated Sikyon's autonomy and Epameinondas' recent settlement. His aim achieved, Euphron killed or banished his oligarchic opponents, seized their property, established a democratic constitution that included new elections, manumission and enfranchisement of slaves, and maintenance of a large mercenary army not very unlike the Arkadian Eparitōi. The plot also proves that the Peloponnesians, now rather secure from the Spartans, increasingly preferred to make their own decisions rather than obey the orders of others. The move was also a small but significant rejection of Epameinondas' concept of Theban hegemony of the alliance. As early as this the idea began to hobble.²²

Epameinondas' second invasion was much less impressive in its achievements, aims, and extent than the first, but in the summer of 369 the Thebans had already achieved most of their goals. In the

²¹ Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.18–22; Diod. 15.69–70.1; Plut. *Mor.* 193F. Beloch, *GG* III².1.180; Buckler, *TH*, 99–102; personal observations of 19 November 1970; 4 August 1971. W.E. Thompson, *GRBS* 26 (1985) 51–57.

²² Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.44–47, 3.8–11; Diod. 15.70.3. P. Meloni, *RFIC* 79 (1951) 14–24; Roy, *Historia*, 577; A. Griffen, *Sikyon* (Oxford 1982) 73–75; Buckler, in Flensted-Jensen *et al.*, eds., *Polis and Politics*, 431–435.

second campaign Epameinondas had either cut away several of Sparta's remaining Peloponnesian allies or at least had inflicted such damage on them that they rather defended themselves than lent aid to Sparta. Of the eight states that had sent the Spartans relief during the first invasion Epameinondas had wreaked havoc on at least five besides detaching Sikyon and Pellene from their Spartan alliance. The success of his second campaign can be gauged by the fact that all of these states, excepting only Corinth and Phleious, either abandoned the war or fought on as Theban allies. Epameinondas had thereby closed the ring more tightly around Sparta, deprived it of more allies, and isolated it still further. Pertinent also was the failure of the Spartan army to defend its allies, leaving them to look after their own interests. They faced the options of accepting peace with Thebes, remaining quiescent, or vainly continuing the struggle. Yet for the Thebans a darker side also appeared before the end of the summer. Now that their Peloponnesian allies enjoyed more security from Sparta they could also become more independent of Thebes.

Over the winter of 369/8 warfare gave way to diplomacy. Artaxerxes at this point ordered his satrap Ariobarzanes to dispatch Philiskos of Abydos to summon the Greeks to renew the King's Peace, this time at Delphi. The choice of site is significant itself, a sign that the King now dispensed with a Greek *prostates* of his peace. Unlike Sparta and Athens, the capitals of those powers, Delphi was a panhellenic sanctuary, legally and customarily independent. Philiskos reasserted the King's authority in Greek affairs and reaffirmed him as the architect of the peace. Having found the peace a useful, if very imperfect, tool, he could not let any Greek state usurp his position, as Athens had after Leuktra. Furthermore, Artaxerxes needed a tranquil Greece to enable him to recruit mercenaries for his campaigns against various rebels. Persia at this point faced a major crisis. Not only did Egypt remain free and defiant, but increasing independence among some of his western satraps also erupted in the Satraps' Revolt, that riot of confusion and treachery. The first rumblings of disaffection came from the able Datames, who revolted from the King about 370, which sharply increased Artaxerxes' need for foreign troops. Ariobarzanes himself further complicated matters. He had gained control of both sides of the Hellespont, his possession of Sestos actually constituting a violation of the King's Peace. He too took a personal interest in Greek affairs, especially now that Athens had shown renewed interest in regaining Amphipolis. Furthermore, his

man Philiskos was an old friend of Chabrias, with whom he had served at Abydos. Now that Athens had become the principal Spartan ally, Philiskos could perhaps extend his and Ariobarzanes' influence to their former enemies. That influence could be all the more important to the satrap who was about to follow Datames' example.²³

The major Greek states accepted Philiskos' invitation, but the Theban and Spartan delegates played the leading roles in the affair. Philiskos probably proposed terms identical to those of the Peace of Sparta, and as usual the clause calling for the autonomy of the Greek states created an impasse. In all probability the Spartans did not yet again champion the autonomy of the Boiotian cities, for they would only have embarrassed themselves by reminding the world of the demand that had led to their disaster at Leuktra. Whether questions like the Eleian claims to Triphylia and the Athenian to Amphipolis were even raised is nugatory, for they paled to insignificance when compared to the status of Messene. The Thebans and their allies, having already recognized its legal existence, were committed to winning general recognition of its independence. The Spartans, though incapable of recovering it by deeds, opposed its freedom with words, in which they presumably received the support of their new Athenian allies. Over the status of Messene, a matter on which neither side compromised, the negotiations failed. The Theban and allies' response surely did not surprise Philiskos, who used it to portray them as being in the wrong. Their stand justified his support of their enemies. Hypocrisy had marked his mission from the outset. While proclaiming peace, he had gathered 2000 mercenaries whom he surely never intended for Theban service but instead now put at the disposal of the Spartans. This obvious fact, though seldom appreciated, betrays the sincerity of his mission. It must have encouraged the Thebans, should they have even needed the stimulus, to reject his mission for the fustian that it was. The actual results of the episode were mixed, and only Ariobarzanes and the Spartans actually gained anything from it. Nor did the affair enhance the reputation of the Common Peace, which began to resemble a sad lady who had lost

²³ Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.27; Diod. 15.70.2; Nepos *Datames* 3.5–5.6; Polyain. 7.21.6. Philiskos: *IG* 11² 133. S. Hornblower, *Mausolus* (Oxford 1982) 201 n. 151, which is very conjectural; M. Weiskopf, *The So-Called "Great Satraps' Revolt" 366–360 B.C.* (Stuttgart 1989) 34–36; S. Ruzicka, *Politics of a Persian Dynasty* (Norman 1992) 60–61.

whatever virtue she once had. Most immediately, Ariobarzanes' support of the Spartans resembled that of Cyrus the Younger of Klearchos. Rather than support the Thebans, to him an unknown quantity, Ariobarzanes preferred to deal with the Spartans, who at least had some experience in Persian affairs. The 2000 mercenaries, more useful than the Athenian levy, also gave the Spartans the instrument with which they could improve their position in the Peloponnesos. Ariobarzanes and the Spartans made this arrangement formal when sometime between 368 and 366 they concluded a formal alliance. Philiskos' activities indicate that the satrap had already determined to rise against the King. He now waited only for the opportunity.²⁴

In two campaigns Epameinondas had destroyed Sparta as a power of the first rank yet without having rendered it impotent. Furthermore, the Thebans had neither translated military victory into formal peace nor had they created an institutional basis useful in achieving it. They now faced the challenge of accepting the duties of arbiter and architect of a coherent policy capable of winning both victory and peace. Anything less would doom the Peloponnesos to further turmoil. They soon failed to meet the challenge by temporarily withdrawing from Peloponnesian politics, which is all the more surprising given Philiskos' reinforcement of the Spartans. The Theban retreat from responsibility held two grave consequences for the Peloponnesians. First, the Thebans made no effort to settle a dispute between Elis and the Arkadian League over Triphylia, the retrieval of which had animated the Eleians to build a strong alliance against Sparta. The alliance was built and Sparta defeated, but the Triphylians formally joined the Arkadian League. Therefore the Eleians became increasingly hostile to the Arkadians to the point of refusing to join the common defense against the Spartan invasion of Arkadia in 368. Theban inaction also allowed Lykomedes and the Arkadians to assert their own claim to the leadership of the Peloponnesian alliance. Lykomedes urged a policy of extending and consolidating the Arkadian League, aiding the Messenians and Argives, co-operating with the

²⁴ In addition to the preceding note see also Nepos *Epam.* 4; Plut. *Mor.* 193C; Ael. *VH* 5.5; Stobaios *Flor.* 5.48. Diod. 15.70.2, again confuses the fine points of the various Common-Peace treaties: see J. Buckler, *ICS* 19 (1994) 119–122; Judeich, *Kleinasiatische Studien*, 197; Weiskopf, *Satrap's Revolt*, 35–36; Jehne, *Koine Eirene*, 79–81. Stylianou, *HDC*, 461–463, totally misunderstands the event. Klearchos: Xen. *Anab.* 1.1.9; *Ages.* 2.26.

Thebans, and further weakening Sparta. He essentially made Epameinondas' policy his own, yet his attitude towards the Eleians directly conflicted with Epameinondas'. Once the Thebans had established the free state of Messene, Elis no longer bordered on Spartan territory, which decreased its strategic value. Lykomedes considered Elis an expendable ally, of less importance than the acquisition of Triphylia. Epameinondas, however, realized the importance of Eleian wealth and its potential menace to the alliance, should it take the side of Sparta. Elis could also serve Thebes as a counterweight to Arkadia. Yet owing to Theban inactivity in 368 because none of these problems was solved, they all became more acute.²⁵

For the Spartans 368 held some hope: in addition to Philiskos' mercenaries Dionysios of Syracuse sent another relief-force. With these troops Archidamos invaded southeastern Arkadia before turning westwards to Asea and then southwestwards to Parrhasia, where Megalopolis would soon be built. While engaged on this tour of destruction, he warned the Eleians to remain quiet, but they needed no such admonition. The Argives and Messenians, however, sprang to the defense of Arkadia so quickly that they trapped Archidamos at Lakonian Leuktron. He perforce confronted his enemies who broke before his onset in what became known as the "Tearless Battle", owing allegedly to the loss of not one Spartan, whereas the Arkadians and Argives suffered severe casualties. The significance of this engagement was more political and diplomatic than military. It struck a stiff blow at Arkadian pretensions to leadership of the alliance and momentarily chastened them. Even so it had the salutary effect of persuading them to found Megalopolis, both to protect this vulnerable area and to establish the city as the new capital of Arkadia. Although Epameinondas has often and erroneously received credit for the foundation of Megalopolis, and although the Thebans supported the work, the Arkadians justly deserve the real credit. The battle and the subsequent Theban aid proved alike that the Arkadians still needed Thebes standing behind them. Megalopolis was the third great walled city built in the southern and central Peloponnesos since

²⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.22–26; *SIG*³ 160, 183 lines 20–22; Diod. 15.67.2, 77.2; Paus. 10.9.5. Triphylia; Paus. 5.5.3. F. Bölte, *RE* 7A (1939) 199–200; E. Meyer, *Neue peloponnesische Wanderungen* (Bern 1957) 60–73. See also Beloch, *GG* III².1.185 n. 3; III².2.238.

370, and they along with Tegea served to hedge Sparta in from the outside world.²⁶

For the Thebans and especially for their allies 368 had proved a difficult year, with the latter realizing with a shock that Sparta still menaced them. The events of the year show all too clearly the dangers of weaknesses inherent in Thebes' failure to define specifically its position as hegemon and to create a syndedrion of allies. Had Thebes dealt properly with these matters at the outset, it could have curtailed Arkadian pretensions before they had caused harm to themselves and others. As it stood, Arkadian rivalry with Thebes simply fostered internal discord and wasted allied strength. It also made unified action all the more difficult. Moreover, once the Thebans had abandoned their responsibility towards the allies, their dereliction allowed disgruntled allies to withhold their support, which only inflamed existing animosities within the alliance. Thus, as early as 368 the Thebans saw, but virtually ignored, the first cracks developing that would eventually cause the collapse of the alliance and the failure of the Theban ascendancy.

C. THEBAN INTERVENTION IN THE NORTH (369–367 BC)

While these tumultuous events convulsed the Peloponnesos, equally momentous stirrings disturbed northern Greece, heretofore something of a backwater in Greek politics. The deaths of Jason in Thessaly and King Amyntas in Macedonia led to separate struggles for power that quickly fused and as quickly attracted the attention of Thebes and Athens. Not particularly noteworthy at first, the rivalries now unfolding there would eventually see the entire region united not under either of these two Greek powers but under Philip of Macedonia, a young and untried princeling in 369 but master of all Greece some thirty years later. Although Jason had for a moment united Thessaly and brought it to considerable power, his death doomed any hopes

²⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.28–32; Diod. 15.47.7, 72.3–4; Strabo 8.8.1; Parian Marble, *FGrH* 239 A73; Livy 35.27.13–30.8; Plut. *Ages.* 33.5–8; Diog. Laert. 3.23; Paus. 6.12.8; 8.27.1–7; 9.15.6, 16.6; Ael. *VH* 2.42; Polyain. 1.41.5. Topography: Leake, *Morea*, II.42–44, 322–323; *Peloponnesiaca* (London 1846) 348–349; Loring, *JHS*, 64–66; B. Niese, *Hermes* 39 (1904) 121–122; W. Wrede, *RE* 12 (1925) 2308; Winter, *Greek Fortifications*, 31–33; Trampedach, *Platon*, 37–41; Y.A. Pikoulas, in T.H. Nielsen and J. Roy, *Defining Ancient Arkadia* (Copenhagen 1999) 305.

for further greatness. The region sank back into its traditional rivalry between the strong men of Pherai and the Aleuadaei of Larisa, whom the rest of the nobility generally supported. In Macedonia the death of the king as so often before sparked a fierce struggle for the throne that condemned the realm to internecine warfare. Nor was it unusual for the turmoil in one region to become entangled in the affairs of the other, for the histories of Thessaly and Macedonia were often closely joined. The novelty came with the Theban intervention that brought some stability to Thessaly and a fitfull respite to Macedonia, during which two kings fended off their barbarian neighbors to the north and the Athenians to the south.²⁷

In Thessaly chaos came close on the heels of Jason's assassination. Although his brothers Polydoros and Polyphron assumed the *tageia*, the former died quite suddenly under suspicious circumstances, and in 369 Alexander of Pherai murdered the latter, which ignited another round of civil war. To the south in Thebes lived Jason's widow, to whom Alexander unsuccessfully proposed marriage in an effort to legitimize his position. Instead, he married Jason's daughter Thebe, her very name attesting to the attachment of Jason's house to Thebes. Even more immediate was the close friendship of Jason and Pelopidas, which doubtless prompted the Theban to care for his friend's widow. Alexander's unsuccessful courtship of her brought him to Pelopidas' attention and with it intimate knowledge of Thessalian turmoil. Quite probably, but not demonstrably, Pelopidas used his connections to maintain his contacts in Thessaly. At any rate, this strife promised him, probably the Theban best known there, his own theater of activity independent of Epameinondas and the Peloponnesos. Meanwhile, Alexander of Pherai so pressed Krannon,

²⁷ The chronology of the 360s, especially of northern events, remains complex and disputed. One group of scholars prefers the so-called high chronology that is followed here (see Buckler, *TH*, 240–255). It places events one year earlier than those who adopt the low chronology that dates them one year later. Most scholars agree that the low chronology is possible, but that the preponderance of evidence argues in favor of the high. Nonetheless, Stylianou, *HCD*, 446–455, has recently defended the low chronology against the high. Yet Stylianou's case is severely weakened because he bases too much of his argumentation not on the evidence but on speculation about it. Sometimes he resorts to nothing more than unsupported expressions of opinion, as when he writes (453): "Actually Plutarch does not say so explicitly, but this is what he must mean". Other examples abound. Since Stylianou's positions are often lapidary and even careless, one must return to the earlier work of Niese, *Hermes* 39 (1904) 84–139, and J. Wiseman, *Klio* 51 (1969) 176–199, for a more careful defense of the low chronology.

Pharsalos, and Larisa that by mid-summer 369 the Aleuadaï realized that they needed foreign help to stop him. They accordingly sent an embassy to King Alexandros of Macedonia urging his intervention. Although the young king had newly ascended the throne, his tenure was tenuous. In Ptolemaios of Aloros, though unrelated to the royal house, he still had a formidable foe bent upon usurpation of the throne. Nonetheless, having gained the momentary advantage, King Alexandros willingly honored the Aleuadaï's request. If he could turn the civil war in Thessaly to his own advantage, and if he could prevent Alexander from unifying the country, he could avoid the situation in which his father Amyntas had found himself under Jason. His entire plan depended upon speed, both to forestall the Thessalian tyrant and to prevent his Macedonian enemies from using his absence to rally against him.²⁸

While the Macedonian king prepared his army, Alexander of Pherai gathered his troops to strike first into Macedonia. Forestalling him, the king won over Larisa and Krannon, which he garrisoned but with an oath to restore them to the Thessalians. In the face of the king's advance, Alexander returned to Pherai, where he awaited investment, the time for which the king lacked owing to the unsettled situation in Macedonia. His prolonged absence in Thessaly would provide Ptolemaios with the opportunity to rise against him. In the face of these difficulties the Thessalians with the concurrence of the king sent an embassy to Thebes for help. Even though Epameinondas and their main field-army were then campaigning in the Peloponnesos, the Thebans responded with alacrity, raising a second army which they dispatched north under Pelopidas' command. Upon arriving in Thessaly, Pelopidas received the cities from King Alexandros, who voluntarily removed his garrisons. In return the two reached an understanding which committed Pelopidas to intervene on the king's behalf against his domestic enemies. Pelopidas next conferred with the Thessalians on the course of the campaign against Alexander of Pherai, who anticipated them by voluntarily asking the Thebans for a treaty of friendship. The pact would be a renewal of the

²⁸ Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.31–35; Diod. 15.60.5–61.3; Plut. *Pel.* 26.1–5; Valerius Maximus 9.10 ext.2. Pelopidas' friendship with Jason: Plut. *Pel.* 28.5–10; *Mor.* 194D; see Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.37. Alexander and the army: Anaximenes, *FGrH* 72 F4. B. Helly, *L'État thessalien* (Lyon 1995) 256–257; Stern, *Hegemonie*, 188–189; Westlake, *Thessaly*, 126–129; Sordi, *La lega tessala*, 191–193, 203.

agreement earlier made by the Thebans with Jason, a prospect decidedly unpopular with the Thessalians. Although Pelopidas was willing to recognize Alexander as a constitutional ruler so long as he respected the rights of the other Thessalians, they denounced the tyrant as something less than human. Since compromise proved impossible, Alexander withdrew from Larisa determined to defend himself by force of arms. Against him Pelopidas launched a campaign marked by hard fighting in which he penetrated Magnesia and won some small gains without however delivering a decisive blow. Nonetheless, Pelopidas inflicted such damage on him that he agreed to leave the Thessalian cities in peace.²⁹

Though bowed, Alexander was unbroken, which left Pelopidas and his allies the challenge of marshalling the resources of the region under the direction of a general government. Now in all likelihood was the time when Pelopidas and his allies revitalized the Thessalian Confederacy to meet future threats from the tyrant. They established a federal assembly that probably included the hoplite class. The assembly elected an archon, the traditional title of the leader of Thessaly. This magistracy directly challenged and indeed denied Alexander of Pherai's use of the *tageia* as a claim to supreme authority. The assembly also elected four *polemarchoi*, the chief military officers who in turn commanded junior officers, both cavalry and infantry. Their number strongly indicates that they represented the traditional tetrads, the four basic districts of Thessaly. The federal assembly also passed decrees dealing with war, alliance, and peace. A new council of *hippeis* probably performed the probouleutic functions of the assembly. This league attempted to unite the entire region in terms of districts and cities in one encompassing government that could prove superior to the ambitions of any one city.³⁰

While still in Thessaly, Pelopidas received a request from King Alexandros asking for aid against Ptolemaios, who continued to contest the throne. Although the pretender brazenly sent a message of his own, Alexandros confidently expected Pelopidas to honor his earlier agreement. Once in Macedonia Pelopidas concluded a formal alliance with Alexandros in which the king accepted the status of

²⁹ Buckler, *TH*, 245–249, 299 n. 11; M.B. Hatzopoulos, in P. Roesch and G. Argoud, eds., *La Béotie Antique* (Lyon 1985) 248–252; Georgiadou, *Plutarch's Pelopidas*, 190–195; Jehne, *Klio* 81 (1999) 327–328.

subject-ally. Yet Pelopidas was too weak to remove Ptolemaios from the scene, and his failure even to discipline him left the situation in Macedonia unresolved. Nonetheless, Pelopidas took thirty hostages from the king and the aristocracy, including Alexandros' brother Philip, to ensure their loyalty. In effect, Pelopidas accomplished little there except further to secure to some degree the safety of Thessaly from the vagaries of Macedonian politics. Ultimately far more significant to the course of history was Philip's enforced but honorable sojourn in Thebes at the height of its power. Philip lived in the house of Pammenes, a very promising Theban officer and protégé of Epameinondas, and there began a friendship that lasted until Pammenes' death. During these years Philip became acquainted with Pelopidas and Epameinondas and their military thinking. As his own career proves, he understood the significance of the innovations that the two great Thebans were introducing. Owing to the ascendancy of Thebes and the diplomatic activity that its new position entailed, the young Macedonian also learned at first hand some of the intricacies of Greek diplomacy. Likewise, he observed the actual workings of a democratic government and a federal state, lessons not to be learned in Macedonia. In sum, Thebes at the center of Greek affairs proved a far better school for the young king than the Pella of that day.³¹

The first sign that Pelopidas had done his work in the north imperfectly came in spring 368, when Thessalian envoys arrived in Thebes with new complaints against Alexander of Pherai. Even though he had not resumed open warfare against the cities, he had fostered political agitation against them. He had evidently proceeded very carefully, trying neither openly to violate his truce with the Thebans nor raise undue suspicions about his schemes. Pelopidas and his friend Hismenias, son of the famous politician, sponsored the Thessalian

³⁰ *IG* II² 116, 175; *SEG* XVII 243; Aischin. 3.161; Dem. 2.11; Diod. 17.4.1; Justin 11.3.2. Westlake, *Thessaly*, 135–137; Sordi, *La lega tessala*, 207–208; Larsen, *Gk. Fed. States*, 12–26; Helly, *Thessalien*, 39–68; Beck, *Polis und Koinon*, 128–134.

³¹ Plut. *Pel.* 26.4–8; Dem. 19.135; Aischin. 2.27–29; Diod. 15.67.4; 16.2.2–3; Ael. *VH* 13.7; Justin 7.5.1–3; Bengtson, *SdA* II².275. Geyer, *Makedonien*, 128–131; Westlake, *Thessaly*, 133; A. Aymard, *REA* (1954) 15–36; M. Sordi in M. Sordi, ed., *Contributi dell'Istituto di Storia Antica* 3 (1975) 56–64. Although J.R. Ellis, *Philip II and Macedonian Imperialism* (London 1976) 43–44, argues that Philip was then too young to have absorbed much information, his early career proves his precocity. G. Wirth, *Philipp II.* (Stuttgart 1985) 26.

delegation but without convincing the assembly of any serious threat. Instead of endorsing military operations, which under the circumstances would constitute a violation of the truce, they voted to send the two on an embassy to investigate the charges. Having arrived at Pharsalos, however, Pelopidas concluded that Alexander once again posed a threat to the cities and to meet it recruited Thessalian troops. Yet before he could deal with the tyrant, he learned that Ptolemaios, probably with the connivance of Eurydike, the king's mother and the pretender's lover, had engineered the assassination of King Alexandros. The deed triggered a civil war in which Pausanias, an aristocratic exile of royal blood, emerged as the prime contender for the throne. He enjoyed initial success in the northern Chalkidike, and further to complicate matters Iphikrates with a small squadron sailed into the chaos. He was under orders to take advantage of the confusion preparatory to beleaguering Amphipolis. Having supposedly been adopted by King Amyntas, Iphikrates championed Perdikkas, the heir apparent, and under this guise drove Pausanias from the kingdom.³²

Pelopidas could not allow the Athenians to gain a foothold in Macedonia. Despite the threat posed by Alexander of Pherai, he marched north to retrieve the situation there. Embarrassed by lack of troops, he hired mercenaries at Pharsalos and marched against Ptolemaios, who bribed away Pelopidas' troops before striking a bargain with him. Ptolemaios saw in Thebes a far lesser threat than Athens, nor did the Thebans entertain any real concern for the slain king. Since the Thebans harbored no territorial ambitions in Macedonia, they served as a safe ally who would leave Ptolemaios alone to deal with the Athenians. On this basis the Thebans recognized Ptolemaios as regent for the immature Perdikkas. They thus undermined the policy of Iphikrates, who need not now protect the legitimate heir to the throne. Pelopidas also accorded Ptolemaios the same allied status as that held by the slain Alexandros. The regent also agreed to send fifty of his companions, representing prominent Macedonian families, to Thebes as hostages. The agreement, practical if cold-blooded, both kept the Macedonians out of Thessaly and free to defy the Athenians.³³

³² Plut. *Pel.* 27.1; Diod. 15.71.2; Polyb. 8.35.7. Buckler, *TH*, 119–121.

³³ Plut. *Pel.* 27.2–5; Aischin. 2.26–29 and schol.; Nepos *Iphic.* 3.2; Justin 7.5.4–5;

Enraged by his perfidious mercenaries, Pelopidas returned to Thessaly bent on revenge. After gathering a small band of troops, he and Hismenias marched on Pharsalos, where Alexander of Pherai intercepted them with no good intent. Hoping to repeat their performance in Macedonia, the two Thebans voluntarily walked into the tyrant's arms, naively placing their reliance on their truce with him. After seizing them, Alexander captured Pharsalos, which constituted a declaration of open war. While bold to the point of rashness, he could hope to trade his prisoners for a political settlement with the Thebans. The hope was not realized, for the Thebans had not heretofore shown especial interest in the north. An immediate and infuriated Theban response dashed his designs. The Thebans mobilized an army of 8000 hoplites and 600 cavalry which they entrusted to the boiotarchoi Hypatos and Kleomenes. Epameinondas served in the ranks because of an earlier defeat in a political dispute. The reaction dismayed Alexander, who promptly sent ambassadors to Athens seeking alliance and aid. The Athenians had watched the growth of Theban influence in the north with some apprehension, so Alexander's appeal gave them the opportunity to intervene in Thessalian affairs with local support. Despite his reputation as a mercurial, treacherous, and violent tyrant, the Athenians concluded an alliance with him, after which they dispatched their general Autokles with thirty ships and 1000 men to support him³⁴

While Autokles rounded Euboia, the Theban army entered Thessaly to be met by a confident Alexander. The Theban campaign proved a difficult one, for Thessaly was not an easy place in which to operate in the face of a hostile force, especially one strong in cavalry. Alexander decided to fight in the plains specifically to take advantage of his superiority in this arm. West of Thermopylai the tyrant surprised the Thebans, bringing them to a halt and turning their Thessalian allies to flight. This success gave Autokles time enough to reach Alexander, thereby compounding the danger to the Thebans.

Bengtson, *SdA* II²277. G.M. Bersanetti, *Athenaeum* NS 27 (1949) 69–72; G. Cawkwell, *Philip of Macedon* (London and Boston 1978) 26; Georgiadou, *Plutarch's Pelopidas*, 196–199.

³⁴ *IG* II² 116 lines 39–40 = Bengtson, *SdA* II².276; Dem. 23.120; Diod. 15.71.3; Ephippos, *FAC* fr. 1; Hermippos, *FAC* fr. 63; Plut. *Mor.* 193D–E. Beloch, *GG* III².1.182–183; Westlake, *Thessaly*, 142; Sordi, *La lega tessala*, 212–213; Buckler, *TH*, 123–125. Stylianou, *HCD*, 467.

In their effort to extricate themselves from peril Hypatos and Kleomenes led an army sorely harassed by cavalry and a rain of javelins onto difficult ground. The soldiers themselves finally called Epameinondas out from the ranks to urge him to assume command, which he did. Although he saved the army from its plight, the men were too shaken and the season too advanced for further operations. Over the winter Epameinondas restored the Theban army. For the first time since Leuktra Theban arms had suffered defeat in the field, and he was determined not to see it happen again. In 367 he led his men northwards, entered Thessaly in the face of hostile cavalry, and conducted a deliberate campaign of ravaging the countryside, wearing Alexander down until he appealed for terms. Having received no further reinforcement from Athens and unable to discomfit Epameinondas, the tyrant offered to release Pelopidas and Hismenias in return for a treaty of peace and friendship, precisely what he then shared with the Athenians. In rejecting these terms, Epameinondas proposed only a thirty-day truce. Alexander realized that further hostilities were unlikely after the expiry of the truce. Once Epameinondas had received the prisoners, he would in all probability leave Alexander alone, leaving his strength substantially intact. Having little to lose by compliance, the tyrant accepted the terms and was cheered by seeing the Theban army retire without further incident.³⁵

During 368 and 367 Theban handling of the Thessalian problem had proven ineffectual, for which most of the blame must be ascribed to Pelopidas. While coping with Alexander of Pherai in 368, he attended to the crisis in Macedonia, as he must, but he could at least have authorized Hismenias to continue operations in Thessaly. The failure to take further action against the tyrant gave him the opportunity to regroup his forces. The most significant result of Pelopidas' blundering was Thebes' virtual abandonment of Thessaly for the next three years, which constituted a victory for the tyrant. The principal reason for the failure in Thessaly came from the unwillingness of the Thebans to devote themselves fully either to crushing Alexander or to strengthening his Thessalian opposition. In truth, the Thebans lacked the resources simultaneously and effectively to

³⁵ Diod. 15.71.4–5; Plut. *Pel.* 19.1; *Mor.* 194E; 680B; 797A–B; Nepos *Epam.* 7.1–3; Paus. 9.15.1–2; Polyain. 2.3.13; Bengtson, *SdA* II².281. Buckler, *TH*, 125–128; Georgiadou, *Plutarch's Pelopidas*, 201–205.

operate in two widely separated theaters of war, which made it impossible for them to dominate all of Greece. They never seriously considered bringing Thessaly and Macedonia under tight control to exploit their revenues, agricultural produce, and natural resources for use elsewhere. That was left to Philip II. Although they failed to take full advantage of the weakness of Thessaly to make it a vassal, they were at least never again in any real danger from the north. If for them Thessaly proved an opportunity not taken, perhaps that stemmed from any lack of desire to do so. Just as they had not attempted to translate their victories in the Peloponnesos into an empire, so they likewise showed no inclination to create one in the north. The reasonable conclusion appears that they strove for hegemony but not empire.

D. THE FAILURE OF PEACE (367–364 BC)

In summer 367 war gave way to peace efforts, when the Spartans sent an embassy under Euthykles to Sousa seeking Persian support. Whether they hoped to renew the King's Peace yet again or simply to petition for a subsidy is unknown, but the delegation prompted others to react. The Thebans decided to counter it by sending an embassy of their own with Pelopidas and Hismenias at its head. By 367 the Thebans had realized their fundamental goals, especially in the Peloponnesos, and now they wanted a peace that endorsed their achievements. They sought Persian acceptance of Thebes as patron of a new King's Peace that would abolish Sparta's tenure of that role and reject Athens' assumption of it in 371. They also urged the general, official recognition of Messenian independence that would deny all Spartan claims to the area. Thebes notified its partners in the alliance of its decision, this in accordance with the clause forbidding any ally from unilaterally concluding peace without the consent of the others. Ambassadors from Arkadia and Elis certainly and most probably Argos and Messene also travelled together with their Theban counterparts, though with specific objectives of their own. Of primary import was the dispute between Elis and Arkadia over Triphylia. Antiochos of Lepreon, the Arkadian envoy, himself represented trouble, for his home was the chief city of Triphylia. He embodied in himself a sure sign that the Arkadians refused to compromise on the status of the region. When the Athenians learned of

this activity, they hurriedly and independently dispatched an embassy led by Timagoras and Leon. The Spartan refusal to inform the Athenians of Euthykles' mission indicates the true spirit of that alliance. Yet Sparta's selfish conduct freed the Athenians to advance their own interests regardless of their ally. Although apparently willing to recognize the independence of Messene at no cost to themselves, they wanted above all recognition of their right to Amphipolis, which very firmly indicates that the King had not previously granted the point. Renewed interest in the city indicated that the Athenians had again begun to look to their own maritime interests. Thus, the goals of several of the major participants diverged so widely that the future of any peace appeared dim from the outset.³⁶

Once in Sousa, Pelopidas reminded the King of Sparta's recent perfidy and Thebes' traditional friendship with him. He justly boasted that the Thebans had gone from victory to victory but that both their enemies and their allies had suffered defeat. The Athenian Timagoras voluntarily stepped forward to confirm all that Pelopidas had said, but his support was hardly disinterested. Artaxerxes had showered him with gifts for which he expected a diplomatic return. He was not totally disappointed. Artaxerxes handed down a peace typical of its predecessors that included the customary autonomy-clause, and re-affirming that the Asiatic Greeks remained his subjects. Autonomy now specifically included the Messenians, an unmistakable repudiation of his erstwhile Spartan friends. Just as the Spartans in 371 had used the clause against the Boiotian Confederacy, so the Thebans now intended to use it against Sparta. The King recognized the autonomy of Amphipolis, thereby spurning the chief Athenian petition, and demanded the docking of the Athenian fleet. He also decided in favor of Elis against Arkadia in the dispute over Triphylia. The treaty also contained an enabling clause stipulating that any state that refused to honor the peace was subject to attack by the others. If any city refused to take the field in defense of the peace, the rest of the Greeks could first move against the recalcitrant city. Lastly, the Thebans and Artaxerxes signed a diplomatic accord

³⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.33–36; Dem. 19.137, 191; Ps.-Dem. 7.29; Phanias, *FHG* II.296 fr. 11; Antiphanes, *FAC* fr. 58; Nepos *Pel.* 4.3; Plut. *Pel.* 30.1–9; *Artax.* 22.8–9; Paus. 6.1.3, 3.9, 17.5; Ael. *VH* 1.21; Souda, s.v. "Timagoras", J. Hofstetter, *Beiträge zur Achämenidengeschichte* (Wiesbaden 1972) 103; Ryder, *Koine Eirene*, 137–139; Urban, *Königsfrieden*, 175–176; Jehne, *Koine Eirene*, 82–85.

declaring their hereditary friendship. The ambassadors varied their responses widely but none voiced his as manfully as did Leon, who uttered a variant of that old Greek diplomatic challenge that it was time for the Athenians to seek some friend other than the King. Artaxerxes, alive to the implied threat, handed down a codicil to his decree that opened the way to further negotiations and even amendment of it. He both ensured himself against Theban failure to enforce the new peace and introduced a way to a direct diplomatic settlement with Athens. The Arkadian ambassador reacted angrily and ominously. Instead of accepting the royal gifts customarily given to all envoys, he stormed homewards, his manner clearly indicating how little the Arkadians would like this treaty. Of the other legates only Archidamos of Elis, who naturally praised Artaxerxes' decision on Triphylia; Timagoras, at least for the moment; and Pelopidas, who had fulfilled his mission, left the court happy.³⁷

The clauses of this treaty obviously reflected recent political currents in Greece and the eastern Aegean. Most noticeably, Artaxerxes himself took a far more active part in this peace than in its predecessors. Although the autonomy-clause was an original feature of the King's Peace, Artaxerxes now for the first time decided specific cases, not leaving them to the Greek patron of the treaty. He knew that he was alienating the Spartans over Messene, the Arkadians over Triphylia, and the Athenians over Amphipolis. He obviously cared little about the situation in the Peloponnesos, leaving that to the Thebans, but Athens and Amphipolis mattered to him. His actions stemmed from several factors. The Athenian assumption of the role of *prostates* of his peace in 371 may have struck him as impertinent and an undesirable sign of Athenian ambition. His decision on Amphipolis simply but specifically repeated his diktat of 386. In that respect nothing had changed. Yet by ruling on this particular example, he publicly expressed his disapproval of the growth of Athenian naval power in the Aegean. This sentiment also explains why he so conspicuously demanded the docking of the Athenian fleet. Although the first King's Peace implied a general disarmament and that of Sparta in 371 expressly did, only now did the King explicitly order

³⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.36–37; Isok. 6.27; Diod. 15.81.3, 90.2; Plut. *Pel.* 30.7, 31.1; Bengtson, *SdA* II².282. Buckler, *TH*, 153–157; Jehne, *Koine Eirene*, 82–86; *Klio* 81 (1999) 321–325; J. Wickersham, *Hegemony and Greek Historians* (Maryland and London 1994) 115.

a state to obey it in this unequivocal manner. Moreover, in more sharply defining the enabling clause, Artaxerxes in essence required all the Greeks—and not as before only those who ratified the treaty—to wage war against those who rejected it. It was an ultimatum. An obvious reason for Artaxerxes' firmness is his desire to weaken Athens and Sparta because of their co-operation with Ariobarzanes, whose maintenance of Greek mercenaries outside his satrapy betokened rebellion (see pp. 351–354).³⁸

Because of the combination of two obstreperous Greek states and an unreliable satrap Artaxerxes had little choice but to throw his support to the Thebans. Although he could try to break up their alliance by playing Athens against Sparta, far more attractive was the effort to weaken both powers, for which his assistance to Thebes was necessary. Thebes alone could sufficiently handle the military situation in Greece, but against the Athenian fleet the Theban army could do nothing. In the event of Ariobarzanes' revolt the King needed command of the Aegean to isolate the rebel and to prevent him from receiving reinforcements from Greece, without which his defeat would prove quite likely. Artaxerxes could most easily check Athenian seapower first by demanding the demobilization of the fleet, and if that should fail, to sponsor a Theban navy. He had long used this old ploy with huge success, and it was worth another try. If he needed another fleet, as he had with Konon and Antalkidas, he would build it. The relative lack of Theban maritime interests in many ways added to his advantage, inasmuch as the Thebans would

³⁸ G.L. Cawkwell, *CQ* 11 (1961) 84; Hornblower, *Mausolus*, 196; and Stylianou, *HCD*, 485–488, all rely on Dem. 9.16 and 19.253, as evidence that the King and all the Greeks recognized the Athenian right to Amphipolis and the Chersonesos. If there is any truth in either of these dubious claims, it can only be that at the Peace of Athens in 371 the Athenians inserted these clauses. The King, however, was not a party to this peace, as was earlier seen (above p. 300). Therefore, Demosthenes' statements are clearly false. Having rejected these claims in 366, Artaxerxes did not afterwards change his policy (pp. 328–330). Years after the fact Demosthenes was free to falsify the record for a purely local Athenian audience that had every reason to wish them to be true. Current propaganda in these circumstances proved far more useful than historical accuracy. The principal argument of these scholars is that the Thebans honored the Athenian claims to these places in return for formal Athenian recognition of the Theban hegemony of Boiotia. The Thebans had settled that question at Leuktra. For the real Athenian opinion of the Theban position in Boiotia, see Dem. 5.10; 9.23; 18.18; 19.20–21, 42, 325; Aischin. 2.104, 119, 137. Not until 339 did the Athenians recognize the Theban hegemony of Boiotia: Aischin. 3.141–142.

be unlikely to use the navy to their own ends. He accordingly offered to finance the immediate construction of a Theban fleet. In the meantime he tried to achieve his ends by diplomacy.³⁹

The return of the ambassadors sparked a furor in Arkadia, Sparta, and Athens, all of which saw their objectives thwarted and none of which had any reason to accept the proposed peace. Typical was Athenian treatment of Timagoras, whose execution resulted from Leon's indictment. The Athenians further vented their anger by erasing the reference to the King's Peace on their proud inscription recording the founding of their League. As subsequent events would prove (see p. 353), their gesture was more symbolic than real in that they were in fact reluctant to break the existing peace. They were for the moment content to reject the new redaction and to pursue all the more actively their own interests in the Aegean. Nor did the King's decision intimidate the disgruntled. The Thebans at the Peace of Sparta and the Eleians at that of Athens had shown that states could with impunity defy a King's Peace when it ran counter to their interests. In this resentful and fractious mood, the envoys of these states convened in Thebes to hear the King's emissary broadcast the terms. Opposition arose at once. The Corinthian envoys refused to accept the terms on the grounds that they had received no authority to swear to the peace but only to listen to its terms. Their position was similar to that of the Thebans themselves in 386. They suggested instead that the Thebans send ambassadors to each city to receive the oaths. This polite form of defiance would guarantee the failure of the treaty. Unlike Agesilaos earlier, the Thebans did not order them to return home, receive authorization to sign, or face the consequences. The Corinthians clearly did not believe that Thebes was strong enough to compel submission. Lykomedes sealed the fate of the proposed peace. He challenged the very right of the Thebans to hold the conference at Thebes instead of the seat of war, meaning Arkadia. The argument was spurious in terms of the King's Peace but justifiable within the context of the Boiotio-Peloponnesian alliance. This clause was common among Greek alliances but irrelevant to the present proceedings simply

³⁹ Buckler, *TH*, 154–155; Weiskopf, *Satrap's Revolt*, 42; Ruzicka, *The Politics of a Persian Dynasty*, 63–64; J. Heskell, *The North Aegean Wars, 371–360 B.C.* (Stuttgart 1997) 113. Ariobarzanes and Artaxerxes: Beloch, *GG* III².2.145–147; Hornblower, *Mausolus*, 173.

because not all of those in attendance were parties to that alliance. Not only did Lykomedes undermine the peace, but he also challenged the Theban right to hegemony of the alliance. When the Thebans angrily accused the Arkadians of deliberately destroying the treaty, Lykomedes stormed out of the conference. If Thebes' own allies refused to accept the treaty, no other state was likely to endorse it. Hopes for acceptance of the pact had suffered a fatal blow. The aftermath further humiliated the Thebans, who vainly hoped to overawe individual cities by the combined prestige of the Boiotian Confederacy and the King. The oath-receivers journeyed first to Corinth, where they encountered a blunt refusal to accept the treaty, a reply echoed by the other cities that the Theban delegation visited. The peace effort thus died a painful and ignominious death, and Theban prestige sank to its lowest depth since before Leuktra.⁴⁰

This diplomatic debacle held wide and serious significance for all. First, it demonstrated that the major Greek states had so abused the concept of the King's Peace that no one considered it a valid, effective, or useful accord. It remained what it had always been, merely a convenient and obvious tool of the King and its Greek patron to pursue their own policies. At Thebes in 366 the Greeks had scorned both. The notion of a Common Peace, one that was purely Greek, had not died, because it had not yet been born. That would happen only in 362 in the general peace made after the battle of Mantinea and without the King. For the moment this fiasco also indicated that the Greeks felt confident enough to defy the King's commands with impunity. Most of the Greeks on the mainland feared nothing from him, but felt greater apprehension from their neighbors who had abused his compacts. The second lesson was again the folly of the Theban refusal or failure to establish a syndedrion to prevent such a breakdown of their alliance. The Thebans should have foreseen the results of their championing Elis against Arkadia; and if unwilling to resolve the dispute by negotiation, they should

⁴⁰ Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.39; Diod. 15.76.3. Among recent scholars only Stylianou, *HCD*, 485–489, persists in believing that this so-called Peace of Pelopidas was actually ratified and became a valid King's Peace. Yet he has overlooked Jehne, *Koine Eirene*, 85–90, whose arguments against a general peace prove decisive. The single most potent argument against Stylianou's view is that the subsequent, separate peace between Corinth and Thebes (Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.6–7) would have been unnecessary had they ratified Pelopidas'.

at least have stood ready to assert their authority over the recalcitrant party. In 366 they did neither. They relied instead on their military prestige, not any political principle, for their ascendancy, and that proved inadequate. The lesson was not lost on Epameinondas, but the failure to master it would doom the so-called Theban Hegemony.

The failure of peace prompted the renewal of war on fronts as widely separated as the Peloponnesos, the borders of Attika, and the Aegean. The Thebans now faced the challenge of restoring their authority in the Greek world. Epameinondas met the crisis by taking some vigorous new steps. In 366 he inaugurated the naval program by calling for the construction of 100 triremes (see pp. 338–340). While the fleet was building, he dealt first with the Arkadian challenge to the Theban hegemony of the grand alliance and next took an unexpected opportunity to strike a direct and humiliating blow at Athens.

Lykomedes' rejection of Theban hegemony endangered the very existence of the alliance. To reassert their position of leadership the Thebans must counter the challenge by reaffirming in fact what they had failed to establish by treaty. Epameinondas struck at the heart of the problem by taking the unusual step of proclaiming an invasion of Achaia, still a Spartan ally. The move would force the Peloponnesians to commit themselves on the question by requiring them to send their contingents to the allied army. They could either recognize the Theban hegemony or take Lykomedes' side. The Achaian campaign could also deprive Sparta of still another Peloponnesian ally. Perhaps even more importantly, in the event of war between Elis and Arkadia in which the Thebans took the Eleian side, Achaia could provide them with a thoroughfare along which to send forces to their ally. Achaia could not directly be further exploited for a major military invasion of Arkadia, for topography was against it. Epameinondas' justification for attacking this otherwise inconsiderable target was the legal technicality that the two states were still at war. Although the Achaian Confederacy had endorsed the treaties of Sparta and Athens in 371, the Thebans had rejected both. Therefore, no formal peace existed between them, and the Achaians could not legally justify any claim to neutrality.⁴¹

⁴¹ Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.41. *Hegemonia*: *IG* I³ 83 lines 24–25; *IG* II² 112 lines 35–36; Thuc. 5.47.7, 79; Bengtson, *SdA* II².193, 290. Achaia: J.K. Anderson, *BSA* 49 (1954)

This was the target, itself weak and militarily insignificant, against which Epameinondas called out the allied army. Mt. Oneion presented him with his chief military problem, which he easily solved with Argive help. Thence he marched probably to Nemea, where he met the contingents of all the other allies. That fact alone meant the success of his primary goal. To obey his summons the Arkadians and Eleians had perforce put aside their dispute, if only temporarily. While reasserting Theban hegemony of the alliance, Epameinondas had graphically demonstrated to all of them that the collapse of the King's Peace notwithstanding, Theban leadership remained undisputed in the field. From Nemea Epameinondas led the army to the coast and thence to Rhion, where he ordered probably only a detachment across the straits to secure the surrender of Naupaktos and Kalydon. These he handed over to the Aitolians who had wanted their return since the early years of the fourth century. Having reached Dyme on the Peloponnesian coast without interference, he received an Achaian delegation of federal officials who offered to surrender and to become subject-allies in return for his pledge to leave their oligarchic governments intact. Epameinondas agreed, but the very informality of the settlement proved its undoing. Even as boiotarchos Epameinondas could not guarantee its ratification by the Boiotian federal assembly. Without official oaths to a formal treaty nothing bound anyone to respect this gentlemen's agreement.⁴²

Epameinondas' return met with heated opposition to his pact. The Arkadians, doubtless upon Lykomedes' instigation, and Achaian democrats protested that Epameinondas had only allowed the Achaian aristocrats to continue their support of Sparta. Obviously taking their revenge for having been cowed into acknowledging Theban hegemony, the Arkadians used the incident to proclaim that Thebes was

82; Walbank, *HCP* I.230–232; Larsen, *Gk. Fed. States*, 80–89; Beck, *Polis und Koinon*, 55–66; Freitag, *Golf von Korinth*, 250–308. Legal status of Achaia: Meyer, *GdA* V⁶.433; Beloch, *GG* III².1.187; Roy, *Historia*, 579; and RA. Bauslaugh, *The Concept of Neutrality in Classical Greece* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1991) 204–207, all claim that Achaia was neutral in 366. They fail to realize that since Thebes had refused to ratify these treaties, it remained technically at war with Achaia, as Epameinondas proved in his attack on Pellene in 369. Achaian quiescence does not legally constitute neutrality, nor can it be used as evidence for the fictional Achaian arbitration after Leuktra, on which see Walbank, *HPC*, III.762; Jehne, *Klio* 81 (1999) 325–327.

⁴² Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.41–42; Diod. 15.75.2; Daimachos, *FGrH* 65 F1; schol. to *Iliad* 2.494; Bengtson, *SdA* II².283. Topography: Buckler, *TH*, 188–190; personal observations of 7–8, 12–16 July 1995; see also Freitag, *Golf von Korinth*, 301–302.

not the power best suited to lead the alliance. In Thebes these parties found champions who prevailed upon the Boiotian assembly to reject Epameinondas' informal accord. The assembly voted instead to send harmosts and garrisons to Achaia to succor the democrats. Whereas the Thebans had earlier installed a governor and garrison in Sikyon, they intended in that case to defend the city not to dominate it. Now the Thebans, like Lysandros earlier, used military coercion for political control. This motion was Thebes' only attempt forcibly to hold a state to a policy against its will. In the event, the Theban effort failed, when thus goaded the Achaian aristocrats, though at first expelled, quickly rallied to regain control of all Achaia. They next strengthened their diplomatic ties with Sparta, thenceforth fought actively on the Spartan side, and probably regained all of their losses. What Epameinondas had gained by force of arms, the Thebans, their Arkadian allies, and the Achaian democrats undid by a political move that actually reinforced Lykomedes' claim that Thebes was unfit to lead the alliance.⁴³

A subsequent and unrelated event further affected Arkadian relations not only with Thebes but also with Athens. Themison, tyrant of Eretria and ally of the Boiotian Confederacy, cared far less about broader events than local concerns. In 366 he conspired with Theodoros of Oropos and other exiles to seize the city. Many Oroepeians had never felt content under an Athenian governance in which they served at best as an appendage. The Athenians never made Oropos a deme. In 411 and again in 402 many of them had rebelled against Athenian rule, but the original King's Peace probably returned the region to Athens. The tyrant and the exiles now regained Oropos; and the Theban army, perhaps under Epameinondas, rushed to their aid. The Athenian response, though swift, proved ineffectual. Chabrias and with him Kallistratos saw at a glance that their cause was lost. The Athenian levy was no match for the veterans of Leuktra. Recoiling from armed conflict, the Athenians called for arbitration in which the decision went against them. Minor in itself, the episode held far-

⁴³ Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.42–43; Isok. 6.66; Strabo 9.4.7. Stern, *Hegemonie*, 206; Buckler, *TH*, 190–192. Only in Sikyon did the policy of harmost and garrison prove successful and that only because of Theban indifference to Euphron's government so long as he remained loyal; P. Meloni, *RFIC* 79 (1951) 24–32; Roy, *Historia*, 578–581; A. Griffin, *Sikyon* (Oxford 1982) 68. Buckler, in Flensted-Jensen *et al.*, eds., *Polis and Politics*, 435–437.

reaching ramifications. Enraged by the failure of their allies to assist them, the Athenians realized the hazards of their mainland policy in which their maritime partners took no interest and could make no mark. Nor could Sparta, Corinth, and Phleious, themselves tightly hemmed in, render any service. While the Athenians complained about their allies, Lykomedes saw in Oropos his chance to improve relations with Athens while reducing Theban influence in the Peloponnesos. He persuaded the Arkadian Ten Thousand to offer the Athenians a defensive alliance. The proposal sparked some opposition from the cities nearest Sparta, especially Tegea and Megalopolis, which remained staunchly pro-Theban, but Lykomedes carried the day. In Athens his audience received the proposal with surprise and uncertainty, only to be persuaded by his assurances that the pact would not betray prior Athenian commitments to Sparta. That beleaguered ally would instead profit by seeing Arkadia less dependent upon the Thebans. The Athenians accepted the alliance; and even though Lykomedes himself was assassinated at Corinth on his way home, his work survived.⁴⁴

This treaty was something of a curiosity. The Athenians had bound themselves to send help if anyone invaded Arkadia but did not oblige them to support an Arkadian invasion of Lakonia. In turn, the Arkadians promised to send troops if Attika were invaded. Yet the pact probably included an exemption clause that excused the Arkadians from intervening against the Thebans and the Athenians from sending troops to Arkadia against a Spartan invasion. Although this alliance seemingly offered little of substance to either party, for the Athenians it entailed only a limited military commitment on the mainland but one that marked a continuation of their original policy to succor Sparta. Lykomedes, for his part, had virtually signalled the end of Arkadian involvement in the war against Sparta. He and the Athenians had in the process weakened the bonds of the Boiotio-Peloponnesian alliance, thereby striking a blow at Thebes' Peloponnesian policy. This agreement makes sense only in terms of the Peloponnesos.

⁴⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.1–3, 6; Isok. 5.53; Aischin. 2.164; 3.85 and schol.; Dem. 18.99 and schol.; schol. to Dem. 21.64; Diod. 15.76.1; Paus. 1.32.1. Theban claims to Oropos: Agatharchides, *FGrH* 86 F8; Diod. 12.65.3; Paus. 1.34.1; see also Thuc. 8.60; Diod. 14.17.1–3; Strabo 9.1.22. Beloch, *GG* III².1.189–190; Roy, *Historia*, 581–582; Buckler, *TH*, 193–197, 312–313; Dušanić, *Arkadski savez IV Veka*, 301–302; P. Funke, in Flensted-Jensen *et al.*, eds., *Polis and Politics*, 121–131.

For the Arkadians it counterbalanced their alliance with Thebes, thereby permitting their diplomacy there a wider scope. They could now use the Athenian connection against Elis and the Thebans against Sparta. The treaty also served as a safeguard against Theban interference in Arkadian affairs, which likewise furthered Athenian aims. In short, this alliance freed Arkadia from strict dependence on Thebes, perhaps even allowing it to become the pivotal power in the Peloponnesos and at little cost to Athens. Lastly, Athenian acceptance of this limited commitment presented little new, inasmuch as the Athenians had on several occasions during the Peloponnesian War found Arkadia a useful ally against both Sparta and its then-allied Theban friends.⁴⁵

In spite of all the political intrigue and diplomatic bargaining, peace visited Corinth and some of its neighbors in 366/5. Ever since Epameinondas' first campaign in winter 370, Corinth had watched the march of armies across its land, and Kallistratos had previously established Athenian garrisons there. Despite their co-operation with the Athenians, the Corinthians owed their primary loyalty to the Spartans, a bond that the twenty years since the conclusion of the King's Peace had not weakened. Therefore, they looked upon the new Atheno-Arkadian pact with deep suspicion, which the Athenians readily returned. The Athenian Demotion even urged in the assembly, and the people agreed, to use armed force to seize control of Corinth, an act more flagrant than Phoibidas' stroke against Thebes. Corinth at least was still a loyal ally of both Athens and Sparta. Although the Athenians dispatched Chares to implement the deed, news of it reached Corinth before him. Though foiling Chares' attack, they found themselves at a loss. The situation confronting the Corinthians now seemed virtually impossible. Their Spartan allies were too distant and feeble to help, their Athenian friends were indistinguishable from enemies, and the Thebans remained at their door. They strengthened their own defenses, which they put under the command of Timophanes. He immediately betrayed his trust by making himself tyrant. His brother, the famous Timoleon, thwarted the effort by fratricide, but the Corinthians still faced the ugly pos-

⁴⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.2, 6; Bengtson, *SdA* II².284. Despite these machinations, the Boiotio-Arkadian alliance continued to exist: Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.27, 36, 40; Justin 6.6.6–10. Roy, *Historia*, 596, has ably argued the point. See also W.E. Thompson, *Historia* 32 (1983) 149–160.

sibility of witnessing a renewal of the horrors of 393. In 365, still in an exposed and friendless situation, they sent envoys to Thebes seeking a separate peace. The Thebans eagerly responded by proposing that the Corinthians and all others who so desired conclude a peace on the basis of the unratified "Peace of Pelopidas". In strict conformity with their treaty obligations to Sparta, the Corinthians asked their allies either to join them in concluding peace or allow them to do so alone. With good grace in a hopeless situation, the Spartans granted the Corinthians and the others permission to end the fighting. The Corinthians, Phleisians, and probably the Epidaurians on their side, and the Thebans, Argives, Sikyonians, and doubtless the Messenians at least on the other concluded a peace that recognized the independence of Messene. Corinth and its neighbors resolutely rejected the Theban offer of an alliance, accurately calling the notion nothing more than war in a different guise.⁴⁶

The Corinthians and their allies became the first of Sparta's traditional friends to recognize the independence of Messene, a substantial diplomatic victory for the Thebans. The war in the northern Peloponnesos was over. The peace realized the purposes for which Epameinondas had launched his second invasion: Corinth, Phleious, and the states of the Akte were lost to the Spartans and the Athenians. The area of conflict now centered in the central and southern Peloponnesos.

The last event even vaguely linked to the peace effort was Epameinondas' naval campaign of 364, one of the much discussed but little understood curiosities of the period. Although the fiasco in Thebes must have given Artaxerxes cause to reassess his support of his new ally, he continued to finance its fleet, all the more so perhaps given subsequent Theban success in the northeastern Peloponnesos. The need for it became all the more obvious when in 366 the Athenians took advantage of unrest within the Persian Empire to open an energetic naval campaign in the Aegean. Once Ariobarzanes had openly revolted, he sought Athenian aid for his efforts, which alone must

⁴⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.4–11; Arist. *Pol.* 5.5.9; Isok. 5.51; 6.11–13, 27, 58, 91, 96; Dem. 16.16; schol. to 16.11; Theopompos, *FGrH* 115 F239; Diod. 15.76.3; 16.65.3; Plut. *Tim.* 4.4; *Mor.* 808A; Bengtson, *SdA* II² 284. Meyer, *GdA* V^o.463 n. 1; H.D. Westlake, *Timoleon and His Relations with Tyrants* (Manchester 1952) 59–61; R. Sealey, *Historia* 5 (1956) 193–194; D.J. Mosely, *Ancient Society* 3 (1972) 5–7; Salmon, *Wealthy Corinth*, 384–386.

have removed the King's doubts about continuing his support of the Thebans. More than ever he needed Thebes and a friendly fleet to neutralize Athenian naval power. The launching of that fleet still lay in the future, and the Athenians realized that Artaxerxes' expressed hostility left them with little to lose by now employing their fleet to best advantage. As in 377, when Chabrias had taken service with the Egyptian king Akoris against his Persian master, so now the Athenians advanced the ambitions of Ariobarzanes. Thus began a new phase in Athenian naval activity, this one aimed not only at securing tighter control of the Aegean but also at weakening the King. So long as they restrained themselves to the traditional limits of the King's Peace, they could lawfully dispute the objectives of the nascent Theban fleet and thereby keep the Aegean as their own lake.⁴⁷

The Thebans meanwhile faced the enormous challenge of building 100 triremes, which entailed far more than merely the actual construction of the ships. The Thebans had a long, but often unappreciated, tradition of ship-building, and as recently as 413/2 they had sent twenty-five ships to sea. They provided their own naval architects and shipwrights. Yet the cost of building 100 triremes would have amounted to at least 100 talents. Another significant expense involved the construction or expansion of harbor and dock facilities; and even though Boiotia boasted several harbors, none had heretofore housed 100 triremes. Before the fleet could put to sea, it needed crews, the pay for which would probably have amounted to 600 talents for six months' service. Financing a naval program of this magnitude clearly beggared Theban resources. Artaxerxes and his father, however, had long proven that the King could afford such large fleets, as they had for Alkibiades, Lysandros, Konon, and Antalkidas. Epameinondas proved only the most recent example. In 364 he led the fleet to sea, but his naval expedition is a topic that finds its proper place in the more general tumult that engulfed the northern Aegean from 367 until 359, a tumult so vast and relatively self-contained that it deserves treatment in its own context (see Ch. IX). For the moment, Epameinondas' sailing marks the last,

⁴⁷ Judeich, *Kleinasiatische Studien*, 199; Beloch, *GG* III².2.255; Buckler, *TH*, 307 n. 17; Hornblower, *Mausolus*, 172–174; Weiskopf, *Satrap's Revolt*, 37–46; Ruzicka, *Persian Dynasty*, 64–65; Heskell, *North Aegean Wars*, 131–132.

ineffectual effort to make the so-called Peace of Pelopidas a political fact.⁴⁸

These events in the eastern Aegean, significant in their own right, nonetheless made little impression on mainland Greece. More immediately pressing there in 364 were events in Thessaly that led to a resolution of Theban difficulties with Alexander of Pherai. In that year he, though quiet since Epameinondas' exploits of 367, renewed his war against the cities of the Thessalian Confederacy. For the first time in the 360s the Thessalians had tried to defeat him without foreign assistance. He had instead conquered and then garrisoned Phthiotic Achaia and Magnesia, which threatened to cut the Confederacy in two. The Thessalians responded by asking the Thebans for a relief force with Pelopidas as its commander. At Pelopidas' prompting the federal assembly granted the request, thus giving him the opportunity to resume his work there and to avenge himself on his erstwhile jailor. On 13 July 364, as Pelopidas and his army prepared to march, the sun was eclipsed, which the sooth-sayers and the general populace interpreted as an ill omen. The two combined to cancel the expedition, but Pelopidas persisted with 300 mercenary cavalry and any Boiotians willing to volunteer for service. Marching first to Pharsalos to collect the Thessalian contingents, the Theban force presented a disappointing sight. Nonetheless, Pelopidas pressed on with the available levies towards Pherai in the hope of catching Alexander unprepared. Having crossed the Enipeus river just north of Pharsalos, Pelopidas turned eastwards through generally flat terrain bordered on the north by low, rolling hills. Alexander meanwhile approached Pharsalos from the east until he reached Kynoskephalai, a long, lone ridge that juts into the valley of the Enipeus. On a neighboring ridge immediately to the east stood the Thetideion, a small temple. The ground rises from south to north,

⁴⁸ Although Stylianou, *HCD*, 494–496; and Ruzicka, *CP* 93 (1998) 61 n. 8, have again raised objections to the construction of 100 triremes, like their predecessors Salmon, *Études*, 193, and Roesch, *Thespies*, 110, none of them provides any evidence for his views. Furthermore, they have all overlooked Buckler, *TH*, 308 n.19, and again in Department of History, U.S. Naval Academy, ed., *New Aspects of Naval History* (Baltimore 1985) 14. It seems never to have occurred to them that given the size of the Athenian fleet at this period, the King and the Thebans needed a comparable navy seriously to challenge it. For the size of the Athenian fleet in these years, see *IG* II² 1604–1621, which none of them cites. Theban fleet in 413/2: Thuc. 8.3.2.

gradually at first but then more steeply, its eastern side, carved by the Karamatlis river, being steep and difficult.⁴⁹

Here the two armies collided, and both commanders at once sent their infantry to seize the ridge immediately west of the temple. Pelopidas himself led his cavalry against Alexander's horsemen, who had reached the Thetideion first, and easily drove them from the field. The action next centered on a race for the ridge, which Alexander's infantry had seized first. Although Pelopidas' Thessalian hoplites manfully stormed the heights from the west, Alexander's troops easily beat them to a halt. At this critical point Pelopidas again showed his mettle as a tactician. Having recalled and re-formed his cavalry, he sent it up the ridge from the south to crush the exposed left flank of Alexander's infantry. Dismounted, Pelopidas led the struggling Thessalians in a renewed frontal attack against Alexander's line. Although Alexander's men at first stood their ground, the combination of Pelopidas' mounted flank attack and headlong frontal attack finally forced the enemy to give way. Having fought to the summit of the ridge, Pelopidas rashly threw himself at Alexander and his bodyguard, only to be cut down in the fierce fighting. Nonetheless, the combined assault carried the day.⁵⁰

Pelopidas' death meant a victory as costly as it was indecisive. Only tactical, it left Alexander undisturbed in his power. The tyrant in fact now enjoyed something of an advantage in having removed his most talented and ardent opponent. When news of Pelopidas' death reached Thebes, the assembly dispatched a field-army of 7000 hoplites and 700 cavalry to settle the score. The Thebans brought a weakened Alexander to battle, defeated him, and forced him to abandon conquered territory, to confine his authority to Pherai alone, and to become a subject-ally of the Boiotian Confederacy. Yet the Thebans had neither destroyed the basis of his power nor forced him to abandon his tyranny, which left him free to recoup his losses.

⁴⁹ Diod. 15.80.1-4; Plut. *Pel.* 31.2-5; 32.1-2; *Mor.* 192D; Nepos *Pel.* 5.2-4; Strabo 9.5.6; Steph. Byz. *s.v.* "Thetideion". Eclipse: Ginzel, *Chronologie*, II.527; Bersanetti, *Athenaeum* NS 27 (1949) 79; Sordi, *La lega tessala*, 218; Westlake, *Thessaly*, 148; Stählin, *Thessalien*, 141-142; Pritchett, *Topography*, II.114-117; Georgiadou, *Plutarch's Pelopidas*, 211-215; Gaebel, *Cavalry Operations*, 136-137; personal observations of 27-28 August 1971.

⁵⁰ Diod. 15.80.4-81.1; Nepos *Pel.* 32.3-34-1. Kromayer, *AS* II.118-122; Bersanetti, *Athenaeum* NS 27 (1949) 80-81; Sordi, *La lega tessala*, 218-219; Pritchett, *Topography*, II.118-119; Buckler, *TH*, 175-180; Georgiadou, *Plutarch's Pelopidas*, 216.

Nonetheless, contented with these results, the Thebans now largely retired from Thessalian affairs.

E. THE ROAD TO MANTINEIA (365–362 BC)

In the summer of 365 a war impending since 369 and accelerated by the failure of the “Peace of Pelopidas” erupted between Elis and the Arkadian League over Triphylia, much to Theban exasperation. Yet the events should have surprised no one. The Eleians began hostilities by successfully attacking Lasion, a fortified spot in the valley of the Ladon river on the Arkadio-Eleian border. A counter-attack carried Arkadian arms all the way to Olympia, which fell easily. Together with Messene, Sikyon, and probably Argos the Arkadians concluded an alliance with the Pisatans, who renewed their archaic claims to the presidency of the Olympic Games. This treaty, almost as much as the actual warfare, disrupted Theban designs in the Peloponnesos. The Thebans could no longer control their own allies, who had ranged themselves one against the other. Epameinondas’ whole diplomatic scheme stood on the verge of collapse. The situation worsened when the Arkadians aided Eleian democrats in an unsuccessful attack on the city of Elis itself. When the Thebans failed to intervene to stop the hostilities, the Eleians turned to their old Spartan enemies for help. Bereft of any Peloponnesian ally except Achaia, the Spartans eagerly embraced an alliance with Elis that would end their geographic isolation. Next followed a joint attack on southern Arkadia, with the Eleians continuing their operations in the west while the Spartans struck from the south. Leading an army of twelve *lochoi* along the road to Megalopolis, Archidamos easily captured Kromnos, a small but strategically important town near the road between Megalopolis and Messene. Instead of pressing his advantage, he inexplicably left three *lochoi* in town before retiring to Sparta. The fall of Kromnos, despite Archidamos’ failure to exploit it, shocked the alliance. The Arkadians withdrew their troops from Elis, the Argives marched to the scene, and both called for the assistance of Thebes and Messene. Once more threatened by a vigorous Sparta and too weak to dispense with a leader more powerful than they, the allies closed ranks behind Thebes. Their myopia resulted more from their own local ambitions than any larger Theban designs on the Peloponnesos. The Thebans moved

quickly to recapture Kromnos, which they reduced by siege, inflicting casualties and taking large numbers of prisoners, men whom Sparta could not replace. The reverse at Kromnos accompanied by such loss threw Sparta on the defensive for the next three years. Nevertheless, the Thebans in their turn failed dismally to use their victory to reassert their hegemony of the alliance. They had retrieved the situation without doing anything to prevent a recurrence of the problem. Though still resentful of the Arkadians, they were apparently unwilling to exert themselves much more than necessary to do anything more than maintain the ring around Sparta.⁵¹

The results of this combined failure of the Thebans and their allies became painfully vivid in the aftermath of their victory at Kromnos. Having learned nothing, the Arkadians renewed their conflict with Elis at Olympia, where at the games of 364 they suffered a serious military not athletic defeat. In an attempt to seize the sanctuary while the contests were underway, they launched an attack only to be driven off with heavy loss and accusations of sacrilege. Nonetheless, the Arkadians continued the war that so financially drained their treasury that they began to plunder the sacred treasures of Olympia to pay the Eparittoi. Faced with defeat, penury, and impiety, the Mantineians took the first steps to halt a war that hurt the Arkadians more than the enemy. Objecting to the sacrilege, the Mantineians voluntarily contributed the money to the maintenance of the federal army to relieve its dependence on Zeus' wealth. The Arkadian magistrates who had appropriated the sacred treasures censured the Mantineians for undermining the authority of the federal government. The Mantineians in turn accused the magistrates with impiety; and when the Ten Thousand refused either to punish the Mantineians or impeach the magistrates, the Arkadian League split apart. More trouble followed when funds to pay the Eparittoi dried up completely, causing the poorer, democratic elements in the army to desert. This in turn enabled the oligarchs to fill the vacant ranks

⁵¹ Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.20–27; *Poroi* 3.7; Kallisthenes, *FGH* 124 F13; Diod. 15.77.1–4; Polyb. 4.75.1; *SEG* XX 339; Plut. *Mor.* 192A; 535A–B; Paus. 8.34.6; Polyain. 1.41.4; 2.15; Justin 6.6.6–10; Steph. Byz., *s.v.* “Kromna”. Although the location of Kromnos has long been uncertain—see for example Curtius, *Peloponnesos*, I.291–292—J. Roy in J.M. Sanders, ed., *ΦΙΛΟΑΡΚΩΝ* (London 1992) 185–194, reports having found it south of Megalopolis. See also Nielsen and Roy, eds., *Defining Ancient Arkadia*, 218, 303, 305.

with their own friends, transforming the Eparittoi into their own army. Alarmed by the oligarchic reaction and fearful of their own status, the magistrates sent word to the Thebans that only their intervention could prevent the Arkadians from joining the Spartans. When news of Theban-led military preparations reached Arkadia, the oligarchs of Mantinea persuaded the rump government to request the Thebans to desist. However distressed they felt because of this turmoil, the Thebans honored the request.⁵²

Granted this respite, the Arkadian oligarchs in 362 concluded a peace settlement with the Eleians in which they renounced all ambitions to preside with the Pisantans over the Olympic Games. With regard to the plundering of Olympia, they agreed to submit the decision on reparations to arbitration. The peace treaty, however, failed to solve the most urgent problem of Triphylia, which remained in Arkadian hands until 219. This largely unnoticed fact proves the strength of the southern members of the Arkadian League which held the federation together in the face of Mantinea's secession. Nor did the League recognize the validity of this separate peace. Despite the Mantineian defection, the rest of the League continued to function as the legal representative of the region, and that region still supported the Thebans. The Mantineians simply acted as rebels, because of which no Arkadian ally need endorse this agreement. Moreover, the Mantineians had contravened not only their pact with other Arkadians and Pisantans but also the treaty with the Thebans and their allies. By so doing, they threatened to disrupt everything that the alliance had accomplished since 370, and Epameinondas could not allow this challenge to go unanswered. A Theban officer in Tegea further complicated matters by swearing the oaths of peace without the authorization of the Boiotian Confederacy. He and his troops were present at Tegea during the celebration following the accord, when the Arkadian magistrates who had been responsible for plundering Olympia conspired with the Theban to seize the leading aristocrats. In a scene worthy of comic opera the plot failed, and with understandable wrath the Arkadians ordered the Thebans immediately to leave their land. They followed by sending an embassy to Thebes condemning the officer's conduct. They encountered an angry

⁵² Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.28–35; *IG* IV 616. Beloch, *GG* III².1.204; P. Cloché, *Thèbes de Béotie* (Namur n.d. [1952]) 160; Roy, *Historia*, 586–587.

Epameinondas who roundly and justly accused the Arkadians of perfidy for having negotiated the peace without Theban approval. The clause prohibiting any member from making a separate peace without the consent of the others was crucial to the existence of the grand alliance. Even the excuse that the Arkadians had only mended a quarrel with a former ally carried no weight. The ally had taken the Spartan side and had borne arms against its erstwhile friends so frequently and so vociferously that Epameinondas could not allow these ambassadors to flout it again. Now on solid legal grounds and with practical political reasons for taming Arkadian fractiousness, he promised the envoys that he would lead his army into Arkadia to assert Theban rights. Upon their return, the ambassadors' report shocked the Mantineian faction, which hurriedly arranged alliances with the Eleians, Achaïans, Athenians, and Spartans. Seeing this crisis as yet another pro-Spartan threat to its existence, the Arkadian League itself firmly supported Epameinondas' stand. It sent its own embassy to Thebes requesting armed intervention to settle the dispute.⁵³

The Thebans promptly responded by mustering their forces and summoning those of their northern allies, of whom the Euboians, all of the Lokrians, and the Thessalians, including a contingent from Alexander of Pherai, responded. Only the Phokians refused on the grounds that their alliance was purely defensive in nature. Their participation was unnecessary, as Epameinondas depended more heavily for support on the levies from Argos, Messene, Sikyon, and the Arkadian League, which would constitute the essential allied strength of the army. The allies of Mantinea in the meantime assembled there to await Epameinondas. Among them numbered the Eleians; Achaïans; three lochoi of the Spartan army, the rest of which still mustered for the campaign; and a band of mercenaries. From Nemea, after a vain attempt to catch the Athenian army alone, Epameinondas marched to Tegea, a position that put him between the enemy army now strongly encamped at Mantinea and the remaining troops at

⁵³ Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.35–40; Diod. 15.82.1–3. Arbitration: *IG* IV 616; see also M.N. Tod, *International Arbitration amongst the Greeks* (Oxford 1913) 58–59. Lepreon and probably Lasion remained Arkadian: Dem. 16.16 with schol. Stern, *Hegemonie*, 228–231; Roy, *Historia*, 587–588; Buckler, *TH*, 205–207. Xenophon portrays the Mantineians as the legitimate representatives of the Arkadian League, whereas the facts from the fourth century and later prove otherwise: see Dušanić, *Arkadski savez IV Veka*, 306–311; Beck, *Polis und Koinon*, 77–79.

Sparta. Owing to a time-limit put on his campaign by the Boiotian federal assembly, Epameinondas could not long sit idly at Tegea, but he had no wish to attack an enemy who enjoyed such a strong position. He soon learned that Agesilaos was leading the bulk of the Spartan army northwards, which prompted him to venture a bold stroke at the undefended city. An added incentive was the opportunity to catch Agesilaos' army in the open with predictable results. The plan was sound, for Agesilaos perforce marched northnorth-westwards towards Pallantion, which left the direct road between Tegea and Sparta open to him.⁵⁴

Epameinondas led his infantry, probably only the Boiotians, and his Boiotian and Thessalian cavalry on a night march, striking southwards along the road through Karyai and Sellasia that he had travelled eight years earlier. A deserter betrayed his plan to Agesilaos, who quickly returned from Pellana only a little more than eleven kilometers from Sparta. The king planned to repeat his earlier strategy of holding the city while surrendering the countryside. Early the next morning Epameinondas' troops reached the well-defended city, ordered his men across the Eurotas, and into the suburbs of Sparta. They fought their way into the city itself only to be repulsed by stubborn, valiant resistance. Archidamos launched a resolute counter-attack that drove the intruders back across the Eurotas, thus saving the city. Unwilling to renew a hopeless attack, Epameinondas refreshed his army before retracing his steps on another forced march back to Tegea. Again marching all night, he arrived there early the next morning, and sent his cavalry thence on to Mantinea in the hope of catching numbers of citizens outside the walls. His Boiotian and Thessalian riders came within two kilometers of the city before they unexpectedly confronted the arrival of Athenian cavalry from the north. After a brisk clash, Epameinondas' men and horses, badly worn down by two nights of hard marching and two days of more marching and fighting, retreated to Tegea.⁵⁵


⁵⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.4–9; Diod. 15.82.3–4, 85–2. Kromayer, *AS* I.29–32; G. Roloff, *Probleme aus der griechischen Kriegsgeschichte* (Berlin 1903) 27–30; Pritchett, *Topography* II.99 n. 26; Westlake, *GRBS* 16 (1975) 29–30.

⁵⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 7.5.9–17; *Poroi* 3.7; Kallisthenes, *FGrH* 124 F26; Ephoros, *FGrH* 70 F85; Isok. 5.48; *Letter to Archidamos* 4; Aineias 2.2; Diod. 15.82.6–84.2; Polyb. 9.8.2–13; Front. 3.11.5; Plut. *Ages.* 34.5–11; *Mor.* 346C–E; Paus. 8.10.2, 11.1–5; Justin 6.7.1–9; Ael. *VH* 6.3; Polyain. 2.3.10. A. Bauer, *HZ* 65 (1890) 254–260; Kromayer, *AS* I.35, 40–41; Buckler, *TH*, 209–212. L. Breitenbach, *Xenophons Hellenika*, III (Berlin

Despite the brilliance of his strokes, precursors of Hannibal's against Rome, Epameinondas must now stake all on a pitched battle with the enemy at Mantinea. His march took him and his army of 30,000 foot and more than 3000 horse from Tegea to a gap between Mt. Mainalos on the west and Mt. Kapnistra on the east, some seven kilometers south of Mantinea, where he encountered his enemies blocking farther advance. He unhurriedly deployed his column into oblique march in line of battle, and led it to the foot of modern Merkovouni, where he ordered his men to ground arms. His halt deceived the enemy 3000 meters away into thinking that he had decided to encamp for the night, preparatory to joining battle the next day. Between the two armies spread ground that is now farm land, deeply ploughed and otherwise fairly level with occasional swells and a small patch of broken ground that posed a minor obstacle to the attackers. Behind the Sparto-Athenian line spread Pelagos Wood, where that army had made its camp. The terrain was well suited for the movements of hoplites and horsemen. Having deceived his enemy into thinking that he was himself encamping, Epameinondas ordered the lochoi on his right to march towards the left, where he stood. While the infantry marched behind those still facing forwards, he sent his cavalry into the plain to raise a cloud of dust. He thereby marshalled the entire Boiotian army in a deep, sledge-hammer formation, similar to that used at Leuktra. He placed the Arkadians on his immediate right, his weakest allies in the center, and the Argives on the far right. Now ready to engage the enemy, he drew up his cavalry in a solid ram-like formation into which he integrated light-armed infantry. Opposite him the Spartans, Mantinians and other Arkadians under Agesilaos held the extreme right of their line drawn up at the foot of modern Mytika. Eastwards stretched the Eleians and Achaians with the Athenians anchoring the left on the slopes of Kapnistra. Their combined strength numbered some 20,000 heavy infantry and 2000 cavalry.⁵⁶

1876) 243; Underhill, *Hellenica*, 303–304; and Westlake, *GRBS* 16 (1975) 33, have confused the course of Epameinondas' attack by ignoring the topography. Pausanias (3.17.1) states the truth when writing that the akropolis of Sparta did not rise to a conspicuous height. Only the eastern bank of the Eurotas could serve as the point of attack. Topography: see the personal observations of p. 308 n. 15 above.

⁵⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 7.5.18–24; Diod. 15.84.4–85.2. Diodoros' numbers (15.84.4) probably reflect in reasonable limits the relative strength of both armies. See also Kromayer, *AS* I.114–123; Roloff, *Probleme*, 27–30. Polyb. 12.25f.5; Plut. *Mor.* 214C–D;



6. The Battlefield of Mantinea, 362 BC.

Thus arrayed, Epameinondas gave the order to advance. Some of the Spartans and their allies, having mistaken his intentions, had already broken ranks and only in some panic had re-formed their line. Epameinondas' cavalry opened the battle by easily driving their Spartan counterparts onto their own line, further adding to the confusion. The victorious horsemen penetrated the Spartan phalanx and then swung to the east trying to take the Athenians in flank. Though repulsed, their attack distracted the Athenians at the moment of Epameinondas' main thrust, which he launched before the enemy was aware of it. His Boiotians shattered the Spartan line, and for an instant the fighting was furious. As the Spartan line broke and ran, the Boiotians pressed the fleeing survivors, Epameinondas received a mortal blow that felled him and distracted his army from exploiting its victory. Fighting stopped, and his cavalry returned to its phalanx without inflicting further harm on the defeated enemy. Although some of his men carried him from the field still alive, he died shortly thereafter. He had won a superb victory for Thebes, but his death turned it into defeat.⁵⁷

The victory at Mantinea resulted not in the crushing blow for which Epameinondas had hoped, but it nonetheless spawned a general peace among the war-weary Greeks. This treaty, while endorsing the major clauses of previous compacts, added another formally recognizing the independence of Messene. In essence the Greeks now ratified the decision that the King had made in the abortive "Peace of Pelopidas". Nothing is known of any other specific clauses of the peace or whether historical claims such as Athens' to Amphipolis were endorsed. The scant evidence indicates that the autonomy-clause was interpreted literally. To gain a common peace most major powers must have ignored local disputes. The Spartans, however, rejected the treaty because it recognized Messene. Their decision made them a constant object of suspicion and hostility within the Peloponnesos. The King was no more a participant in this peace

Paus. 8.11.1-4; Front. 2.2.12; Polyain. 2.3.14; Arrian, *Tactics* 11.2. Stern, *Hegemonie*, 237-238; H. Droysen, *Heerwesen und Kriegsführung der Griechen* (Freiburg i.B. 1889) 99-101; Pritchett, *Topography*, II.5-58; Buckler, *TH*, 215-217; personal observations of 7 August 1971 and 16 August 1978.

⁵⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 7.5.22-25; Diod. 15.85-87; Plut. *Mor.* 194C; 761D; Paus. 8.11.5-10; Ael. *VH* 12.3; Polyain. 2.32. Kromayer, *AS* I.69-75; Pritchett, *Topography*, II.63-66; Anderson, *Military Theory*, 221-224; Buckler, *TH*, 216-219; Gaebel, *Cavalry Operations*, 139.

than in that of Athens 371; but mindful of his sensibilities, the rest of the Greeks made it abundantly clear that they honored his will and would continue to do so unless he or his agents harmed or sowed discord among them. For the first time, then, the Greeks insisted upon their treaty rights under the King's Peace. They voiced their refusal to tolerate the peace as an instrument of the King to further his ambitions in Greece. Nor did they countenance a Greek state acting as patron of the peace only to realize its own narrow designs at the expense of the others. They did, however, reaffirm their agreement that the Greeks of Asia Minor were the King's subjects. They further declared that they had no quarrel with the King, who had not harmed them.⁵⁸

The remarkable thing about this the first treaty known to be called by contemporaries as a Common Peace was its effectiveness, a fact not widely appreciated. It endured not only longer than any of its predecessors but it also outlived all of them combined. From the first King's Peace in 386 to the day of this one stretched twenty-four years; from its to Philip II's settlement of 337, twenty-five. It ended major wars in the Peloponnesos, and even the ineffectual Spartan attacks on Arkadia in 352–350 remained temporary and local. The peace admittedly did not prevent the Sacred War of 356–346; but though at various times that conflict engulfed parts of central and northern Greece, its hostilities did not ignite a general war like those of the earlier fourth century. Moreover, its causes were religious as well as political. Local wars continued, as will be seen, but the conflagrations that had consumed all of Greece were temporarily over. In that respect, the Theban ascendancy proved far more successful in bringing placidity, if not real peace, to Greece than had its Spartan predecessor. The bald, simple truth, however, is that no single Greek state had conceived of a political idea or principle acceptable to the others that could bring peace and stability to all. Nor was any single state capable of mastering the others. Relative peace came to Greece not from any political or intellectual enlightenment but from physical exhaustion. The Greek political system had virtually reached bankruptcy.⁵⁹

⁵⁸ Bengtson, *SA* II².292; F. Taeger, *Der Friede von 362/1* (Stuttgart 1930); Jehne, *Koine Eirene*, 96–115; Buckler, *ICS* 19 (1994) 121.

⁵⁹ See also Jehne, *Klio* 81 (1999) 355–358.

CHAPTER NINE

TUMULT IN THE NORTH (366–355 BC)

A. RIVALRY IN THE EASTERN AEGEAN (366–359 BC)

While the Greeks of the mainland struggled to shape their imperfect peace, events elsewhere were anything but pacific. From 366 to 360 two major, loosely related episodes shaped the volatile history of the northern Aegean. In eastern Macedonia and the Chalkidike Athens renewed efforts to establish an empire divorced from its broader maritime League. During the same period Athens also dabbled in the Satraps' Revolt that convulsed the northeastern Aegean and all of Asia Minor. In the west Athens struggled to subdue Amphipolis to which it had laid claim since the fifth century. It attacked neighboring Olynthos, Torone, Poteidaia, and Pydna in the process. In the east Athens cautiously supported the rebel satrap Ariobarzanes in its effort to win control of the European side of the Hellespont. Athens pursued a traditional policy aimed at putting the resources of the Aegean under its control but attempted to do so without seriously provoking the King. Its meddling in the Satraps' Revolt amounted simply to circumspect adventure calculated to take advantage of any opportunity that the situation offered. The ability of Athens to pursue a course that in many aspects violated its various treaties with the King arose only because of the general turmoil then troubling western Anatolia. This period saw legalities become unenforceable inconveniences, and the Satraps' Revolt itself proved a riot of chaos and confusion. Even a precise chronology of the period lies beyond recovery, so nothing lapidary will be offered here. Yet enough evidence survives to provide a reasonable, reliable sequence of events.¹

If one incident can be said to have triggered the entire subsequent chain of events it must surely be the revolt of Ariobarzanes,

¹ For background see Judeich, *Kleinasiatische Studien*, 190–220; Hornblower, *Mausolus*, 170–203; Weiskopf, *Satraps' Revolt*, 45–68; Ruzicka, *Persian Dynasty*, 56–78; Heskell, *North Aegean Wars*, 101–122.

satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia. His satrapy stretched along the northwestern coast of Anatolia from the satrapy of Lydia, the northern border of which was the Hermos valley, along the littoral to that of Kappadokia on the Halys river, and southwards inland to Gordion on the border of Phrygia Proper, or Greater Phrygia. Its expanse along the southern coasts of the Euxine or Black Sea made it particularly vital to Athens, which was so dependent on foodstuffs from this entire region. As early as 368 Ariobarzanes, as seen above (pp. 316–317), had signalled his looming treachery by lending mercenaries to Sparta and by so helping Athens that it granted both Philiskos and him citizenship. Artaxerxes had additional reason to suspect the loyalty of his satrap. The rightful governor of the satrapy was Pharnabazos' son Artabazos, who was to assume his duties upon his majority. At that point Ariobarzanes was obliged to relinquish his satrapy to him; and now in 366, when the youth had come of age, he wanted his patrimony. The situation was anything but simple. In addition to placing Athens and Sparta in his debt, Ariobarzanes had used his Greek lieutenant Philiskos to seize control of the Hellespont. He won on the Asian side of the straits, as was the satrap's right. Philiskos, however, also occupied Sestos and Krithote, while maintaining a band of mercenaries in Perinthos, all in Europe and none a part of Ariobarzanes' satrapy. When Ariobarzanes received the King's command to surrender his office, he refused, thus beginning the most serious phase of the Satraps' Revolt. He called upon Athens and Sparta to repay their debts to him; and owing to the King's recent decisions at Sousa, they responded to his appeal as well as they could. Ariobarzanes meanwhile braced for the attack. His peril was great, for the loyal Autophradates, satrap of Lydia, advanced onto Assos, driving a wedge into the line of his coastal possessions. Assos, even without its magnificent walls, held a very strong natural position on the coast. Steep heights virtually isolated its harbor from the interior, but its port proved a vital link in coastal traffic. Mausolus also arrived at Assos with a fleet of 100 ships, some of which he deployed against Sestos. Kotys, king of Thrace, furthered Persian efforts by beleaguering Sestos from inland. Sestos controlled the main road between Europe and Asia and overlooked an excellent bay on the straits. At Sestos and Abydos across from it the channel widens, but a shoal reaching from the Asian shore forces ships to the European side. The combination of Assos as a staging area together with Sestos and Abydos ensured Ariobarzanes' mari-

time communications with the Hellespont, a route also essential to Athens.²

The response of the Spartans and Athenians to Ariobarzanes' appeal varied markedly. Scarcely able to defend themselves in the Peloponnesos, the Spartans sent only Agesilaos as an envoy to the satrap. The Athenians, however, responded to his request by ordering Timotheos to aid him but to do so without violating their treaty with the King. The Athenians thereby signalled that even though they had rejected the "Peace of Pelopidas" and had erased the references to the King's Peace from the charter of the League, they nonetheless honored it in fact. That said, their orders gave Timotheos wide discretion, while leaving them free to disavow any of his indiscretions. Above all, Ariobarzanes' rebellion so distracted the King and his loyal satraps that the Athenians could now more easily pursue their ambitions in the Aegean. The turmoil there had already abetted their intentions, and the situation at Samos provided the most convenient opportunity to begin realizing them. In 366 Timotheos found the island garrisoned by the Greek Kyprothemis, stationed there by Tigranes, an Armenian by name. Tigranes himself probably acted under the orders of Autophradates, satrap of Lydia, but whatever the details, the Persians had no right to the island. Samos had not joined the Athenian League, and the King had forgone any claim to it by his own treaties. The island legally enjoyed the right to autonomy, but such irregularities as its Persian occupation became common in these tumultuous times. This one simply proves that the King's own officers willingly broke his peace for their own ends.

² Ariobarzanes: Judeich, *RE* 2 (1895) 833. Hellespontine Phrygia: Hdt. 3.90.2; Thuc. 1.129.1; Xen. *Hell.* 4.1.15–16; Strabo 12.4.1–6; Arr. *Anab.* 1.29.5. W. Ruge, *RE* 20 (1941) 801–802; Dandamaev, *Achaemenid Empire*, 27; W. Ruge, *RE* 10 (1919) 1910–1911. Lydian border: Judeich, *Kleinasiatische Studien*, 39 n. 1. Athenian grain trade: Buckler, *TH*, 170–171; C. Tuplin, *ZPE* 49 (1982) 121–128. H. Parkins and C. Smith, eds., *Trade, Traders and the Ancient City* (London and New York 1998), specifically G.R. Tsatskhadze, 54–63; M. Whitby, 102–128. Philiskos: Dem. 23.141–142. Kotys at Sestos: Xen. *Ages.* 2.26; Nepos *Tim.* 1.3; see Isok. 15.108, 112. Assos: Leaf, *Strabo*, 289–300; Cook, *Troad*, 240–250; personal observations of 5 June 2002. Sestos and Abydos: T.A. Trant, *Narrative of a Journey through Greece* (London 1830) 431; Casson, *Macedonia Thrace and Illyria*, 210–228. U. Karhstedt, *Beiträge zur Geschichte der thrakischen Chersones* (Baden-Baden 1954) 10–14; Weiskopf, *Satraps' Revolt*, 34; personal observations of 24 May 2002, 4 and 6 June 2002. Decisive against Hornblower's (*Mausolus*, 201 n. 148) query whether Ariobarzanes held neighboring Adramyttion (Polyain. 7.26) is Ruzicka's *Persian Dynasty*, 183 n. 22.

That opened the way to Timotheos, who could intervene there without breaking the King's Peace or violating the Athenian compact with its League. Strategic considerations also prompted Timotheos to concentrate on Samos, possession of which would secure the all-weather crossing of the Aegean. Unable to seize the island with one blow, he invested it for the next ten months. While doing so, he intervened in the affairs of Erythrai in Autophradates' satrapy. He tested the waters to see how far he could go without provoking the Persians. Perhaps now the Karian satrap Mausolos, who was always careful of his borders, showed the Athenians that Timotheos had ventured too far by defeating an Athenian naval contingent near Chios. Mausolos' intervention at this time may well have earned him significant honors from Erythrai. At any rate, Timotheos' small adventure came to nothing. He fared better on Samos, which surrendered to him in 365. His victory could in simple terms be seen as a triumph of Greek over barbarian, but the Athenians expelled the Samians and sent their own *klerouchoi* to the island. Although their action did not violate the agreements made at the creation of the Athenian League, it diametrically opposed the spirit that had inspired that union. It also signalled an aggressive spirit that became increasingly obvious in the northern Aegean.³

From Samos Timotheos sailed to Amphipolis, where he relieved Iphikrates, who had spent three years dabbling in labyrinthine northern affairs. In 368 the Athenians had sent Iphikrates as strategos to reconnoiter Amphipolis but not to beleaguer it. Queen Eurydike of Macedonia, mother of Philip II, sent for him with a request that he intervene against Pausanias, a powerful pretender to the throne. Pausanias posed a threat to Eurydike and the Athenians alike, for he based his power in eastern Macedonia on the western borders of the Chalkidike. He had seized Strepsa, which actually lay in Chalkidian territory; Anthemous, situated in a valley between the Thermaic Gulf

³ Ariobarzanes: Xen. *Ages.* 2.26; Isok. 15.108; Dem. 15.9; 23.141; Nepos *Tim.* 1.3; Pompeius Trogus *Prologue* 10. Samos: Isok. 15.111; Dem. 15.9; Dein. 1.14; Ps.-Arist. *Econ.* 2.2.23, on which see M.I. Price, *NC* 7, 7 (1967) 1–6; Polyain. 3.10.5, 9, 10; Diod. 18.18.9. Timotheos in Erythrai: *IG* II² 108; see also Isaios 6.27; *IG* II² 1609; Polyain. 6.8; 7.26. J.K. Davies, *Historia* 18 (1969) 321–322, 331; J. Hofstetter, *Die Griechen in Persien* (Berlin 1978) 113; Hornblower, *Mausolos*, 107–110, 197–200; Weiskopf, *Satrap's Revolt*, 40; Ruzicka, *Persian Dynasty*, 64–78; J. Cargill, *Athenian Settlements of the Fourth Century BC* (Leiden 1995) 18–20; Heskell, *North Aegean Wars*, 26–28, 100–101.

and the hinterground; and Therme on the eastern coast of the gulf to which it gave its name. Hence, Pausanias enjoyed convenient access to his neighbors both to the east and west. The invitation offered Iphikrates attractive possibilities. He responded by augmenting his small force with the mercenary commander Charidemos and his band, with which he drove Pausanias from Macedonia. His success enabled Ptolemaios of Aloros to assume the regency; and, as seen above (pp. 322–323), he aligned himself with Thebes, thus dashing Iphikrates' hopes. The precise sequence of subsequent events remains unclear. Ptolemaios next concluded an alliance with Amphipolis, which he sealed by securing hostages whom he entrusted to his subject Harpalos. An alliance between Olynthos and Amphipolis further added to Iphikrates' woes, a situation made all the worse when the Olynthians occupied Amphipolis. This combination of powers alone proves how unwelcome was the Athenian presence. The grand proclamation made earlier at the establishment of the League no longer inspired belief, especially after the treatment of Samos. That alone sounded the tocsin that Athens still looked back to its fifth-century past. The Greeks of the north responded with suspicion, fear, and hostility. Iphikrates nonetheless somehow managed to seize the Amphipolitan hostages from Harpalos and hand them over to Charidemos. Now at least he had some means of striking a bargain with the Amphipolitans. Even so, after three years of such desultory and convoluted events, of which the Athenians had tired, in 365 they recalled him in Timotheos' stead. Before Timotheos had arrived on the scene, Charidemos unexpectedly returned the hostages to their homes, doubtless for a fee, thereby putting Amphipolis beyond Athenian reach. What had begun as a mere scouting expedition had developed into a war that pitted Athens against Macedonia, Olynthos, and Amphipolis, for which Athens was not fully prepared.⁴

This was the political morass into which Timotheos sailed. At the outset the legal status of Amphipolis demands clarification. In 365 the city was obviously at war with the Athenians, who by no means

⁴ Aischin. 2.26–29; Dem. 23.149; Diod. 15.71.1, 77.5; 16.2.4. Strepsa: E. Oberhummer, *RE* 4A (1931) 354; N.G.L. Hammond, *The Macedonian State* (Oxford 1989) 81. Anthemous: G. Hirschfeld, *RE* 1 (1894) 2369; Hammond, *Macedonian State*, 43. Therma: E. Oberhummer, *RE* 5A (1934) 2391–2402. Although Isokrates (15.112) claims that Timotheos sailed from Samos direct to Sestos and Krithote, he covers in silence Timotheos' failure before Amphipolis. See also A. Schaefer, *Demosthenes und seine Zeit*, II (Leipzig 1886) 11–14; Heskell, *North Aegean Wars*, 25–30.

saw themselves as aggressors. They instead felt entitled to the city. They presumably based their claim on its probable inclusion in their Peace of 371, which lacked the endorsement of the King. As already seen (pp. 328–329), he had rejected it in the unratified “Peace of Pelopidas”. Rather he consistently proclaimed Amphipolis, like all other Greek states in the Aegean and on the mainland, autonomous. Although he had invited the Athenians to present any juster proposals on the subject, no evidence exists that they subsequently did so, and nothing indicates a second general Greek congress at Sousa in these years. The only consistency to be found in the new Athenian position is the impression that so long as they did not interfere in Asia Minor, they were free to act in the west as they willed. For them the autonomy-clause no longer applied to the northern Aegean. On that premise Timotheos now struck at targets of opportunity.⁵ Once upon the scene Timotheos relieved Iphikrates, who went into exile, finding refuge with his brother-in-law Kotys. Although Timotheos tried to retain Charidemos, despite his deposition of the Amphipolitan hostages, the mercenary also sided with Kotys, taking with him the Athenian triakontors, small ships of thirty oarsmen, then in his possession. Kotys welcomed both men in part because he was even then investing Ariobarzanes’ garrison at Sestos. Thus left in the lurch, Timotheos confronted the two major cities of Olynthos and Amphipolis, while facing the possible hostility of the new king Perdikkas, who had murdered his brother-in-law Ptolemy of Oloros. Despite the many uncertainties, a reasonable reconstruction indicates that Perdikkas unexpectedly supported Timotheos. Fear of Macedonian opposition removed, the Athenian reduced Torone at the southern tip of the middle Chalkidikic peninsula of Sithone. The city gave Timotheos an excellent base for use against nearby Olynthos farther up the coast and the more distant Amphipolis to the east. The Olynthians responded by hiring Charidemos from Kotys’ service. Timotheos

⁵ Heskell, *North Aegean Wars*, 129–130, claims that the Athenians sent Leon on a second embassy to the King but without citing any evidence. Develin, *AO*, 256–274, provides no names of Athenian ambassadors from 367 to 358, although of course there were many. Heskell also maintains that the Spartans sent a second embassy under Kallias, for which she cites Xen. *Agēs.* 8.3 and Plut. *Artōx.* 22.6–7. Kallias provides the clue. He is known also from Xen. *Hell.* 4.1.15. Furthermore, Plut. *Mor.* 213D–E, proves that the King’s letter to Agēsilaos, upon which she depends for support, dates to the period of the original King’s Peace. See also Poralla, *Prosopographie*², 70; and G.L. Cawkwell, *CQ* 26 (1976) 68 n. 29. Artaxerxes did not in fact change his rulings.

intercepted him, but instead of punishing him, took the mercenary into Athenian hire. From Torone Timotheos launched an unsuccessful attack on Olynthos and another equally unavailing stroke against Amphipolis, from which he retreated with some difficulty. He had failed to take the primary targets that the Athenians had assigned him.⁶

After his failure at Amphipolis Timotheos needed a victory to restore his prestige and to supply resources to pay his troops, both of which in 364 could be gained most easily in the Hellespont. The Chersonesos especially provided him with the ideal situation. Sestos was still in the hands of the Athenian ally and rebel satrap Ariobarzanes, then under siege by Kotys and Mausolos. By the terms of the numerous peace treaties the Persians had no more right to the city than had Tigranes to Samos. Kotys doubtless cared less about subduing Ariobarzanes than gaining an important city adjacent to his realm. Timotheos could achieve several things to his own advantage by raising the blockade of Sestos. Most urgently he would further secure the Athenian grain route, and next relieve pressure on his Persian ally. Since the city was then in the hands of the Greek Philiskos, himself an Athenian citizen, Timotheos could argue that he simply brought relief to another Greek and a fellow Athenian. Nearly as importantly, he could act without necessarily alienating the King but honoring his instructions from home. An additional factor was the suspicious conduct of Kotys, whose hostility to Athens now went undisguised. Timotheos not only lifted the siege of Sestos and took neighboring Krithote, but he also carried the war to Kotys himself. Even though Iphikrates defended his kinsman against the Athenians, Timotheos stripped the Thracian king of numerous cities and much booty. In gratitude for his achievements, Ariobarzanes recognized the Athenian right to Sestos and Krithote, a grand gesture insasmuch as they were not really his to give. In all, Timotheos had secured the Athenian grip on the Chersonesos and its environs without having injured Artaxerxes.⁷

⁶ Iphikrates and Charidemos: Dem. 23.129–131, 149–152. Perdikkas and Timotheos: Dem. 2.14; Polyain. 3.10.14; see also Diod. 15.77.5. Torone: Isok. 15.108; Diod. 15.81.6; Polyain. 3.10.15. Olynthos: Dem. 2.13; Polyain. 3.10. Amphipolis: Dem. 23.150; schol. Aischin. 2.31; Polyain. 3.10.8. Timotheos' attack on Amphipolis before his campaign in the Chersonesos: Dem. 23.150; Diod. 15.81.6. See also L. Kallet, *GRBS* 24 (1983) 246 n. 24; Heskell, *North Aegean Wars*, 31–32; D. Hamel, *Athenian Generals* (Leiden 1998) 151.

⁷ Isok. 15.112–113; Dem. 23.130–131; Nepos *Tim.* 1.2. Sestos: *IG* II² 274.

A very curious aspect of Timotheos' campaign, especially when taken with Agesilaos' presence at Assos, was the conduct of the loyal satraps co-operating with Ariobarzanes. Autophradates supposedly abandoned his siege of Assos merely because Agesilaos appeared on the scene as a Spartan envoy. Together with Mausolos he even paid the Spartan a handsome sum of money before sending him home with a fine escort. Neither satrap was likely to be frightened by an ineffectual old man from a ruined state. For his part, Mausolos with his fleet of 100 ships also watched Timotheos defeat Kotys, whereupon he sailed back to Karia, leaving Sestos and Krithote in Athenian hands. The explanation for this remarkable display probably lies in the ambitions, suspicions, and apprehensions of the two satraps. They could easily enough buy Agesilaos' good offices, for Sparta needed money and its men which remained their only marketable commodities. Both satraps soon joined Ariobarzanes in the Satraps' Revolt, and even as early as 364 both may have entertained serious thoughts of rebellion. Autophradates so sympathized with Ariobarzanes that he later imprisoned Artabazos, despite his right to the satrapy of Hellespontine Phrygia. Though quite probably like-minded, Mausolos had his own reasons for allowing Timotheos a free hand at Sestos. Above all, it was senseless to fight for a place that was neither his nor the King's. Athenian possession of it no more threatened his own satrapy than had Ariobarzanes'. Even with Timotheos in control of the city he could justly claim that he had freed it from Ariobarzanes'.

C. Veligniani, *Klio* 76 (1994) 185–191. Timotheos could only have sailed from the Chalkidike to the Chersonesos in spring 364, not late 365, as Buckler, *TH*, 256–257, mistakenly maintains. See also Kallet, *GRBS* 24 (1983) 246 n. 24, though her chronology is also somewhat faulty; Weiskopf, *Satraps' Revolt*, 52 n. 95. Iphikrates quit his *strategia* in 365/4 (Develin, *AO*, 260–261) and did not hold office again until 357 (*ibid.*, 275). The archon-year of 365/4 began on or about 27 June 365 BC (Ginzler, *Chronologie*, II.579), which left the rest of that campaigning-season for Timotheos' operations in the Chalkidike. Timotheos' arrival in the Chersonesos should reasonably be dated to 364/3 for the following reasons: Timotheos was active at Sestos and Krithote and at war with Kotys (Isok. 15.113; Xen. *Ages.* 2.26; Nepos *Tim.* 1.2–3; Polyain. 7.26). He intervened in Kyzikos (Diod. 15.81.6, dated to 364/3; Nepos *Tim.* 1.3), about the time when Diomedon of Kyzikos sent Mikythos to Epameinondas (Nepos *Epam.* 4; Hofstetter, *Griechen*, 51). Timotheos also intervened in Herakleia Pontikos shortly before Epameinondas did so (Justin 16.4.3). After Timotheos had gained Sestos and Krithote, he reduced Poteidaia (Isok. 15.112). He also campaigned against Amphipolis as well (schol. Aischin. 2.31, with the archon-date), and is not known to have returned to the Hellespont before his defeat at Amphipolis in 360/59 (schol. Aischin. 2.31). Therefore, only early 364 BC provides the occasion for Timotheos' operations in the Hellespont.

grip and restored it to the Greeks. If neither Autophradates nor Mausolos had significantly harmed Ariobarzanes, they had for the moment done something to demonstrate their loyalty to Artaxerxes but without at the same time alienating Ariobarzanes and the Greeks. In these uncertain times neither man eagerly declared his true intentions. Sailing farther into the Propontis, Timotheos dabbled further in Persian affairs by raising the siege of Kyzikos, ostensibly in support of Ariobarzanes. Thence he sailed to Herakleia Pontikos, where he declined to settle their political differences. Although he had interfered in the King's domain, he had done no real damage while giving some slight aid to his ally. His actions could have led to war but for the fact that their results were so negligible when compared with the greater crisis confronting Artaxerxes. Timotheos had in reality very ably fulfilled his difficult instructions from home, and in the process he had strengthened the Athenian hold on the vital grain route. The Athenian convoys could now sail from the Aegean past Sestos and Lampsakos, which like Perinthos was in Philiskos' hands, by Kyzikos to allied Byzantion and beyond. This achievement more than redeemed his failure before Amphipolis.⁸

Epameinondas meanwhile was ready to take the Boiotian fleet to sea (see pp. 338–339). From 366 to 364 Boiotian shipyards constructed a fleet of 100 triremes capable of challenging the Athenians in the Aegean. Although Boiotia was geographically ill-suited to be a naval power, it enjoyed a considerable naval tradition, albeit one inferior to the fame of its infantry and cavalry. Boiotian shipwrights had long designed and built triremes and other warships that had served effectively in Greek fleets, Spartan and Athenian alike, and the crews who manned them had proven their worth as sailors. Now after two years of preparation, the Thebans had collected rowers,

⁸ Xen. *Ages.* 2.26–27; Dem. 23.154; Nepos *Tim.* 1.3. Although Xenophon implies that Agesilaos was responsible for Kotys' lifting of the siege of Sestos, he does not explicitly make the claim. Isokrates (15.150–151) and Nepos (*Tim.* 1.2) provide better testimony that Timotheos repulsed Kotys. Xenophon's entire record of Agesilaos' activity at this point is tendentious, and further complicated by corruption of the text, which Hornblower (*Mausolos*, 174–175) unsuccessfully explicates. Xenophon also links Agesilaos with the rebellion of King Tachos of Egypt, which he explains by claiming that the Spartan sought revenge against Artaxerxes for having recognized Messenian independence. Xenophon has in reality distorted the truth to disguise the fact that Agesilaos had become a mercenary commander. See Ruzicka, *Persian Dynasty*, 60–66; Shipley, *Plutarch's Agesilaos*, 375–378. Perinthos and Lampsakos: Dem. 23.141–142. Kyzikos: Nepos *Tim.* 1.3. Herakleia Pontikos: Justin 16.4.3.

most of them doubtless mercenaries, and officers to begin operations. While the ships were on the ways, the Thebans readied harbor installations at Aulis. Easily the most famous Boiotian harbor and the one most commonly used from antiquity to today, Aulis provided ample facilities for servicing a large fleet, was well protected from high winds, and enjoyed good communications with Thebes. Despite some considerable strategic disadvantages, it served as the home port of Epameinondas' fleet. Diplomatic contacts kept pace with naval construction, but the precise aims of Theban naval policy have never been certainly understood—perhaps not even by the Thebans themselves. Although most scholars have assumed that they wished to destroy the Athenian naval hegemony of the Aegean, that was probably only one of several goals and perhaps not even the most important one. A full-scale naval war with Athens was clearly beyond Theban resources, and control of the Aegean held no intrinsic value to this land power. A reduction of total Athenian might was of course desirable, as any weakening of the enemy invariably is, but Athenian naval power had never posed a serious threat to Thebes. Athenian triremes had not even prevented the Thebans from re-occupying Oropos. The best Theban expectation was that worrying the Athenians in the Aegean would distract them from pursuing ambitions on the mainland. The Athenians must defend their League and other maritime interests. If successful, the Theban naval venture might even force Athens to abandon its active support of Sparta, the total isolation of which ranked as one of Epameinondas' principal goals in order to protect its own vital naval interests.⁹

At any rate, Theban aims inextricably intertwined with those of Artaxerxes, who surely played the predominant role in Theban planning. He had paid for Epameinondas' fleet, and had his own reasons for its existence. For him too the destruction of the Athenian navy, while desirable, was not necessarily compelling so long as Athens confined itself to an Aegean that could at least notionally call itself autonomous. That had been his point since 386. Far more urgent to him in 364 was restoration of his authority in western Anatolia, and he planned to use his new fleet to that end. First, it would help

⁹ Aulis: *Med. Pilot*, IV.130–142; Buckler, *Naval History*, 15–18, with personal observations of all harbors along this coast between 10–15 August 1978. In general see, D.J. Blackman, *Les Dossiers d'Archeologie* 4 (1993) 32–41.

to suppress Ariobarzanes by cutting him off from Athenian naval support. Moreover, Epameinondas' fleet could also deter Mausolos and Autophradates, whose loyalties were questionable, from following his example. They could also prove their allegiance to him by giving Epameinondas all the assistance that he required of them. If they nonetheless determined to rebel, Artaxerxes now had an independent force on the spot and able to intervene against them. The element of deterrence extended to Athens as well, the Boiotian fleet serving notice that they could suffer for further support of rebel satraps. Moreover, it could sow dissension among the discontented naval allies who might welcome an alternative to Athenian leadership. In short, Epameinondas' fleet gave the King a powerful and independent force that he could reliably apply against any opposition in the Aegean.

As part of this scheme the Thebans had surely already made contact with Rhodes, Chios, and Byzantium. The three had long pursued a foreign policy aimed at maintaining their independence from foreign domination. The same spirit that had inspired the unity represented by the Coinage Alliance (see p. 133), burned all the brighter in 364. The three states all had reason to suspect the wholesome intentions of Athens because of Samos, the renewal of operations in the Chalkidike, and Timotheos' exploits in the Propontis. Yet if Athens could pose a threat to them, they could also bedevil Athens. They stood astride nearly all of the major sealanes of the eastern Aegean. They enjoyed positions from which they could block the Athenian grain trade, which enabled them to exert commanding pressure on their hegemon. If quite hard pressed, they could starve out their persecutor. Epameinondas' fleet could provide the tool with which to do it. The Thebans thereby offered them protection from Athenian adventurism. Since the Thebans had always endorsed the autonomy-clause of the King's Peace, excepting its application to Boiotia, and upon which Artaxerxes still insisted, they had little to fear from them. The Thebans even provided them with the opportunity to secede from the Athenian League. Even more urgent for these states were the unsettled conditions in their own neighborhoods and the loyalty of the two principal satraps there. No one knew how dependable they would prove, and ill-advised trust in them could expose them to Persian retaliation for having supported two potential rebels. For all of these reasons none of the three had any reason immediately to conclude formal ties with Thebes. All of them

were aware of Theban friendship with the King and hostility towards Athens and Sparta, so a community of interest existed, but nothing more. For them caution was a prudent necessity, especially since the Thebans were an unknown and untried factor in this complex and uncertain situation. All involved, Greek and Persian alike, had seen the fleets of Konon, Antalkidas, and others come and go, and nothing at the outset suggested that Epameinondas' fleet would prove any different. All of these considerations with their many uncertainties gave the principals every incentive to treat Epameinondas and his fleet with an equal measure of respect and caution and every prudent reason to commit themselves to nothing binding until the Theban had achieved concrete results.¹⁰

At last Epameinondas took his ships from Aulis northwards through the Euboian and Malian Gulfs into the Aegean. Their sortie, which put them in a position to deploy anywhere within the sea, prompted the Athenian strategos Laches to intercept them. His ships, however, were out-numbered, so he broke off contact without challenging them. Although Epameinondas should perhaps have brought Laches to battle, he refused to do so probably because of his own naval inexperience and that of his crews. The danger of heavy damage and serious losses at the beginning of the voyage could have meant the failure of the whole venture. Like the German High Seas Fleet of World War I, the Boiotian fleet was too valuable to be risked for light reasons or small gains. Yet when all is considered and despite all the risks, one must ask whether Epameinondas was wise to squander this opportunity to weaken the Athenian navy. Even though Laches' refusal of battle represented some small success in itself, no one derived great benefit from it. Nonetheless, Epameinondas had gained the open sea without contest, now free to pursue his goals. Once free from land he shaped a course in all likelihood first to Byzantion, which was immediately threatened by both Ariobarzanes and the Athenians. They had ringed the city, and together they held Sestos, Abydos, Krithote, Lampsakos, and Perinthos. Yet on his voyage Epameinondas attacked none of these cities, nor had he provoked Timotheos to challenge him any more than he had Laches. A possible explanation for Athenian restraint comes from reluctance

¹⁰ F. Carrata Thomes, *Egemonia Beotica* (Turin 1952) 34–35; Buckler, *TH*, 170–171, 309–310. Jehne, *Klio* 81 (1999) 336–338.

to commit another fleet in waters where Lysandros and Antalkidas had decisively defeated them before. Rather, they were content to await developments. Instead of taking advantage of this situation to carry the war to Ariobarzanes, Epameinondas arrived in Byzantion without having disturbed the rebel at all. The Byzantines were doubtless impressed by the Theban fleet, but they refused either to secede from the Athenian League or to form an alliance with the Boiotian Confederacy. Both would have been foolhardy until Epameinondas had produced some concrete results, which he had so far failed to do. Formidable though their defenses were, the Byzantines shrank from a premature move against Athens that would only bring upon them immediate reprisal. Unsuccessful at Byzantion, Epameinondas sailed into the Euxine Sea to call at Herakleia, as Timotheos had recently done. Although the city was a Boiotian colony then embroiled in civil strife, and although Epameinondas probably sincerely wanted to restore order there, he also wanted the use of its forty triremes. The internal troubles of the city lying beyond his solution, he retraced his course beyond Byzantion and back into the Aegean. He had already failed in his mission. He had given the Byzantines no reason to support him and good reason to remain aloof. He had also left Ariobarzanes as secure as he had found him. Epameinondas had simply failed. Not even his enemies could have expected a more disappointing debut of such a powerful fleet.¹¹

From the Hellespont Epameinondas sailed southwards past Assos, again without striking Ariobarzanes' garrison there, to Chios. He used the visit largely to undo Timotheos' earlier work at nearby Erythrai, his very presence perhaps persuading the populace to remain loyal to the King. Further to complicate uncertain circumstances Epameinondas' presence could have coincided with Mausolos' efforts to spread his influence as far north as Erythrai, which granted the satrap *proxenia*. As such he became its official Karian representative.

¹¹ Diod. 15.78.4–79.1; Isok. 5.53; Plut. *Pel.* 14.2; Justin 16.4.3. For insufficient reasons several scholars conclude that Epameinondas' voyage resulted in Byzantion's secession from the Athenian League and even in an alliance with the Boiotian Confederacy, for which there is absolutely no evidence: e.g. Cargill, *Athenian League*, 169; Lewis, *Teiresias*, Sup. 3 (1990) 71–73; S. Hornblower, *The Greek World 479–323 BC* (London 1983) 232; *Mausolus*, 126; E. Badian, in W. Eder, ed., *Die athenische Demokratie in 4. Jahrhundert v. Chr.* (Stuttgart 1995) 95; Ruzicka, *CP* 93 (1998) 62–64; Stylianou, *HCD*, 412–413, 497. Opposed is J. Buckler, *Mnemosyne* 51 (1998) 192–195; in Flensted-Jensen *et al.*, eds., *Polis and Politics*, 439–440.

As so often in these years, the inability to establish a precise chronology makes all interpretations inconclusive. Yet the evidence suggests that Mausolos made concerted efforts to secure his littoral as early as Timotheos' intervention in Erythrai. If so, Epameinondas' appearance supported the work of a satrap who was still the King's liege. Under these circumstances the Chians naturally greeted Epameinondas warmly to be thanked by his friendly assurances. These sentiments, however, did not lead to alliance or secession from the Athenian League. The Chians had every reason not to be dragged into the Satraps' Revolt. Courteously treated but diplomatically unsuccessful, Epameinondas continued on his way, passing Samos unmolested, but probably putting in at Kos. The Koans had recently founded a new city on the northwestern point of the island, and here again some evidence suggests that Mausolos at least approved of the move. Koan sympathies doubtless favored Epameinondas, but their official stance reflected that of the Chians. He next stopped at Knidos, where he received an enthusiastic welcome that probably typified that of the others. The Knidians granted him *proxenia*, which made him their legal representative in Thebes. As such he enjoyed the honor but no real political power, which is hardly surprising inasmuch as Knidos lay in Mausolos' satrapy and remained the King's possession. The presence of Epameinondas at Knidos literally tested the waters. His fleet equalled Mausolos' in numbers, so it remained to be seen whether the satrap would receive the Theban as the King's friend or openly follow the example of Ariobarzanes. The wisest and safest course for Mausolos was to respect him as the King's friend and ally. For that matter the satrap generally seemed more intent on maintaining the strength of his family's hold on Karia than of pursuing wider ambitions. The Knidian grant of proxeny to Epameinondas served in fact as a sign that Mausolos remained loyal to the King and at least nominally furthered the Theban mission. Epameinondas' last port of call was Rhodes, which lay off the southwestern coast of Karia and thus of great importance to Mausolos' satrapy. Given the co-operation between Epameinondas and Mausolos, the Rhodians had excellent reason to nurture good relations with both. Although the Rhodians therefore welcomed the Thebans warmly and may even have honored Epameinondas particularly, they no more than the Byzantines and Chians concluded a formal diplomatic compact with the Boiotian Confederacy. By this time they had certainly seen

Epameinondas do no harm to Ariobarzanes or Athens, so polite words sufficed as a proper response to his inaction. If Epameinondas achieved anything of note before his return to Aulis, it was the rebellion of Keos from the Athenian League. Yet nothing connects the Thebans with this incident, nor did Epameinondas intervene on behalf of the rebels. Epameinondas returned safely to his home port but without winning a victory at sea.¹²

Epameinondas' voyage and the entire Theban naval program easily constitute the most enigmatic episode of the Theban ascendancy. After two years and much money to build a fleet capable of challenging Athenian supremacy in the Aegean and of striking direct at Ariobarzanes, Epameinondas used it for neither purpose. He had conducted a demonstration, not a campaign. Artaxerxes certainly did not find in him an Alkibiades, Lysandros, or Antalkidas. Nor did Epameinondas' fleet sail again, but simply disappeared into mystery. Several factors may account for its ephemeral existence. The first and most obvious is the King's displeasure with its performance, such as it proved. Next is Theban inexperience in the broad naval strategy necessary to achieve two large objectives. Nor did Epameinondas know how effectively to use a large fleet to those ends. Even the Spartans in the last stage of the Peloponnesian War received schooling by Alkibiades, but in 364 the Thebans had no such mentor. The lack of any concrete results presented the King with a quandary: a large, useless navy was too expensive to maintain and yet no other Greek state could take Thebes' place against Athens, Sparta, and Ariobarzanes. He may also have seen Epameinondas' accomplishments as an effort to revive the old "Coinage Alliance", which would do him no harm but no good either. The King had no further reason to finance Theban foreign policy. Ariobarzanes' death about this time was perhaps still another factor, but it cannot unfortunately be securely dated. Current scholarship places it in either

¹² Diod. 15.79.1. Mausolos in northern Karia and Ionia: Rhodes-Osborne, *GHI* 56; Theopompos, *FGrH* 115 F 59; Lukianos *Diologi mortuorum* 429–430; Polyain. 6.8; 7.23.2. See also S.M. Sherwin-White, *Ancient Cos* (Göttingen 1978) 70–71; Hornblower, *Mausolos*, 42–43, 110–112; Ruzicka, *Persian Dynasty*, 70–75; Heskell, *North Aegean Wars*, 65–68. Knidos: Buckler, *Mnemosyne* 51 (1998) 192–205. Rhodes: Hornblower, *Mausolos*, 126–131. R.G. Hepworth in L.A. Carradine *et al.* eds., *Proceedings of the 10th International Congress of Numismatics* (Wetteren 1989) 39–40, argues that the famous issue of Epameinondas' coinage bearing the rose, unique in the series, refers to this incident.

363 or 362, but perhaps more instructive is the entire situation facing the King in these two years. By 363 general political and military upheaval had disturbed western Anatolia, which presented Artaxerxes with pressing problems in his own realm that could more easily be solved by the military efforts of his own satraps. In that case, he had no further need for a costly foreign fleet that had refused to fight for anything. Whatever the reasons, 364 saw the end of all Theban naval ambitions. The Aegean remained Athenian.¹³

The sequel is quickly told. For the most part the subsequent events of the Satraps' Revolt belong more properly to Persian than Greek history. The tale is one of deceit, betrayal, adventure, and for most of the rebels ultimately of failure. Nowhere is the precise reason for the uprising given, but the singular example of Ariobarzanes combined with the age of Artaxerxes brought local unrest and personal ambition to the front. As just noted (see pp. 358–359), Autophradates and Mausolos had left the rebel Ariobarzanes with his position on Hellespontine Phrygia intact. The example proved contagious. In *ca.* 364 the King faced a massive revolt in the western satrapies that included the Greek inhabitants of the Anatolian coast; Autophradates, satrap of Lydia; Mausolos of Karia; Orontes, satrap of Armenia; Datames, ruler of Kappodokia; and King Tachos of Egypt. Tachos was far less concerned with overthrowing Artaxerxes than re-establishing an independent native dynasty in Egypt. To this end he hired Agesilaos and 1000 troops to bolster his army and Chabrias to command his naval forces. Agesilaos patriotically claimed that he opposed Artaxerxes for having recognized Messene, but in reality Sparta needed the money to survive. Peoples along the coast from Lykia to Phoenicia also rose in revolt. Although the rebels supposedly chose Orontes as their commander-in-chief; and although some of them co-operated with one another, each rebel actually pursued his own ambitions, as proven by the lack of co-ordination of effort among them. Only the abrupt collapse of the revolt matched its magnitude.¹⁴

¹³ Ariobarzanes' death: Xen. *Kyrōp.* 8.8.4; Arist. *Pol.* 5.8.15; Val. Max. 9.11 ext. 2; Harpokr. *s.v.* Ariobarzanes. Judeich, *Kleinasiatische Studien*, 206; Hornblower, *Mausolus*, 181; Weiskopf, *Satraps' Revolt*, 50, 52–54.

¹⁴ Xen. *Ages.* 2.26–29; Diod. 15.90–91.1. Beloch, *GG* III².2.136–137; Olmstead, *Persian Empire*, 411–421; Dandamaev, *Achaemenid Empire*, 302–303; S. Hornblower, *CAH* VI².86–89. Although Hornblower, *Mausolus*, 174–175, rejects the standard emendation of *ταχέως* to *Ταχώς* at Xen. *Ages.* 2.27 to eliminate any co-operation between Mausolos and Tachos, Ruzicka, *Persian Dynasty*, 189 n. 1, convincingly defends the emendation. In fact, Hornblower's suggestion does insufficient justice

At the height of their success the rebels threatened Kappadokia, Syria, and Phoenicia, but Orontes hoped that by betraying his colleagues he could win Artaxerxes' gratitude which would be expressed by making him satrap of the entire coastal area, much as Tissaphernes had been. He accordingly beguiled many fellow rebels whom he arrested and dispatched to the King for punishment. Other rebels fell into similar traps when they sent Rheomithres to Tachos, who entrusted him with money and fifty warships. These he sent to Leukai, near Chios, and Erythrai, to which he summoned other insurgents. Rheomithres likewise arrested them and forwarded them to Artaxerxes. The King responded to Datames' threat by ordering Artabazos to invade Kappadokia. When Datames marched against him, the rebel's own father-in-law betrayed him to his death. In the south Tachos, while invading Phoenicia, learned of a rebellion at home in which his commanding general had put Tachos' son Nektanebos on the throne. Despite his attempt to retrieve his authority, Tachos endured defeat at his son's hands. Now secure on the throne, the new pharaoh sent Agesilaos home in grand style, with Mausolos also honoring this guest-friend, but the old king did not long enjoy his acclaim. Agesilaos died off the coast of Libya, having reigned for forty-one years, and was buried with great glory at home. He who had become king of Sparta at the height of its power bore chief responsibility for his country's humiliation. He had presided over its downfall and returned there embalmed.¹⁵

By 359 the loyalist forces had suppressed the Satraps' Revolt. Of all the principals Mausolos had fared the best. Although his loyalty at one point remained suspect, he had done no real harm, and his role in the whole affair appears minor and half-hearted. By its end at least he had extended his influence well northwards of the Karian border and had retained the King's confidence. Whereas his neighboring satrap Autophradates had compromised himself by arresting

to Mausolos' ability to stay on reasonable terms with all of the principals involved in the Revolt without committing himself to any inconvenient position.

¹⁵ Dem. 23.154-159; Diod. 15.92-93; Manethon fr. 74; Nepos *Ages.* 8.2-7; *Datames* 5-11; Plut. *Ages.* 36-40.4; Front. 2.7.9; Polyain. 7.21.3-7; Trogus *Procl.* 10. F. Kienitz, *Politische Geschichte Ägyptens vom 7. bis zum 4. Jahrhundert vor der Zeitwende* (Berlin 1953) 95, 175; Ruzicka, *Persian Dynasty*, 80-88; Shipley, *Plutarch's Agesilaos*, 389-399. Persian attack on Egypt: see Xen. *Ages.* 2.30-31; Diod. 15.93.2-5; Plut. *Ages.* 38.1; 40.1; Trogus *Procl.* 10. Synkellos (ed. W. Dindorf) 486 lines 20-487 line 1.

Artabazos, Mausolos seemed to be the reluctant rebel. He may nonetheless have used the turmoil to improve his relations with Athens and Thebes alike. At the height of Tachos' bid for independence, the Egyptian sent an embassy to Athens, one of whose members was Pigres, whose name is Karian. He may only have been a Karian resident of Egypt, but given these tumultuous days it would hardly be too speculative to suppose that Mausolos gave the embassy his blessing, just as he and Tachos sent Agesilaos off with great honors. It made eminently good sense under the circumstances for Mausolos also to be on good terms with the Athenians, especially because of their recent occupation of Samos. Nor would cordial relations with Athens, which had not officially supported the rebels, indicate disloyalty to Artaxerxes. The indistinct picture emerges of a discreet and clever man who charted a careful course through dangerous seas. Mausolos emerged from the uproar as the most influential Persian official on the Anatolian coast.¹⁶

The Greek responses to the Satraps' Revolt varied with the situation of the individual states. Those of the mainland flatly refused to become involved when certain unknown satraps sought their help. Their official response stated that the Greeks had established a Common Peace and that they were not at war with the King, nor would they declare war so long as he did not set the Greeks against one another or disrupt the peace. Should he provoke them, they would defend themselves. In simple terms this reply reiterated that the Greeks intended to honor the original terms of the King's Peace and that they harbored no ambitions in his domain. The Greek islanders and the Byzantines took a similar stance, but their delicate position dictated a cautious resistance to the intrigues of the satraps. Their best policy dictated that they remain aloof from the turmoil, and like their kinsmen on the mainland honor the treaty. In their case expediency and strict adherence to the peace coincided nicely. The only Greek state singularly to benefit from the convulsions of the Revolt was Athens, which used them to pursue its ambitions in the northern Aegean. Support of Ariobarzanes had proven a mistake that the Athenians cared not to repeat, so they denied the satraps' request for help. They found that the disarray in Anatolia

¹⁶ Pigres: *IG II²* 119. Kienitz, *Geschichte Ägyptens*, 175; Hornblower, *Mausolus*, 174; Ruzicka, *Persian Dynasty*, 77–78.

benefitted them hugely, for the King now left the Greeks beyond his borders to themselves.¹⁷

B. ATHENIAN ADVENTURES IN THE NORTH (363–357 BC)

Timotheos' campaign inaugurated a new stage in Athenian policy in the northern Aegean, one that reverted to that of the fifth century. The Athenians henceforth exerted themselves strenuously in the Chalkidike in their efforts to seize Amphipolis and Olynthos while continuing their attempts to master all of the always precious Chersonesos. Along the latter, Sestos and farther north Byzantion held supreme importance, and as of 364 the one city was in Athenian hands and the other still an ally. These two theaters of operations presented them with various and different problems. In the north-eastern Aegean neither Amphipolis nor Olynthos with their anti-Athenian memories particularly welcomed the renewed Athenian attention. Nor could the Athenians predict the Macedonian response. The Macedonians had remained loyal Theban allies since Pelopidas' visit (see pp. 322–323), and they had usually displayed hostility to Athenian incursions into their realm. In the northwestern Aegean the Thracians under their king Kotys doggedly and sometimes effectively fought to repel any further Athenian inroads. Kotys also

¹⁷ Greek reply to the satraps: *IG* IV 556 = Bengtson, *SdA* II².292; Rhodes-Osborne, *GHI* 42. Although some scholars have suggested dates later than 362 for this inscription, it remains the most preferable because it affords the only known occasion in this period when the Greeks met in common to re-affirm a general peace. A date of 338–334 can be excluded because of *IG* II² 236 and 329 = Schmitt, *SdA* III.403. See also Ryder, *Koine Eirene*, 142–144; M.J. Osborne, *BSA* 66 (1971) 319–320; Buckler, *ICS* 19 (1994) 119–121. King's response in 344: see below Ch. 00. Similarly, epigraphers and historians have sometimes advanced *IG* II² 207 as evidence that the Athenians concluded official ties with Orontes in 361/0: M.J. Osborne, *BSA* 66 (1971) 320 n. 149; Hornblower, *Mausolus*, 202 n. 160; Weiskopf, *Satrap's Revolt*, 76–79. They base their conjecture on the restoration of the archon's name in line 11 of Fragment a from Nikomachos (341/0) to Nikophemos (361/0) to Kallimachos (349/8) for no discernible epigraphic reasons. Pittakys, who saw the now-lost stone, read Nikomachos, but his successors have changed the reading on the basis of historical possibilities. In fact, Pittakys' reading is almost certainly right because of his report in line 2 of the name Polykrates son of Polyeyktos who is known to have served as *bouleutes* in 343/2 and 336/5: Develin, *AO*, 331, 367. For the dangers of cavalierly restoring inscriptions, see E. Badian, *ZPE* 95 (1993) 139. Restoration *exempli gratia*, no matter how attractive, does not constitute historical fact; and in this case the attraction is absent. If, however, the evidence is allowed to speak for itself, it proves that Orontes, like Mausolos, survived his temporary fit of rebellion.

held a position from which to intervene against his enemies by aiding Amphipolis and threatening Sestos. The meteoric Alexander of Pherai remained another unpredictable factor. He harbored as little love for the Athenians as he held for the Thebans. The most urgent question thus confronting the Athenians was whether their resources could sustain their maritime ambitions while supporting Sparta on the mainland.

From his adventures in the Hellespont Timotheos in 363 returned to the Chalkidike but not immediately to resume his attack on Amphipolis and Olynthos. Over the winter Perdikkas, like his earlier namesake, shed his ties to Athens probably because of traditional distrust of this powerful and often unwelcome associate. He threw his support to Olynthos and Amphipolis only to find himself the immediate target of Timotheos, other Athenian generals dispatched to the area, and Menelaos the Pelagonian, who was also king of the Lynkestians. Menelaos provided his new friends with supplies and helped them to carry the war beyond Macedonia into the Chalkidike and Amphipolis. Perdikkas thus found himself threatened from the west and the east. In the ensuing fighting he quickly lost Pydna to the Athenians. The city gave the Athenians the only harbor along the Olympian foreshore between Therme and Pagasai, and together with Torone another naval base against their enemies. All of these advantages enabled the Athenian general Kallisthenes to defeat Perdikkas, with whom he made a truce that the home government considered premature. They rewarded him with a sentence of death. His fate was the first of other generals in this theater of war to be condemned for not satisfying Athenian expectations. Of far greater significance was Timotheos' victory at Poteidaia, which gave the Athenians virtual command of the Gulf of Torone. With Poteidaia and Torone in their hands the Athenians had isolated Olynthos from the sea, and Timotheos furthered the work by capturing many other cities in the area.¹⁸

¹⁸ Perdikkas and the support of Olynthos and Amphipolis: Aischin. 2.29; Dem. 2.14 and schol.; see Thuc. 4.103.3 for Perdikkas II and the Chalkidike in 424. Menelaos: *IG* II² 110 (= Rhodes-Osborne, *GHI* 38) with the evidence that several Athenian generals operated in Macedonia and against the Chalkidike and Amphipolis. Kallisthenes: Aischin. 2.30–31; Arist. *Rhet.* 2.3.13–14. Pydna: Dem. 4.4; Dein. 1.14. Poteidaia: Isok. 15.108, 112–113, who arranges his list of captured cities geographically, not chronologically; Dem. 2.4 with schol.; Diod. 15.81.6. Although many include the fall of Methone in this campaign, see below n. 413.

The Athenians failed to make much further progress in the northwest during 362 because of conflicts elsewhere in the Aegean. Above all, they faced troubles closer to home. Sometime either in 363 or early 362 some Keans revolted from the Athenian League, discarded their copy of its charter, and exiled some of their pro-Athenian countrymen. Chabrias suppressed the uprising, but the situation remained unsettled as late as the summer of 362. The cause of this disaffection is unknown; and even though it is sometimes ascribed to the appearance of Epameinondas' fleet the year before, another possibility exists. In that same summer of 362 Alexander of Pherai began a series of swashbuckling naval raids on Athenian allies, beginning with an attack on Keos' neighboring Tenos. The tyrant enslaved the population, but apparently made no attempt to hold the island. He had nonetheless struck deeply into the Cyclades much to the chagrin of the Athenians. Nor did they effectively counter him. For eight months their general Autokles, based on Thasos, did nothing, and his replacement Menon proved equally ineffectual. Thus unopposed, Alexander continued his depredations in 361 by landing mercenaries on Peparethos and occupying the city of Panormos. In response the Athenians sent Leosthenes and a force to trap Alexander's men in the city. The tyrant launched an unexpected counter-attack against them that not only extricated his mercenaries but also saw the seizure of six triremes and 600 prisoners. Anything but daunted by the Athenians, Alexander next sailed boldly into Piraeus itself, landed at the Deigma in broad daylight, and relieved the merchants' tables of their money. In the face of these embarrassments the Athenians gave Chares a fleet; but he, instead of attacking Alexander, sailed off to Kerkyra, then beset by civil strife. The only bright spot for the Athenians in 361 came from their sending of *klerouchoi* to Poteidaia. The act in itself proves that they had abandoned their high principles of 377 and that the spirit that had inspired the creation of the Athenian League had expired. Otherwise the rest of the campaigning-season of 361 proved unhappy for the Athenians. Still another incompetent general, Timomachos, while stationed at Thasos entered into illegal communications with the exiled Kallistratos, who had found refuge in Methone. This incident would never spark particular interest except that it indicates that the Athenians had not yet taken Methone, for otherwise Kallistratos could not have found a safe haven there. Methone probably fell to Athens only in 360, when Timotheos led another expedition into the area. His primary target

remained Amphipolis, but in yet another attempt on the city, he failed again. He, like Iphikrates, Autokles, Menon, Timomachos, and Leosthenes in this theater, suffered censure at the hands of the Athenian people. The achievements of many years of exertion in the Chalkidike and against Amphipolis were small in comparison to the commitment of men, ships, time, and money. By the end of 360 Amphipolis, Olynthos, and Macedonia still successfully defied all Athenian attempts to subjugate them. The Athenians had failed to re-create their empire in this region.¹⁹

Athenian exertions in the northeast proved as bootless as those against Amphipolis and Olynthos. There the Athenians encountered economic as well as political problems that no general could easily solve. In the political arena Kotys continued his efforts to regain the Chersonesos only to find his subject Miltokythes in revolt from him. For support the rebel looked to Athens. That sort of thing was routine, but the same could not be said of the economic crisis spawned by long political turmoil. Furthermore, local hardships exerted direct effects on the welfare of Athens itself. The briefest glimpse of the situation proves the point. In the Propontis the Kyzikenes waged war against Prokonnesos, an Athenian ally that lay astride the grain route. Their belligerence most probably resulted not from imperialism but from impending famine. Like the Byzantines and the Chalkedonians they found their land incapable of sustaining their populations. They all accordingly forced merchant ships into their harbors demanding that the crews unload their cargoes. Although most modern scholars see this episode as a sure sign that Byzantion had rebelled from Athens to ally itself with Epameinondas, they mis-

¹⁹ Keos: *IG* II² 111 (= Rhodes-Osborne, *GHI* 39); Chabrias was general in 363/2: Develin, *AO*, 263, but Atheno-Kean arrangements were to be concluded by Skirophorion of that year, thus 362 BC. Alexander: Aischin. 2.124; Hyper. 4.1; Diod. 15.95.1–3; Plut. *Phok.* 7.5; Polyain. 6.2; Ps.-Dem. 50.4 is chronologically important because his use of the aorists proves that the tyrant's raid on Tenos preceded Molon's archonship of 362/1. Leosthenes and Chares: Ain. Takt. 11.13–14; Diod. 15.93.3; Polyain. 6.2.1. Timomachos: in 362/1 Autokles had served eight months before his recall, thus also 361 BC, and Menon the rest of the archon-year; Ps.-Dem. 50.12; Dem. 23.104; 36.53; Hyper. 4.1–2; fr. 17. Kallisthenes and Methone: Ps.-Dem. 50.12, 14, 46–48; Lyk. *vs.* *Leok.* 9.3. Poteidaia: *IG* II² 114. Although *IG* II² 118 is usually associated with these *klerouchoi*, it is not immediately apparent why ambassadors should have been sent instead of οἱ ἡκοντες δημοσίου of *IG* II² 114 lines 5, 10. Timotheos' second failure before Amphipolis: schol. Aischin. 2.31. Papearethos: R. Herbst, *RE* 19 (1937) 551–559.

take the entire picture. Chalkedon and Kyzikos had never joined the Athenian League, remained still nominally loyal to the Persian Empire, and made no effort to unite politically with Byzantion, much less the Boiotian Confederacy. The problem was economic, not political; and as will be seen below, Byzantion did not secede from the Athenian League until 357. The situation did, however, endanger the welfare of Athens, where food prices rose dramatically. The Athenians solved this problem not by trying to reduce any of these three states but rather by sending a fleet of triremes to convoy the merchantmen to Piraeus.²⁰

The Chersonesos presented the Athenians with a stiffer challenge. Ariobarzanes' gift to them of Sestos and Krithote failed to impress Kotys, who successfully pressed his attacks in the area, principally against Sestos. As early as 363 he had wrested much of the region from the Athenian general Ergophilos, who was impeached for his failure. Nonetheless, after the war had lasted for some time, Miltokythes rebelled from Kotys and asked the Athenians for an alliance, which they probably did not grant. When they called out their fleet in the summer of 362, Kotys sent them ambassadors with great promises, whereupon Miltokythes panicked, fearing that the Athenians were also displeased with him. Sent out to retrieve the situation, the Athenian general Autokles spent the next eight months accomplishing nothing, for which he was recalled and punished. Menon, his replacement, fared no better, and himself suffered punishment. Kotys meanwhile captured the Sacred Mountain, situated near Bisanthe on the coast west of Perinthos. The Thracian king thereby put himself in a position to threaten the Athenian grain trade. By 361 the Athenians had lost much of the Chersonesos except for Sestos, Krithote, and Alopekonnesos. Kotys' campaigns were as surprisingly successful as the Athenian general Timomachos' resistance was futile. Timomachos succeeded in conducting the Athenian grain ships safely through the Propontis and Hellespont, a notable feat. Yet his attempt to seize Maroneia farther to the west in Thrace failed, after which he returned to the Hellespont. There his fellow general Theotimos

²⁰ Ps.-Dem. 50.4–6; Dem. 23.104. Alleged Boiotio-Byzantine alliance: Hornblower, *Mausolus*, 200–201, 206; E. Badian, in Eder, ed., *Die athenische Demokratie*, 95; Heskell, *North Aegean Wars*, 136; Ruzicka, *Persian Dynasty*, 66–68; Stylianou, *HCD*, 412–413, 497. Against: Jehne, *Klio* 81 (1999) 341–344; Buckler, in Flensted-Jensen *et al.*, eds., *Polis and Politics*, 438–442.

somehow lost Sestos, a major blow that together with Kotys' possession of the Sacred Mountain further complicated the effort to keep open the grain route. Even Python's assassination of Kotys in 360/59 proved no boon to the Athenians, for his son Kersebleptes ably continued the war. One of three sons, all of whom claimed the Thracian throne, Kersebleptes confronted the dual challenge of repulsing the Athenians and suppressing Miltokythes. He achieved the first by writing a letter to Timomachos that lured him into a fatal sense of security. Taking advantage of the Athenian's gullibility, the king seized additional Athenian territory. The Athenians impeached Timomachos, as they had so many other of their generals in these years, and in 360 sent Kephisodotos to replace him.²¹

No match for his opponents, the hapless Kephisodotos demonstrated the poverty of Athenian strategical thinking and manner of waging war. He received a letter from Charidemos in which the adventurer offered to secure the Chersonesos for Athens. Having served with Memnon and Mentor, sons-in-law of Artabazos, during the Satraps' Revolt, Charidemos gained passage from Abydos to Sestos. His services completed and his continued presence as unwanted as unneeded, the Persians gladly rid themselves of him. Once back in Europe, Charidemos betrayed Kephisodotos, returned to Thracian service, and with Kersebleptes beset Krithote and nearby Elaious, situated near the southwestern tip of the Chersonesos, another site significant to the Athenian grain trade. For the next seven months Charidemos warred against the Athenians. They in turn responded by sending ten triremes to Perinthos, where Charidemos repulsed them. Kephisodotos retired to Alopekonesos opposite Imbros, a city that pirates had occupied. The Athenians laid siege to the place only to see Charidemos march overland against them from Sestos. This time Kephisodotos agreed to a pact with him by which the Athenian broke off the investment. He apparently had little real choice, for

²¹ Ergophilos: Arist. *Rhet.* 2.3.13–14; Dem. 19.180; 23.104; Harpok. *s.v.* *Ergophilos*; Souda, *s.v.* *Ergophilos*. Miltokythes: Dem. 23.104; Ps.-Dem. 50.5. F. Geyer, *RE* 15 (1932) 1708. Autokles: Dem. 23.104; 36.53; Ps.-Dem. 50.12; Hyper. fr. XVII. Sacred Mountain: Dem. 23.104; see Xen. *Anab.* 7.1.14; Strabo 7 fr. 55; E. Oberhummer, *RE* 8 (1913) 1530; Casson, *Macedonia Thrace and Illyria*, 213 n. 1; 215; Manfredi, *Strada*, 249; Lendle, *Kommentar*, 418. Timomachos: Dem. 19.180; 23.115; Develin, *AO*, 267–268. Maroneia and return to the Hellespont: Ps.-Dem. 50.21–22, 52. Thetimos: Hyper. 4.1. Assassination of Kotys: Dem. 23. 163; Arist. *Pol.* 5.8.12. U. Kahrstedt, *RE* 11 (1922) 1551–1552. Kersebleptes' letter: Dem. 23.115; 36.53.

he could not depend upon his poorly-paid mercenaries. The Athenians subsequently punished him, but in reality they did their generals no service by demanding great success with small means. Worse was still to come. Charidemos furthered his employer's efforts by seizing the rebel Miltokythes and handing him and his son over to the Kardians, who promptly and brutally killed them.²²

These bewildering and chaotic events had wide, unpredictable, and subsequently significant consequences. By their co-operation with Charidemos the Kardians in the northwest Chersonesos actually demonstrated their animosity towards Athens and their willingness to foil its ambitions in the Chersonesos. The brutality with which they murdered Miltokythes and his son resulted in such revulsion among the Thracians that the kings Amadokos and Berisades made a pact with each other for mutual security with Kersebleptes and his mercenary friend. Under these circumstances they looked upon the Athenians as possible allies. Athenodoros, an Athenian mercenary, seized upon their predicament to form an alliance with them, sealed by marriage to Berisades' daughter. He was, like Iphikrates before him, now a member of a ruling family. Thus united, Athenodoros and the two Thracian kings forced Kersebleptes to conclude a common agreement by which the three kings each governed a portion of Thrace under an associated monarchy. The Athenians in turn concluded an agreement with the three kings in which they would receive the return of lost territory in the Chersonesos. The Athenians lost their share of the bargain, when in 359 they sent the renowned Chabrias to the region with but one ship. Furthermore, they refused to provide additional funds to Athenodoros' men, which forced him to disband their only effective force in the area. Whether they acted from arrogance, penuriousness, or simple inability, the Athenians provided Charidemos with the opportunity to persuade Kersebleptes to disclaim his agreement in favor of a new one from Chabrias. The latter perforce accepted its terms, which officially recognized Kersebleptes' right to Sestos and the income from its harbor dues. The Athenians at home subsequently repudiated the pact after long and

²² Charidemos: Dem. 23.153–165. Pritchett, *GSW* II.85–89; Hamel, *Athenian Generals*, 17–18. Alopekonnos: Androtion, *FGrH* 324 F19; Dem. 23.166; Aischin. 3.51 and schol.; Ps.-Plut. *Mor.* 850F. Casson, *Macedonia Thrace and Illyria*, 219–225. Miltokythes: Anaximenes, *FGrH* 72 FF5–6; Theopompos, *FGrH* 115 F307; Dem. 23.169, 175.

windy debate. They resolved instead to send ten ambassadors to insist upon Kersebleptes' compliance with the earlier pact with Athenodoros. The envoys, however, so dawdled that not until 357 did Chares sail to the Chersonesos with a large force to settle matters to Athenian satisfaction. His arrival turned the tide in the area. He concluded an alliance with the three kings that left them secure in their domains, guaranteed the Greek cities under their control autonomy, and required them to assist in the collection of allied tribute to Athens. Yet they surrendered on one bit of ground. Charidemos remained in control of Kardia, from the shelter of which he could continue to pose a threat to the Chersonesos.²³

It remains to make sense of the apparently senseless. First and above all, the Athenians had formed no consistent, uniform plan for dealing with northern affairs. They also lacked the resources for operations on a grand scale. Next, the years between 365 and 359 demonstrated several things about a new policy. In the north they abandoned their earlier high-minded ideal about the freedom of the Greeks in favor of their fifth-century desire for hegemony. They demanded Amphipolis and Olynthos as their right. Even were one to accept the mistaken modern view that the King had recognized Athenian claims to Amphipolis, that did not apply to Olynthos, which had never joined the Athenian League and whose right to autonomy was guaranteed by the several treaties of the Greeks and the King. They had installed *klerouchoi* at Samos and Poteidaia, and they expected the Thracian kings to help them collect tribute from the Greek cities in the Chersonesos. They tried in this region to erect an Athenian empire separate from the League that did not enjoy its rights and privileges. Moreover, they wished for more than they could militarily gain. They were incapable simultaneously of reducing the Chalkidike, Amphipolis, and the Chersonesos. Nothing proves the point more poignantly than their dispatch of Chabrias to Thrace with just one ship. Given the past, they should have foreseen their future tribula-

²³ Operations: Dem. 23.169–177. Schaefer, *Demosthenes*, I².157–162; Beloch, *GG* III².1.219–223. Archibald, *Odrysian Kingdom*, 216, 231–232. Athenodoros: Dem. 23.10–11, 170; Tod, *GHI* 149; W. Judeich, *RE* 2 (1896) 2043. Berisades, Amadokos, and Kersebleptes: Dem. 23.170; *IG* II² 126; Strabo 7 fr. 47. W. Judeich, *RE* 3 (1897) 294; *RE* 1 (1894) 1713. Chabrias: Dem. 23.171–176. Athenian displeasure with Chabrias' conduct seems certain by the partial erasure of his name in *IG* II² 124 line 20 (= Rhodes-Osborne, *GHI* 48). Charidemos and Kardia: Dem. 23.181. Heskell, *North Aegean Wars*, 152–153.

tions. They had re-aroused distrust among the Macedonians, the northern Greeks, and the Thracians. Their imperiousness had begun to alienate the Greek islanders and those in the littoral states that no longer saw in Athens the gallant defender of their rights as free Greeks but as their old oppressors. The Athenians alone were responsible for these stark realities.

C. THE SOCIAL WAR (357–355 BC)

Athenian troubles did not end with Chares' settlement in the Chersonesos. Rather the Athenians stood on the verge of the Social War, a conflict that saw the secession of Chios, Rhodes, Byzantion, Kos and at least nine other major states. Although numerous reasons lay behind the rebellion, principal was the new aggressive Athenian spirit. During the fighting in the north the Athenians had captured twenty-four cities, which they treated not as allies but subjects. Instead of liberating Samos and Poteidaia, they occupied them with *klerouchoi*. They treated none of these states as equals of the members of the League, to which they were not admitted. In fact the Athenians extended these treaty rights to no other Greek states after 374. When they erased the reference to the King's Peace in the charter of the League, they sent a chilling message that indicated that they felt themselves no longer bound by its terms. That suggested in turn their rejection of the principle of autonomy for Greek cities, which proved the case with the newly-conquered cities. They in effect created an empire separate from the League administered solely by themselves. This trend reminded many of the Athenians of the fifth century. By 357 the situation had become too obvious and menacing to tolerate. Even some members of the League, as will shortly be seen, felt that the old bonds no longer held. The repercussion of Athenian actions and the general response to them proved greater than the Athenians expected.²⁴

²⁴ No new members: Ryder, *Koine Eirene*, 60–61; Cargill, *Athenian League*, 64–67. Erasure: *IG* II² 43 lines 12–15; see also Isok. 8.16; schol Dem. 3.28. Cargill, *Athenian League*, 29–32. Twenty-four captured cities: Isok. 15.113; Dein. 1.14. Twelve known states involved in the Social War: Amorgos: *SIG*³ 193; Andros; Aischin. 1.107; Byzantion: Diod. 16.7.3 *etc.*; Chios: *ibid.*; Keos: *IG* II² 404; see also Rhodes-Osborne, *GHI* 39; Tod, *GHI* 162; Kos: Diod. 16.7.3; Kyzikos: Dem. 21.173; Ps.-Dem. 50.4;

The Athenians even infringed upon the rights of the members of the League, which spawned fear among them. Here rests another major cause of the Social War. The particulars are several. From 365 to 357 the Athenians led without a clear purpose which meant that they could systematically execute nothing. The ineptitude of their commanding officers and their lack of resources marked the course of their military and naval operations. Their failure in the Hellespont endangered the Byzantines and their neighbors. Their involvement in the Satraps' Revolt invited Mausolos to extend his influence within the southeastern Aegean at the expense of Rhodes, Chios, and Kos. In their efforts to create a new empire the Athenians violated their oaths to the allies by harsh collection or extortion of tribute, interference in the autonomy of some allies, and imposition of garrisons, all piously renounced in the charter of the League. Such was the case at Keos, where the Athenians had suppressed an insurrection and subsequently regulated the constitution to their satisfaction. The situation in Euboia is less clear, but *stasis* led some cities to seek Theban support against Athens. Whatever the details, the unrest proves that some Euboian cities had found Athenian leadership irksome. The Athenians interfered in the local trade of some allies, which was also reminiscent of the abuses of the fifth century. The Athenians created an atmosphere of fear among the allies by making these impositions to further an offensive war not in their interest and against the defensive principles of the League. The Athenians had begun to use the allies to their own ends, which the allies both resented and opposed. When they saw the Athenians conquer Greek cities contrary to the King's Peace and infringe upon their own rights, they had ample reason to distrust and resist them. In large part those states that rebelled both protected themselves from the Athenians and saw to their own interests. Although each state harbored its own reason for rebelling based on local concerns, Athens stood in the way of all of them.²⁵

Mytilene: Ps.-Dem. 50.53; Naxos: *IG* II² 179; Perinthos: Plut. *Dem.* 17.2; Rhodes: Diod. 16.17.3 *etc.*; Samos: Nepos *Tim.* 3.3–4; Thera *IG* II² 179 fr. c lines 9–11.

²⁵ Fear of Athenian imperialism: Isok. 8.23, 46; hypothesis 8; Dem. 15.3. Tribute: Isok. 8.12, 46; Ps.-Dem. 50.53. Extortion: Isok. 8.46, 125; Aischin. 1.107; Polyain. 3.9.23; Ps.-Dem. 50.53. Garrisons: *SIG*³ 192–193 (= Rhodes-Osborne, *GHI* 51–52). Local trade: *IG* II² 179 (= Rhodes-Osborne, *GHI* 40). Interference in local autonomy: *IG* II² 11, 404, and above. Keos: *IG* II² 111 (= Rhodes-Osborne, *GHI* 39). Euboia: *IG* II² 124–125; see also *SIG*³ 172; Aischin. 3.85; Diod. 16.7.2.

Against this background can be set the few details known about the outbreak of the war. The Athenians claimed that the King and Mausolos were responsible for it; and that although the satrap served as architect of it, the results pleased Artaxerxes. The rebels themselves specifically complained that Athens was plotting against them. They made no reference to the Persians, and given their litany of grievances against Athens they had no reason to do so. Although Mausolos usually receives the blame for starting the Social War, he instead far more likely took personal advantage of Greek disaffection. He had no realistic ambitions farther afield; and except for the fleet that he sent to Chios in 357, he made no other known direct contact with rebels elsewhere. During the war he ventured no farther north than Chios and perhaps Erythrai, but instead concentrated his serious efforts on Rhodes and Kos. Mausolos benefitted from the Social War, played a significant part in it, but he alone did not start it. No one knows precisely why the rebellion erupted at this point, but the solution may lie in two factors. The first is obviously the allied discontent with Athens, and the second perhaps the rebels' history of acting in concert during insecure times. Their reaction in 357 is strikingly reminiscent of their mutual stand in 394–390, when the eastern Aegean was likewise turbulent (see pp. 134–139). Nor does any source describe how the allies seceded from the League. They may have sent official messages of secession, or recalled their delegates from the synedrion of the League, or refused to make their normal contributions. No record indicates that they took any active hostile action at this point, although such action would hardly cause surprise. The tension between Byzantion and Athens some five years earlier, already noted, arose from a specific local problem not shared by the other rebels. Further to complicate matters, lacunous sources make even a tidy chronology of the conflict impossible to reconstruct. It can, however, be reasonably assumed, even without evidence, that the major states discussed their intentions before they seceded. The discontent had long simmered.²⁶

²⁶ Mausolos and Artaxerxes: Isok. 7.10; Dem. 15.3; Didymos 1st hypothesis 1.4 of Dem. 24; 2nd hypothesis 2.1. Hornblower, *Mausolus*, 209–211. Erythrai: *SIG*³ 168 (= Rhodes-Osborne, *GHI* 56). Hornblower, *Mausolus*, 107–110. Chios: Diod. 16.7.3. Samos: Nepos *Tim.* 3.3–4. Kos: Dem. 15.3; Diod. 16.7.3, 21.1; W.R. Paton and E.L. Hicks, *The Inscriptions of Kos* (Oxford 1891) no. 350, and Sherwin-White, *Ancient Cos*, 73 n. 224. Rhodes: Dem. 15.3, 27; Diod. 16.7.3, 21.1–2. Oligarchies: Dem. 15.19, 27; Polyain. 3.9.23.

For Athens trouble began in 357 on Euboia, where civil unrest divided the island into two parties, one favoring the Thebans and the other the Athenians. Theban military intervention prompted an Athenian response in the form of a naval and military expedition led by Diokles. One of his soldiers was Aischines, soon to become one of the most noted of Athenian orators. The conflict centered around pro-Athenian Eretria, which received local assistance from Karystos. That in turn suggests that Chalkis, a traditional friend of the Thebans, had originally called upon them for support. Details of the conflict are lacking. After thirty days of numerous skirmishes but no pitched battles, the Thebans retired, leaving the Athenians to secure their hold on the island. They did so by concluding alliances with Eretria, Karystos, Chalkis, and Histiaia. The Athenians had without significant losses brought this strategically important island back to their side. The Euboians did not, however, rejoin the Athenian League. Yet this local incident may have caused wider repercussions elsewhere in the Aegean. Although the turmoil on Euboia did not inspire Byzantion and the others to secede at this point, it at least provided them with an ideal opportunity to rise against a distracted Athens.²⁷

When the Social War broke out in 357, the Athenians sent Chabrias and Chares with sixty triremes to Chios. The reasons were several. Foremost was the strategical position of the island, which provided the central link in the chain between Rhodes and Byzantion. Chios also faced Erythrai on the opposite coast, a city in which Timotheos and Mausolos had both shown specific interest. Lying due north of Samos, it was precious in Athenian eyes. A quick, successful strike at Chios would at least divide the rebels, end their hopes of a united confrontation against them, and protect Samos. Chabrias and Chares arrived to find the Chians reinforced by the Byzantines, Rhodians, and Koans. The Athenians were also most disagreeably surprised by the presence of Mausolos, who had brought his considerable fleet to support the rebels. His forces alone sufficed to turn the tide against

²⁷ Aischin. 3.85 with schol.; Dem. 8.74; 21.174; Diod. 16.7.2; Polyain. 5.29. Euboian background: Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.23; *Ages.* 2.24; Diod. 15.85.2, 6; 87.3; and above (Ch. 00). Athenian settlement: *IG II²* 124–125 (= Rhodes-Osborne, *GHI* 48, 69) 149; 1953 line 10. Yet it seems strange that Diokles should have served both as strategos and trierarchos in the same year; see also Develin, *AO*, 275–276. G.L. Cawkwell, *JHS* 83 (1963) 47–67; P.A. Brunt, *CQ* 19 (1969) 245–265; J.M. Carter, *Historia* 20 (1971) 418–429; E.M. Burke, *TAPA* 114 (1984) 111–120; E. Ruschenbusch, *ΣPE* 67 (1987) 158–159; H. Wankel, *ΣPE* 71 (1988) 199–200; Sealey, *Demosthenes*, 102–103.

the Athenians. Furthermore, he provided a formidable obstacle to any Athenian movement against Rhodes. This combination of forces indicated that if the Athenians could not win at Chios, they would lose the war. The city of Chios on the eastern coast of the island served as the primary Athenian target. The open and broad harbor offered the Athenians the opportunity to launch a combined attack from land and sea. Chares led the infantry against the walls, while Chabrias challenged the allies in the harbor. In a fierce naval battle Chabrias forced his way into the harbor only to be surrounded by the enemy. Although he died heroically, he lost the battle and with it the campaign. Chares fared no better in his land attack, which a determined counter-attack repulsed. In the face of this combined failure, Chares was fortunate to retire safely from the island instead of enduring a fate reminiscent of that of Nikias and Demosthenes at Syracuse. Nonetheless, the defeat at sea boded ill for Athens for only naval power could win this war. Failure at Chios also meant that the only hopes for Athens were the defeat of Byzantion and with it the securement of the grain supply or peace with the rebels.²⁸

The campaigning-season of 356 dawned dismally for the Athenians, who faced the distinct prospect of failure throughout the Aegean. Amphipolis and Olynthos stood firm against them in the northwest, as did Byzantion and its allies in the northeast, and Mausolos had closed the southern Aegean to them. The Athenians had in effect lost control of most of the eastern Aegean. They defended themselves by placing a garrison under the famed Attidographer Androtion in Arkesine on Amorgos, which protected their nearer allies in the Cyclades. They also strengthened their ties with Naxos, Thera, and Andros, which further strengthened their inner defenses. The Athenians now decidedly stood under guard, all the more urgent, for the rebels, emboldened by the previous year's success, took the offensive by manning some 100 ships and striking at Imbros and Lemnos, thus threatening a vital link in the Athenian grain route. Their success also weakened Athenian control of the eastern Aegean. They next beleaguered Samos and despoiled other islands still loyal to Athens.

²⁸ Dem. 20.80; Diod. 16.7.3, 21; Dion. Hal. *Lys.* 12; Nepos *Chab.* 4; Plut. *Phok.* 6.1–2. Topography: *Med. Pilot*, IV.306–307. Erythrai: Tod, *GHI* 155 (= Rhodes-Osborne, *GHI* 56); *IG* II² 108; see also *SIG*³ 126. Surely not by accident did the Athenians at this point enter into a treaty with Leukon, king of the Bosphoros: Bengtson, *SdA* II².306.

The Athenians responded to this threat by sending Menestheus with Iphikrates and Timotheos as advisors to Samos, where Chares joined them from Neapolis in the northwestern Aegean. Together they forced the Chians and other rebels to lift the siege, and then planned their counter-attack. The threat to the Athenian grain route prompted them to strike at Byzantion itself, which forced the rebels to sail to the defense of their ally. The sequel is unclear, but the opposing fleets did not reach the Hellespont. At Embata, an obscure place located near Erythrai, the two fleets made contact in stormy weather that brought high seas. The strait of Chios is wide and clear, but high north winds together with a lee current make navigation difficult for sailing vessels. The experienced Timotheos and Iphikrates put into port under these conditions, but an ambitious and outraged Chares stood out in the channel. Because of this poor seamanship, he lost a number of ships to the elements. To mask his incompetence he levelled charges of cowardice against his colleagues. Although some modern historians write of a battle of Embata, Chares fought only with Poseidon, not the allies. Though discomfited, Chares indicted Timotheos and Iphikrates, Timotheos being found guilty. He retired in disgust to Chalkis, where he ended his days. Although Iphikrates was acquitted, this was his last campaign. The Social War had by 356 claimed the last of the eminent generals of Athens—Chabrias, Iphikrates, and Timotheos—and the city would not again see their like.²⁹

By 355 Athens had endured two years of reverses that had taken their toll on its navy, leadership, and resources. Chares became now its principal commander, a man whose salient quality was his ineptitude. He now confronted a situation clearly beyond his abilities. In

²⁹ Amorgos: Rhodes-Osborne, *GHI* 51. Naxos and Thera; *IG* II² 179. Andros: Aischin. 1.107. Keos: Rhodes-Osborne, *GHI* 39; *IG* II² 404. Samos: Diod. 16.21.2; Nepos *Tim.* 3.1. Amphipolis: hypoth. Isok. 8; Nepos *Tim.* 3.1. Imbros and Lemnos: Diod. 16.21.2. Menestheus: Isok. 15.129; Philochoros, *FGrH* 328 F152; Nepos *Tim.* 3.3. Byzantion: *IG* II² 1612 lines 232–235; Diod. 16.21.3. Perinthos: Plut. *Dem.* 17.2. Selymbria: Dem. 15.26. Embata: Isok. 15.129–130; hypoth. 8; Dein. 1.14; 3.17; Diod. 16.21.3–4; Nepos *Tim.* 3.3–5; 4.4; *Iphic.* 3.3; Plut. *Mor.* 788D–E; 836D; Polyain. 3.9.29; 4.2.22; Steph. Byz. *s.v. Embaton*. For Embata see also Thuc. 3.29.2; Theopompos, *FGrH* 115 F14. L. Büchner, *RE* 5 (1905) 2485–2486; Gomme, *HCT* II.291; Hornblower, *Mausolus*, 213 n. 253. The verbs used by the sources prove that a battle was intended but not fought. Strait of Chios: *Med. Pilot*, IV.312–313. For the Athenian military situation in terms of command, see L.A. Burckhardt, *Bürger und Soldaten* (Stuttgart 1996).

addition to an eastern Aegean beyond Athenian grasp lay a western Asia Minor again plagued by satrapal unrest. Artaxerxes had died in 359 after a generally successful reign, despite the loss of Egypt. His son Ochus began his career with a purge that alarmed even loyal Persians, one of whom was Artabazos, the satrap of Hellenistic Phrygia. Fearing for his life and position, he revolted from the new king, though badly out-numbered by loyal troops. Artabazos in desperation hired Chares, who took the opportunity to sack Lampsakos and Sigeion, both in the King's sphere. With Artabazos he won a signal victory that he modestly compared to Marathon. His victory led to Athens' defeat. Ochus sent letters to his maritime satraps to pursue the war against Athens, sent ambassadors to Athens denouncing Chares, and condemning his breach of the King's Peace. He also bruited the word about to the allies that he would support them against Athens with 300 triremes. Unable to withstand economic hardship, allied resistance, and this new threat, the Athenians recalled Chares and concluded peace with with secessionists. Peace rested on the recognition of the autonomy of the allies, in which lies great irony. The Athenians only endorsed that which they had promised at the establishment of the League and which conformed with the clauses of the original King's Peace. The very terms of the settlement indict Athens for its failure to honor its original principles. Byzantion, Chios, Kos, Rhodes and the others became officially independent of Athens, but the League was not dissolved. It now became not only truncated in size but also limited to considerably weaker allies. Athenian desire for a new empire resulted only in the significant loss of gains made since 377.³⁰

The loss of the Social War held grievous repercussions for the Athenians for several reasons beyond the immediately obvious. After his influential part in the defense of Chios, Mausolos had turned Athenian weakness to his advantage by extending his control through his immediate neighborhood. His most precious gain was Rhodes, which had admitted Karians into the akropolis. A Rhodian oligarchy

³⁰ Chares and the war: *IG* II² 1612 lines 232–235; Isok. 7.9–10, 29; schol. Dem. 3.31; schol. Dem. 4.19; Didymos hypoth. 2.1 to Dem. 24; Diod. 16.22.2; Plut. *Arat.* 16.3. Finances: Isok. 7.9; 8.21; Xen. *Poroi* 2.3; Dem. 10.37; 20.33; 23.209. Peace: Dem. 15.26; 18.234; hypoth. Isok. 8; schol. Dem. 3.28; Aischin. 2.70; C. Wessely, in *Festschrift zu Otto Hirschfelds* (Berlin 1903) 100–103; Bengtson, *SdA* II².313; Pritchett, *GSW* II.79–80.

afterwards replaced the democracy, a move echoed by Chios and Mytilene. Although some scholars have urged that Athens fought the Social War primarily to retain Rhodes, the known facts argue against the idea. Extant sources document no serious Athenian attempt to regain the island. The most noticeable Athenian success in the area was the retention of Amorgos owing in no small part to the sagacity of Androtion. Probably soon after the conclusion of peace he served on an embassy to Mausolos to accuse him of wronging the islands. The argument was cogent in that the original Peace and its codicils had declared them autonomous of the Persians. Yet the Athenians themselves had violated those same treaties. Not only did Androtion's case prove futile, but the King was also pleased by Mausolos' enterprise. The Persians taught the Athenians that they could not play the same game with two different sets of rules.³¹

The Athenian debacle in the Social War came at the very time when a new and ultimately lethal rival came to the fore in the form of Philip of Macedonia. The war had alienated many theretofore loyal allies and crippled the League.³² Thebes and its friends remained a considerable and hostile force, and the amicable ties forged by Epameinondas meant that the newly-autonomous would either support Thebes or at least remain aloof from Athens. In sum, Athens in 355 was hardly the power that it had been even in 366.

³¹ Androtion: Rhodes-Osborne, *GHI* 51; Dem. 24.12 with schol.; 24.127; Didymos hypoth. 1.4 to Dem. 24; *IG* II² 150. Rhodes: Hornblower, *Mausolos*, 212, opines that the retention of Rhodes was the primary Athenian objective of the Social War, and Sherwin-White, *Cos*, 73 n. 224 suggests Koan military action there. Yet the flimsy evidence depends upon a fragment of a Roman comic poet, Lucius Lanuvinus (*Com. Rom. Frag.*, Ribbeck 96 f), who refers to an Athenian war against Rhodes; a scholiast on Dem. 13.1 who holds the Rhodians culpable for the war, while mentioning the strength of the fleet; and lastly one undated Koan inscription in which the islanders celebrated their successful defense against the Athenians. None of these is compelling, for the scholars assume that the fighting took place at this time and in these waters. Rather both Rhodes and Kos had repulsed the Athenians at Chios and engaged them at Samos, both naval conflicts that fit the sparse evidence equally well. In fact no contemporary source, and not even the derivative Diodorids, mentions any combat near the island, and Mausolos' fleet alone was strong enough to discourage Athenian intervention in the area.

³² Dem. 18.234.

CHAPTER TEN

THE SACRED WAR AND THE RISE OF PHILIP (357–347 BC)

After the battle of Mantinea in 362 failed to solve the question of hegemony in Greece or end the rivalries of the major powers, it brought some respite to the Peloponnesos. Isolated incidents disturbed the peace, notably the Mantineian effort to dismantle Megalopolis. Yet the Theban general Pammenes, the successor of Epameinondas and Pelopidas, promptly thwarted the attempt. The Peloponnesians afterwards suffered no significant turmoil until 351, when the Spartans likewise failed to destroy Megalopolis. The relative calm in the Peloponnesos provides an obvious but generally unappreciated tribute to the success of Epameinondas' policy there, one that Philip II, not Thebes, would soon inherit. He too appreciated the diplomatic opportunities the Peloponnesian fear of Sparta offered any outsider. The Athenians never learned this lesson. So too elsewhere. Although Athenian aggression led to turmoil in the Aegean, as already noted, it did not lead to general warfare. Yet the uneasy calm was illusory. Events beginning in 357 led to an irreversible shift to northern Greece that would culminate in the eclipse of all the major Greek powers and the dawn of the Macedonian hegemony. The cause is not far to seek. The Greeks had wearied one another in internecine warfare, while the Macedonians had never marshalled the considerable resources, human and material, at their disposal. Throughout classical history Macedonia had lain as a dormant giant that was generally on friendly terms with its Thessalian neighbors to the south but on the defensive against the Illyrians, Paionians, and Thracians on the west, north, and east, and generally at odds with the intrusive Athenians. From the days of the Persian invasion of 480 to 359, the Macedonians had devoted their energies mainly to fending off their foes, who at times had threatened to overwhelm them. The experience of Amyntas III fairly typified their predicament (see pp. 159–160). The situation seemed destined to repeat itself on the death of Perdikkas III in 359.¹

¹ Xen. *Hell.* 7.5.27; Diod. 16.2.4. Megalopolis: Diod. 15.94.2–3; 16.34.3, 39.1–7.

A. PHILIP II AND THE ASCENT OF MACEDONIA (359–356 BC)

Classical Greece had by 359 seen no lack of extraordinary men, but few of them quite compared with Philip II of Macedonia, one of the decisive figures of the period. The great and irascible Theopompos slyly put it well, when he wrote his enigmatic appreciation of the man. In a sentence that can be translated either as “Europe had never produced such a man at all as Philip, the son of Amyntas” or as “Europe had never endured such a man at all as Philip, the son of Amyntas” the historian caught the complexity of the king. His enemies for the most part painted the historical portrait of him, using in the process largely dusky hues. Yet the historical record, even though provided by his enemies, amply demonstrates that he was a complex, talented, often engaging, and genial man who put the security of his kingdom before virtually all other concerns. He could be as ruthless as his enemies, but for all of his reputation as a grim warrior, deserved as it was, he was also a consummate diplomat, speaker, and politician. No Macedonian would hold as dire an opinion of him as did the Athenians.²

When Philip ascended the throne in 359, he confronted more of the same problems that his father had in 393. Although Amyntas had coped with the Illyrians in the west and the Olynthians in the east, the challenge to Philip was far greater. In addition to the Illyrians, who had again invaded Macedonia and slain his brother Perdikkas together with 4000 others, the Paionians had launched plundering raids from the north, and Thracian and Athenian intervention imperilled the eastern part of the kingdom. In the face of this combined peril, Philip rallied his Macedonians and shored up their strength to meet the impending challenge. Though severe, the incursions of the Illyrians and Paionians menaced only the borders

Schaefer, *Demosthenes*, II².3–16; Hammond and Giffith, *HM* II.203–210; R.M. Errington, *A History of Macedonia*, Engl. trans. (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1990) 1–39; E.N. Borza, *Before Alexander* (Claremont 1999) 5–49.

² Theopompos, *FGH* 115 T19; F27; Aischin. 2.34–39, 125; Dem. 19.39; Diod. 16.3.1–3. Yet unanimity did not mark Athenian opinions of Philip: see also Isok. 5, *Letters to Philip* 1 and 2; Speusippos, *Letter to Philip*, for which see E. Bickermann and J. Sykutris, *Speusippos Brief an König Philipp* (Leipzig 1928). Theopompos’ opinion of Philip: W.R. Connor, *GRBS* 4 (1963) 107–114; G.S. Shrimpton, *Phoenix* 31 (1977) 123–144; see also M.M. Markle III, *JHS* (1976) 8–99; Flower, *Theopompus*, ch. 5.

of Macedonia. These invaders came more to plunder than to seize land, and those on the marches could prevent any permanent damage. The danger from the Thracians and Athenians threatened to be far more immediate and potentially lethal. The Thracians, doubtless under their king Berisades, supported the claim of Pausanias, probably the royal exile who had earlier menaced Eurydike after the death of Amyntas III. Athens, however, posed a more formidable problem. The Athenians saw in the death of Perdikkas the opportunity to further their expansionist efforts within the northwestern Aegean. Their immediate goal, as was seen (pp. 300–301), remained the conquest of Amphipolis, against which Timotheos had recently failed. The apparent weakness of Macedonia invited them directly to intervene and to that end they supported the ambitions of Argaios. Of royal blood, Argaios had supposedly ruled the kingdom for two years around 393. The Athenians thereby took the first egregious and intrusive step against Philip. Their intervention amounted to an unwarranted act of aggression against a seemingly helpless kingdom that was still at least nominally an ally. Athens had gotten off on the wrong foot with Philip.³

Philip's ascension to the throne indeed awakened Macedonia, the dormant giant of the Balkan peninsula. The king first bolstered the morale of his subjects by restoring internal order and re-organizing the army. In the latter he doubtless drew some of his inspiration from the military innovations of Epameinondas and Pelopidas, who had taught him the value of speed and mobility. He learned also the significance of the integration of arms together with the co-ordinated deployment of them in battle. Not merely a student, Philip

³ Theopompos, *FGrH* 115 F29; Dem. 36.53; Aischin. 2.27–31 with schol.; Diod. 16.2; Justin 7.5. Atheno-Macedonian alliance: Bengtson, *SdA* II².264; see Cargill, *Athenian League*, 85 n. 7. Argaios: Diod. 14.92.4; 16.2.6. Th. Lenschau, *RE* 18 (1949) 2398; Errington, *Macedonia*, 269 n. 15. N.G.L. Hammond, *Philip of Macedon* (Baltimore 1994) 23–24, argues here as earlier in favor of Justin's (7.5.9–10) statement that Philip for a long time acted not as king but regent. In addition to Justin, he cites Marsyas, *FGrH* 135–136 (without including mention of any particular fragment), further to support his position. Inspection of the fragments prove that Marsyas nowhere in them even mentions Philip only as a guardian after the death of Perdikkas. Furthermore, Diodoros (16.2.1), where one finds written in the margin of cod. R $\rho\omega\tau\omicron\nu\epsilon\tau\omicron\varsigma\ \tau\eta\varsigma\ \Phi\iota\lambda\iota\pi\pi\omicron\upsilon\ \beta\alpha\sigma\iota\lambda\epsilon\acute{\iota}\alpha\varsigma$ proves him wrong. Hammond's position, which few others accept, should be rejected. See also J.R. Ellis, *Philip II and Macedonian Imperialism* (London 1976) 46–47; G.L. Cawkwell, *Philip of Macedon* (London and Boston 1978) 27–28; H. Bengtson, *Philipp und Alexander der Große* (Munich 1985) 53; G. Wirth, *Philipp II.* (Stuttgart 1985) 25.

introduced his own creations, most notably the pike, or *sarisa*, longer than the Greek lance. The two weapons differed significantly in that the pike could not easily be thrown as could a hoplite's lance. That meant that the Macedonian infantryman depended upon his pike as his chief offensive weapon. Philip also lightened his troops' defensive armor, but even so they now more than ever needed the support of mobile troops. Philip solved the problem by resorting to the abundant and experienced Macedonian horsemen, whom he used to inflict blows on enemy formations. Cavalry served as an integral component of a combined army capable of inflicting damage at the point of attack. Next Philip needed the time to drill his men so that they functioned efficiently as a unified whole. He transformed a mob of swains or at least a militia into a true army.⁴

With some order restored Philip confronted his enemies, whom he realized he could not counter simultaneously. The Athenians, with their ambitions in the region, represented the most dangerous of them. Well knowing their ardent desire to regain Amphipolis, he undermined their support of Argaios by offering them the city. He also proposed a treaty of friendship with them that would further relieve any threat from them. In return he tried to negotiate a secret treaty by which the Athenians would cede Pydna to him. Secret treaties were rare in Greece; and since the Athenian boule openly discussed his proposals, word of them surely became the news of the day. The need for secrecy, however, is certainly understandable: the Amphipolitans had long and successfully resisted Athenian domination and the Pydnaians preferred autonomy to subjugation to Philip. Although the Athenians and Philip quite probably failed to conclude a formal agreement, their discussion closely resembled a devil's pact, and at the very least each party knew what the other wanted. Philip's thinking was quite lucid. Although he proposed to abandon Amphipolis, that did not mean that the Athenians would automatically recover it. The Amphipolitans and the Athenians would decide that. He would not necessarily gain Pydna, but he did not possess it anyway.

⁴ Diod. 16.3.1–2. H. Droysen, *Heerwesen und Kriegführung der Griechen* (Freiburg i.B. 1889) 107–114; H. Delbrück, *Geschichte der Kriegskunst*, I² (Berlin 1908) 180–181; G.E.M. de Ste. Croix, *CQ* 13 (1963) 110–119; M.M. Markle, *AJA* 81 (1977) 323–339; A.B. Lloyd, ed., *Battle in Antiquity* (London 1996) 169–198; Gaebel, *Cavalry Operations in the Ancient Greek World*, 147–150. For the fullest modern treatment of Philip's military innovations, see Griffith, *HM* II.405–449.

He lost nothing in the attempt but stood to gain much. His last stroke was masterful. He voluntarily and unilaterally withdrew the Macedonian garrison from Amphipolis and declared the city autonomous. He thereby cut a magnanimous figure for himself as a supporter of the general concept of the right of autonomy for the Greek states. As significantly, he had not in legal and physical terms handed it to the Athenians, who again confronted the task of reducing an independent, resolute, and powerful city. Although the Athenians did not conclude a treaty of friendship with Philip, they accepted his offer. Nor did they give any further significant support to Argaios. Their general Mantias landed him and his mercenaries at Methone, whence they marched inland to Aigai. The populace refused him entry; and on his retreat to Methone, he encountered Philip and the new Macedonian army. The young king defeated the pretender, inflicting heavy losses in the battle. The victory heartened the untried Macedonian soldiers, who could be justly proud of their victory over experienced mercenaries. It further strengthened Philip's position and authority as king. A last aspect of the incident was diplomatic. In the battle Philip took a number of Athenian prisoners who had served as Argaios' mercenaries. Instead of selling them into slavery, as was his right, he released them to Athens. He also sent notice to the Athenians that he wanted to forge an alliance with them. This is precisely what he would later do before the Peace of Philokrates.⁵

These incidents, though seemingly minor, established the pattern of relations between Philip and Athens. One more detail can be added. After the defeat of Argaios and the release of the Athenian mercenaries, Philip sent ambassadors to the Athenians with an offer of peace on the grounds that he had abandoned all claims to Amphipolis. He said in essence that he had honored his word to them. Despite uncertainties, enough evidence suggests that the two parties at this time concluded a formal peace. Nonetheless, the recent past was hardly conducive to good cheer. By supporting Argaios the Athenians had lawlessly opposed Philip, the legitimate heir to the throne, against whom they had waged a tepid war. Philip's voluntary

⁵ Theopompos, *FGH* 115 F30; Dem. 2.6; Diod. 16.3.1–3. Problems of secret pacts in Athens: P.J. Rhodes, *The Athenian Boule* (Oxford 1972) 41–42. Argaios: Dem. 23.121; Diod. 16.3.5. Papastavru, *Amphipolis* (Leipzig 1936) 33–37; Ellis, *Philip II*, 48–51; Cawkwell, *Philip*, 29–30; Wirth, *Philipp II.*, 23–24; Errington, *A History of Macedonia*, 38–39.

abandonment of Amphipolis and his renunciation of all claim to it in concert with his pledge, his release of Athenian mercenaries who had fought on behalf of his rival, and in the following year his release of the captured Athenian garrison at Poteidaia all concretely demonstrated his attempts to accommodate the Athenians. The Athenians reacted belligerently. They had spurned Philip's attempts to establish a friendly connection, broken their treaty obligations with the Macedonian royal house, and by their conduct had soiled their relations with the young king. Despite all of these facts, many modern historians consider Philip the aggressor. On the contrary, history proves that from the outset Philip was the victim. Having given the king every good reason to distrust them, the Athenians had taken the first long step to make themselves his enemy. Nor is the reason for this turn of events far to seek. The Athenians had established this pattern as early as 371, when they tried to harvest the fruits of Leuktra to make themselves the hegemon of Greece.⁶

Though important, Athens created only one of Philip's several problems. The king dealt next with the Paionians by presenting them with gifts and offering them a peace agreement. They considered Philip's bribes more useful than Macedonian land, which allowed him easily to buy them off. He similarly removed the threat of Pausanias in the east by sending sufficient gifts to Berisades, thus leaving the border with Thrace stable for the moment. The revitalized Macedonian army must surely have made these gifts more acceptable than the prospect of combat. During this entire crisis Philip demonstrated a remarkable ability to combine diplomatic with military ability. He fought only when necessary, acquiesced to a situation that he could not turn to his favor, and used Macedonian wealth to buy time. At the end of his first year as king, he had consequently kept Macedonia intact, while dividing his enemies by dealing with them separately. With his borders secure, he could pursue his policy of making Macedonia a major power.⁷

⁶ Dem. 2.6 with schol.; 23.121; Theopompos, *FGrH* 115 F30; Diod. 16.4.1; Polyain. 4.2.17; *SEG* XXI 246; Bengtson, *SdA* II².298. Griffith, *HM* II.237–240; Badian, in Eder, ed., *Die athenische Demokratie*, 96 n. 49. Ancients and moderns have made much of Philip's secret offer to give the Athenians Amphipolis in exchange for Pydna. Nothing necessarily argues against the notion, especially as a clever ploy by Philip; but whatever the truth of the matter, Philip and Athens seem either to have concluded a formal peace at this point, which is likely enough, or at least to have come to a mutual accommodation.

⁷ Diod. 16.3.4; Justin 7.6.3–5.

The campaigning-season of 358 presented Philip greater possibilities and fewer dangers, but it still promised its own turbulence. The precise sequence of events remains irrecoverable, but in brief the death of the Paionian king Agis gave Philip the opportunity to launch a successful campaign against his newly-placated enemies. He readily reduced them to Macedonian subjects. He next turned to the Illyrians into whose territory he led his entire army of some 10,000 infantry and 600 cavalry. King Bardylis initially responded by offering him an armistice on the basis of each side holding what it then possessed. Philip, however, was determined to retrieve lost territory. He demanded that the Illyrians withdraw from all Macedonian cities. Buoyed by his previous successes, Bardylis met the Macedonians with 10,000 picked infantry and 500 cavalry near Lake Lychnitis, the modern Ohrid. The order of battle would prove typical of future Macedonian tactics. Philip held his right with his infantry, and ordered his cavalry to take the enemy in flank. Although Philip usually and deservedly receives credit for being a military student of Epameinondas, the Theban never used this combination of arms in this particular fashion. The idea was Philip's. The Illyrians advanced in a square, a formation not normally used by the Greeks. Philip joined battle by launching a frontal infantry assault, while his cavalry pressed the Illyrians from the flank and rear. The combined assault overwhelmed the Illyrians, who broke formation only to suffer very heavy casualties in their flight. Bardylis surrendered to Philip, withdrew his forces from Macedonia, and concluded a temporary armistice. Despite its glory, Philip's victory was indecisive, for he was forced to leave his general Parmenion to maintain peace in the area. Only in 356 did this famous lieutenant win a crushing victory over the Illyrians. Even though Philip had not yet fully stabilized his frontiers, within the space of a few months this new Macedonian army had easily handled two forces that only the year before had discomfited them. Philip had thus extended Macedonian influence as far north as modern Albania and Serbia. These victories, coming on the heels of the defeat of Argaios' Greek mercenaries, proved that Philip had shaped a formidable weapon.⁸

The challenges and victorious beginnings probably prompted Philip to re-organize his kingdom. Although again the chronology and the

⁸ Diod. 16.4.2–7, 8.1; Dem. 1.23; Plut. *Alex.* 3.8. J. Wilkes, *The Illyrians* (Oxford 1992) 120–122.

extent of the changes are alike uncertain, Philip inaugurated a policy of establishing urban centers for the protection of Macedonia from its northern enemies. The development was quite probably neither wholesale nor immediate, but he began to concentrate Macedonians in newly-founded cities. Perhaps at this point he founded Herakleia Lynkestis at modern Monastir to protect this rich and vulnerable border with the Illyrians. He would later refound Krenides, the new Philippoi, and established Thessalonike as his urban jewel. Still later he established Philippi, the modern Plodiv in Bulgaria, as a defense against the Paionians. With the exception of the last, these cities shared the fact that they stood along the route of the later Via Egnatia. A pattern thus emerges, the key to which is the route. Macedonian cities eventually stretched from Herakleia Lynkestis eastwards to the capital at Pella on to Thessalonike past Amphipolis to Philippoi. They formed a line of strong points within easy communication with one another. Although Alexander later credited his father with making the Macedonians townsmen instead of mountain-folk, Philip by no means dragged every Macedonian down from the hilltop, but he did establish the strongest line of defense that Macedonia had ever known and one that endured until the fall of the Roman Empire.⁹

Late in 358 the face of northern politics changed even more abruptly, when the Thessalians asked Philip to intervene on their behalf. As so often before in the fourth century, the Thessalian Confederacy had become embroiled with the Pheraian tyrants, the chief opponents of whom were the dogged, though largely ineffectual, Aleuadae of Larisa. They, however, enjoyed traditional ties of friendship with the Macedonian monarchy; and Philip, having secured his kingdom from immediate external threats, now enjoyed the luxury of renewing traditional ties with his southern neighbors. He intervened against the Pheraians, temporarily relieved the situation, and endeared himself personally with the Thessalians. More importantly, he made a marriage alliance with the Aleuadae, which made him their enthusiastic ally. This bond formed the cornerstone of his Thessalian policy. So long as Pherai threatened the very existence of the Thessalian Confederacy, the Aleuadae and others there needed Philip, who entered their affairs as an invited guest and protector, not as an

⁹ Polyb. 34.12.7; Strabo 7.7.4; Arr. *Anab.* 7.9.2. E. Oberhummer, *RE* 8 (1912) 429; Ellis, *Philip*, 58–60; Cawkwell, *Philip*, 39–40; Griffith, *HM* II.658–662.

invader. His intervention failed yet to remove the danger of Pherai, but his friendship with Larisa proved strategically vital. The city commanded several routes running north-south between Macedonia and Thessaly, from which radiated additional routes farther afield. In short, the seat of the Aleuadae opened the door to the plains of Thessaly. By the end of 358, then, Philip had baffled the Athenian attempt to make Macedonia their vassal-state, had cowed the barbarians on his other borders, and had made the Thessalians fast friends. Seldom, if ever, had any other Macedonia king achieved so much against such great odds in such a short period of time.¹⁰

With his other borders secure, Philip in 357 turned eastwards to Amphipolis. Philip's success had raised grave concerns there, and one faction sent an official embassy to the Athenians proposing to hand the city over to them. Given his earlier promises, Philip should not have objected to the arrangement. Yet now he declared these negotiations a provocation to war. He obviously no longer harbored any quaint illusions about the worth of Athenian friendship. His reaction constituted the first fruit of recent Athenian interference in Macedonian affairs. He moved against the city with great force, including a considerable battery of siege machinery. Having breached the wall, his Macedonians stormed through the city striking principally at his political opponents. He exiled the foremost of the survivors, itself a mild response, and treated the other inhabitants with some compassion. Philip's attack demands some notice. As a naked act of aggression, the reasons for it require some explanation. Philip's ambitions come immediately to mind, but distrust of Athenian intentions deserves like attention. The Athenians were hardly innocent of perfidy. The stark facts of reality most probably account for his decision. Amphipolis was just too wealthy and strategically vital to put into the hands of a state that he could not trust. At any rate, Philip's attack amounted to a declaration of war on Athens itself.¹¹

Amphipolis not only secured Philip's eastern border, but it also gave him command of the rich riverine trade of the Strymon valley. It also put him squarely on the western border of Thrace, which suffered from political disarray after the assassination of Kotys in *ca.*

¹⁰ Diod. 16.14.1-2; Buckler, *SW*, 58-62 nn. 1-12.

¹¹ Theopompos, *FGrH* 115 F42; *SIG*³ 194; Isok. 5.2-5; Aischin. 2.21, 70, 72; 3.54; Dem. 1.8; Ps.-Dem. 7.27-28. Papastavru, *Amphipolis*, 32-38; personal observations of 10 July 1996.

359. His death permitted Berisades, Amadokos, and Kersebleptes to divide the kingdom among them, with Berisades ruling the westernmost part that probably stretched from the Strymon river in the west to Maroneia in the east. Amadokos held the central portion from Maroneia to the Hebros river in the east, while Kersebleptes reigned over the area from the Hebros to the Chersonesos. The three immediately began bickering among themselves to win control of the whole kingdom. The Athenians, then in the throes of the Social War, made little real impression on the course of events. Undisturbed, Philip easily obtained Pydna, whose citizens welcomed him. Pydna commands a long stretch of beach behind which rise abrupt bluffs. The heights are lower in the center of the beach, and through this gap access to the interior is easy. The way leads to a coastal road tending southwards and another northwards past Methone, Aigai, and thence to the Macedonian hinterland. These natural advantages made Pydna a good and defensible harbor. With Pydna in his hands he now controlled the coast of Macedonia with the exception of Methone, itself isolated and far from Athenian help.¹²

From Pydna Philip struck eastwards along the line of the future Via Egnatia to Krenides, well within the western portion of the Thracian realm. The region again suffered from turmoil. In the interval between the Athenian alliance with Berisades and Philip's campaign in 356, the king had died, leaving his three sons, the best known of whom is Ketroporis, who entertained ambitions against Krenides. Originally a colony of Thasos, Krenides received no support from its metropolis, nor could the distracted Athens provide any relief. Philip, however, easily occupied the city, which he modestly renamed Philippi, and far more importantly assumed possession of the rich gold and silver deposits in the area. He made such improvements in mining that the annual revenue brought him more than 1000 talents. He had amassed a fortune that was secure and independent of tribute or trade. He thereby obtained a firm financial foundation for his ambitions, one under his sole control and untrammelled by

¹² Dem. 1.5, 9.12; 4.4, 35; 20.61, 63; Arist. *Pol.* 5.8.12; Hegesandros, *FHG* IV.213; Theopompos, *FGrH* 115 F31; Diod. 16.8.3; personal observations of 6 July 1996; see also *Med. Pilot* IV.174. Thracian kingdoms: *IG* II² 126 (= Rhodes-Osborne, *GHI* 47); Dem. 23.8, 10, 170, 183; Strabo 7 fr. 47. Judeich, *RE* 3 (1897) 294; U. Kahrstedt, *RE* 11 (1921) 329; 11 (1922) 1552; Danov, *Altthrakien*, 357; E. Badian, *Pulpuveda* 4 (1983) 51–71; Archibald, *Odryian Kingdom*, 231–232.

the usual fiscal restraints of the Greek polis. His acquisition of this new eastern territory stretched his communications and brought added difficulties with the Thracians and Athenians. Security for his new gains demanded the domination of western Thrace and the nullification of Athenian seapower. Thasos, the main Athenian naval base in the area, stood as a threat that he could not eliminate. Philip solved the problem in precisely the way that Alexander followed on his march southwards along the western Asian coast. He would seize control of all the places along the Thracian littoral that could serve as bases against him. Thus, he probably took this occasion to destroy or capture Oisyme with its good cove at Cape Brasides, a name evocative of an earlier conflict. Farther to the west he razed Apollonia and Galepsos. Command of these two ruins strengthened his hold on Amphipolis immediately to the northwest. Only Neapolis, a stalwart Athenian ally, now threatened his line of communications. It could serve as an Athenian base against Philip, an outpost against Philip's future movements; but instead the king took advantage of its precarious position to reduce it. These conquests facilitated Philip's approach farther into Thrace; for having secured the inland line of the Via Egnatia, he now also enjoyed control of the coast. He had further seen at first hand the confusion in Thrace and the weakness of Athens. These factors prompted him increasingly to look eastwards to the Hellespont.¹³

Philip's successful operations throughout northern Greece spurred the Athenians to create a coalition against him. In midsummer 356 they made an alliance with Ketriporis and his brothers in Thrace; with Lypeios, the Paionian king; and Grabos, king of Illyria. They joined to defend themselves against Philip and to regain Krenides. The pact offers a study in futility, for the principals could hardly defend themselves. The Athenians were still encumbered by the Social War, the Illyrians still hard pressed at home, and the Paionians posed no threat to Macedonia. None of these could help the Thracians.

¹³ Poteidaia and Krenides: Tod, *GHI* 151, 157; Dem. 1.9, 12; 2.7; 4.4, 35; 20.61; Diod. 15.81.6; 16.3.7; Plut. *Alex.* 3.8; Justin 12.16.1–6; Steph. Byz. *s.v.* Krenides, Philippi. U. Kahrstedt, *RE* 11 (1921) 372; E. Oberhummer, *RE* 18 (1949) 589–592; Zahmt, *Olynth*, 104–107; Alexander, *Potidaea*, 88–91. Oisyme, Emathia, and Galepsos: Strabo 7 fr. 11, 35. E. Oberhummer, *RE* 17 (1937) 2288–2289; *RE* 5 (1905) 2480; *RE* 7 (1910) 597; Casson, *Macedonia Thrace and Illyria*, 88–89; *Med. Pilot*, IV.188; Giffith, *HM* II.364–365; B. Isaac, *The Greek Settlements in Thrace until the Macedonian Conquest* (Leiden 1986).

The situation should have shown the Athenians that they lacked any potent ally in the north. This treaty most significantly proves that the Athenians now realized that their earlier conduct had made an enemy of Philip. Nothing better demonstrates the fatuousness of their cause than the desire to regain Krenides, which in fact remained Philippoi. They would soon instead find themselves fighting for their own independence.¹⁴

Philip's power in the northwestern Aegean now stretched from Pydna past Amphipolis to the new Philippoi, but it did not yet branch southwards into the Chalkidike. Not surprisingly, Philip turned next to an isolated Olynthos. Instead of hostility, he offered the Olynthians a pact of peace, friendship, and alliance. As a gesture of good faith, he proposed to renounce the Macedonian claim to the Chalkidian city of Anthemos and its territory. He further startled the Olynthians by proposing to reduce Poteidaia, then held by an Athenian garrison, which he would afterwards hand to them. He must have argued that his line of interest ran northwards of the Chalkidike, following the general line of the Via Egnatia eastwards to Amphipolis and Thrace. If he and the Olynthians combined, they could exclude Athens from their regions. The Olynthians found the offer particularly attractive in that it would rid them of their unwelcome Athenian neighbors. The Athenians then held a strategically valuable place that potentially menaced the very existence of Olynthos. Although the Athenians had also vied for Olynthian favor, Philip, apparently the lesser evil, presented them with the better terms. Athens had already demonstrated its animosity towards them, but Philip had not. They could not trust either, which may account for the decision to publish the terms of their treaty with Philip at Olynthos, Dion in Macedonia, and especially at Olympia and Delphi. The publication of terms also served Philip well by portraying him as a pious philhellene. The erection of the stone at Delphi also indicates that the Sacred War had not yet erupted.¹⁵

Philip proved as good as his word, for early in 356 he moved against Poteidaia. The city sat astride the narrowest part of the peninsula of Pellene, now Kassandra, between the Toronaic Gulf on the east and the Thermaic on the west. The two headlands flanking the

¹⁴ Rhodes-Osborne, *GHI* 53.

¹⁵ Rhodes-Osborne, *GHI* 50; Dem. 2.7, 14; 6.20–21; 23.108; Libanios, hypoth. Dem. 1.2; Diod. 16.8.5; Steph. Byz. *s.v.* Anthemos.

city form a series of steep bluffs interspersed with ravines that allow easy access to the interior. The land generally opens onto small rolling hills that offer no great obstacle to movement. The city also possessed an extensive harbor. The Athenians claimed that their *klerouchoi* in the city had concluded a treaty with Philip, which he violated by his attack. The circumstances make the claim quite suspicious. The Athenians perhaps interpreted their treaty with him of 358 as including their *klerouchoi*. Yet Athenian possession of Poteidaia itself violated the Peace, which nullified any treaty rights to which they felt entitled. Philip could even in fact argue that he was simply enforcing the autonomy-clause of the Peace. At the moment Philip cared nothing for legal quibbles. He laid siege to the city, the fortifications of which failed to compensate for the city's natural vulnerability. He reduced it before the Athenians could relieve it. Not only did the Social War still distract them, but they also began to discover that their resources did not match their ambitions. Philip kept his word. Having captured the city, he sold the inhabitants into slavery further to fill his coffers. The city itself and its land he duly handed to the Olynthians. Although he also stripped the Athenians of their possessions, he otherwise treated them well by sending them back to Athens without ransom. He thus made another attempt to mollify the Athenians, though it was unlikely to succeed. His recent victories had put him in virtual control of the northwestern Aegean, for which Athens had for so long striven. The Athenians in all probability now held only Torone in the immediate region. The fall of Poteidaia also marked the occasion when Philip learned of Parmenion's defeat of the Illyrians and the birth of his wilful son Alexander. In the brief time since his accession Philip had not only stabilized his borders, but he had also built Macedonia into a burgeoning power ready to assert itself in the larger Greek world.¹⁶

B. THE OUTBREAK OF THE SACRED WAR (363–355 BC)

While Philip changed the face of northern politics, unrelated events in the south would soon draw him and all of the major states of

¹⁶ Dem. 1.9; 2.7; 4.4–6, 35; 7.10; Isok. 7.9; 16.8.5; Livy 44.11.1–3; Plut. *Alex.* 3.8. Alexander, *Potidaea*, 124 nn. 50–52; Zahrt, *Olynth.*, 104–108; Griffith, *HM* II.248–251; personal observations of 8 July 1996.

the Greek peninsula into an inextricable embrace. The Sacred War served as the agent, originally a somewhat minor Greek dispute over the sanctuary of Apollo at Delphi. The origins of the Sacred War actually precede the Peace of 362. As early as 363 stasis shook Delphi, and equally ominous conflict marked the following years. The precise cause for this unrest remains uncertain, but all available evidence indicates a combination of local strife and outside interference. In the spring of 363 the representatives of the Amphiktyonic Council, the *hieromnemones*, under the presidency of Andronikos of Krannon, both banished Astykrates and ten other prominent Delphians and confiscated their property. The exiles found refuge at Athens, where Astykrates received Athenian citizenship and exemption from taxation. His colleagues acquired *isopoliteia*, equal citizenship with the Athenians. The Athenians in turn used the occasion to accuse the *hieromnemones* of having violated both the laws of Delphi and those of the Amphiktyonic League. Then at war with most of the other Amphiktyons, the Athenians had obvious motive for making a spurious accusation, but nothing compels others to believe it. These events are both unique and mysterious, for they constitute the only instance of the Amphiktyons intervening in the internal affairs of a member. The *hieromnemones* reached their decision at a regular meeting, a *pylaia*, of the Council, where the majority of them rendered their verdict. Later Amphiktyons never charged any of them, Andronikos included, for any abuse of power or process.¹⁷

The political position of Delphi in this controversy is crucial. Throughout the classical period Delphi strove for independence from the rest of Phokis. The Delphians saw themselves as the stewards of a panhellenic religious center. As early as 448 they had asserted this view, much to the consternation of the Phokians. Although the Athenians at first sided with Phokis, they soon endorsed Delphian

¹⁷ Events of 363: *IG* II² 109; see also M.J. Osborne, *Naturalization in Athens* (Brussels 1981) 49–51; *FdD* III.5 nos. 15–18, 91 line 19. H. Pomtow, *Klio* 6 (1906) 89–96; U. Kahrstedt, *Griechische Staatsrecht* (Göttingen 1922) I.392; J. Buckler, in P. Roesch and G. Argoud, eds., *La Béotie Antique* (Paris 1985) 237–246; Buckler, *SW*, 90.

The principal narrative source for the Sacred War is Diodoros Book 16. On his sources for it see N.G.L. Hammond, *CQ* 31 (1937) 79–91; M. Sordi, *Diodori Siculi Bibliothecae Liber Sextus Decimus* (Florence 1969); T.T. Alfieri, *Acme* 41 (1988) 21–29; M.M. Markle in I. Worthington, ed., *Ventures in Greek History* (Oxford 1994) 43–69. Markle's observation (46) that "Identification of the sources for Diodorus 16 can be based on nothing more than informed and intelligent guess-work" says enough about the value of the effort.

independence. Later in the Peace of Nikias the Spartans, Athenians, and most of their allies formally agreed that Delphi was sacred ground and that the temple of Apollo and the Delphians themselves should be governed by their own laws, taxed only by themselves, judged by their own courts with regard to their people and territory according to their own customs. In the fourth century the status of Delphi as international ground was underlined in 368, when the site was chosen, much as Geneva often is today, as the seat of negotiations aimed at renewing a multilateral peace treaty. In the light of these facts, the Athenians in 363 violated the very principles of Delphian independence. Hence, several factors pertain to the situation obtaining in 363. The first was the long history of tension between Delphi and Phokis on the one hand and the close ties between Delphi and the other members of the Amphiktyonic League on the other. The Amphiktyony existed to administer the sanctuary of Apollo at Delphi, its members drawn basically from neighboring peoples such as the Thessalians, Phokians, Boiotians but also from the Dorians, Ionians, and lesser folk. They met in an assembly of twenty-four delegates in which the Delphians also enjoyed the right to deal with their own secular affairs. Nonetheless external politics and political rivalries often clouded strictly Amphiktyonic business. In 363 the animosity between Thebes and its Athenian and Spartan opponents constituted an immediate example. A similar complicating factor involved the traditional Athenian friendship with Phokis and their joint hostility towards Thebes. The Athenian diplomatic intrusion in the Delphian stasis of 363 fuelled these enmities.¹⁸

Trouble at Delphi increased dramatically until the situation at this point became critical. The Amphiktyons issued a decree so sweeping that its provisions expressly protected the sanctuary and its prerogatives. Its clauses are instructive. One insisted upon the right of the Amphiktyons to levy port taxes at Kirrha and the freedom to raise them at will. The Amphiktyons insisted upon the right to regulate the capital on deposit and to keep account of sacred funds. The decree also forbade the introduction of foreign troops onto

¹⁸ Fifth-century conditions: *IG* I³ 9; Thuc. 1.112.5; 5.18.2; Philochoros, *FGrH* 328 F34; Theopompos, *FGrH* 115 F156; Eratosthenes, *FGrH* 241 F38. Fourth century: Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.27. G. Roux, *L'Amphictionie, Delphes et le Temple d'Apollon au IV^e siècle* (Lyon 1979); Beck, *Polis und Koinon*, 192–196; F. Lefèvre, *L'Amphictionie Pyléo-Delphique* (Paris 1998).

sacred land. At least three conclusions immediately follow. The first is that some imminent external power threatened Kirrha and its revenues. Next, that same power entertained designs on the dedications of the temple and the way in which they were administered. Lastly, this power was prepared to use armed force to obtain its goals. This decree clearly indicates that the sanctuary of Apollo faced the danger of foreign invasion and seizure. That danger could not have come from Thebes to whom the Delphians had granted the right of consulting the oracle first (*promanteia*) in 360/59. The events of 357 provide the most compelling explanation of this document. At a regular meeting of the Amphiktyonic Council the Thebans brought charges against the Spartans for having seized the Kadmeia in 382. The Delphians also took this opportunity to accuse the Phokians of having illegally cultivated the sacred land of Kirrha. They had already publicly warned the Phokians and the entire Greek world, but the offenders had not heeded the injunction. The Delphians responded to Phokian intransigence by this formal indictment. Ruling in favor of the prosecutors, the Council levied heavy fines against both defendants. Until they paid their fines, they could not lawfully participate in the panhellenic festivities associated with the cult or consult the oracle.¹⁹

Two curious aspects cling to these indictments. The first is the nature of the charges against the offenders, and the second is the timing of the indictments. The Theban case is clear. By attacking Thebes in time of peace the Spartans had violated the Amphiktyonic oaths that regulated relations among members. The Delphians successfully proved the Phokians guilty of having violated the sacred land around Kirrha which even the Phokian leader Philomelos later confessed to be true. Kirrha holds the key to the dispute between the Delphians and Phokians. The rich land of the Kirrhaian, or Krisaian, valley remains today both extensive and alluring, and the

¹⁹ Theban *promanteia*: *FdD* III.4.375; see J.F. Bommelaer, *BCH* 93 (1969) 93–94; Amphiktyonic decree: L. Lefèvre, *BCH* 118 (1994) 99–110 (= *CID* IV.2); F. Salviat, *BCH* 119 (1995) 565–571; F. Pownall, *EHC* 42 (1998) 35–55; J. McInerney, *The Folds of Parnassos* (Austin 1999) 228 n. 66. P. Sánchez, *L'Amphictionie des Pyles et de Delphes* (Stuttgart 2001) 182–183, offers the intriguing suggestion that the Thessalians, not the Thebans nor the Delphians, indicted the Phokians. Yet the Thessalians figure in none of the sources—especially epigraphical or literary—that bear upon this episode. Nor would the pious Diodoros have any ostensible reason to shield the Thessalians. See also Jehne, *Klio* 81 (1999) 344–351.

pilgrimages of the faithful from the port to the sanctuary provided a lucrative source of income. Recent Phokian encroachment onto sacred land easily explains the timing of the charges. While the events were recent, the Delphians alone were too weak to resist their more powerful neighbors. All hope of success must come from the Amphiktyons in general and the Thebans in particular. Having issued their decree, the Council now intended to enforce it. The occasion also gave the Thebans the opportunity publicly to humiliate the Spartans for an old grudge. The revenge proved all the more apt because the Spartans were a genuinely pious folk.²⁰

The Spartans responded to the verdict with lofty, impotent disdain; but the Phokians found themselves confronted by an impending crisis, one made all the more urgent by the close proximity of the Thebans and Thessalians, both capable of quickly enforcing the Amphiktyonic decision. The Phokians convened a special session of their league to discuss the ultimatum. Philomelos of Ledon urged his countrymen to defy the Amphiktyons. While admitting Phokian guilt, he claimed, perhaps rightly, that the verdict was too harsh. He advised the Phokians to reject alike the validity of the condemnation and the authority of the Amphiktyonic Council to speak on behalf of Delphi. On the latter point he was unconscionably wrong. In defiance of the Council he insisted instead that the Phokians assert their right to administer the temple, its land, and its other possessions. He finished his speech by proffering himself as commander-in-chief (*strategos autokrator*) of the Phokian Confederacy. He also nominated Onomarchos and another worthy to assist him. Though fiery, his proposal met with some equally spirited resistance, most notably from the Thrakiadai, a noble Delphian family, and the people of Abai, who tended their own renowned sanctuary of Apollo.

²⁰ Diod. 16.23. Amphiktyonic oath: Aischin. 2.115; Delphian case: Dem. 18.18; Aischin. 3.107–112; see also 3.122–123, for an actual account of the inspection of sacred land; Paus. 10.2.1, 15.1. Although McInerney, *Parnassos*, 206–207, objects to Buckler's reading of Diod. 16.23.2–3 in Roesch-Argoud, eds., *La Béotie Antique*, 243; *SW*, 15–16, his grammatical and stylistic interpretation of the passage is tortured and irregular. He insists that Diodoros' clauses containing the indictments "are stylistically if not syntactically paired", and that Diodoros wrote "more with an eye to style than clarity". By shifting from the active voice in the *men*-clause to the passive voice in the *de*, Diodoros achieved neither. In this case, syntax alone supports Buckler's interpretation of the passage; see also J. Buckler, review of J.M. McInerney, *The Folds of Parnassos* in *Bryn Mawr Classical Review*, 30 November 2000; and H. Beck, *Scripta Classica Israelica* 20 (2001) 302.


Confronted with this dire situation, the Phokian Confederacy legally ratified Philomelos' proposals and elected him as their official magistrate.²¹

Philomelos next journeyed to Sparta, where he received a friendly reception. There he revealed his intention to revoke the Amphiktyonic decrees and to seize the sanctuary, the resources of which would constitute his war-chest. In response to the Phokian appeal for help, Archidamos promised unofficial support but refused at the moment openly to commit his state. Nonetheless, the Spartan king obviously acted in the full knowledge and approval of the Spartan authorities. Encouraged by his welcome in Sparta, Philomelos returned to Phokis determined to implement his designs. Since the levy of the Phokian Confederacy alone was no match for the Amphiktyons, he recruited a mercenary army that included 1000 Phokian peltasts. This adroit move brought a large number of Phokians into collusion with him, and this type of soldier deployed most efficiently on the terrain around Delphi. Thus armed, at the end of the spring *pylaia*, or around July 356, Philomelos marched on Delphi, which easily fell to him. He ruthlessly eliminated his political opposition, and only the intervention of Archidamos dissuaded him from destroying the entire population of the city. His ferocity set its stamp on a war that would prove especially brutal.²²

The news of Philomelos' stroke sparked the Lokrians, probably those from neighboring Amphissa, to rush vainly to the god's defense. Philomelos repulsed them outside the sanctuary and ordered the

²¹ Diod. 16.23.4–6, 29.4; Paus. 10.2.2; Polyain. 5.45; Justin 8.1.8. Onomarchos as second-in-command in 355: Diod. 16.31.5. Schaefer, *Dem.* F.491; Buckler, *SW*, 21–22; *CQ* 90 (1996) 380–382.

²² Diod. 16.24.1–3, 29.4, 64.2; Theopompos, *FGH* 115 F312; Timaios, *FGH* 566 F11; Aischin. 2.131 with schol.; 3.133; Paus. 3.10.3–4; 10.2.3; Justin 8.1.8. Th. Flathe, *Geschichte des phokischen Kriegs*, (Plauen 1854) 6; M. Scheele, *ΣΤΡΑΤΗΓΟΣ ΑΥΤΟΚΡΑΤΩΡ* (Leipzig 1932) 10–12; J. Seibert, *Die politischen Flüchtlinge und Verbannten in der griechischen Geschichte*, (Darmstadt 1979) I.134–135. McInerney, *Parnassos*, 229 n. 71, in a point well taken objects to Buckler's (*SW*, 47) conclusion that the Phokian *strategos autokrator* acted within the law of the Phokian Confederacy. In his official capacity Philomelos had the right and the power to act within his state and against its declared enemies. Modern analogies include A. Hitler's extermination of the *Sturm Abteilungen* (SA) on 30 June 1934; J.W. Wheeler-Bennett, *The Nemesis of Power* (London 1961) 320–326, and F.D. Roosevelt's detention of Japanese-Americans on 19 February 1942; I. Glasser, *Visions of Liberty* (New York 1991) 207–212. When Philomelos and the Phokians seized Delphi, they acted as rebels against the Amphiktyony, the legitimacy of which they had until that moment recognized. They then put themselves beyond the law, as most of the Greek world declared.



7. Phokis and Eastern Lokris

prisoners to be thrown from the Phaidriadaï Rocks, the traditional penalty for those guilty of sacrilege. His calculated cruelty emphasized the Phokian claim to the presidency of the sanctuary and his intention ruthlessly to defend it. Flushed with victory, he turned his attention to the sanctuary and to Delphi itself. He destroyed the inscription that bore the Amphiktyonic condemnation of the Phokians, crushed the legal government of the city, and recalled Astykrates and his friends from Athens. He next established them as a puppet-government in the city, and then demanded that Apollo ratify his actions. When he forced the priestess to mount the tripod and issue an oracle, she snidely answered that he could do what he wanted. He accepted the sneer as an oracle, published it, and summoned an extraordinary session of the Phokian Confederacy at Delphi. The very choice of Delphi as the site of the meeting further underlined the Phokian claims to the presidency of the sanctuary. He persuaded his countrymen to send embassies to the leading states of Greece to reassure them that far from intending to seize the sacred treasures, the Phokians were merely reasserting their ancestral authority. He piously promised to render a full account of the god's possessions. Lastly, he charged the ambassadors to urge the other Greek states either to join him or at least remain neutral.²³

The Spartans naturally welcomed the Phokian message, well knowing that the fine against them had been erased and hoping that ensuing turmoil could assist them in reasserting their lost position within the Peloponnesos. If the Thebans became embroiled with the Phokians, they could attempt to reconquer Messene and again attack southern Arkadia. In Athens too traditional hatred of Thebes guaranteed the Phokians a sympathetic hearing. Beyond defiance of Thebes the Athenians stood to gain virtually nothing from the looming conflict. Only should the Thebans suffer a catastrophic defeat could Athens hope to recover Oropos, which they fervently desired. Yet Athenian entry into the war might endanger the northern border of Attika. Although this consideration alone gave the Athenians ample reason

²³ Diod. 16.24.4–25.1; 27.14; 28.3; Aischin. 12.131; Plut. *Mor.* 292D–E. Return of exiles: *FdD* III.1. no. 146; III.5. no. 19. Phaidriadaï Rocks: Plut. *Mor.* 825B; Aelian, *VH* 11.5; schol. Aischin. 2.142; Aesop test 22; schol. Ar. *Birds* 1446; Eusebios *Praep. Ev.* 8.1.4. Frazer, *Paus.* V.248; personal observations of 1 June 1983. N.G.L. Hammond, *JHS* 57 (1937) 46–51; L. Lerat, *Les Locriens de l'Ouest* (Paris 1952) II.47–48; Roux, *L'Amphictionie*, 109; J. Fontenrose, *The Delphic Oracle* (Berkeley 1978) 307; Buckler, *SW*, 24–26; Lefèvre, *L'Amphictionie*, 31–32.

to remain aloof from the strife, they too endorsed the Phokian position, thereby defying the rest of the Amphiktyons again. Phokian embassies to the Boiotians, Thessalians, and other Amphiktyons met with failure. Those who had found the Phokians guilty of profaning sacred land could hardly condone a violent program that defied the will of the Amphiktyonic Council. Instead, the Lokrians appealed to the Boiotian Confederacy to vindicate them and the god. This plea, especially after the spilling of blood, could not be ignored. The Thebans sent embassies to other Amphiktyons demanding action against Phokis. The Amphiktyons probably met in special session sometime around September and October 356 to deal with the crisis. Demanding that the Amphiktyonic decrees be enforced, the Thebans called for a sacred war against the Phokians on the grounds of sacrilege. The Thessalians and other Amphiktyons enthusiastically endorsed the proposal, a decision that divided Greece along predictable lines according to allegiances with Thebes, Athens, or Sparta. The Thebans successfully depended upon the support of most Amphiktyons and the neutrality at least of their Peloponnesian allies, who in fact largely avoided the conflict. The latter concentrated on keeping watch on Sparta. Athens, Sparta, and most of their allies favored the Phokians in an alignment similar to the one that had existed during the Theban Ascendancy. Piety, however, led many other Greek states to take the side of the Amphiktyons. The decision for official hostilities came in the autumn of 356, when the Amphiktyons formally declared war against Phokis and its Athenian and Spartan allies.²⁴

When the Amphiktyons determined for war, they also mapped their strategy against Phokis. Having decided to launch their first campaign in the coming spring of 355, they set a date and place for their forces to rendezvous. Philomelos made his own dispositions. Rather than rely mainly on the full levy of the Phokian Confederacy, he recruited still greater numbers of mercenaries. These troops could and ultimately would serve as a private army that gave its loyalty to its paymaster and not to the Phokians. It gave Philomelos freedom

²⁴ Xen. *Poroi* 5.9; Theopompos, *FGrH* 115 F63; Dem. 16.28; 18.18; Aischin. 3.118 with schol.; 3.133; Diod. 16.25.1, 27.5, 28.3–29.1; Paus. 3.10.3; 4.28.1; Justin 8.1.11. Extraordinary sessions: *FdD* III.5. no. 19 lines 8–30. Beloch, *GG* III².1.248; Buckler, *SW*, 26–29; McInerney *Parnassos*, 207–209. Lastly, the needless Athenian entry into the Sacred War argues forcibly against Ober's (*Fortress Attica*, 51–66) theory that the Athenians pursued only a defensive policy during the fourth century. The Athenians were in fact courting trouble.

of action without constraint from the Confederacy. This consequently proved to be a war such as had never previously been seen in Greece. Philomelos could meet the financial demands of this large mercenary army only by plundering the Pythian sanctuary. Even though realistically he had no other choice, his appropriation of the dedications from the entire Greek world turned many states against Phokis. The people of Lampsakos, for example, could not have enjoyed the news that Philomelos gave their dedication of a golden crown to a dancing girl whose military finesse was at least dubious. From the outset, then, Philomelos obviously looked upon Apollo as his paymaster. Having looted sacred treasures, he attracted a force of some 5000 mercenaries by increasing the rate of pay by half. The arrival of spring saw Philomelos further supported by mercenaries sent from Archidamos and 1500 Achaians, bringing his army to some 10,000. Nonetheless, his situation was dire. The Lokrians and Thessalians threatened Phokis from the north and west and the Boiotians from the east, presenting him with the classical problem of conducting a war on two fronts. He decided upon a bold response. He would strike at eastern Lokris before the Amphiktyons could assemble their several contingents in a combined army. He could thereby knock the Epiknemidian Lokrians out of the war at its very outset. A quick victory in this quarter would also give the Phokians command of Mt. Kallidromon separating the southwestern coast of the Euboian Gulf from the the Kephisos Valley. With the passes in his hands, Philomelos could block the Thessalian ascent from the sea, thereby forcing them either to fight on unfavorable ground in order to break through, perhaps even before the arrival of the Thebans, or to retreat without striking a blow. Then he could deal with the Thebans alone. This plan gave him the only hope of defeating his enemies piecemeal.²⁵

²⁵ Diod. 16.30.1–2, 56.6; Theopompos, *FGrH* 115 F248; Ephoros, *FGrH* 70 F96; Athen. 6.231d; 13.605c; Plut. *Tim.* 30.7; *Mor.* 397F; Paus. 10.2.4; on 10.8.7 see also Hdt. 1.92; 10.33.2; Polyain. 5.45; Eusebios *Praep. Ev.* 8.14. Against Diod. 16.28.1, 56.3 see Polyb. 9.33.4 and more importantly the contemporary inscriptions found in *FdD* III.5. nos. 19–20. Although the Thessalians could have used the Dhema Pass, a discussion of which will be found below, they would then have risked confronting the Phokians alone. Chronology of the war: E. Pokorny, *Studien zur griechischen Geschichte im sechsten und fünften Jahrzehnt des vierten Jahrhunderts v.Chr.* (Greifswald 1913); P. Cloché, *Études chronologique sur la troisième guerre sacrée* (Paris 1915); N.G.L. Hammond, *JHS* 57 (1937) 44–77; M. Tonev, *Studia philologica Sordicensis* 1 (1939) 165–212; M. Sordi, *RFIC* n.s. 36 (1958) 134–166; Buckler, *SW*, 148–195.

The Amphiktyons mustered about 13,000 men, but Phokis itself divided the levies. Word that the Theban contingent of 6000 men were ready to march triggered events. Philomelos immediately crossed Mt. Kallidromon in a swift invasion of Epiknemidian Lokris. Although one cannot now determine whether he used the route from Triteis to Naryx or that from Tithronion through the Kleisoura Pass to Argolas, the modern Mendenitsa, both reach the same general area, from which he could observe all of the roads available to the Thessalians. He could also descend thence onto Thermopylai, if necessary. His stroke caught the Amphiktyons by surprise before they could assemble their forces. The Lokrians sent cavalry to oppose him only to meet with defeat. Yet their sacrifice bought the Thessalians and their allies enough time to arrive on the scene, thereby preventing the Lokrians from being overwhelmed. With his superior numbers Philomelos immediately joined battle with the Thessalians, whom he readily defeated. The vanquished stood siege in Argolas; and after desultory clashes, awaited the arrival of the Thebans. When Pammenes at their head reached the scene, Philomelos preferred not to challenge the victors of Leuktra and Mantinea. Yet the appearance of the Achaians prompted him to continue skirmishing, which led to atrocities on both sides. Achieving nothing, unable to defeat the enemy, and himself suffering casualties, Philomelos ordered his army to retire to the Kephisos Valley to cover Phokis. He probably marched by way of the Kleisoura Pass, the fastest route open to him. Pammenes in turn ordered the Amphiktyonic army to pursue him southeastwards along the upland valley of Mt. Kallidromon through the Fontana Pass south of Naryx. After the Phokians had descended onto Tithronion and the Amphiktyons onto Triteis, the two collided as they converged on Tithorea. Neon, its akropolis, gave its name to the ensuing battle, which actually took place in the level region north of the lower city. The Amphiktyons defeated the Phokians in hard battle, and then drove the survivors up the heavily wooded slopes of Parnassos. Among them fled the badly wounded Philomelos. Rather than face capture, he hurled himself from the rocks, the manner of death precisely that prescribed for temple-robbers.²⁶

²⁶ Diod. 16.31.2–5; Paus. 10.2.4; Eusebios *Praep. Ev.* 8.14. F. Schober, *Phokis*, (Crossen, Oder 1924) 70–71; Pritchett, *Topography*, IV.125–128, 134–135; VIII.155 n. 16; Buckler, *SW*, 39–44; personal observations of 30 May 1983, 10 and 14 July 1986; McInerney, *Parnassos*, 336–337.

The Phokian defeat at Neon, instead of bringing peace and punishment for the sacrilegious, inaugurated a new and far more ambitious stage of this unusual war. Although Pammenes had won a major victory, the greatest of his career, he failed to use it to end the Sacred War. Rather than advance on Delphi to liberate the sanctuary, he dismissed the Amphiktyons, thus giving the Phokians another chance to recoup their fortunes. Onomarchos immediately took command of Phokian forces, led the shattered remnants of Philomelos' army back to Delphi, and planned the further pursuit of the war. Convening a meeting of the Phokian Confederacy and inviting the allies to attend, he urged them all to continue the conflict. Although one group favored peace, he pointed out that surrender would put them all at the mercy of the Amphiktyons, not a cheerful prospect after the looting and the shedding of so much blood. In addition to the original fine, the Phokians could now expect still another punitive fine to pay for their depredations. Those chiefly responsible could expect punishment. Nor would retribution be limited to them, for the Amphiktyons had cursed the Phokian people as a whole. Individuals had at the outset tilled the sacred land; but Philomelos and Onomarchos, duly elected magistrates of the Phokian Confederacy, had seized the sanctuary, plundered its wealth, and defied the Amphiktyons in the field. The Phokians themselves thereby held the ultimate responsibility for the sacrilege and could accordingly expect punishment. A decision to continue the war was hardly more attractive. The Phokians could recoup their losses only by raiding the sacred treasure ever more extensively than before. To continue the war they must put their faith into the hands of a branded criminal who could act regardless of their wishes but the consequences of whose acts would fall upon their heads. Faced with this dire alternative, the Phokian Confederacy voted to carry the program of Philomelos to completion. They elected Onomarchos *strategos autokrator* and his brother Phayllos *strategos*. The Phokians had now irretrievably committed themselves to victory over the Amphiktyons.²⁷

His position as commander-in-chief legitimate and secure, Onomarchos next tried to crush the numerous and considerable opposition that had pressed for peace. Under no illusions about the dangers

²⁷ Diod. 16.32.1-3; Aischin. 2.117; Paus. 10.2.5. W.S. Ferguson, *RE* 18 (1939) 495-496; Buckler, *SW*, 45-47; McInerney, *Parnassos*, 210-211.

and difficulties confronting his policy, he wanted unanimous support from his countrymen. Therefore, he had his major opponents arrested and executed and their property confiscated to swell his war-chest. As strategos autokrator he probably acted within the law, no doubt justifying his actions as necessary for the safety and welfare of the people at large. His conduct could not, however, be distinguished from that of a tyrant. All the same, his severity succeeded temporarily in quelling local opposition, allowing him to proceed untrammelled. Onomarchos next confronted the task of rebuilding Phokian military power, to which end he began relentlessly to plunder Delphic treasure on an unprecedented scale. Bronze and iron dedications became the raw materials for Phokian weapons. He also added a new element into his arsenal by introducing non-torsion stone-throwers capable of hurling a five-pound shot and light enough to serve in an emergency as rudimentary field artillery. Some bronze was minted into coins, with the Phokian emblem of a bull's head on the obverse and Onomarchos' name encircled by a wreath on the reverse. Gold and silver dedications were also melted down for coins. Regardless of forms, these metals financed Onomarchos' recruitment of mercenaries, which became no easy matter after the disaster at Neon. Not only did he fill the empty ranks of the slain, but he also increased the size of the army until he could field a force of about 20,000 infantry and 500 cavalry. All of these efforts took time; but since the Amphiktyons failed to press their advantage, he had the winter of 355/4 at his disposal.²⁸

Of all the Phokian generals Onomarchos came closest to victory because of his political, diplomatic, and military skills. He even turned Philomelos' defeat to Phokian advantage. Having stabilized the situation in Phokis and raised a new army, he had in the process isolated the Ozolian Lokrians from their allies. He bullied Amphissa, which he then garrisoned, and probably the rest of western Lokris into concluding an alliance with Phokis. He thereby secured his homeland from attack from that quarter, while easing communications with his Peloponnesian allies. He probably next dragooned them into allying

²⁸ Diod. 16.33.3; Aischin. 2.131; Dem. 19.21. Artillery: E.W. Marsden, *Greek and Roman Artillery* (Oxford 1969) 59. Coinage: Diod. 16.33.2; Plut. *Mor.* 401F; B.V. Head, *Historia Numorum*² (Oxford 1911) 339; R.T. Williams, *The Silver Coinage of the Phokians* (London 1972) 51–69, who concludes that of all the generals Phayllos minted most extensively. Mercenaries: Diod. 16.32.4, 35.4.

themselves with Athens. The Phokians consequently allowed acceptable Lokrians to participate in Delphic affairs, which helped ostensibly to strengthen the Phokian claim to the legitimate presidency of the sanctuary. If Onomarchos could not deal so easily with the eastern Lokrians, he faced less to do there. Philomelos had inflicted serious losses on the Epiknemidians, and Phokian Daphnous separated them from their Opountian kinsmen. Enemies still encircled Phokis, but one of them was badly shaken. After their defeat at Argolas, the Thessalians were unlikely to intervene again against an even larger force than Philomelos', especially in 355, when the persistent feud between Pherai and the Thessalian Confederacy flared anew, doubtless encouraged by the defeat. Peitholaos and Lykophron, the tyrants of Pherai, readily seized the moment to challenge other Thessalians for mastery of the land, and as usual the Aleuadaí of Larisa resisted. Onomarchos decided to turn the internal discord to his advantage by aiding the Pheraian tyrants so that the Thessalian Confederacy could not again oppose Phokis. Then only the weak eastern Lokris would impede his way to Thermopylai, the securement of which would end the menace from the north. He easily accomplished his aims by allying himself with Lykophron and Peitholaos and by contributing substantial sums to the maintenance of their own mercenary army. In 354 the Thessalian Confederacy would have its hands full merely defending itself. By wise use of Philomelos' initial victory and by diplomatic intrigue, Onomarchos removed the Thessalian Confederacy from the Phokian theater of the Sacred War and virtually from the war itself. Lastly, the winter gave him the respite to direct these advantages towards Phokian victory.²⁹

C. PHILIP AND THE SACRED WAR (355–353 BC)

The campaigning-season of 355 proved somewhat remarkable because it saw the convergence of several divergent historical developments that would not be separated until the conclusion of them all. In the

²⁹ Thessaly: Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.35–37; Theopompos, *FGH* 115 F352; Isok. 8.118; Diod. 16.14.2, 33.3, 34.2, 37.4; Plut. *Pel.* 35.6–12. Westlake, *Thessaly*, 160–173; Sordi, *La lega tessala*, 240. Lokrians: Diod. 16.33.3, Plut. *Mor.* 249E–F; *FdD* III.5. no. 19 lines 34, 44. W.A. Oldfather, *RE* 13 (1926) 1204–1205; W.S. Ferguson, *RE* 18 (1939) 489; Lerat, *Les Locriens de l'Ouest*, II.50–51; Buckler, *SW*, 48–50.

north Philip had stabilized the Macedonian kingdom and had established cordial relations with Thessaly. He had also frustrated Athenian designs on Amphipolis and the broader region. Although Athens concluded an alliance with Neapolis, south of Philippi, its position along the coast was quite tenuous. In the progress of his advance, Philip had won western Thrace and made enemies of the two remaining sovereigns, who could only look to Athens for support. Athens itself was a weak stalk, for it was still distracted by the Social War and the risk of Persian intervention in the eastern Aegean. Farther south the Sacred War served as a vortex to virtually every state on the Greek peninsula. Kersebleptes added his own contribution to the situation by having the Phokian-held Delphi honor his four sons. The gesture served as symbolic support of Phokis and its Athenian ally, as well as public recognition of the proper succession of his line. In the south Onomarchos still confronted the two formidable factors of Thebes and Thessaly. The futures of all these states had become inextricably combined in a way heretofore unknown. The year 355 was the time when Philip's course and that of larger Greek affairs met.³⁰

With so much in confusion and pending on the Greek mainland, to everyone's surprise the Thebans removed Phokian worries by involving themselves in the last phase of the Satraps' Revolt. When in 355 the King angrily presented the Athenians with the ultimatum either to recall Chares from service with Artabazos or face war, they chose peace (see p. 383). Thus left in the lurch, the rebel offered the Thebans handsome pay for the service of 5000 hoplites. Unlike the Athenians who were sworn to defend their League, the Thebans stood virtually beyond the reach of the King's arm. Having agreed, they duly dispatched Pammenes and the troops overland to Asia Minor. The startling Theban response calls for some comment, for the ties between them and the King went back to the Persian War, and as recently as 367/6 the two had jointly sponsored a Common Peace. The latter experience suggests an answer, for the episode ended in the most humiliating failure in Theban foreign policy since the King's Peace of 386. That embarrassment followed by the futility of Epameinondas' naval expedition provided the Thebans with

³⁰ Atheno-Neapolitan alliance: Tod, *GHI* 159. Kersebleptes' sons: *FdD* III.1.392. J. Buckler, *Klio* 68 (1986) 348–350; see also Dem. 23.10, 170. Archibald, *Odrysian Kingdom*, 231–232.

excellent reasons to avoid a closer relationship with the King. Artabazos, however, offered them something simple and more tangible—gold for hoplites with little risk of the King's retaliation. The timing of the abrupt Theban decision can reasonably be explained by concluding that the victory at Neon seemed to mean the end of the war. In previous conflicts such a massive defeat as Philomelos' would have automatically led to a truce or peace. Onomarchos, however, had the treasure of Apollo at his disposal, which enabled him to buy new armies so long as the god's wealth lasted. No one in 355 yet realized this fact. Philomelos and Onomarchos ushered into the mainstream of Greek history the era of the hired army.³¹

The episode holds one more point of general interest. Pammenes' outward march took him to Macedonia. Just as the Theban had helped school his old friend in Greek politics, so now Philip introduced Pammenes into the tangled affairs of Macedonia and Thrace. The presence of 5000 veteran Theban troops also augured well for Philip's designs on Thrace. The two led their armies to Maroneia on the western border of Amadokos' realm, where Kersebleptes' ambassador met them. They planned to crush Amadokos between them, but he did not intend to be carved up like a goose. Enjoying the support of Chares with a large Athenian squadron at Neapolis, he simply ordered Philip to leave his kingdom. Kersebleptes' envoy speedily returned home, and Amadokos prudently permitted Pammenes to continue on his way. Pammenes' part in this venture is quickly told. Although he won two victories for Artabazos, the rebel executed him from fear of treachery. Shortly afterwards Artabazos himself fled to Philip's court for sanctuary. Philip in fact gained the most from this entire venture. Before returning to Macedonia, he ravaged Maroneia and Abdera, a sign that he was not quit of Thrace, and then easily eluded Chares' ships at Neapolis. Thereafter, the city quietly fell to him. Philip probably at this time made Ketriporis his vassal with the Nestos River the eastern border of Macedonia. Only Torone, Olynthos, and Methone on the northern coast stood outside his sphere of power.³²

³¹ Diod. 16.22.1–2, 32.1, 34.1. A.B. Bosworth, *A Historical Commentary on Arrian's History of Alexander*, I (Oxford 1981) 113; J. Buckler, in H. Beister and J. Buckler, eds., *BOIOTIKA* (Munich 1989) 157–160; *SW*, 50–51.

³² Dem. 23.183; Diod. 16.34.1; Polyain. 4.2.22; 5.11.2; 7.33.2. Beloch, *GG III*² 2.269; Th. Lenschau, *RE* 18 (1949) 298–299; U. Kahrstedt, *RE* 11 (1921) 372; Griffith,

In 355 Philip next turned to Methone. The city stood astride the road from Pydna in the south to Aloros in the north on the Thermaic Gulf. Behind its beach rise low broken hills punctuated by valleys all ending in a long enveloping ridge that dominates the site. Although little can now be seen there, in Philip's day Methone was a strongly-fortified polis protected by the hills to the west. It formed the last Athenian outpost on his land; but when Philip beleaguered it, the Athenians failed to lend support. After a long, hard siege in which Philip lost an eye, the city fell. His terms of surrender were generous for the period. He allowed the survivors to leave the city unharmed but with only a single cloak, after which he so thoroughly razed the city that its site is still difficult to find. He had in the process gained control of the entire eastern coast of Macedonia. The Athenians no longer had a vantage-point in the area, and his nearest neighbors there were the Olynthians, his allies. He had secured the eastern part of his realm.³³

While these events disturbed the north, Onomarchos took the offensive in central Greece. The earlier Thessalian casualties, the weakness of the Lokrians, and the absence of Pammenes gave him his best opportunity to win the Sacred War. With the heart of the Kephisos Valley firmly within his grasp, he needed to win control of Epiknemidian Lokris and Thermopylai in order to divide the Thessalians from the Thebans. To that end in spring 354 he launched an invasion of eastern Lokris with Thronion as his immediate target. Probably using the Fontana pass which led through Naryx, he descended directly into the Boagrios Valley. The city of Thronion dominated an important strategic position in the corridor of Thermopylai at the northernmost end of the best route direct from Phokis. Onomarchos besieged the city, which proves that his other military plans hinged on victory there. He successfully stormed Thronion, the inhabitants of which he sold into slavery, and left a garrison there. His stroke there further isolated the Epiknemidian Lokrians

HM II.264–267; E. Badian, *Pulpudeva* 4 (1983) 57–60; Buckler, *SW*, 50–53; Archibald, *Odrysian Kingdom*, 233. Artabazos' fate: Diod. 16.52.3; Curt. 5.9.1; 6.5.2. Nestos River as boundary: Strabo 7 fr. 35.

³³ IG II² 130; Dem. 1.9; 4.35; 18.67; schol. Dem. 3.5; Theopompos, *FGrH* 115 F52; Douris, *FGrH* 76 F36; Ps.-Plut. *Mor.* 851A; Justin 7.6.13–16. M. Hatzopoulos *et al.*, *BCH* 114 (1990) 639–668; personal observations of 5 and 7 July 1996. N.G.L. Hammond, *BSA* 93 (1998) 383–390.

from their Opountian kinsmen and closed the last road from Thessaly through Thermopylai. Not until Philip led them south in 346 would the Thessalians again take a direct part in the Sacred War. From Thronion Onomarchos retired to Doris, which he systematically plundered. This campaign effectively knocked the Dorians out of the war, which further protected the western and northern borders of Phokis. Command of Doris also put Onomarchos in control of an excellent all-weather route between the Malian and Corinthian Gulfs. This line began westwards of Herakleia Trachinia, ran south and then turned east of Thermopylai, thus outflanking it, before entering Doris at the headwaters of the Kephisos River. Onomarchos had closed the last invasion route from Thessaly to Phokis. The Phokians now commanded nearly all of the Kephisos Valley, and could politically depend upon the Dorian vote in the Amphiktyonic Council. The southern part of the valley became Onomarchos' next target. He struck first at Orchomenos, a shell of its old self but still a valuable prize because it stood at the end of an easy and strategically important route through Abai and Hyampolis. In the process he denied the Thebans the use of this route to outflank the main road between Boiotia and Phokis, which ran from Chaironeia past the strong point of Parapotamioi into the lower Kephisos Valley. From Orchomenos, which he garrisoned, Onomarchos moved southwards onto Chaironeia, to which he laid siege. The last major city in the area still in Boiotian hands, its fall would give the Phokians control of the southern valley of the Kephisos and the entire northwestern basin of Lake Kopais. Besides securing the safety of the Phokian cities in the vicinity, victory at Chaironeia would be a serious blow to Thebes and the Boiotian Confederacy.³⁴

While Onomarchos enjoyed his success in central Greece, Philip gave him a rude surprise by re-appearing in Thessaly. His distraction of Onomarchos enabled the Thebans to drive the Phokians from Chaironeia, but far more importantly Onomarchos confronted in the Macedonian king his own nemesis. The crisis was not directly of Onomarchos' making. His Pheraian allies Lykophron and Peitholaos had resumed the traditional attempt to dominate Thessaly, and the

³⁴ Diod. 16.33.4; Dem. 1.4; Strabo 9.4.11. All-weather route: E.W. Kase *et al.*, *The Great Isthmus Corridor Route*, I (Dubuque 1991). Amphiktyonic Council: *FdD* III.5. no. 5 line 11, no. 19 lines 34, 44. Buckler, *SW* 54–55; personal observations of 7 August 1980, 24 May 1983, and 15–16 August 2000; McInerney, *Parnassos*, 333–339.

Aleuadaí had in response called Philip back from Macedonia to act in the capacity of the supreme commander of their combined forces, much as Pelopidas had done. Although the precise chronology lies beyond recovery, Philip had either already subdued Methone by this time or he hurriedly did so. At any rate in 354 he suddenly arrived in Thessaly for the obvious reasons that Thessaly was rich in men and resources and he enjoyed the support of the Thessalian Confederacy. Ascendancy in Thessaly would not only extend Macedonian power dramatically, but the region would also serve as a buffer between Macedonia and Greece proper. Moreover, Thessaly would place him on the doorstep of central Greece, wherein his ties of friendship with the Thessalians and Boiotians could open profitable diplomatic doors. Given the situation in Greece, the ties between the tyrants of Pherai and the temple-robbers of Phokis and those of the other Thessalians with Thebes, Philip surely realized that he was entering the often dangerous mainstream of Greek politics. The conflict would no longer stand between an Athens trying alone to regain distant territory and him defending his kingdom. His intervention would put him squarely on the side of those who opposed Phokis, Athens, and Sparta. Yet at the same time he would win the sympathy of the Thebans and their numerous Peloponnesian allies. In 354, then, Philip had much more to gain in Thessaly than he had had in 358/7, with greater resources for the effort and far less to lose.³⁵

So, sometime in high or late summer 354 Philip led his army, this time with a siege train, back to Thessaly, apparently to reduce Pherai. His target commanded a strong position. The akropolis of Pherai rises steeply from the surrounding plain, while the town itself spread below to a lower hill and into the plain. Some thirteen kilometers separated the city from its harbor at Pagasai, itself possessing a strong, fortified akropolis. Probably joining forces with the Thessalians at Larisa, Philip with the combined army marched on to challenge Lykophron and Peitholaos. The course of Philip's operations cannot certainly be reconstructed. Yet the king probably attacked the Pheraian tyrants in their lair, whereupon Lykophron summoned help from his Phokian allies. Philip's arrival in Thessaly

³⁵ Hdt. 7.196; Isok. 298; Xen. *Hell.* 6.1.4–12; Strabo 9.5.17–23. Bursian, *Geographie*, I.40–86; Lolling, *Geographie*, 145–155; Philippson, *Thessalien und Epirus*, 29–91. T.R. Martin, *CP* 76 (1981) 188–201; Buckler, *SW*, 58–65; Sánchez, *L'Amphictionie*, 196–199.

caused major concern to Onomarchos, who immediately realized the danger to Phokis of a Thessaly united under someone as talented and powerful as Philip. He immediately dispatched his brother Phayllos with 7000 men to counter the danger, but Philip handily defeated him. Onomarchos next intervened personally in full force against Philip, and the presence of siege machinery in his army proved that he intended not only to defeat the Macedonian intruder but also to reduce Thessalian cities. Victory in Thessaly would relieve Onomarchos of the northern threat and enhance his overall position. Domination of Thessaly also meant control of its vote in the Amphiktyonic Council, which when added to those of Lokris, Doris, and his Athenian and Spartan allies, would give him a majority in the Council. The Phokians could then legally end the Sacred War by having the Amphiktyons endorse Philomelos' repudiation of the original indictment and fines.³⁶

Onomarchos' force, including the remnants of Phayllos' detachment, probably numbered some 20,000 infantry and 500 cavalry, a force larger than Philip's. Easily entering Thessaly, the Phokian pitted his mercenaries against Philip's veterans in a campaign that excites the interest of the military historian. Vital details, however, are unfortunately lacking. Onomarchos defeated Philip in two battles, in the second of which he used his siege-machinery as field-artillery. The Phokians inflicted heavy losses on the Macedonians, but Philip extracted the remains of his army with great difficulty and determination. Himself unshaken, Philip supposedly said, "I did not flee, but just like the rams, I walked backwards in order to ram again the harder". If true, Philip declared that he would return. On his part Onomarchos made no concrete use of his victories, so Thessaly did not fall to him. He had, however, made a mortal enemy of Philip, who now put everything else aside to deal with Onomarchos and Thessaly.³⁷

³⁶ Diod. 16.33.4, 35.1-4; Polyb. 18.20.1; Livy 42.56.9-10; Strabo 9.5.15. Pherai: Stählin, *Thessalien*, 106; E. Kirsten, *RE Sup.* 7 (1940) 984-1026; personal observations of 29 May 1983. Pagasai: Stählin, *Thessalien*, 66-67; personal observations of 23 May 1983; Schaefer, *Demosthenes*, F.509 n. 12; Griffith, *HM* II.224; Ellis, *Philip*, 82; Cawkwell, *Philip*, 61; Buckler, *SW*, 64-67. Siege machinery: Polyain. 2.38.2. Marsden, *Greek and Roman Artillery*, 59.

³⁷ Diod. 16.35.1-2; Polyain. 2.38.2. Marsden, *Greek and Roman Artillery*, 59-60, 164-168; Griffith, *HM* II.270-272; Ellis, *Philip II*, 77-79; Cawkwell, *Philip*, 61-62; Buckler, *SW*, 67-69.

Although the winter of 354/3 probably witnessed a surge of diplomacy, nothing came of it. Onomarchos nonetheless had every reason to draft a peace founded upon victory in the field. Even without any contribution from his nominal allies, he had thrown his enemies onto the defensive, and he alone could determine the course of the next campaigning-season. He quite remarkably began in the spring of 353 by invading Boiotia instead of exploiting his previous success in Thessaly. The reasons behind his thinking lay perhaps in the knowledge that he had badly hurt Philip and the Thessalians, which gave him the opportunity now to knock Thebes out of the war. His decision, however, proved a strategic mistake, one perhaps explained or indeed directed by the return of Pammenes' veterans, even without their gifted commander. Like the Spartan Kleombrotos in 371, Onomarchos took the route from Stiris in Phokis along the heights of Mt. Helikon before turning aside to descend the Phalaros Valley onto Koroneia. Although the Thebans mounted a spirited counter-attack, Onomarchos took the city, which offered him the opportunity to detach the entire western Kopaic basin from the Boiotian Confederacy. His use of Mt. Helikon also opened a new stage in the war, one in which Phokian armies traversed the heights to strike quickly and easily deep into Boiotian territory.³⁸

For Onomarchos the capture of Koroneia marked the flood of his tide of victory, but the ebb began to flow in Thessaly. In either late spring or early summer 353 Philip returned as promised, but only after having restored the morale of the Macedonian army. Regaining the confidence of his Thessalian allies likewise presented an urgent but easier task, for they had no other possibility of outside help. Thebes was itself too hard pressed to defend anyone else, so Philip embodied their only hope. With a combined force of perhaps more than 20,000 infantry and 3000 cavalry he marched upon Pagasai to detach it from Pherai. His move took Onomarchos by surprise, but the Phokian cut short his Boiotian campaign and alerted his Athenian allies to the new danger before moving northwards. The Athenians realized the gravity of a Macedonia army so close to Thermopylai, and that Onomarchos now offered them the best and indeed the only chance of striking a decisive blow against him. To that end

³⁸ Arist. *Nik. Eth.* 3.8.9; Ephoros, *FGrH* 70 F94; Diod. 16.35.3. Buckler, *SW*, 71–73.

they dispatched Chares with a large fleet to Thessaly. Their choice of general was poor, for Chares was notoriously dim-witted and dilatory. The subsequent course of events is not entirely certain, but Onomarchos and Chares planned to rendezvous at Pagasai, not only to lift Philip's siege of the place but also because it was the only port in the area capable of accommodating the Athenian fleet. The ensuing confrontation is usually known as the battle of the Crocus Plain, but in fact the location of the battlefield cannot be precisely identified. As earlier Onomarchos led 20,000 infantry but only some 500 horse to Thessaly, a notoriously difficult place in which to operate without cavalry. Philip's superiority in this arm proved decisive. Upon Onomarchos' approach Philip moved south to prevent his enemies from uniting. When he drew near the Phokians, he ordered his men to crown themselves with laurel, as though they represented the army of Apollo, who would be their leader. They would fight against temple-robbers to avenge the god and hence enjoy his protection. This important symbolic gesture, the first of several, formed a consistent pattern in Philip's public actions. Perhaps forced to action prematurely, Onomarchos engaged Philip and his Thessalian allies without waiting for Chares to arrive. The battle became the bloodiest land engagement in classical Greek history. Philip's forces turned Onomarchos' flank, forcing the remnants to the coast, off which Chares finally appeared. The pursuit turned into a rout, with many men dying while trying to swim to the safety of the Athenian ships. Some 6000 Phokians and mercenaries fell in the struggle, Onomarchos among them, and another 3000 were taken prisoner. Philip had on a single day destroyed nearly one-half of Onomarchos' army, a stunning success by any standards. Pherai stood isolated, while Chares impotently looked on. Thessaly was Philip's.³⁹

The victory his, Philip turned its fruits to his fullest advantage. Just as he had dedicated his Macedonians to Apollo before the battle, so he afterwards used his victory to punish the god's oppressors. He ordered Onomarchos' body crucified, a symbolic act with several meanings. It held to public display the remains of the only man who had twice defeated him in battle. Not the most significant

³⁹ Dem. 1.9, 12; 4.35; 19.319; Diod. 16.331.6, 35.4–6; Strabo 9.5.8; Paus. 10.2.5; Steph. Byz. *s.v.* *Demetrios*. Stählin, *RE* 11 (1922) 1943; *Thessalien*, 170; Burr, *ΝΕΩΝ ΚΑΤΑΛΟΓΟΣ*, pl. 36–37; Buckler, *SW*, 74–75; repeated personal investigations of the area have failed to determine the exact site of the battle.

factor, Philip had also denied his enemy proper burial, the customary dishonor shown to the sacrilegious. He next ordered the 3000 mercenaries to be drowned. His force sufficed to bind the condemned and push them into the sea. Although the Macedonians presumably held little affection for these foes, Philip ordered them executed in this fashion in accordance with customary religious practice in cases of sacrilege. The mercenaries who had thrived on Apollo's wealth met the fate of temple-robbers and like Onomarchos denied proper burial. In both cases Philip demonstrated to the Greek world not only the extent of his victory, but also that he was avenging Apollo by punishing those who had plundered his possessions. By these deeds Philip further declared to the Greek world that he had joined the Sacred War. He would enter Greece not as an invader but as Apollo's champion. The victory also gave him the opportunity to settle Thessalian affairs to his satisfaction. He seems first to have dealt with Pagasai, which upon conquest he did not give to the Thessalian Confederacy. Since the port had not been a member of that league, he need not treat it as a rebel of his allies. In practical terms Pagasai demonstrated that Philip had come to secure the obedience and the co-operation of Thessaly. There remained the question of Pherai, which he soon answered. Having had time to contemplate the fate of Onomarchos' mercenaries, Lykophron and Peitholaos surrendered the city to him in return for safe passage of them and their mercenaries. Some of them would live to fight another day but principally in the Peloponnesos. So Philip removed the last major obstacle to his domination of Thessaly.⁴⁰

Although the fall of Pherai left Thessaly to Philip, the endemic fractiousness of the country demanded that he restore order there. Still acting as commander-in-chief of both armies, he reduced all of Thessaly to his will. His success led the Thessalians to elect him archon of the Thessalian Confederacy, an office that he thereafter held for life. If this combination of monarch and magistracy be not unique, it was certainly very unusual in Greek political history. The

⁴⁰ Dem. 5.23; 8.65; 18.43; Diod. 16.35.6, 38.1, 61–64; Paus. 10.2.5. Beloch, *GG* III².1.477; A. Momigliano, *Filippo il Macedone* (Florence 1934) 105. Wirth, *Philipp* II., 49; Buckler, *SW*, 76–77; in Wallace and Harris, eds., *Transitions*, 81–82. Pagasai: Dem. 1.9, 12, 22; 2.11; 4.35; 1.260; Ps.-Dem. 10.67; *IG* IV 617; Diod. 16.31.1, 6; 37.1. Pherai: Dem. 2.14; 8.65; 9.12; 19.320. Peitholaos and Lykophron in Athens: Arist. *Rhet.* 3.9.7, 10.7; Ps.-Dem. 59.91.

archonship gave him the advantage of establishing governments to his liking in Thessaly and of turning the country's revenues to his own purposes. The increase in his power presented Philip as a new and daunting power in a north that he had rapidly united under him. Only with this Thessalian settlement completed did he advance onto Thermopylai. The position of archon brought with it the duty to end the Sacred War and therefore the march. The Athenians, however, sent a force to hold the pass against him in the face of which he retired to Thessaly. His effort, which was unnecessary for the defense of Thessaly, gives the first concrete indication that he had begun to look southwards. The question, generally unasked, is why Philip stopped at Thermopylai. The usual and insufficient answer is that the Athenians had blocked the pass, which lacks much merit. Had Philip then wished to turn the position at Thermopylai, he could have struck southwestwardly from a point west of Herakleia Trachinia along a road through the Dhema Pass into western Doris and thence down the Kephisos Valley. Yet Philip had two larger problems on his mind. He first needed to consolidate his control of newly-won Thessaly. Military history teaches the often unheeded lesson that it is generally easier to win territory than to hold it. Next he had unfinished work in the Chalkidike, an area no longer to be ignored now that the Athenians had bestirred themselves against him. Olynthos stood as their last major ally in the northwest. It likewise posed the last potential obstacle to Philip's command of the area. For the moment, however, Philip turned his attention to his immediate gains. He reaffirmed the *tetrarchia* which divided all of Thessaly into four parts. Over each he placed an archon, and in some places he installed his own Thessalian men in positions of power. Given the new urgency for Thessalian representation on the Amphiktyonic Council, he likewise turned to trustworthy partisans to protect sacred and political matters. He seems to have created nothing new but rather behaved like a traditional Thessalian leader.⁴¹

⁴¹ Theopompos, *FGrH* 115 FF35, 208–209; Isok. 5.20–21; Dem. 1.21–22; 9.26; 18.48; *SIG*³ 220, 274; Arr. *Anab.* 3.18.5; Diod. 16.38.1; 17.4.1; Justin 11.3.2; see also Eur. *Alkestis* 1154; Polyb. 9.33.7; Harpok. *s.v.* *Eudikos*, *Dekadarkia*. Distinction between archon and tagos: *IG* II² 116 lines 17–19, 33–34; Xen. *Hell.* 6.1.8–9, 12, 23; 6.4.34. Although E.M. Harris, *Aeschines and Athenian Politics* (Oxford 1995) 175–176, has rejected the common notion that Philip became the constitutional leader of Thessaly, the bulk of the evidence argues decisively against him. His mistake comes from relying almost exclusively on Justin 11.3.1–2 and Thuc. 7.28.4 without having

D. THE WAR WIDENS (352–347 BC)

In the space of six years Philip had not only beaten back his enemies, both barbarian and Athenian, but he had also extended his power southwards into northern Greece. As king of Macedonia and as tagos of Thessaly he commanded the resources of a total area that exceeded that of the rest of Greece. His successful entry into Thessalian affairs introduced him into the mainstream of Greek politics. Although the Thessalians expected him to crush the Phokians and end the Sacred War, in 352 he retired to Macedonia. Nonetheless, his entry into the war added another element to a conflict that was far from over. Instead, it soon spread throughout Greece. Several factors aided the Phokians at this point. Philip considered Olynthos far more important than Delphi, and the Thebans could not easily move northwards until they had regained Koroneia and Orchomenos. These factors left the Phokians the opportunity to recover their strength. Elected strategos autokrator, Phayllos further plundered the sanctuary to build still another army. So long as Apollo's treasures and bands of mercenaries lasted, the Phokians could wage war despite losses that would have ruined a mighty polis. Furthermore, Phayllos called upon his heretofore tepid allies to support him. Realizing that for the moment he had nothing to fear from the north, he determined to strike direct at the Thebans, for the moment his most dangerous enemy. Their defeat meant victory for the Phokians, Athenians, and Spartans alike as well as the end of the Theban ascendancy in

considered the other sources cited above. He argues that Philip's right to collect harbor and market dues (Dem. 1.22) was common for an ally without necessarily involving the duties of either archon or tagos. Both passages actually stand against his point, especially that of Thucydides. Athens imposed taxes on the members of the Delian League in their role of their hegemon, as witnessed by the *Athenian Tribute Lists*; see also Gomme *et al.*, *HCT* IV.408–409. The fact that Philip appointed archons of the *tetrarchiai* indicates that he assumed the powers of the *tagēia*, an office that Jason had apparently resurrected. He thereby denied the tyrants of Pherai any claim to rule Thessaly but without usurping the authority of the archon of the Thessalian Confederacy, a position which he already held. Aischines Sokratikos fr. 10, equates the tagos with the basileus, and states that the tetrarchia was the basic political unit of Thessaly. Philip may very well have harkened back to the days of Aleuas the Red. At any rate, Philip was, *pace* Harris, the legitimate political leader of Thessaly. See also Helly, *L'État thessalien*, 61–68; M. Sordi, *Topoi* 7 (1997) 177–179; Sprawski, *Jason*, 22–23; Lefèvre, *L'Amphictionie*, 27. Although Sprawski has argued that Jason created the *tagēia*, the evidence of Aeschin. Sokr. fr. 10 and Xen. *Hell.* 6.1.12, argues against the view. When Jason told Polydamas that he intended to become tagos, the latter did not ask him what a tagos was. He already knew.


Greece. He appealed to his allies so successfully that in the spring of 352 the Spartans sent him 1000 troops, the Achaians 2000, and the deposed tyrants Lykophron and Peitholaos 2000. The Athenians, perhaps heartened by their successful defense of Thermopylai the year before, dispatched Nausikles at the head of 5000 infantry and 400 cavalry. This time the Thebans stood entirely alone with absolutely no prospect of reinforcement from their allies. Phayllos' army numbered not less than 10,000 infantry and probably closer to 15,000 against whom the Thebans could muster some 7000–8000.⁴²

Phayllos opened his campaign against Boiotia by striking southwards by way of Abai onto Orchomenos. The hapless city easily fell to him, but a Theban counter-attack routed him. Having suffered heavy losses, he retired towards Chaironeia, where his pursuers inflicted another serious defeat. With Chaironeia and the Thebans barring his path back to Phokis, he boldly led his army towards Koroneia in an effort to reach the safety of Mt. Helikon. The Thebans confronted him again a few days later, whereupon they inflicted still further casualties. Nonetheless, he and the remnants of his army finally escaped up the Phalaros Valley and back to Phokis. Despite his advantages, he had failed to defeat the Thebans, much less to knock them out of the war. His poor generalship and the military failures of his predecessors impressed his allies so unfavorably that they made no further attempt to intervene in the war until its very end. The risk of losses so deep in enemy territory struck them as too great a risk to take for slender advantages.⁴³

Although Phayllos' disastrous campaign ended the fighting in central Greece for the year, the Spartans took advantage of the Sacred War to pursue their particular goals in the Peloponnesos. With Thebes so heavily engaged against Phokis, the Spartans expected the freedom to subjugate Megalopolis and Messene, thereby breaking the ring that Epameinondas had forged around them. Yet events in Boiotia worked against them. Theban victories had rendered the Phokians incapable of sending the Spartans any aid and any move against the two Theban allies threatened to provoke Theban

⁴² Dem. 16.4 with schol.; Diod. 16.35.1, 36.1, 37.104, 39.3; Paus. 10.2.6. Schaefer, *Demosthenes*, II², 180–181; Parke, *Greek Mercenary Soldiers*, 137–138; R.M. Kallet-Marx, in Beister and Buckler, eds., *BOIOTIKA*, 301–311; Buckler, *SW*, 81–86.

⁴³ Diod. 16.36.1, 37.2–6; Plut. *Sulla* 6.11–2. Topographical observations of 5, 8 August 1980; Buckler, *SW*, 86–87.



8. Southwestern Boiotia


retaliation. Even in the face of these considerations, the Spartans strove to regain their hegemony of the Peloponnesos. They sedulously launched a brisk diplomatic effort to win allies that could translate their policy into reality. They urged that Elis should regain Triphylia, Phleious the fortress of Trikaranon, and "certain Arkadians" what belonged to them. All of the territory in question was then in the hands of Theban allies. The vague reference to "certain Arkadians" clearly meant the dismemberment of Megalopolis and the dissolution of the Arkadian League, a goal that Agesilaos had earlier failed to achieve. The ultimate aspiration, however, always remained the reconquest of Messene, for which they needed a free hand and foreign assistance. The Spartan threat so alarmed the two targets that they launched a diplomatic initiative of their own. The Argives automatically supported them. Suspecting that the Thebans could no longer come to their aid because of the Sacred War, the two states also sent ambassadors to Athens. They thereby presented the Athenians with the option of shaping a new policy whereby they could replace Thebes as the mentor of the Peloponnesians. The shift would cost them the Spartan alliance which had not materially furthered their interests while putting a drain on their resources. The Athenians, however, demurred, reluctant again to become involved in a thankless conflict of no benefit to them. As in 370 the Peloponnesians trekked next to Thebes, and as earlier the Thebans promised military intervention in the event of a Spartan attack. The alliance established by Epameinondas still held. Just as in the 360s the Argives and Messenians again stood ready to defend Arkadia, and together with the Sikyonians they prepared to resist a Spartan *revanche*. The Spartans in response sent a delegation to Athens that promised their help in retaking Oropos from Thebes and urging that Plataia, Thespiiai, and Orchomenos be made independent. Those who could scarcely defend their own city had no reasonable expectation of defeating the Boiotian Confederacy, so the Athenians did not take these fantasies seriously. Demosthenes reminded his countrymen that after the battle of Mantinea in 362 they had concluded a peace treaty whereby they had bound themselves to help Messene against invaders. Then preoccupied with northern concerns, the Athenians wisely remained aloof from the conflict.⁴⁴

⁴⁴ *IG* II² 161; Dem. 16 *passim*; 30 with schol.; Diod. 15.94.1–3; Paus. 4.28.1–2. Beloch, *GG* III².1.480; Buckler, *SW*, 87–89.

In the summer of 352 Archidamos led the Spartans in desultory but largely successful operations in southern Arkadia and western Argolis. He accomplished little more than demonstrating that Sparta could still match its Peloponnesian enemies even without Athenian help. Thus encouraged, the Spartans renewed their attack on Megalopolis in the following year. They then advanced into the north-western section of Megalopolitan territory only to be thwarted by the Thebans and their Peloponnesian allies. After more indecisive fighting the Spartans signed a truce with the Arkadians, upon which all returned to their homes. These seemingly aimless campaigns held a wider significance in demonstrating that although Thebes still proved a staunch friend, it could no longer quash the Spartans. For that the Peloponnesians needed a power greater than Thebes. If this sobering fact did not entail the re-emergence of Spartan power, it doomed the region to another round of costly and useless warfare that could not reshape the direction of Peloponnesian politics.⁴⁵

In Phokis meanwhile Phayllos stared defeat in its uncomely face. Chastened by his experiences, he reverted to Onomarchos' strategy but on a much more modest scale. The Phokians had raised a formidable enemy in Philip, and Thebes remained bloodied but unbroken. Phayllos planned to guard against Philip's return by conquering all of Epiknemidian Lokris, after which he could turn to western Boiotia. These offensive operations aimed paradoxically at defense, for only by holding the area from Thermopylai to Orchomenos could Phokis remain safe. Gone were the dreams of winning the war by conquering Thessaly and all of Boiotia. Now he must keep the enemy at bay, especially since he could expect little help from his allies. To these ends he opened the campaigning-season of 351 with an invasion of northwestern Lokris, which he quickly overran. The strategically important cities in the vicinity of Thermopylai constituted his primary targets. Although one normally thinks of Thermopylai as the spot where Leonidas made his famous stand in 480, from the hot springs to the west to the modern Kamena Vourla and beyond stretches a narrow corridor with the sea to the north and mountains to the south. The land for the most part consists of tall, steep-sided hills, like that of the akropolis of Thronion, or lower but nonetheless abrupt hills like that of Skarpheia. Consequently, anyone desiring

⁴⁵ Diod. 16.39.1-7; Paus. 8.27.10. Buckler, *SW*, 89-92, 97-98.



9. The Thermophylai Corridor

complete freedom of movement through this area must command the entire route in order to conduct or hinder sustained operations. The Phokians already held control of the fine pass west of Herakleia Trachinia into western Doris, so success here would provide greater security.⁴⁶

Phayllos crossed Mt. Kallidromon to overrun Alponos, which stood near a point where the road through Thermopylai was broad enough to permit only one cart to pass. It lay on the coast commanding a harbor, but most importantly it gave Phayllos control of the western end of the Thermopylai corridor. Next came Nikaia, the modern Aghias Trias, strategically significant because of its harbor. Although its defensive position does not look strong, its port would have proved very useful to anyone bent on turning the pass at Themopylai and Alponos. To the east of Nikaia lay Skarpheia, the akropolis of which stood on the summit of a lone hill south of the modern village of Molos. The site commands both the road running through the corridor and a path upland to Argolas. By capturing these places, Phayllos gained command of the entire Thermopylai corridor and the strong points along it. His last target, and the most difficult of them was Naryx, located somewhat west and above the modern village of Rhenginion. The city commanded a route up the Boagrios Valley from Thronion in the north to the Kephisos Valley in the south. Possession of it meant complete control of communications between Phokis and the sea. After a siege interrupted by a vain effort to lift it, the city fell to him. He now held every northern route from Herakleia Trachinia to Opous, which gave him little to fear from Philip and the Thessalians. Thebes remained his only immediate antagonist.⁴⁷

⁴⁶ Hdt. 7.176; Strabo 9.3.2. Lolling, *Geographie*, 132–122; Burr, *ΝΕΩΝ ΚΑΤΑΛΟΓΟΣ* 36–37; Pritchett, *Topography*, IV.151–155; personal observations of 27 May 1983.

⁴⁷ Alponos: Hdt. 7.176, 216; Aischin. 2.132–138 with schol.; *SIG*³ 419; Demetrios, *FGH* 85 F6; Strabo 1.3.20; Steph. Byz. *s.v.* Alponos. Leake, *NG* II.38; R.H. Simpson, *Mycenaean Greece* (Park Ridge 1981) 81; Pritchett, *Topography*, IV.159–162; Buckler, *SW*, 92–96; personal observations of 8 July 1986. Nikaia: Aischin. 2.132, 138; 3.140 with schol.; Ps.-Dem. 11.4; Philochoros, *FGH* 328 F56b; Timosthenes 11, in L. Pearson and S. Stephens, eds., *Didymi in Demosthenem Commenta* (Stuttgart 1983) *ad loc.*; Diod. 16.59.2; Memnon, *FGH* 434 F28. W.A. Oldfather, *RE* 17 (1936) 222–226; Pritchett, *Topography*, IV.162–166; personal observations of 11 August 1980 and 28 May 1983. Skarpheia: *Iliad* 2.532; *IG* IX 1 3, 314; Strabo 1.3.20; 9.4.4; Paus. 7.15.3–4; Prok. *Gothic Wars* 8.25.19. Burr, *ΝΕΩΝ ΚΑΤΑΛΟΓΟΣ*, 35; Pritchett, *Topography*, IV.166–167; VIII.145–151; Buckler, *SW*, 94–96; personal observations of 11 August 1980 and 26 May 1983.

Despite his success, Phayllos fell terminally ill; and although the situation offered an opportune time to conclude peace on reasonable terms, the Phokians determined to continue the war. They elected Phalaikos, the young nephew of Phayllos, and Mnaseas to serve as generals. The two leading and opposing families of Phokis had united for survival. The Phokians renewed attacks on western Boiotia, and the rest of the action there constituted a grim combination of attrition and stalemate until Philip ended the carnage in 346. Until then the Phokians and Boiotians exchanged a series of raids, in which the Thebans in 349 again suffered the loss of Koroneia, the scene of Onomarchos' victory in 353, and Tilphossiaon in its neighborhood. To tighten his grip even further, Phalaikos captured Chorsiai, a somewhat isolated city in southwestern Boiotia. Possession of these places together with command of the routes over Mt. Helikon enabled the Phokians to create a triangular system of fortified places capable of offense and defense. For the Thebans still worse was soon to come. Phalaikos seized Orchomenos, which isolated Chaironeia. By the end of 349 he could realistically expect to win the Sacred War.⁴⁸

Phalaikos' victories had wide and unexpected repercussions, some of which were most strongly felt in Thessaly. Events indicated that Thebes stood on the point of losing the war, so now the Thessalians demanded decisive action from Philip. They were angered by his occupation of Pagasai and Magnesia and especially his use of confederate funds for his own Macedonian ends. They demanded that he instead crush the temple-robbers, to which he cordially agreed. Once again it served his purpose to return to Greece as Apollo's savior. He first settled affairs in Thessaly, where he expelled Peitholaos who had regained power in Pherai, and he next countered Phokian attempts to seize Euboia. Yet he forebore for the moment to venture farther south because his main concern at the moment centered on his duel with Olynthos (pp. 436–439). His decision thus left the Thebans alone to pursue the war, which they did stoutly but ineffectually. Several battles between the belligerents caused losses on both sides, but the Thebans could not replace theirs. In these

⁴⁸ Arist. *Pol.* 5.3.4; Theopompos, *FGrH* 115 F167; Timaios, *FGrH* 556 F11; Dem. 19.141, 148; Diod. 16.38.6–7, 39.8, 56.2, 58.1; Paus. 9.34.1, 4; 10.2.7. Frazer, *Pausanias*, V.167–169; S. Lauffer, *KOPAIS I* (Frankfurt a.M. 1986) end map; Buckler, *SW*, 98–104; personal observations of 21 June 1971, 11 August 1978, 9, 13–14 August 1980.

encounters the Thebans demonstrated that they could still win the big battles, but the big battles could not win the war. Decisive victory over the Phokians lay beyond them. By the end of 347 the political situation in Greece appeared gloomy even to the most optimistic. Although the Athenians still held the rump of their League, they lacked their earlier strength. Sparta remained caged in Lakonia with the other Peloponnesians intent on keeping watch on their enemy. The Thebans did well enough to defend their own territory, and the Phokians were running out of Apollo's wealth. The Thessalians could not act without Philip, who at the moment concentrated on Olynthos. Nonetheless, the period of stalemate soon came to an end.⁴⁹

⁴⁹ Buckler, *SW*, 104–113.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

PHILIP, ATHENS, AND THE NORTHERN AEGEAN (353–343 BC)

A. FROM THE WAR WITH OLYNTHOS TO THE END OF THE SACRED WAR (353–346 BC)

While the Sacred War ground to its end, Philip concentrated his attention on the north, which was of the closest concern to him. His victory in Thessaly gave him the opportunity to deal again and this time much more forcibly with the Illyrians and Paionians. While his previous campaign had intimidated them, he had not yet subjugated them. He did so now with such success that they troubled Macedonia little until Alexander's succession to the throne. In the process he nullified the influence on them that the Athenians had established in 356, when they had all concluded a mutual alliance. They now learned that Philip's power carried more weight than Athenian promises. Philip also dealt with Arybbas, king of the Molossians, again so effectively that he remained loyal until 341. The Greeks sometimes noted these and other such activities in the farther north, but modern scholars have often not fully appreciated them. Nonetheless, Macedonian relations with these neighbors usually carried far weightier significance than those with the more removed southern Greeks. Even Athenian ambitions on the fringes of the northern Aegean posed hardly more than a local nuisance. The northern barbarians, however, embodied a potentially lethal threat that accounts for Philip's numerous campaigns on this vulnerable frontier. The recent campaign against the Illyrians and Paionians constituted just another episode in Philip's attempt to extend Macedonian influence in the north as much for defensive as for imperial reasons.¹

¹ Illyrians and Paionians: *IG* II² 127 (= Rhodes-Osborne, *GHI* 53); Dem. 1.13, 23; 4.48; Diod. 16.22.3; 17.8.1. Arybbas: *IG* II² 226 = Rhodes-Osborne; *GHI* 70; Dem. 1.13; Justin 8.6.3–4. Ellis, *Philip II*, 90–91; Griffith, *HM* II.304–308; Wirth, *Philipp II.*, 55.

Having stabilized his western and northern borders, Philip next turned eastwards to deal with the Athenians and Thracians, his two principal enemies there. By thwarting him at Thermopylai, the Athenians had publicly demonstrated their hostility, after which the two sides considered themselves at war. In 352 during the late summer and winter, a time when the Etesian winds made sailing northwards dangerous and ineffectual, Philip struck at the main Athenian bases of Lemnos and Imbros, where he captured some Athenian citizens. He seized shipping at Geraistos, crowning his exploits by landing at Marathon, whence he took the sacred trireme *Paralos* as a prize. Although he ventured into Euboia, presumably from the newly-won Pagasai, the Athenians easily repulsed him. These forays, while inflicting little damage, nonetheless displayed Philip's new determination, and served as a warning that the Athenians now confronted a serious foe. He next made a much more daring and ambitious strike into Thrace, where the situation approached chaos. The Byzantines harbored designs on neighboring Kalchedon, a Persian possession, while Athenian generals waged supposedly unauthorized little wars against Lampsakos and Sigeion, both in the King's domain and both vitally important to the Athenian grain route. Chares further strengthened the Athenian grip on this sensitive region by seizing Sestos. Thence the Athenians could threaten Abydos on the opposite side of the Hellespont. These events in turn awakened Kersebleptes, king of eastern Thrace, to the extent of his danger. He had long played a dangerous and duplicitous game in Thrace, having at one time attacked his brother Amadokos and his cousin Ketriporis in the course of which he violated his treaty with Athens. Now isolated and distrusted by all, he extricated himself from peril by renewing his alliance with Athens. He did not, however, become a member of the Athenian League. In these efforts he enjoyed the help of Charidemos, an Athenian citizen who had endeared himself to his countrymen by promising to restore Amphipolis to them. Upon Chares' appearance in the area, Kersebleptes ceded all of the Chersonesos except Kardia to the Athenians. Accepting the gift with alacrity, they immediately sent *klerouchoi* to occupy the land that they had long desired. By siding with the Athenians against his local enemies, Kersebleptes further antagonized the Byzantines, Perinthians, and the Thracian king Amadokos, none of whom had any reason to welcome an increased Athenian presence in the area. Artaxerxes III had in the meantime launched a major campaign against Egypt in which

he was so heavily engaged that he could hardly bother with minor affairs in Thrace. The field there thus lay open to local ambitions.²


Philip's sudden appearance in Thrace upset matters still further. Kersebleptes had now joined the Macedonian's enemies, even though the two had conspired against Amadokos as recently as 355. Kersebleptes had again become embroiled with his brother and with the Perinthians and Byzantines by campaigning against various Hellespontine cities. Together the embattled called upon Philip for help, so once again he entered the fray not as an invader but as a saviour. Once he had concluded alliances with them, he defeated Kersebleptes in a series of battles. He afterwards levied tribute on the conquered, but far more importantly he forced him to cede land upon which he built cities at strategic points. He further demanded Kersebleptes' son as a hostage. Perhaps at this point Kersebleptes and Charidemos sent an ambassador to Athens seeking help, but nothing was forthcoming. Philip next evicted many Thracian potentates, obviously Kersebleptes' supporters, whom he replaced with others loyal to him. This inroad deep into eastern Thrace brought him into the vicinity of Perinthos and Byzantion, both now in his debt. Against him stood the chastened Kersebleptes and the Athenians, in whom neither Amadokos nor the two Greek states held much trust. Philip took this opportunity to beleaguer Heraion Teichos on the western shore of the Hellespont. The site stood at the European end of the major route leading from the Adriatic Sea to the Propontis, the line of the Via Egnatia. Possession of it would provide him with a convenient terminus at its eastern end that would enable him to threaten vital Athenian interests. Although Heraion Teichos did not fall to him, in the course of the campaign Philip brought most of southern Thrace to his side. Amadokos and two powerful Greek

² Philip in the north: Dem. 4; 18.87; Aischin. 2.169; see also Dem. 3.4; 19.84; Diod. 16.34.3, 35.3–5; 38.1; Justin 8.2.8–9. Etesian winds: Semple, *Geography*, 580–582; Casson, *Ships*, 272–273. Northeastern Aegean: Ephoros, *FGrH* 70 F83; Dem. 2.28; 15.26; 23.13–14, 103, 107, 153, 156, 181–182; *IG* II² 1613 lines 297–300; Rhodes-Osborne, *GHI* 47; Diod. 16.34.3–4. When at 23.10 Demosthenes claims that Kersebleptes had violated his treaty with Athens by attacking the other two kings, he refers to Bengtson, *SdA* II².303, a recorded alliance among them all. He cannot mean the Athenian agreement (*SdA* II².309 = Rhodes-Osborne, *GHI* 53) made with Ketriporis and his brothers Monounios and Skostokos. Though an ally, Kersebleptes never held a seat in the synod of the Athenian League: Aischin. 3.74; Ps.-Dem. 12.8. Egypt: Diod. 16.40.3–52.8. E. Bresciani in I. Gerschevitch ed., *Cambridge History of Iran*, II (Cambridge 1985) 502–528.

states now stood in debt to their new ally. Kersebleptes remained isolated in Kardia, and the Athenians largely confined to the Chersonesos. Philip had gained ascendancy over the northern Aegean coast from the Chalkidike to the Chersonesos.³

The Athenians voted to meet Philip's challenge by dispatching Charidemus with ten ships without combatants. Yet when they learned that Philip lay either ill or dead they abandoned the expedition. They thereby wasted the opportunity to strengthen their position in Thrace by a counter-attack against his newly-won gains. Lack of will and misuse of financial resources rest at the bottom of Athenian flaccidity. Philip recovered his health without harm coming to his domain in the meantime. Nonetheless, his very success in the Chersonesos aroused alarm in the Chalkidike. One group in Olynthos led by Lasthenes and Euthykrates staunchly supported Philip. His gift of Poteidaia to Olynthos and his generous treatment of the city gave them every good reason to regard him as a friend and benefactor. Apollonides, however, led an opposing group that saw danger in the growth of Macedonian power. The situation deteriorated to the point where neither Philip nor the Olynthians trusted each other. Internecine politics became so intense that Philip's supporters banished Apollonides, who found refuge in Athens, where he received citizenship. Yet the triumph of the philo-Philippians proved brief. The Olynthians opened negotiations with Athens, which did not technically violate their treaty with Philip. The terms of that pact did not bind them to have the same friends and enemies, but only to share alliance and friendship. Either side could offer amendments to its terms for a period of three months after the swearing of oaths. By 349 neither had moved to amend the treaty. Their enemy being originally Athens, Philip had actually furthered their mutual goals by weakening Athens in eastern Thrace without having made any hostile move against Olynthos. Nor did he have any immediate strategic need to antagonize his ally which lay well south of the Via

³ Theopompos, *FGH* 115 F101; Dem. 1.13; 2.9; 3.4, 16; 4.48; 23.13, 92; Isok. 5.21; Diod. 16.34.4, 71.1; Aischin. 2.9, 81 with schol.; Bengtson, *SdA* II².318–319. The chronology is somewhat uncertain; but Philip's activities can be reasonably dated on the basis of Dem. 3.4; 18.87, and the date of his delivery of the *First Philippic* with its reference to Philip's activities, especially 4.17, 31, 34, 50. See also Beloch, *GG* III².2.280, 282; Sordi, *Diodori*, 126–127; Archibald, *Odryian Kingdom*, 233–234.



10. Western Macedonia and Eastern Thrace, adapted from R.F. Treharne and H. Fullard, *Muir's Historical Atlas* (New York: Barnes and Noble 1963) by courtesy of Barnes and Noble.

Egnatia. In short, the Chalkidian League did not stand geographically in the way of Philip's farther eastern designs. A hostile Olynthos could endanger his southern flank, but a loyal ally gave him nothing to fear. Realizing the hostile intent of his new combination, Philip probably interpreted the Atheno-Olynthian negotiations as a breach of his ally's faith, if not literally one of law. Loyalty became the essential question.⁴

Philip sought a solution in a pretext. His half-brother Arrhidaios had found shelter in Olynthos, and Philip now demanded his return. Arrhidaios was himself a harmless and probably retarded man, but Philip had already seen what his opponents, especially the Athenians could make of pretenders. By requiring and receiving the surrender of Arrhidaios Philip could further strengthen his grip on the throne and receive a solid stamp of Olynthian loyalty. He did not apparently expect war to result from his ultimatum, but the Olynthians refused to yield. Fear and distrust of their Maceonian neighbor together with Athenian machinations prompted their response. The more distant Athens was the lesser of their evils. Demosthenes, Philip's mortal enemy, candidly admitted that many Athenians felt that the Olynthians must be made to fight against Philip. Nothing more is needed to prove the Athenian part in alienating the two allies. Yet not all Athenians shared Demosthenes' views. Some still considered Philip as negligible, and many resented the Olynthians for having fought against them as his ally. Although they had earlier wanted to exclude an Olynthian embassy even from addressing their assembly, Philip's recent victories had changed their mood. Many now believed that if they did not oppose him in the Chalkidike, they must eventually do so in Attika. The fear of Philip's ambitions, whether real or presumed, prompted the Athenians and Olynthians first to conclude peace with each other, then friendship and alliance. Although the precise terms of this pact remain unknown, the Athenians may have recognized Olynthian rights of Poteidaia and the Olynthians the Athenian claim to Amphipolis. If so, they seem little more than

⁴ Charidemus: Dem. 3.5. Chronology: Mikalson, *Calendar*, 58–60; Boedromion fell in August/September in both 352 and 351 BC: Ginzel, *Chronologie*, 579. Unmanned ships: Jordan, *Athenian Navy*, 54–55. Philip's illness: Dem. 1.13; 3.5 with schol.; 4.11. Philip's alliance with Olynthos: Bengtson, *StA* II².308. Extent of the Chalkidian League and its geographical position relative to the Via Egnatia: Zahrtm *Olynth*. 104–111; *Barrington Atlas*, maps 49–51. Olynthian politics: Dem. 9.56–57, 66; 19.265–267; Ps.-Dem. 59.91; Theopompus, *FGH* 115 F127.

amenities. Far more importantly, the Athenians realized their hopes of embroiling the Chalkidian League in their war with Philip. Before the actual conclusion of the alliance, Philip marched into the Chalkidike. Seeing war before him anyway, he concluded that his best hope of victory lay in a quick campaign against a nearby Olynthos that preempted any possible Athenian response.⁵

Philip launched his first campaign against the Chalkidians in late summer or early autumn 349. The precise course of his operations remains unknown, but he intended first to isolate and then to reduce Olynthos. An initial target included the otherwise unknown fortress perhaps named Zeira, which he reduced by siege. Philip's strike came so suddenly that thirty-two cities fell easily to him. The surprised Olynthians had failed to muster confederate forces to defend the land, which they helplessly watched being overrun. Only then did they settle their differences with the Athenians, who dispatched Chares with 2000 peltasts and thirty triremes to their aid. The Athenians themselves manned another eight. Although this force did not even slow Philip's progress, events in Thessaly now demanded his immediate attention. As seen above, he now settled finally with Peitholaos, but success at Pherai meant that the campaigning-season had advanced too far for further operations in the Chalkidike. In Philip's absence Chares seems already to have retired.⁶

Winter provided time for thought. In Athens Demosthenes pondered finances, diplomacy, strategy, and public sentiment. He urged the Athenians to total war against Philip. The cost of it he knew

⁵ Dem. 1.7–8 with schol.; 1.21; schol. Dem. 1.5; Justin 8.3.10. Atheno-Olynthian negotiations: Dem. 1.15, 25; 3.8, 15–16; 2.6; 3.7–8, 16; 6.20; 15.24. Peace: Dem. 3.7; Libanios hypoth. Dem. 1.2–3; Bengtson, *SdA* II².317. Friendship and alliance: Dem. 1.11; 3.7; 23.108–109; Philochoros, *FGrH* 328 FF49–51; Bengtson, *SdA* II².323. Schaefer, *Demosthenes*, II².121–122; Beloch, *GG* III².1.493. Although N.G.L. Hammond, *Philip of Macedon*, (Baltimore 1994) 51, claims that Philip's treaty with the Chalkidian League prohibited a separate Olynthian alliance with Athens, nothing in the actual terms of this treaty supports his statement. He depends on the later testimony of Libanios cited above, not on the extant treaty itself. In reality, the matter hinged upon Philip's interpretation of the alliance.

⁶ Philochoros, *FGrH* 328 F49; Diod. 16.52.9; Steph. Byz. *s.v.* *Zeirenia*. The identity of the fortress perhaps lies beyond recovery. Its name is corrupt in the manuscripts of both Diodoros and Steph. Byz. Although Fischer prints *Στάγειραν*, little recommends it. Stephanos also mentions Stageira, which proves that he knew of the existence of two different places. He does not list a Geira. Even fourth-century Greeks were unlikely to know of a fortress in the Chalkidian interior. See also Zahrnt, *Olynth*, 186; Griffith, *HM* II.317 n. 1.

would be so huge that his fellow citizens might well shrink from devoting their revenues to a remote and perhaps otiose war. Philip after all had not yet done them any significant harm. Even by Demosthenes' own reckoning operations against Philip would cost the Athenians far more than they had spent on the lost war for Amphipolis. He proposed to raise the money by abolishing the theoric fund that provided free entertainment for the Athenians at public festivals. The outcry against the notion being terrific, he dropped it. His ideas about diplomacy likewise seemed totally unrealistic. He suggested that Athens try to raise the Thessalians against Philip, this at a time when he had just eliminated Peitholaos as their common enemy. Demosthenes also failed to appreciate the significance of Philip's promise to the Thessalians to end the Sacred War. He realized, however, that the Phokians would soon run through Apollo's wealth, thus rendering them helpless. At the same time he understood that Thebes was too mired in the Sacred War to exercise any wider influence. Given these factors, he urged his countrymen to draw upon their own and allied strength, first to serve in person and then to make full use of their bases in the north. In this respect, a fleet deployed from Thasos could prove effective against the eastern Chalkidike but in fact could lend little support to Olynthos. Nonetheless, he proposed to implement this policy by sending fifty triremes and transports for half of the Athenian cavalry. One half of this force was to relieve Olynthos and the other to harry Philip's territory. Even though he admitted that Athens could not defeat Philip in pitched battle, he hoped to annoy him into retreat. He offered Athens a limited war that could lead to total victory and indeed stood little chance of saving Olynthos. Although Demosthenes' hopes of a grand effort against Philip never materialized, he had at last quickened the Athenian intent to defy the Macedonians and to defend Olynthos. The mere fact that the majority of Athenians voted to accept the Olynthian alliance, knowing that it would probably involve war, meant at the very least that they shared Demosthenes' fear of Philip's ambitions.⁷

⁷ Demosthenes' plans—total war: 1.17; 4.43; diplomacy: 1.22, 26–28; 2.7, 11; 3.8, 27. Athenian military service: 2.3–6; 4.16, 21–27, 44. Athenian bases: 3.1; 4.32, and their use 3.1, 4; 4.16, 43. Cost of war: 1.27; 3.11, 28; 4.28–29. Theoric fund: 3.11. J.J. Buchanan, *Theorika*, (New York 1962). Sealey, *Demosthenes*, 137–143.

Philip rejoined battle with Olynthos in 348 by drawing the ring more tightly around the embattled city. He seems to have attacked directly eastwards along the Via Egnatia before turning southwards to Aioleion in Bottike. He then continued farther southwards through the peninsula of Pallene, thus securing the western approaches to Olynthos. The Athenians responded by diverting Charidemos from the Hellespont with his eighteen triremes, 4000 peltasts, and 150 cavalry. Although he reportedly ravaged the countryside of Bottiaia, the swampy land there offered him little to plunder. Instead of wasting time there, he probably carried the war to Bottike and Pallene, where he did nothing to impede Philip's advance. Rather, he retired to Olynthos, where his licentious behavior harmed his allies more than it helped them. Philip meanwhile seized the occasion to complete his conquest of the northern Chalkidike. He captured Apollonia, in all probability that situated on the Via Egnatia. The city lay in a broad, fertile valley ringed by low hills, open land that left it vulnerable to Philip's attack. From it he descended upon Stageira, the birthplace of Aristotle, which he destroyed. The victory opened the peninsula of Athos to him. Now isolated from Olynthos, Akanthos and Dion made an appeal to Athens but to no avail. Philip secured the surrender of Torone without a battle, an easy step in sealing Olynthos' doom. Torone commands a spacious bay looking westwards, and from it Philip now oversaw all of the maritime traffic in the Toronaic Gulf. Philip next moved against Olynthos itself. Its harbor Mekyberna surrendered without a struggle, which sealed the city's fate. Although the Olynthians defied him in two battles, he prevailed, whereupon the embattled city made a last appeal to Athens. Within one year the Olynthians had lost all of the Chalkidike. At their last gasp they asked specifically for Athenian troops, not mercenaries, probably a reflection on Charidemos' conduct. The Athenians voted to send seventeen triremes, 2000 hoplites, and 300 cavalry, all under Chares' command, the sort of response that Demosthenes had long urged. Yet the expedition failed in the teeth of the Etesian winds, which blow between late May and the middle of September. Beginning in mid-morning, they often reach gale force by early afternoon, and against them even a commander more resolute than Chares could literally make little headway. Having counted upon the winds, Philip now struck direct at the isolated city. Its surrounding land spreads in a rather open, large, and relatively level plain, good terrain for a classical Greek battle. When within a bit more than

seven kilometers from the city, Philip presented the defenders the choice of unconditional surrender or battle to the finish. Thus confronted, the Olynthians fought, but Euthykrates and Lasthenes betrayed their cavalry to Philip at the outset of battle and with their treachery went all hope of Olynthian victory. Philip destroyed the city in a few days, not simply to relieve himself of a formidable enemy but also as a symbol of the price of perfidy. Euthykrates and Lasthenes met a fate similar to that of their city. With Olynthos and the two traitors Philip had used the same method as that after his victory at the Crocus Plain. He thereby sent the Athenians an unmistakable example of his resolve. Despite their ultimate failure, the Athenians had made a worthy effort to defend their ally. They had in all during their operations dispatched seventy-three triremes, an unknown number of horse-transports, 6000 peltasts, 2000 hoplites, and 450 cavalry. Their mistake lay in throwing these forces into battle piecemeal and under inferior commanders. In spite of these efforts, they had lost their influence in Thrace except for Kersebleptes' enclave and the Chersonesos. The failure of these efforts convinced many Athenians that a reasonable peace with Philip was preferable to the continuation of a hapless war.⁸

In 348 even before the fall of Olynthos and the end of the fighting on Euboea, Philip made the first move to conclude peace with Athens, a gesture gingerly welcomed in many quarters. Despite uncertainties, the general course of events remains clear. Some Euboian envoys friendly to Philip opened peace negotiations with Athens to settle their own differences. In the course of their discussions they mentioned that Philip too desired peace with Athens. Their message took many Athenians by surprise, but most found relief in the thought

⁸ Philochoros, *FGH* 328 FF50–51; Theopompos, *FGH* 115 FF143–144; *IG* II² 207c lines 9–28; schol. Dem. 1.5. although neither text shows significant signs of corruption, Philochoros' Bottia is probably a mistake for Theopompos' Bottike, which was near Pallene. The only argument against this suggestion comes from Dem. 9.26, where he includes Methone with Olynthos, Apollonia, and thirty-two other cities. Yet Methone probably lay in the Pieria (Thuc. 2.99.2), and the coastline of Bottia has long been nothing but marsh. Akanthos and Diod: *IG* II² 210; E. Schweigert, *Hesperia* 6 (1937) 329. See also Dem. 2.27; 3.1, 33; 9.11; 19.266; Diod. 16.52.1–2; Plut. *Mor.* 40E, 215B, 458C; Libanios *hypo.* to Dem. 1.2–3; Souda, s.v. *Karanos*. Lasthenes and Euthykrates: Dem. 8.40; U. Kahrstedt, *RE* 12 (1924) 890; J. Kirchner, *RE* 6 (1907) 1507. Olynthos, Torone, Apollonia: personal observations of 9–10 July 1996. Apollonia: Zahrnt, *Olynth.* 155–158; M.B. Hatzopoulos, in Worthington, ed., *Ventures into Greek History*, 159–188; Olynthos: Zahrnt, *Olynth.*, 209; Stageira, Zahrnt, *Olynth.*, 238–243; Torone: Zahrnt, *Olynth.*, 247–251.

that Philip's ambitions did not extend farther southwards. An unrelated event further relieved the fears of the sceptical. Captured by Macedonian pirates during the Olympic truce, Phrynon of Rhamnous was duly ransomed, and upon his return he asked his countrymen to send an embassy to Macedonia to win the repayment of his ransom. They obliged by sending Ktesiphon, a friend of Demosthenes, to Philip, who took the opportunity to explain that he had unwillingly gone to war and now wanted only peace. When Ktesiphon reported his news, the Athenians were overjoyed, whereupon Philokrates won a vote in the assembly to open peace negotiations with the king. One of the leading politicians of the day, Philokrates realized that Athenian ambition exceeded its resources. Thus he favored peace with Philip, even if that meant formal surrender of Athenian claims to Amphipolis. The fall of Olynthos put a temporary halt to proceedings, and Philip's capture of many Athenians alarmed the entire city. The crisis prompted Euboulos, an enemy of both Philip and Philokrates, to persuade the Athenians to raise other Greeks in a common war against Philip. The Athenians duly sent embassies to the Greeks for the purpose only to find incredulity among their hosts. Most Greeks thought the idea arrant nonsense. The experience of the delegation to the Arkadian League, which best documents this response, amply reveals the more prevailing Greek sentiment. The Athenians sent Aischines, soon to become the fervent enemy of Demosthenes, to argue their case. Aischines and his fellows learned with a shock that Philip enjoyed a wide popularity among the Greeks because of his religious piety. Many, however, regarded the Athenians as the enemies of Greek freedom. In short, they neither saw Philip as a threat nor trusted Athens. The Peloponnesians especially disliked the Athenians and their Spartan friends, both of whom had long supported the Phokian temple-robbers. Philip, to the contrary, championed Apollo, while maintaining cordial relations with Thebes. Furthermore, from the days of their ascendancy the Thebans had protected the Peloponnesians from Athens and especially from Sparta. Philip built upon Epameinondas' policy by befriending these states against their powerful local rivals. He himself remained too far removed from the Peloponnesos to be seen as any threat there. The Athenian delegations returned in failure, which alone awakened the city to the peril of further hostilities with Philip.⁹

⁹ Euboian envoys: Aischin. 2.12; Dem. 5.5 with schol. Chronology: *IG* I³ 6 lines

Aischines returned to Athens believing that only peace would preserve his city from an Olynthian fate. So did Demosthenes at the outset. Aischines honestly felt that Philip entertained no aggressive designs on Athens, to which Philip's career to this point lent some credence. Athens had transgressed against him from the outset, but by 348 nothing suggested that he harbored any ambitions against it. Nonetheless, the king surely realized the future possibilities that the Sacred War offered him. The matter of captives from other conflicts, however, still remained uppermost in Athenian minds. A minor incident again provided impetus for broader events, this one quickly leading to the first official Athenian peace embassy to Philip. The family of Iatrokles, an Athenian captive, prevailed upon Philokrates and Demosthenes to ransom him. Aristodemos, their agent, and Iatrokles also returned with enthusiastic reports of Philip's good intentions towards Athens. They insisted that he wished for peace. On the strength of these tidings Philokrates moved to send ten envoys to discuss the topic and other common interests. The delegation consisted of Philokrates, for whom the subsequent treaty would be named, Demosthenes, Aischines, and other notables. Nor did Athens act alone. It called upon its allies of the League to send Aglaokreon of Tenedos to represent their interests. His presence in the negotiations is vital for a proper understanding of the ensuing Peace of Philokrates. He served as the legal delegate of the League alone. Only he could speak for it. He lacked any legal right to represent any other Athenian ally. Though obvious, the point is fundamental to the proper understanding of the status of other Athenian allies in the treaty, for later debate would involve the question of whether Phokis, Halos, and Kersebleptes had the right to be included among them. In fact, none of them was ever represented by an ambassador in any of these proceedings, and none of them ever played an official part in the agreements that culminated in the Peace of Philokrates.¹⁰

76–87. Ellis, *Philip II*, 264 n. 39; Harris, *Aeschines*, 38 n. 57. Phrynon: Dem. 19.10, 303–304; Diod. 16.54.1–2. Greek enmity towards Athens: Dem. 18.20, 24; 19.259, 304; Aischin. 2.79; Dem. 19.10–11, 304–306; Diod. 16.64.3. G.L. Cawkwell, *CQ* (1978) 93–104; M.H. Hansen, *GRBS* 24 (1983) 159–177; Develin, *AO*, 319; Ryder, in Worthington, ed., *Demosthenes*, 58–61; Buckler, in Worthington, ed., *Demosthenes*, 117–119.

¹⁰ Aischin. 1.169; 2.18–20, 83–93, 97, 126; Dem. 19.174; Justin 8.4.1. Accame, *La lega ateniese*, 83–84; Cargill, *Athenian League*, 33; Harris, *Aeschines*, 78–79; McInerney, *Parnassos*, 219–220; Buckler, in Worthington, ed., *Demosthenes*, 117–120.

The fall of Olynthos gave Philip the opportunity to contemplate his situation, which was brighter than ever before. He had not only defeated Olynthos but also its Athenian allies. They had all failed to prevent him from winning virtually the entire coastline of Thrace. Kersepleptes was cornered in Kardia, the Athenians confined to the Chersonesos, and the Byzantines and Perinthians were his allies. Some small trouble had recurred in Thessaly, always a fractious region, where the cities of Halos and Pharsalos were at odds. As archon of the Thessalian Confederacy, he had the right and the duty to settle their quarrel, one that would bring him not too far north of Thermopylai. He could restore order there with perfect justification, while placing himself in an excellent position to end the Sacred War. That was his first priority. Even a march on Delphi would not necessarily take him farther south to Attika. He could content himself with a domain that stretched from Thessaly to Thrace. Kersepleptes remained a nuisance in the east, but one that he could easily remove. Kardia in Macedonian hands would provide Philip with an excellent base upon which to anchor his eastern border. The quandary in late 348 was whether Philip genuinely wanted peace with Athens. The uncertainty of the answer plagued Athenian politicians until 338. For the moment, however, peace handsomely served Philip's purposes. With it or the possibility of it he could end the Sacred War without Athenian interference and thereby bolster his position in central Greece and the larger world. He could afterwards enjoy the luxury of seeing how things stood, all with little danger to himself.¹¹

Philip decided to fulfill his immediate duties by resolving the dispute between the two Thessalian cities and ending the Sacred War by launching one military campaign. He first ordered his veteran general Parmenion to besiege Halos, while he encouraged peace negotiations with Athens. Then located about 100 meters from the sea, Halos was the most significant Thessalian harbor south of Pagasai, but its land communications farther southward were poor. Pharsalos however, commanded the main road south to Lamia, as it does today. The distance is some 114 kilometers. Its strength and location must surely have played their part in Philip's decision to champion it against its neighbor. At any rate, the siege operations against

¹¹ Dem. 19.36 with schol., 163; Diod. 16.71.1–2.

Halos put Philip's best general, an army, and its siege-train within easy reach of Thermopylai and the rest of central Greece.¹²

While Parmenion encamped outside Halos, Philip spent the new year of 347 entertaining Greek ambassadors, especially those from Thebes and Thessaly. Candidly admitting their inability to defeat the Phokians, the Thebans asked for his help. The Thessalians naturally and enthusiastically seconded their request. Philip was more than happy to succeed where the Thebans had failed. The Athenians sent their own delegations to Pella, which landed at Halos along the way. Parmenion treated them graciously, but the sight of Macedonian siege warfare so close to home and so soon after the destruction of Olynthos left them with somber thoughts. Philip did not take warfare lightly. The episode was then otherwise unimportant to the Athenians. When they reached Pella, they encountered a daunting situation. Simply put, the Athenians were engaged in two wars with Philip. The first was the "War for Amphipolis", now militarily lost and the formal end to which they had been sent to reach. Although Kersebleptes had fought on the Athenian side in it, he never belonged to the Athenian League. That alone excluded him from these proceedings, as witnessed by the absence of a legate to represent him. Nor did it involve Halos and Phokis, neither of which had participated in it. Halos shared no treaty with Athens; and Phokis, which did, had never belonged to the Athenian League. Its alliance was therefore separate from that of the formal body of legally recognized confederates. In short, both Halos and Phokis were technically and actually irrelevant to the negotiations to end the "War for Amphipolis". The other conflict was the Sacred War in which Athens was a belligerent against the Amphiktyons and Philip, who acted as the legitimate representative of Thessaly. Although the Athenian delegation could conclude their war with Philip, the Athenians must otherwise deal with the Amphiktyons for their part in that conflict. Though the two wars were unrelated, they nonetheless included nearly all of the principals of both. Philip was therefore all the more intent to confine his present negotiations solely to his own quarrel

¹² Dem. 2.7 with schol.; 5.23; Ps.-Dem. 11.1 with schol.; 19.36 with schol., 163, 174; Polyb. 9.28.3; Walbank, *HCP* II.165–166. Halos: Stählin, *Thessalien*, 177–180; Griffith, *HM* II.292–293; Lauffer, *Griechenland*, 256–258; see also H.P. Reinders, *New Halos* (Utrecht 1988).

with Athens and its League. Then he could intervene in Delphi to end the Sacred War. No one knew how he would treat in that case, and in part the decision depended on the Athenian reaction. Nonetheless, he would not be bound by the terms of the first peace when liberating Delphi. The very complexity of these events, the jumble of states involved, and the disparate goals of many of them all served to complicate the peace efforts of 346.¹³

At Pella the Athenians raised the status of Amphipolis, but Philip answered that it belonged to him by right of conquest. The topic was not subject to further discussion. Yet he promised not to invade the Chersonesos while the Athenians deliberated over the peace. If the envoys raised the question of including Kersebleptes and other states in the peace, nothing came of it. Philip insisted on a treaty solely between the Athenians and their allies of the League and himself and his allies, whom he would designate. He also pressed for an alliance with Athens to accompany the peace. He made as well some vague promises about extraneous matters. The negotiations left most, if perhaps not all, ambassadors enthusiastic. Furthermore, they found it expedient to accept what they could not change. Their mission completed, they returned to Athens in early 346 to witness their countrymen voting to accept Philip's terms. The protocol did not include Phokis, Halos, Kersebleptes, or any other Athenian ally. In 346 the Athenians fully understood that these states constituted liabilities that would only endanger the peace. Unless the Athenians publicly distanced themselves especially from Phokis they could justifiably become the next target of the Amphiktyonic Council. They also learned that Philip had already marched against Kersebleptes even while the Athenian embassy had returned from Macedonia. The treaty ratified, the Athenians and the delegate of the League swore the oaths to Parmenion and Antipatros, Philip's ambassadors. Five days later the Athenians learned that Philip had defeated Kersebleptes. Having in the process seized Hieron Oros, he now held Kardias, which placed him on the doorstep of the Athenian mil-

¹³ Diod. 16.58.3; Justin, 8.4.2–11. Atheno-Phokian alliance: Dem. 19.61; Aischin. 3.118; Diod. 16.27.5; Paus. 3.10.2; Bengtson, *SdA* II².310. Although McNerney, *Parnassos*, 215–225, misunderstands the difference between the War for Amphipolis and the Sacred War, Demosthenes (2.7 with schol.; 5.10, 23–24) clearly did not. Buckler, in I. Worthington, ed., *Demosthenes*, 119–123; Cargill, *Athenian League*, 93, 195; W. Unte, *Hermes* 115 (1987) 411–429; Jehne, *Koine Eirene*, 122; Ryder, in Worthington, ed., *Ventures into Greek History*, 244–248; Sánchez, *L'Amphictionie*, 199–213.

itary colonies in the Chersonesos. Instead of destroying the nascent peace, the news prompted the Athenians to proceed without further delay lest worse happened.¹⁴

When the second Athenian embassy reached Pella, it found Philip returned from Thrace and openly preparing to march on Thermopylai. At his court they were joined by embassies from Thebes, Thessaly, Phokis, and Sparta, a sure sign that events would prove anything but routine. Not somehow even considering the possibility of this eventuality, the Athenians had stopped their preparations for war. With a bow to reality they clarified the treaty by recognizing Kardia as Philip's ally but added a wish that he would treat Kersebleptes honorably. Although Demosthenes supposedly tried to include Halos in the treaty, Philip cynically invited the Athenians to join him when he reconciled the city with Pharsalos. The topic of the Sacred War also arose, even though technically it was irrelevant to the Athenian mission. The fundamental point here became the treatment of the Phokians. Aischines and Philokrates saw the simplest solution of excluding them from the present agreement on the perfectly legitimate grounds that not being members of the League they had never engaged in the War for Amphipolis. Therefore, the Phokians could not logically make peace in a war in which they had never been belligerents. Demosthenes never grasped the significance of this obvious fact, or otherwise he would not consistently have insisted upon including the Phokians in this peace. His own assessment of the strategical and legal situations was hopelessly incompetent. He fatuously hoped that so long as the Phokians held Thermopylai, Athens remained safe from both Philip and Thebes, not realizing how easily that position could be outflanked. Furthermore, while Phalaikos commanded the garrisons in the Thermopylai corridor, his own home government was working against him. There was no hope of a united Phokian front against Philip. Nor could Phalaikos expect much help

¹⁴ Athenian negotiations without Phokis, Halos, and Kersebleptes: Aischin. 2.61, 82–93; 3.69–74; Dem. 19.40–41, 174, 181, 321. Terms of the treaty: Bengtson, *StA* II².329. Amphipolis: Dem. 18.69, 74–77; 19.22, 137, 253–255; Aischin. 2.70. Peace and alliance: Dem. 19.12, 40–41, 48, 87; Aischin. 2.61, 82; 3.65, 71. Kersebleptes: Dem. 19.174, 181; Aischin. 3.65, 68, 74. Phokis: Dem. 19.18, 73, 278 (which contradicts 19.15, 174), 321–322; Aischin. 2.81, 95, 131. Hieron Oros: Aischin. 2.82, 90; 3.73–74; Dem. 19.156, 337; its site: Danov, *Althrakien*, 112 n. 101; Archibald, *Odrysian Kingdom*, 121, 234. In general: Ch. Pecorella Longo, *SIFC* 47 (1975) 204–221; Harris, *Aeschines*, 79–80; McInerney, *Parnassos*, 221–224; Buckler, in Worthington, ed., *Demosthenes*, 120–124; T.A. Schmitz, *AJP* 121 (2000) 47–77.

from the Athenians, whose fifty triremes were unarmed. Under no illusion about the danger of his position and distrustful of his allies, Phalaikos refused to surrender his positions either to the Spartan Archidamos or the Athenian Proxenos. Thermopylai served as his only valuable asset. The situation was more complex than Demosthenes imagined. Even were Phalaikos reinforced by the Athenians and Spartans, they all could easily be caught in a pincer movement between Philip descending from the north and the Thebans marching from the south. In the diplomatic sphere, Philip's own allies openly warned the Athenians that the king could not accept the Phokians because it would violate the oaths given to the Thebans and Thessalians. Aischines, Philokrates, and the others dropped the matter when they saw its futility. Stark reality proved that peace was possible only without Phokis.¹⁵

Excluding the Phokians from the peace put them at a further diplomatic distance from Athens, but it did not remove them altogether from the scene. Owing to their own participation in the Sacred War, the Athenians could not simply forget them. Only Aischines had a solution to this problem that advanced Athenian interests, offered some small protection to the Phokians, and would offend neither Philip nor his allies. He urged them all to let the Amphiktyonic Council decide the fate of the Phokians, as was technically proper. The suggestion appealed to Philip for several reasons. Although he then held no seat on the Council, the majority of his friends did. So did the Athenians and Spartans, but they could justly be excluded for having sided with the temple-robbers. An Amphiktyonic verdict gave Philip an excellent opportunity to manipulate the outcome, should he prefer clemency. Aischines' solution at least gave the Athenians the only realistic possibility of doing something to save the Phokians without themselves risking Amphiktyonic retaliation. Philip met Aischines' proposals coolly, adroitly, and duplicitously by describing the great things that he would do upon the establishment of a general settlement. He promised everything but wrote nothing specific. He duped Aischines and Demosthenes alike into believing

¹⁵ Second Athenian embassy: Aischin. 2.101–104, 113–117, 136; Dem. 9.11; 18.26; 19.36, 179, 181. Kardia: Dem. 19.174; Phokis: Dem. 5.10; 19.123, 318, 321. Thermopylai: Dem. 19.83, 99, 153, 180; Aischin. 2.37. Buckler, *SW*, 139. Phalaikos: Aischin. 2.130–132. Proxenos and Archidamos: Aischin. 2.133. Schaefer, *Demosthenes* II².188–192; Sealey, *Demosthenes*, 153–157; McInerney, *Parnassos*, 219–220; Buckler, in Worthington, ed., *Demosthenes*, 126–131.

that after he had made his peace with the Athenians, he would do all that they wanted. Philip carried all before him merely by telling the Athenians precisely what they wanted hear about a matter over which they had no control.¹⁶

Left now was only the Athenian acceptance of Philip's oaths that would seal the treaty, but the king delayed the ceremony until he and his army had marched from Pella to Pherai. They made the journey of some 160 kilometers in perhaps as little as six or seven days. Only upon his arrival there, when he stood not more than three days' march from Thermopylai, did he officially conclude the treaty known as the Peace of Philokrates. Owing to the celerity of his march, the Athenian boule and assembly eagerly approved of the proceedings. The Athenians and Philip had officially ended the War for Amphipolis. The essential terms of the treaty were rather ordinary. They stipulated peace, alliance, and friendship between Philip and his allies and Athens and its League. It was by no means a Common Peace that embraced all of Greece. The parties involved agreed to the principle of holding what they then possessed and endorsed an enabling clause to ensure the enforcement of the treaty. The King did not participate, nor did Greeks other than those specifically included in the treaty. A state of peace now existed between them by which Philip recognized the legal existence of Athens and its League and the inviolability of their territory. The Athenian party in turn acknowledged Philip as the rightful king of Macedonia, the archon of Thessaly, and legitimate ruler of such conquered places as Amphipolis, Olynthos, and Kardias. Since each side presumably knew the borders of its possessions, no one expected territorial disputes to disrupt the agreement. All parties were to enjoy freedom and autonomy. If any third party attacked the possessions of any of the signatories, the others were bound by treaty to come to its assistance.¹⁷

¹⁶ Phokis and the Amphiktyonic Council: Aischin. 3.114, 117. Philip's promises: Dem. 19.37, 41, 44, 68, 321; Aischin. 1.169; Justin 8.4.11.

¹⁷ Philip at Pherai: Dem. 19.152, 158, 175. Terms of the peace: Bengtson, *SdA* II².329. Peace, alliance, and friendship: Philochoros, *FGrH* 328 F53; Ps.-Dem. 12.22; Dem. 19.48, 87; Aischin. 2.53; 3.67–68. Treaty extended only to the two groups of allies: Ps.-Dem. 7.31; Dem. 19.278. Keeping one's own: Ps.-Dem. 7.26; schol. to 7.18, 24; Dem. 5.25; 19.78. Enabling clause: Dem. 19.143. Exclusion of the King, Phokis, Halos, and Kersebleptes: Dem. 19.49, 159, 174. Beloch, *GG* III².1.502–509; Schaefer, *Demosthenes*, II².225–232; Ryder, *Koine Eirene*, 96–100,

The Peace should have cheered the Athenians, for the general political situation otherwise appeared bleak. The Athenians needed a respite to deal with several problems in the Aegean, to decide how to respond to them, and to reassess their position as a major power. At the moment they appeared at a loss. They stood by helplessly as Idreus, satrap of Karia, kept possession of Chios, Kos, and Rhodes, all of which should have remained autonomous under the King's Peace. Even though the three had successfully seceded from their League, the Athenians could have insisted that the common treaty be honored. The Athenians also made no formal complaint about the Byzantine detention of their ships. This fact proved that the wounds of the Social War had by no means healed. Although the Byzantines had become Philip's ally, nothing indicates their inclusion in the Peace of Philokrates. They far more likely acted in unison with Idreus and their former friends of the old Coinage-Alliance. These details indicate once again that Athens had lost control of the eastern Aegean. The Athenians had proven unable to enforce their own Peace of 371 and powerless to do anything against Idreus now. Having lost the Social War, they now watched the erstwhile rebels ranged against them. Now they had lost the conflict with Philip. Nor had they yet shaped a policy to deal with these drastically changed circumstances. The Peace of Philokrates at least left them with nothing ostensible to fear from Philip, except their role in the Sacred War. If all of this did not amount to a crisis, it forebode ill.¹⁸

The Peace of Philokrates gave Philip the freedom next to end the Sacred War. With his army already at Thermopylai, his presence struck fear into Athens. Philokrates offered a proposal that called upon the Phokians to surrender the sanctuary to the Amphiktyons, while maintaining that Philip had promised to deal justly with them. The Athenians also threatened to take the field against them if they refused. At the last moment the Athenians admitted the illegality of Phokian actions and tried to cloak themselves in a mantle of

145–149; Sealey, *Demosthenes*, 148–150; Jehne, *Koine Eirene*, 125–134; G.L. Cawkwell, *GRBS* 24 (1983) 93–104; N. Sawada, *KODAI* 4 (1993) 21–50; Ryder, in Worthington, ed., *Ventures into Greek History*, 243–245; Buckler, *ICS* 19 (1994) 100, 121; in Worthington, ed., *Demosthenes*, 125–131.

¹⁸ Dem. 5.25; Isok. 5.10; Tod, *GHI* II.161; Bengtson, *SdA* II².318. F. Hampl, *Klio* 31 (1938) 371–388; G.T. Griffith, *JHS* 59 (1939) 71–79; *HM* II.460–461; G.L. Cawkwell, *REG* 73 (1960) 416–438; *CQ* 28 (1978) 93–104; M.M. Markle III, *CQ* 24 (1974) 253–268; H. Klees, in *Zu Alexander d.Gr.* I (Amsterdam 1987) 131–191; Jehne, *Koine Eirene*, 116–137; Ryder, in Worthington, ed., *Demosthenes*, 56–69.

respectability. They in fact abandoned an ally in its hour of peril to save their own skins. Philip also carefully watched the Athenians. In two letters he summoned his new friends and allies to help him liberate Delphi. They posed an ultimatum. With Philip and his allies the Thebans, Thessalians, and Lokrians—none of them Athenian friends—gathering against Phalaikos, the Athenians feared that compliance with the king's summons would merely put the Athenian army into his hands. Anxious that they might themselves become the next target of an Amphiktyonic crusade against the sacrilegious, they brought everything they could into the city, an echo of the early days of the Peloponnesian War. Their response clearly demonstrated that Philip and the Amphiktyons could simply ignore them.¹⁹

Others also watched the Athenian response to the crisis, none perhaps more keenly than Phalaikos. His own messengers four days after the conclusion of peace reported the facts to him. When the rest of the Phokians learned the news, they lost all hope. For Phalaikos the situation had become all too simple. He stood virtually no chance of defeating Philip, and the Crocus Plain suggested the sort of treatment that he and his vanquished mercenaries could expect. Now isolated and without hope of long holding his position, he extricated himself from danger by striking a devil's bargain with Philip. He offered to surrender Thermopylai in return for safe flight. Phokis could fend for itself. Philip accepted the offer, which cost him nothing while giving much. He now held the entire Thermopylai corridor from the springs themselves to Thronion. He thereby controlled all of the northern passes into central Greece—that past Herakleia Trachinia into Doris and Phokis and both the Kleisoura and Fontana passes to the east into Phokis. They gave him unassailable links to his Theban allies. Phalaikos and his men departed to a mercenary's life. Now left defenseless, the Phokian cities surrendered without further resistance. By midsummer 346 the fighting was over.²⁰

The cities of the Phokian Confederacy surrendered to Philip alone, doubtless in an effort to avoid Amphiktyonic wrath. There remained

¹⁹ Dem. 19.152, 158, 175; Aischin. 2.123, 137; Justin 8.4.12. Exclusion of Phokis: Dem. 19.278, 318; Aischin. 2.129. Third Athenian delegation: Aischin. 2.94–95, 130; Dem. 19.121–123; Diod. 16.59.3. Philip's summons and Athenian fears: Dem. 5.10; 19.51; Aischin. 2.137–138. Athenian precautions: Aischin. 2.139; Dem. 5.14. Griffith, *HM* II.339–341; Buckler, *SW*, 137–138.

²⁰ Dem. 19.53, 58, 61; Aischin. 2.130; Justin 8.6.1–6. Buckler, *SW*, 138–139. W. Unte, *Hermes* 115 (1987) 411–429.

the dual questions of punishment for despoilation of the sanctuary and restitution for the treasure plundered, both properly and legally matters for the Amphiktyons alone to determine. Despite being master of the field and leader of the Thessalians, Philip had no vote in the Council. Yet he had nothing to fear from the grateful Amphiktyons, who would hardly oppose his wishes. Using his victory to best advantage, he handed Apollo's temple back to the Amphiktyons, whom he summoned to Delphi to seal the fate of the Phokians. The Athenians and Spartans refused to risk sending delegations, which left the Phokians to the judgement of their enemies. The Amphiktyons, or more precisely the victors, duly assembled at Delphi both to assess the damage done in ten years of raw looting and to mete out punishment for it. The Phokian people, and not just their leaders, were found guilty of sacrilege, with the exception of Abai, which had never condoned it. The victors fined them to recompense the god and forbade them to possess horses and arms until the fine was paid. These measures prevented them from posing a further military threat to the Amphiktyons. This just verdict stemmed from the fact that the Phokian Confederacy had elected all of the strategoi from Philomelos to Phalaikos. The Amphiktyons excluded them from any role in sacred affairs, and they placed those who had participated in the spoilation of the temple under a curse. Many prominent Phokians had already fled into exile at Athens, but the Amphiktyons confiscated their property, which they leased to people who paid their rents to the god. Those who remained received severe punishment. Philip and the Amphiktyons pulled down the walls of Phokian cities and forced the inhabitants, as the Spartans had the Mantineians in 385, to live in small villages widely separated from one another. Philip billeted Macedonian mercenaries and Theban troops among them. He did so to leave a Macedonian bridgehead in central Greece, but one connected by a long and tenuous line to Macedonia. Having established his position in Phokis, he clearly entertained some doubts about the reliability of his Theban and Thessalian allies. These garrisons could also all the more closely watch a distracted, fractious, and fickle Athens. The victors celebrated the formal end of the war with a solemn procession to the summit of the Phaidriadaí Rocks above Delphi, whence they hurled some weapons used by the sacrilegious. This symbolic gesture ended hostilities.²¹

²¹ Peace: Bengtson, *SdA* II².331. Abai: Paus. 10.3.2. Curse on temple-robbers:

With the peace and the safety of the sanctuary secured, the Delphians publicly honored Philip as their *proxenos* and benefactor. The Thessalians nominated him for admission to the Amphiktyonic Council to which their grateful colleagues eagerly acceded. Philip also became a *naopoios*, an officer charged with the rebuilding of the temple. Not hollow honors, they gave Philip an official vote in the Amphiktyonic decisions that affected larger Greek religious and political affairs. As never before, he could now influence sacred pronouncements that applied to all those who sought the wisdom and solace of Apollo at his most revered sanctuary. Philip's religious position equalled that of any other venerable Greek people. He immediately used his new status to demand that the Spartans renounce their right to Messene, a pious and politically profitable recognition of a fact that Epameinondas had realized in 369. Philip also confirmed Theban rights to Orchomenos and Koroneia, which endorsed the legitimacy of the Boiotian Confederacy. He rendered a friendlier decision to the Athenians over a dispute involving the sanctuary at Delos. The Athenians had long claimed jurisdiction over it, but with Philip now ascendant at Delphi, the Delians petitioned the Amphiktyons to restore governance of it to them. In spring 345 the Amphiktyons, surely at Philip's behest, ruled in favor of Athens. The vote's significance lies in Philip's desired reconciliation with the Athenians or at least the maintenance of peace between them. The decision was then a sign of good faith that constituted the first test of the Peace of Philokrates. The decisions amply prove that Philip fully supported the policies and claims of the Thessalians, Thebans, and the other Amphiktyons. Sparta had become an outcast, and Athens received surprising leniency.²²

The Athenians remained fearful and quiet during these events, but Philip made no move against them. He honored his part of the Peace of Philokrates instead of leading a grand and irresistible

Diod. 16.60.1; Paus. 10.3.3. Fate of Phokian cities: Dem. 19.325; Diod. 16.60.2; Paus. 10.3.1–2. Repayments: *FdD* III.5 no. 14; Diod. 16.60.2. Buckler, *SW*, 138–142; *ICS* 19 (1994) 100–102; in Wallace and Harris, eds., *Transitions*, 84–85, 95 n. 49; McInerney, *Parnassos*, 225–226.

²² Delphic honors: *SIG*³ 221. Philip as *naipoios* *SIG*³ 237 IIA line 2; 241 B line 74. Admission to the Amphiktyonic Council: Ps.-Dem. 11.1, 4; Dem. 19.111. Sparta: Dem. 6.13 with schol. Delos: Hypereid. FF67–75; Dem. 18.134. Ellis, *Philip*, 130–134; Roux, *L'Amphictionie*, 166–167; Lefèvre, *L'Amphictionie*, 94–96; Sánchez, *L'Amphictionie*, 203–213.

Amphiktyonic crusade against them. He possessed the ideal opportunity, for the Athenians could not possibly stand against the victors. Nor could Sparta help them against such odds. Attika lay exposed, as Demosthenes clearly recognized, but Philip forebore to attack. This fact alone clearly proves that at this point he had no desire to crush Athens, which strongly argues against the notion that he had drafted a masterplan to conquer it and the rest of Greece. Having the opportunity in 346, he refused to take it. Most of the Greeks were favorably disposed to him; and except for Athens, he had little to fear from them. He had for the moment secured his southern boundary, which enabled him to turn his full attention to the north. Indeed, subsequent events, when seen in conjunction with those past, strongly urge that Philip's primary concern lay with his northern neighbors. Their much more immediate threat to him demanded that he war against them frequently and on a large scale. Athens by comparison posed no menace to him, even with their much-vaunted navy, a fleet that had actually proven itself ineffectual of late. The only argument against this interpretation of events comes from the existence of Theban and Macedonian garrisons in Phokis. That can reasonably be seen as primarily defensive in nature. These troops guaranteed the loyalty of Thebes and Thessaly, while signalling a common interest in curbing the political ambitions of Athens. They left Philip finally ensconced in central Greece, securely in a position to deal with Athens, should necessity require it. As for the other Greeks, he had come as the champion of Apollo, for which he had gained their gratitude and admiration. He had nothing to fear from them.²³

B. FROM THE PEACE OF PHILOKRATES TO CHAIRONEIA (346–338 BC)

After 346 the question became whether the Peace of Philokrates would endure. In the years following Philip turned away to the north. He immediately began an ambitious program to secure the safety of Macedonia itself. He transplanted some pastoral and montane peoples, together with various captives in war, to populate newly-founded

²³ Schaefer, *Demosthenes*, II².295–305; Beloch, *GG* III².1.514–515; Cawkwell, *Philip*, 108–113; Wirth, *Philipp II.*, 95–101; Buckler, in Wallace and Harris, eds., *Transitions*, 84–85; Sealey, *Demosthenes*, 158–159.

cities on the frontier. Major activity doubtless occurred in the west around Lake Lychnitis. He thus changed the shape of Macedonian life by forcibly introducing an increased element of urbanism and turning prisoners into presumably loyal subjects. These cities served as strongly-held positions, the primary aim of which was to ward the border. Their existence reduced the possibility of successful incursions by neighboring barbarians. Philip needed time and space for his massive effort to succeed, for these northern and western regions were particularly vulnerable at this point. He bought the needed time by launching a massive campaign against the Dardanian Illyrians, who lived between the modern town of Risan in the north and the river Drin in the south in modern Kosovo. Defeating their king Pleurias, Philip devastated the countryside, attacked towns and tribes, and reduced them all at least to temporary submission. Philip, however, received a wound in the fighting, but not one serious enough to imperil his life and gains. He had not only removed an immediate threat to the settlements near Lake Lychnitis but he had also extended his power to the Adriatic Sea.²⁴

His northern and western marches secured and himself recovered from his wound, Philip next dealt with an unruly Thessaly, where discord yet again imperilled the stability of its confederacy. Tyrannies had arisen in some cities, which demanded his return to restore order. He suppressed them quickly, much to the general relief of the population. Having installed Macedonian garrisons in recalcitrant cities, he stifled further unrest. His response proved so successful that a subsequent Athenian embassy to Thessaly and Magnesia failed to shake their loyalty. Yet this incident serves as an early example of Athenian meddling in Philip's affairs, one in violation of the recently concluded treaty. Having settled Thessaly's political troubles, Philip turned his attention to Thermopylai, an incident that has provoked considerable misunderstanding. As noted above (p. 425), the road from Anthele in the west to Opous in the east passes the hot springs of Thermopylai along a long, constricted corridor, wider at some reaches than at others. In 480 at least the road narrowed near Anthele to a track that allowed only the passage of a single wagon.

²⁴ Dem. 4.48; 18.44; Diod. 16.8.1, 60.4; 69.7; 93.6; Didymos in *Dem.* 12.64–66; Strabo 7.5.6–7; Arr. *Anab.* 7.9.2; Trogus *Prol.* 8; Justin 8.5.7–6.3; Polyain. 4.2.121 Philip's wound: Isok. *Ep.* 2.3, 12. Griffith, *HM* II.653–657; N.G.L. Hammond, *BSA* 61 (1966) 241–253; Wilkes, *Illyrians*, 121–122, 144–145.

The same slender space limited traffic to the east at Alponos. Immediately eastwards of the springs themselves stands the Middle Gate at Kolonos Hill, the site of Leonidas' heroic stand in 480. Here in 344 as earlier in 480 the pass formed a bottleneck no wider than some fifteen meters. While presenting a good defensive position to bar the march of armies, the spot provided insufficient space for large-scale movement of supplies. Philip to some extent remedied this problem by building a true road through the Middle Gate. He thereby facilitated the movement of his army and its supplies through Thermopylai to the major passes southwards into Phokis at Skarpheia and Thronion. Since he already held control of the Dhema Pass west of Herakleia Trachinia into Doris, he now commanded all of the best routes into central Greece.²⁵

His work done, Philip returned to Macedonia, but his victories in the north and his consolidation of Thessaly greatly alarmed some Athenians. These men, however, still remained in the minority. Most Athenians welcomed a treaty that brought them surcease from a bootless war. The peace had cost them no territory of their own, while guaranteeing the security of their possessions. Even if some thought the peace imperfect, they found it largely satisfactory. This situation enabled Philip to turn serious attention to Greece, which suffered from its usual turmoil. The Spartans had disrupted the frail tranquility of the Peloponnesos by renewing their war against the Messenians, which drew in the Argives and those Arkadians loyal to Megalopolis. Unrest also agitated Euboia. He courted the Thebans,

²⁵ Thessaly: Dem. 18.48; 19.260; Aischin. 3.83; Diod. 16.69.8; Trogus *Prol.* 8; Arr. *Anab.* 7.9.4; Polyain. 4.2.11. Westlake, *Thessaly*, 191–194; Griffith, *HM* II.534–542; Wirth, *Philipp II.*, 102–109. Thermopylai: Road: *SIG*³ 220, 243D lines 42–45, 250D line 43; Arr. *Anab.* 7.9.4. Stählin, *RE* 5A (1934) 2405. Controversy: The dispute over Thermopylai involves the very question of whether a pass existed here at all before Philip's work. Herodotos (7.228) saw the inscribed epigrams erected to celebrate Leonidas' stand there in place, and Isokrates (5.148) mentions that the trophy standing there had become a site of pilgrimage. In the absence of geological evidence to the contrary, the Middle Gate must be located at Kolonos Hill, easily to be found immediately opposite the modern monument to Leonidas on the National Highway. The mere facts that contemporary inscriptions stood there and visitors a century later viewed them prove that a pass existed as early as 480. See also Buckler, review of McNerney, *Parnassos* in *BMCR* 29 November 2000, based on personal observations of 12–18 August 2000; and more generally Pritchett, *Topography*, VII.190–205; Case *et al.*, *The Great Isthmus Corridor Route*, 111–113; Szemler *et al.*, *Thermopylai*; G.J. Szemler and W.J. Cherf, in Mellor and Tritle, eds., *Text and Tradition*, 346–347; J.C. Kraft, *A Reconnaissance of the Geology of the Sandy Coastal Areas of Eastern Greece and the Peloponnesos*, (Newark 1972) 136–142.

whom he doubtless pleased by ordering the Phokians to begin paying their fine to Delphi. He needed a well-disposed Thebes and its strong diplomatic links with the enemies of Sparta to continue Epameinondas' policy of using them to contain the common enemy. He would also strike a blow against Thebes' last remaining major enemy there by ordering the Spartans to abandon their claim to Messene. To that end he lent aid to the Messenians, Argives, and Arkadians. He became a political factor in states as far removed as Messene, Elis, and Argos to Megara. The Arkadians and Argives openly honored him for his efforts. The Peloponnesians apparently saw in Philip one who could protect them from both the Spartans and Athenians. In response to Philip's success the Athenians sent Demosthenes and his friends Hegesippos and Polyuktos to warn the Peloponnesians against the perceived menace of Philip. The Athenians started from a weak position. Their earlier policy had alienated most of the states there, and to worsen their position at this time they enjoyed the support of only the weakest islanders in the League. They could offer the Peloponnesians virtually nothing. All that notwithstanding, the Athenian embassy journeyed first to Messene and Argos but without success. They met similar failure in Elis and Megara. Moreover, the Athenians thwarted their own efforts by sending an embassy to Sparta, which most Peloponnesians had good reason still to fear and distrust. No friend of Sparta could expect Peloponnesian support. Athenian diplomacy simply could not match Philip's endorsement of a successful Theban foreign policy that had demonstrated its effectiveness for twenty-six years. Nor had Philip ever posed any threat to the Peloponnesos, where he coveted nothing. Rather he enjoyed popularity throughout a region that harbored a general hostility to and a suspicion of Athens.²⁶

²⁶ Alarmed Athenian response to the general situation: Isok. 5.73–75, 78–79, 137. Favorable Athenian response: Isok. 5.8, 56–57; Dem. 5.13, 23–24; 8.5, 52; 9.53–55; 10.55, 70, 75–76; 18.36; 19.87, 95. Central Greece: Dem. 6.9, 15–19; *FdD* III.5 no. 4; Tod, *GHI* 172; Roux, *L'Amphictionie*, 164–170; Sánchez, *L'Amphictionie*, 220–227; Relations with Sparta: Dem. 6.15, 19; 19.259–261, 288, see also Dem. 6.9, 13, 15; Ps.-Dem. 11.4; Theopompos, *FGrH* 115 FF171–172, 383; Libanios *hypoth. Dem.* 6.2–5. Messene: Dem. 6.9, 20. Argos: Dem. 5.14; 6.9–10; 19.26. Elis: Dem. 9.27, 29; 19.259–260; Ps.-Dem. 10.10. Megara: Dem. 6.9; 9.8, 18, 27; Ps.-Dem. 10.9, 68, 81; Ps.-Dem. 12.4; Dem. 19.87. Athenian embassies: Dem. 6.9, 19–26; 18.20, 71; 19.304; Dein. 1.13. Weak position: Dem. 18.234. Messene: Dem. 6.9, 20. Arkadia: Dem. 19.261. Argos: Dem. 6.9–10; 19.261; see 5.14. Elis: Dem. 6.20; 9.27, 29; 19.259–260; Ps.-Dem. 10.10. Megara: Dem. 6.9; 8.17, 27; 19.87, 204,

Although Philip's influence in Megara and the Peloponnesos caused the Athenians apprehension, his intervention in Euboia in 343 provoked alarm. The island had long experienced considerable unrest for which he could not be blamed. The several causes included those islanders who strove for complete Euboian independence. Kallias of Chalkis pursued that goal by attempting to create a league of Euboian cities; but when he approached first Philip and next Thebes to effect that end, they both refused. Other factors impeding this goal included friction both among the cities and stasis within them. Widespread local resentment of Athenian ascendancy over the island presented a particular problem. Relations between the Euboian cities and Athens had remained precarious throughout the fourth century. Although some cities had become charter members of the Athenian League, they with other cities took the Theban side after Leuktra. By 357 Eretria, Chalkis, Karystos, and Histiaia (or Oreos) had entered into alliance with Athens but without rejoining the League. For all that, by 343 the general resentment of Athens had reappeared. Trouble began at Eretria, which suffered from stasis. Having spurned an Athenian embassy, the democrats there rose against the tyrant Ploutarchos and his mercenaries, drove them out, gained possession of neighboring Porthmos, and invited the intervention of Philip. The king responded with alacrity by sending them Hipponikos with 1000 mercenaries. They secured Eretria, over which they established Kleitarchos as tyrant. Some mercenaries marched on Porthmos, from which they expelled the pro-Athenians there before dismantling the city walls. The Macedonians garrisoned the city, over which they placed the tyrants Kleitarchos, Hipparchos, and Automedon. Also stricken by stasis, the democracy favored Philip, whose mercenaries under Parmenion took control of the city. Despite the opposition of the prominent democratic leader Euphraios, the majority of democrats favored Philistides, Menippos, Sokrates, Thoas, and Agapaios whom the Athenians dubbed tyrants and agents of Philip. Although enemies accused Parmenion of murdering Euphraios, the vanquished democrat instead committed suicide. In connection with the events at Histiaia Philip supposedly erected a tyranny in Antrones, a Thessalian city on the eastern coast of Achaia Phthiotis. His activity there was

260, 294–295, 326, 334. Sparta: Dem. 5.18. Philip's popularity: Dem. 9.31; 18.24, 36; 19.259–261; Ps.-Dem. 7.30–31; Diod. 16.6.8.

perfectly legal; and while it may not have been connected with developments on Euboia, it conveniently served his purposes at this time to bring the island under closer control. Demosthenes and his followers routinely call all of these new leaders tyrants, but the Euboians accepted them as reasonable alternatives to those whom the Macedonians had expelled. The example of Aristagoras before the Ionian Revolt comes immediately to mind. As in the case of Ionia, the Euboians seemed to have considered their new leaders strategoi rather than tyrants.²⁷

Two aspects of these events demand particular attention. Quite telling in them all is the democratic support for the monarch Philip rather than democratic Athens. It proves that the question of democracy as opposed to monarchy or oligarchy played no part in these incidents. Rather, the Euboians simply rejected Athenian interference in their political affairs. Next, even though Demosthenes and other Athenians accused Philip of actively plotting to seize Euboia, the cities there invited and indeed welcomed his intervention because of a combination of local unrest and Athenian unpopularity. The Euboians enjoyed the right of seeking help from whomsoever they wished, Philip included. Their rejection of Athenian ministration testifies to their distaste of these neighbors. Philip readily and shrewdly took advantage of the opportunity being offered him, but that cannot prove that he had drawn any masterplan of expansion. Even the Athenians admitted that they had neglected Euboia. Philip did not. Demosthenes and some other Athenians, however, detected sinister signs in these developments. Demosthenes claimed that Philip was turning Euboia into a fortress against Athens. He also saw Philip's

²⁷ Chronology: Beloch, *GG* III².1.540–542; III².2.288–290. Kallias: Aischin. 3.88–91. Atheno-Euboian relations: *IG* II² 43 lines 80–83; *IG* II² 124; Xen.*Hell.* 6.5.23. Eretria: Dem. 8.36; 9.12, 57, 60–66; 18.71, 81. Porthmos: Dem. 8.36 with schol., 59; 9.33, 57–58, 66; 18.71; 19.87; Ps.-Dem. 10.8–9. Histiaia: Dem. 8.36 with schol., 59, 66; 9.12, 59, 61–65; 18.71, 81; Ps.-Dem. 10.9, 61, 68; Karystios, *FHG* IV.357. Euphraios: Karystios *loc. cit.*; Dem. 9.26. Antrones: Ps.-Dem. 10.9. Aristagoras: Hdt. 5.38. Hirschfeld, *RE* 1 (1894) 2642; Stählin, *Thessalien*, 181–182; Brunt, *CQ* 19 (1969) 245–265; G.L. Cawkwell, *Phoenix* 32 (1978) 42–67; *Philip*, 131–133; L.A. Tritle, *Klio* 74 (1992) 131–165, has advanced the idea that the Athenians launched these operations from Oropos. He correctly recognizes the weakness of the Thebans precisely at this point, yet it seems unlikely that they would allow their enemies the opportunity to attack Euboia from a place that they had so heartily coveted. A slight amendment to his ideas suggests that the Athenians used Rhamnous as their point of departure. See also J.M. Carter, *Historia* 20 (1971) 418–429; Ryder, in Worthington, ed., *Ventures into Greek History*, 235–238.

activities as part of a scheme to equip stations there, the next target of which would be Geraistos, vital to the grain route. Even though Philip had not initiated these events, they served him well; for he now controlled much of the Euboian Gulf with the dubious exception of Chalkis. Histiaia on the northeastern tip of Euboia and Antrones opposite it across the channel impeded access to the northern Gulf of Euboia from the Aegean. Histiaia also threatened Skiathos to the northeast. The sealanes proceeded thence past Echinus, then in Theban hands, along Nikaia, now held by a Macedonian garrison, and Aulis. Chalkis, whatever its loyalties, lay vulnerable to attack from Boiotia. South of the Euripos Eretria and Porthmos remained securely in Philip's hands. Although no one in 343 could know whether Philip would take advantage of this very favorable situation, many Athenians feared the worst. Yet in all of these actions, whether in the Peloponnesos or on Euboia, Philip had violated not one article of the Peace of Philokrates.²⁸

In the face of these reverses Demosthenes erupted in a series of gulleries in which he claimed that Philip had deceived the Athenians, had broken the Peace, and had even then begun his campaign to crush Athens. He cravenly denied any responsibility for the treaty, despite Aischines' tart reminder that by having given his oath to it he had approved of it. Demosthenes' own published speeches belie his veracity and the validity of his charges against others. Moreover, they prove him a liar and a fool. He accused Philip of having violated the Peace by having seized Pherai, Thermopylai, and Phokis, while having excluded Halos and Kersebleptes from it. Athens and Philip had already settled these matters in the Peace, and a recapitulation of its terms would prove as tedious as otiose. Yet a slight notice of them demands some repetition. The heart of Athenian disappointment stemmed from the way in which Philip had turned the Peace of Philokrates to his own ends. The Athenians now complained that he had humbled Phokis, not Thebes to which he had restored certain members of the Boiotian Confederacy. By gaining Kardia as an ally he threatened the Chersonesos. He had also gained control of Pherai, the rest of Thessaly, and Thermopylai, as a prelude to conquering the rest of Greece. Not one of these complaints constituted a violation of the Peace. If the entire situation puzzled

²⁸ Dem. 8.36 with schol., 66; 9.8; 19.204, 219, 326, 334; Ps.-Dem. 10.68.

the Athenians beyond comprehension, as Demosthenes avers, the fault lies solely in their extravagant hopes and surprising gullibility. These factors lay at the root of their disappointment and frustration. The blame for that belonged to them, for Philip had honored the peace.²⁹

Despite the invalidity and the irrelevance of these complaints, Philip took them seriously enough formally to address them. In 343 he sent a Macedonian embassy with the famed orator Python of Byzantion as its spokesman together with a delegation from Argos and Messene to Athens. Philip instructed them to protest against the Athenian slanders of him. Since only a minority of orators had caused the difficulty, Python addressed his message to the broader Athenian audience. Python reassured them that Philip valued their friendship above that of all others. He doubtless pointed out that the king's deeds had by no means violated the terms of the Peace. None of the Peloponnesians nor the Euboians had participated as signatories, nor had any of the states against which he had subsequently moved. That notwithstanding, Philip benignly empowered the ambassadors to permit amendments to the treaty. He lost nothing by the gesture, for he had not in the meantime gained any Athenian territory or offended any signatory of the Peace. He simply insisted upon the basic principle that both parties should continue to hold what they possessed at the ratification of the Peace. If Philip had afterwards expanded his holdings elsewhere, that matter stood outside the treaty. Having assured his audience of Philip's continued good will towards them, Python praised the efficacy of the Peace while repeating the reasons behind Philip's right to Amphipolis and Poteidaia. Rising in opposition to Python's arguments, Demosthenes accused Philip of plotting against Megara and Geraistos, both of them irrelevant to the treaty. He even outlandishly claimed that Philip had agreed to give Euboea to the Athenians in return for Amphipolis. If Demosthenes actually made this absurd assertion, no one took him seriously. Nonetheless, with his usual modesty he further claimed to have bested Python in debate. Reality, however, proved that the majority of the

²⁹ Phokis and Boiotia: Dem. 5.10; 6.3, 19; 18.71; 19.20–21, 26, 35, 42, 324; Ps.-Dem. 9.19; Aischin. 2.136; 3.80. Philip's alliance with Kardia: Ps.-Dem. 12.11; Dem. 5.25; 8.58, 64; 9.16, 174; 19.174; schol. Aischin. 3.83; Bengtson, *StA* II².329. Thermopylai: Dem. 1.12; 6.7, 13; Ps.-Dem. 7.32; Dem. 8.59; 19.180. Plot against Greece: Dem. 6.2; 8.60; 9.17–18; Aischin. 2.161; Isok. 5.73, 78–79; yet see also *Ep.* 2.20. Athenian perplexity: Dem. 19.328.

Athenians agreed that Philip had properly upheld his part of the treaty. They considered the Peace unbroken. Although one could argue that the Athenians had no realistic alternative to accepting Philip's protestations of friendship or face a war that they could not win, the fact remains that Philip had indeed honored his word. He consented to the amendment that the Peace of Philokrates be extended to the other Greeks as a Common Peace. He had nothing thereby to lose. Most of the Greek states, some of them democratic, supported him. Not at war with him and therefore lacking any reason to conclude a peace treaty, they harbored a deep distrust of Athens. Thus, Python's embassy resulted in no real alteration of a pact that remained essentially intact. No fact demanded that Philip give up to Athenian words what he had won in the field. Another point merits attention. Those who see Philip as an implacable and conniving aggressor bent on the destruction of Athens must explain why he refrained from taking advantage of the situation now presented to him. He held a far stronger strategical position and greater popularity in 343 than in 346. Yet he preferred peace with Athens.³⁰

The Peace and the debate over it sparked by Python's embassy bequeathed to the Athenians anything but peace. Rather, it inflamed a political conflagration that had smoldered since 346. Two clearly recognizable political associations resulted from the dispute. Such prominent public figures as Timarchos, Hegesippos, and Hypereides had shared Demosthenes' displeasure over the Peace since its ratification. They now proclaimed themselves the defenders of Athenian liberty. They had accordingly vented their anger on Philokrates, Aischines, Phokion, and Euboulos, whom they saw as the tools of Philip. Foreseeing the coming bonfire, Aischines struck first in 345 by winning a law suit against Timarchos that drove him from the political arena. In 343 Hypereides indicted Philokrates for having taken Philip's

³⁰ Demosthenes and Philip's promises: Dem. 19.160; Ps.-Dem. 7.33–34; 6.30; see Dem. 19.45 as compared to 18.35; 19.20, 26, 42. Python's embassy: Ps.-Dem. 7.20; Philochoros, *FGH* 328 F1157; schol. Dem. 19.131; Ps.-Dem. 7; Aischin. 2.125 with schol., 2.161; Isok. 5.5 with Aischin. 1.94; Libanios *hypoth.* to Dem. 6.2; Paus. 4.28.2. Demosthenes' claims: Dem. 5.10; 18.136; 19.22, 326; Plut. *Dem.* 19.1; Python's success: Ps.-Dem. 7.23. Failure of the extension of the Peace: Ps.-Dem. 7.30–31; 10.68; 18.20, 24, 45; 19.90–91, 294–295, 304; Diod. 16.69.8. Schaefer, *Demosthenes*, II².376–380; Wüst, *Philipp II.*, 69–73; Ellis, *Philip II.*, 143–147; H.H. Schmitt, *RE* 24 (1963) 611–612; Cawkwell, *Philip*, 124–126; Harris, *Aeschines*, 111–112; Buckler, in Wallace and Harris, eds., *Transitions*, 87, 95; Sealey, *Demosthenes*, 172–173.

bribes to betray the city. Dismayed by the charge and the public uproar, Philokrates fled into exile rather than stand trial. His fears may well have stemmed from the changed mood of the Athenian people. Although they had endorsed the treaty, they had become increasingly dissatisfied with it. They now paid greater heed to the alarms of Demosthenes and his friends. Emboldened by Philokrates' retreat, Demosthenes indicted Aischines on charges of bribery, corruption, and treason. Unlike Philokrates, however, Aischines stood his ground. In a trial that galvanized Athenian opinion about the pact and relations with Macedonia, Aischines barely won acquittal in a pyrrhic victory that badly damaged his political status in Athens. These two incidents put Demosthenes and his coterie in a virtually unchallenged position to seek a military decision with Philip. They undermined the Peace immediately after the Athenians had just again endorsed it.³¹

The embattled Peace of Philokrates provided not the only diplomatic challenge of the hour to the Athenians. A minor but curious distraction arrived from the east, when the King, having recovered Phoenicia and Cilicia, launched his assault on Egypt. Artaxerxes III sent envoys to the major Greek states to enlist mercenaries for the effort. Though declining to help, both Athens and Sparta reaffirmed their friendship with him. The Athenians, however, responded haughtily that they would remain at peace with him so long as he did not attack the Greek states. If this amounted to a response to Idreus' command of Rhodes, Kos, and Chios, they demonstrated more rudeness than sense, for in 343 they could dictate policy to no major Greek power, much less the King. Gone were the days of Konon, Chabrias, and Timotheos. Since the King had demonstrated that he entertained no designs against Athens and its League, he dropped the matter. In Greece the Athenians gained diplomatic success by concluding an alliance with the Achaians, the Arkadians, both those of Mantinea and those of Megalopolis, the Argives and the Messenians. They thereby cut their links to Sparta while moving closer to Thebes, long the patron of most of these states. Now that they had concluded peace and alliance with Philip, himself a stalwart ally of these

³¹ Two political groups: Ps.-Plut. *Mor.* 840B, 844F; Dem. 9.72; Aischin. 2.8, 143, 184. Philokrates: Aischin. 2.6; Hypereid. 3.29; Dem. 19.114–115; H. Schaefer, *RE* 19 (1938) 2495–2499. Wüst, *Philipp II.*, 78–81; Ellis, *Philip II.*, 151–153; Harris, *Aeschines*, 115–120; Sealey, *Demosthenes*, 175–176.

powers, the Athenians appeared in a more agreeable guise. The pact also gave the Peloponnesians additional protection against the Spartans, who now lacked any Greek allies except the lukewarm Eleians. This agreement surely reflected the success of Python's embassy. It did not, however, mean that these new allies, if put to the test, would prefer Athens to Philip.³²

By the end of 343 Philip and Athens remained formally at peace with each other and Peloponnesian affairs appeared calm. Yet Athenian mistrust of him had grown dramatically, which forced his friends there into retreat. There can be no question that his power and influence had increased significantly since 346, but at the same time he had evinced no hostile designs against Athens.³³ Nonetheless, Demosthenes and his coterie, while eagerly looking for any sign of hostile Macedonian intention towards Athens, actively sought excuses for a confrontation. Python's embassy had decidedly not resulted in a genuine reconciliation between Athens and Philip.

³² Athens and Persia: Isok. 5.101–103; 4.162; 12.159. Philochoros, *FGrH* 32 F157; Dem. 5.25; 6.13; Ps.-Dem. 10.34, 52; Diod. 16.44.1. Beloch, *GG* III².2.284–287; U. Kahrstedt, *RE* 9 (1914) 912. Peloponnesian alliance: *IG* II² 225; schol. Aischin. 3.83; Bengtson, *SdA* II².337. Wüst, *Philipp II.*, 64–67; Ellis, *Philip II*, 146–151; Harris *Aeschines*, 108–110; Sealey, *Demosthenes*, 174.

³³ Isok. *Ep.* 2.22.

CHAPTER TWELVE

THE GATHERING STORM (342–339 BC)

EROSION OF THE PEACE (342–341 BC)

With Athenian affairs as stable as anyone could make them, Philip turned his thoughts to problems closer to home. He first decided to settle matters among the Molossians by replacing their king Arybbas with his own brother-in-law, Alexandros. He resolved thereby to secure a tighter control of Epeiros that would protect the south-western border of his realm while giving him virtual control of the eastern Adriatic coast from Illyria to Akarnania. At the beginning of 342 despite the winter weather Philip led a mixed force of light-armed infantry, cavalry, archers, and mercenaries across Mt. Pindos into Ambrakia. He descended upon the cities of the Kassopia, ravaging the land with fire and storming the cities of Pandosia, Bucheta, Bitia, and Elateia. In the face of this onslaught Arybbas fled to Athens where he died in honored exile. Philip won Aitolian support by promising to award them Naupaktos. This gift would serve his interests by providing a strong and friendly harbor on the northern coast of the Corinthian Gulf. It would also constitute a slap to the unfriendly Achaians opposite. His operations in Ambrakia and Leukas also intimidated the Corinthians, who saw imminent danger to their vital economic routes to the west. The Athenians sent troops to Akarnania and Demosthenes as ambassador, but nothing came of these ventures. For the moment Philip had no ambitions farther south. By the early months of 342 his southern borders extended in a belt from Thessaly through occupied Phokis along a well-disposed Aitolia to Epeiros. He further strengthened this line by taking Echinon on the southern coast of Achaia Phthiotis from the Thebans, who had no right to it. Events in Elis and Megara favored Philip, who had, however, taken no hand in them and for the moment took no advantage of them. Oligarchic unrest in both places can best be described as local in nature and in a broader context more anti-Athenian than pro-Philippic. Where evidence exists, it points

to the conclusion that most Greeks looked favorably upon Philip.¹

Immediately after his expedition to Epeiros, Philip turned to Thrace, determined permanently to settle matters there. Nothing new shaped this policy that he had pursued since the beginning of his reign. He planned to conquer the rest of Thrace and politically eliminate Kersebleptes. Thrace would form a part of the Macedonian empire over which Philip exercised direct and undisputed control. Unlike Thessaly and Epeiros, both of which were technically independent, Philip would rule Thrace direct from his throne. In 342 Philip launched one of the most ambitious of his many daring campaigns, this one to demand a year or so of constant struggle. Chronology once again poses its own problems. Although his precise path cannot be recovered, his general course is clear. He planned to seize control of the Thracian coastal cities and to secure vital points in the river valleys of the Nestos and Hebros. Geographically, if not perhaps chronologically, his way took him to Drongilos, or perhaps Tragilos, near Philippoi on the Nestos River. He also seized the unidentified Masteira, which perhaps stood in the same area. These victories tightened his grasp of the eastern frontier of Macedonia. Of greater importance were his designs on the wide ranges of the Hebros River, the modern Maritza. In the west he founded Philippopolis, modern Plodiv, which commanded the inland routes through the riverine plain as far eastwards as Kabyle on the central branch of the Hebros, the modern Tonzos, and thence to the Euxine Sea. In the south at the mouth of the Hebros he won Doriskos, thus establishing a firm hold on the Thracian interior, major points along the river's broad watershed, and its principal outlet. He also spread Graeco-Macedonian culture, albeit that of the rough camp, well into the Balkan interior. Tenuous at first, control of this area served as a buffer to Macedonia proper. It also provided the raw material of economic prosperity and military manpower.²

¹ Dem. 7.32; 9.27, 34; 18.244; 48.24; Theopompos, *FGH* 115 FF206–207; Speusippos *Letter* 7. Arybbas; Rhodes-Osborne, *GHI* 70; Diod. 16.72.1; Justin 7.6.10–12. Chronology: Schaefer, *Demosthenes*, II².424–427; Beloch, *GG* III².2.291. Western Greece: N.G.L. Hammond, *BSA* 32 (1932) 141; *Epirus*, 525; Freitag, *Golf von Korinth*, 87–88; personal observations of 17–21 October 1970. Elis and Megara: Ellis, *Philip*, 150–151; Wirth, *Philipp II.*, 125, and in general G.L. Cawkwell, *CQ* 13 (1963) 120–138, 200–213.

² Dem. 9.34; Diod. 16.71.1–2; Justin 9.1.1. Drongilos and Masteira: Dem. 8.44;

Marching farther eastwards, Philip finally attacked the Odrysian Thracian kingdom ruled by Kersebleptes and Teres. He intended to rid himself of these allies of Athens and to anchor his eastern border on the European side of the Hellespont and the Propontis. He would also establish a direct link with Kardias, his only ally on the Chersonesos and a city of considerable strategical value. The site today presents the dreary face of an extensive mud-flat with few ancient remains visible. The city sat on the coast in a somewhat sheltered nook. Yet the surrounding land above the city opens northwards to Kobryas, Kypasis, and Deris, themselves now overwhelmed by modern development, but which topographically afford a very easy passage into the Chersonesos. He who held these places could move from Thrace at will. Eastwards from Kardias the land spreads across the Chersonesos to a line of low mountains until debouching onto Paktye in the east. Later joined by a wall, the two cities and their surroundings created a barrier against movements southwards into the peninsula. Philip easily overwhelmed Kersebleptes, who lost a kingdom that Athens could protect neither by arms nor diplomacy. Philip secured his gains in the area by declaring that his border ran from Kardias past Agora, located in the neck of the peninsula, along the line of Xerxes' Canal. He pushed farther northeastwards along the coast to Tiristasis or Tyrodiza, a place belonging to Perinthos. He pressed still farther upwards along the coast to Serreion Teichos or Ganos at the foot of the Hieron Oros, in itself an unimportant place. Its northern neighbor Bisanthe made a worthier prize. From that coastal city stretched a major route inland along the line of the Via Egnatia to Macedonia. Somewhere along the way he also seized Myrtenon, a place on the southern Thracian coast, the position of which, however, remains unknown. The march ended for the moment at Heraion Teichos on the very doorstep of Perinthos itself. Still another success, however, was ultimately diplomatic, which further strengthened Philip's position in Thrace. Lured

Ps.-Dem. 10.15; Aischin. 3.82; Theopompos, *FGrH* 115 F83. G. Kazarow, *RE* Sup. 3 (1918) 415; Casson, *Macedonia Thrace and Illyria*, 38 n. 5. Philippolis: Theopompos, *FGrH* 115 F110; Dexippos, *FGrH* 100 FF22, 26–27; Plut. *Mor.* 520B; Steph. Byz. s.v. *Philippolis*. Chr. M. Danoff, *RE* 19 (1938) 2244–2263. Kabyle: Dem. 8.44–45 with schol.; Ps.-Dem. 10.15; 12.3; Theopompos, *FGrH* 115 F220. E. Oberhummer, *RE* 10 (1919) 1455–1456. Doriskos: Dem. 8.64; 9.15; Ps.-Dem. 7.37; 10.8; Dem. 19.156, 334; Aischin. 3.82. E. Oberhummer, *RE* 5 (1905) 1566–1567. Archibald, *Odrysian Kingdom*, 234–237.

by the wealth of Odessos and Tomeus on the western coast of the Euxine, Philip thrust northwards into the land of the Getai. Although he may well have laid an inconclusive siege to Odessos, he abandoned it in favor of making an alliance with the Thracian king Kothelas, whose daughter Meda he married. This accommodation meant that Philip had now secured his position as far north as the Istros, or Danube, River. In the course of these operations he had brought much of the littoral and virtually all of the interior of Thrace under his control. These successes vastly increased his power and wealth, for he established cities at key points and forced the defeated to pay a tithe to him.³

During these operations Philip fastidiously avoided harming Athenian settlements in the Chersonesos. He did so despite his claim that Polykrates had passed a decree declaring that the Athenian *klerouchoi* there were then at war with him. If there be any truth in this accusation, it probably related to the tension with Kardias, an ally which Philip staunchly intended to defend. At any rate, Philip combined the movements of his army and fleet to move through the area without violating the treaty. Together with this restraint, he urged the Athenians to arbitrate their differences with him. He thus made a conscientious effort not to offend Athens.

Though gladly rid of the Thracian threat, the Byzantines and Perinthians now had a new neighbor considerably stronger and abler than the previous. They found themselves isolated on their northern, western, and southern sides with only the sea to the east open to them. Philip's successes alarmed the Athenians as well, which prompted them to send their general Diopieithes and a force with which to defend the Chersonesos. He took advantage of the situation to incite the Byzantines to strike first at Philip. Diopieithes' effort to sow distrust succeeded, for the Byzantines sent their fleet to the Athenian naval base at Thasos. Although they had every right to do so, Philip saw the act as provocative. It at least demonstrated both their distrust of him and their willingness to side with Athens.

³ Kardias: E. Oberhummer, *RE* 10 (1919) 1932–1933; personal observations of 24 May, 7 June 2002. Kersebleptes and Teres: Dem. 9.27; 19.174, 181, 334; Ps.-Dem. 12.8; Dion. Halik. *Amm.* 1.738; Diod. 16.71.1–2; see also Aischin. 3.74; schol. Ar. *Acharnians* 145. Archibald, *Odrysian Kingdom*, 122. Tiristasis: Ps.-Dem. 12.3; 10.5; Aischin. 3.82. Schaefer, *Demosthenes*, II².453; E. Oberhummer, *RE* 7A (1937) 1446; Danov, *Altthrakien*, 309 n. 114. Serreion Teichos: Ps.-Dem. 7.37; 10.8; Dem. 8.64;

Philip later characterized the gesture as war-like, which exaggerated its importance, but it sufficed to warn him of Byzantine fears. For the moment Byzantium and Perinthos studiously maintained their defensive alliances with him while awaiting developments. Yet they fully realized that if war with Philip came, their only hope of relief lay in the succor of the Athenian fleet. Distrusting both Philip and Athens, they did not relish future prospects of deciding between two perceived evils.⁴

Although Philip had spent some eleven months in Thrace, he had not been out of Athenian thoughts. His determined and successful campaign from Thrace to the door of Perinthos caused a swift, angry, and frightened reaction. Demosthenes, as to be expected, erupted in still another dyspeptic torrent of oratory. He and his followers railed that Philip had destroyed Athens' old friend Kersebleptes, whom Demosthenes himself had excluded from the Peace of Philokrates. Philip merely reminded them that the names of the two could not be found on the inscription bearing the Peace of Philokrates. He also fulminated that Philip had seized these various obscure Thracian cities that actually belonged to Athens. While he called them wretched and unimportant, he claimed that they constituted bases for an attack on Athens. He nonetheless admitted that despite their significance most Athenians probably did not even know of their very existence. Aischines wryly and rightly remarked that most Athenians had never heard of them, the names of which he ridiculed. All of this gullery is arrant nonsense, for the Peace of Philokrates included not one of these vital places. Nor had one of them paid tribute to Athens during its fifth-century empire. Never in its history had Athens held these places. Even by Demosthenes' tawdry standard of veracity nothing commends his eloquent discharge. The facts instead argue against him. Nevertheless, he warned that Philip intended to break Athens before conquering all of Greece. The Macedonian point of view in this connection merits consideration. The first duty of the king of Macedonia was to secure the frontiers of his realm from attack. That

9.15; 18.27; Aischin. 3.82. Hieron Oros: Ps.-Dem. 7.37; Dem. 9.15. Casson, *Macedonia Thrace and Illyria*, 213 n. 1; 215 n. 4; 267. Bisanthe: Hdt. 7.137; Plut. *Alk.* 36.3. E. Oberhummer, *RE* 3 (1897) 500–501; Danov, *Allthrakien*, 355. Heraion Teichos: Dem. 3.4. Myrtenon: Dem. 18.27. G. Kazarow, *RE* 16 (1933) 1151. Agora: Theopompos, *FGH* 115 F6; Ps.-Dem. 7.39; Steph. Byz. *s.v. Getai, Tomeus*; Jordanes 10.65; see also Hdt. 4.93. Duration of Philip's campaign: Dem. 8.2, 35.

⁴ Diopithes: Dem. 8.14; Ps.-Dem. 12.2. Kirchner, *PA* 4327.

menace had routinely come from neighboring northern peoples, and the Thracians had presented one of the most prevalent of these dangers. The Athenians had frequently abetted these enemies, so a simple way to solve the problem came from reducing Thrace while maintaining peace with Athens. Without major bases in the area Athens at its worst could be more of a nuisance than a threat. The other Greeks, besides being farther removed, generally held him as a friend rather than an enemy. Nor does any evidence exist that at this point Philip harbored any hostile designs on Athens. His conduct in both 346 and 343 proves the validity of this conclusion. In each instance he enjoyed the opportunity to fall upon an exposed Attika but instead forbore. If he had to this point entertained any wish to overrun Athens, he had blandly squandered it. Demosthenes and his coterie for whatever reasons, good or ill, seem never to have realized that domination of Thrace formed an integral part of Macedonian defense. If a considerable part of that defense also involved the Athenians, they had only themselves to blame for having interfered in Macedonian affairs since the beginning of Philip's reign.⁵

Upon his return to Pella, Philip turned his attention to the Athenians and broader affairs to the south. Tensions between Philip and Athens had again become several and severe. Among them loomed the minor, indeed silly, squabble over the insignificant and somewhat remote island of Halonnesos. After the Peace of Philokrates the pirate Sostratos seized it as a base from which to prey upon shipping. Although the Athenians made no move against him, Philip cast him out and kept the island. Nonetheless, they demanded that he return it to them. Their claim was utterly specious, for Halonnesos had never belonged to them by treaty. Not a member of the fifth-century Athenian Empire, it had not joined the fourth-century League.

⁵ Philip's eleven months: Dem. 8.2, 35; Ps.-Dem. 7; 12.12–15; Dem. 18.69. Kersebleptes: Aischin. 2.84–85; Ps.-Dem. 12.8–10; schol. Aischin. 2.81 maintain that Philip, Amadokos, Perinthos, and Byzantion had divided among them Kersebleptes' part of Thrace. Athenian claims to these Thracian cities: Dem. 8.44 with schol.; Ps.-Dem. 10.8, 15; Aischin. 3.82–85. G.F. Hill (revised edition by R. Meiggs and A. Andrewes), *Sources for Greek History* (Oxford 1966) 407–415; R. Meiggs, *The Athenian Empire*, corrected edition (Oxford 1975) 560–561, both of which survey the extent of fifth-century power in the area. In Ps.-Dem. 10.65 the orator claims that when making the peace the Athenians were deceived about these places, Ps.-Dem. 12.8 states that at the time no one had even mentioned them. Philip's danger to Athens and all Greece: Dem. 6.10; 8.49; 9.1; 19.304; Ps.-Dem. 11.23; Isok. 5.73–79. Greek refusal to help Athens: Ps.-Dem. 7; 12.12–15; Dem. 18.69.

According to the various rescripts of the King's Peace, it was supposed to enjoy autonomy. In 342 Philip responded to the difficulty by offering to give the island to Athens. Though his by right of conquest, Demosthenes and Hegesippos objected to the very phraseology of Philip's letter of gift. They demanded that he restore Halonnesos to them, not give it. Aischines drily pointed out that his political rivals quarreled over syllables, not a place. The neighboring Athenian allies of Peparethos settled the matter by seizing the island and its Macedonian garrison. Despite Athenian support of their allies, Philip retook the island and sacked Peparethos for good measure. In response to Athenian protests, Philip responded with great restraint by offering repeatedly to submit the dispute to arbitration. His gesture demonstrated good will, sanity, and a delicious sense of humor. The humor resulted from a place relatively unimportant to him that he did not particularly want. Yet at the same time it served a vital diplomatic purpose. He could not concede the point to the Athenians without allowing them to demand the return of all his conquests, including Amphipolis, Olynthos, and Poteidaia. Nor did the Athenians have any right to make their demand. This small incident excellently demonstrates Athenian hypocrisy and incompetence. Athenian orators thundered that Thebes should restore Plataia, Thespiiai, and Orchomenos, while they claimed places for which they had no legal claim. Philip refused to argue over verbiage, but under these circumstances he could not merely give it away. Even though the Athenian temporary retention of the Macedonian garrison broke the Peace, thereby providing Philip with a provocation to war, for the moment he declined confrontation. The most ominous aspect of all came from the Athenian rejection of an offer amicably to solve a dispute that was virtually useless to them, one that in the past they had casually ignored. The Athenian intransigence over a singularly minor issue augured darkly against continued peace.⁶

Several other more general problems also confronted Philip. Demosthenes and his friends remained displeased by the continued Macedonian support of the Euboian tyrants, whom they considered a direct military threat to Attika. Philip also realized that the Athenians continued the unfriendly policy of sending embassies to the other

⁶ Syllables: Aischin. 3.83. Peparethos: Dem. 18.70. Ellis, *Philip II*, 154–155; Wirth, *Philipp II.*, 116, Sealey, *Demosthenes*, 177–179.

Greeks warning them of his threat to their freedom. The Greeks as usual paid these delegations no attention. The Athenians either through ignorance or arrogance failed to realize that contrary to their assumption, others did not share their particular complaints against Philip. Demosthenes indeed a bit later admitted that even among those Greeks who opposed Philip some despised a discredited Athens that had forfeited its claim to hegemony. Philip nonetheless heeded Demosthenes' wild claims that having already broken the Peace, Philip was even then actually at war with Athens. Demosthenes again dragged out his fustian that Philip had duped the Athenians in the Peace, despite the inconvenient fact that an Athenian inscription made public the very terms to which the Athenians had agreed. Even so, the boule at that moment was considering a proposal whether to honor the Peace or declare war. They lacked solid support, for many Athenians demanded that Diopieithes' force be disbanded and its leader indicted. These citizens formed perhaps the greatest obstacle to the policy of Demosthenes and his adherents. They, like the Greeks in general, felt that since Philip had done no wrong, he posed no threat. For all that, Philip could depend neither upon their resolution to maintain the peace nor their ability to curb Demosthenes.⁷

The actual Athenian response in the Chersonesos disturbed Philip more immediately than the ineffectual bickering in Athens. Diopieithes with the full support of the Athenian *klerouchoi* there began to harass the Kardians, Philip's allies who were included in the Peace. Late in 342 Diopieithes widened his attacks to include Philip's Thracian possessions of Krobyle and Tiristasis, enslaving the inhabitants and ravaging the surrounding territory. He also seized merchantmen in the Hellespont bound for Macedonia. He justified his conduct by claiming that he thwarted any possible move of Philip into the Chersonesos. In Athens Hegesippos and Demosthenes defended the general by claiming that the boundary of the Chersonesos ran not along the Kardia-Agora-Paktye line but much farther west at the

⁷ Euboian tyrants: Dem. 8.35–36 with schol.; 8.66; 9.18, 27, 33, 57–66; 12.5. Athenian animus to Philip: Dem. 8.35. Greek distrust of Athens: Dem. 8.40, 49; 10.6 (see Sealey, *Demosthenes*, 232–235 on the general acceptance of the authenticity of this speech). Athenian accusations against Philip: Dem. 8.39, 43–45; Isok. 5.73–75. Inscription: Dem. 8.64–65; Ps.-Dem. 12.8. Boule: Dem. 8.4. Athenian support of the Peace: Dem. 8.5, 10, 52, 56; 9.53–55; 10.70, 75–76.

Altar of Zeus, most probably located at Koila, the modern Kilia. To this land, they claimed, Philip had no right. Yet Hegesippos displayed his geographical and diplomatic ignorance by stating that by the site of the altar ran the canal. In fact to the north of the place stand rough mountains that prevent the construction of a canal. From Herodotos' day educated Greeks knew that the correct line ran from the Hellespont to Kardia. Moreover, Hegesippos' contribution to Greek geographical knowledge failed to justify Diopeithes' attack on Krobyle and Tiristasis, both of which stood well eastwards of his own imaginary line. Even by his own inept sophistry Hegesippos could not persuasively justify Diopeithes' outrage.⁸

Diopeithes and the Athenians had without overt provocation intruded upon the course of Philip's Thracian policy. The situation became all the more critical when the Kardians appealed to him for protection. Treaty obligations bound him to their defense; but duty apart, he could not let the Athenians imperil his recent gains. He used the winter of 342/1 to exercise restraint towards Athens and diligence towards Kardia. He tried to mollify Athens with diplomacy, while mustering troops to succor Kardia, should peace prove chimerical. He sent numerous embassies, some to the Peloponnesians, as had the Athenians, but many others to the Athenians. First and above all, Philip appealed to the Athenians to honor their oaths and agreements. As already seen, he had earlier sent ambassadors to declare his willingness to extend the Peace of Philokrates to all other Greeks, who declined to become involved. He now sent envoys to arrange *symbola* with Athens. The pact of *symbola* offered the signatories protection from summary seizure of property and stipulated that merchants be allowed access to legal satisfaction. This agreement would obviously prevent the Athenians from seizing any ship bound for Macedonia. Hegesippos successfully urged the Athenians to reject the proposal on the specious grounds that Macedonia had earlier paid tribute to Athens. Not one document substantiates his claims. The Athenians rejected Philip's overture. About the same

⁸ Diopeithes: Dem. 8.8–9, 14, 28, 43; 9.15; Ps.-Dem. 12.3–5. Zeus' altar and topography: a late inscription found near Kilia mentions Juppiter of the Chersonesos: Casson, *Macedonia Thrace and Illyria*, 224 and map XII; Archibald, *Odrysian Kingdom*, 234–237; personal observations of 24 May, 7 June 2002. Philip and the Kardian alliance: Ps.-Dem. 2.11; Dem. 19.174; 23.181; Libanios *hypoth.* to Dem. 8.1–2. Buckler, in Wallace and Harris, eds., *Transitions*, 86–87.

time the Athenians further inflamed the situation by seizing Philip's herald Nikias in Macedonian territory and with him the official letters that he carried. Instead of punishing the offenders, the Athenians held Nikias captive for ten months and they read the dispatches in the assembly. This act constituted an offense against both Philip and Herakles, for heralds were customarily inviolable.⁹

Even in the face of this outrage, Philip kept his patience, which Diopeithes further tried. After the Athenian general had captured Krobyle and Tiristasis, whose survivors he held hostage, Philip did not summarily demand their immediate return. He instead dispatched Amphilochos as ambassador to negotiate their release. Diopeithes captured, tortured him, and demanded a ransom of nine talents, all with the approval of the Athenian assembly. This, like the case of Nikias, added an unnecessary and flagrant provocation, another indication that many Athenians no longer wanted peace with Philip. They, not Philip, broke the Peace of Philokrates. A further indication of their hostility came when they sent an embassy to the King urging him to declare war against Philip. This insidious effort in effect called upon Artaxerxes, as stipulated in the original Peace and its rescripts, to enforce his diktat in Greece. The Athenians in fact urged a weak case. If they wished to insist that Philip had violated the Thracian autonomy, they had done the same to others there. Since Philip had confined his activities to Europe, the King saw no reason to become involved. Having laboriously reconquered Phoenicia and Egypt, he considered the concerns of Athens insignificant. Nor presumably had he forgotten the recent haughty Athenian reply to his offer of friendship. The Athenian effort to draw the Persians into their own looming war displayed an ominous trend in Athenian policy. When the King rejected their proposal, it further demonstrated that the Athenians could expect little outside support against Philip. In Athens meanwhile Demosthenes continued his verbal campaign. In the face of ineffectual domestic opposition he urged that Diopeithes'

⁹ Philip's diplomacy: Dem. 9.17–18, 20–21, 30–31, 71–72; Ps.-Dem. 12.1; 7.18; Dem. 18.136. Hegesippos' claims: Ps.-Dem. 7.11–12. *Symbola*: Ps.-Dem. 7.9, 11–12 and in general P. Gauthier, *Symbola* (Paris 1972). Chronological certainty for these events remains impossible because Diopeithes served as strategos from 343/2 to 341/0; Develin, *AO*, 328–334. Speeches in the Demosthenic *corpus* are dated no more closely than by archon-years: Dion. Halik. *Ann.* 1.737–738. On Diopeithes see also Pritchett, *GSW* II.92–93. Schaefer, *Demosthenes*, II².493; Wüst, *Philipp II.*, 115.

mercenaries not be disbanded and further applauded the decision to send a second general, doubtless Kallias, to the Hellespont. He exhorted the Athenians to pay their *eisphora*, a special property tax, and themselves serve at sea and in the field to defend their own interests. He noted the common Athenian practice of defraying costs by extorting money from the islanders, including their own allies, and the Greeks of Asia Minor. He also asked whether all Athenians actually cared for their eastern kinsmen, a question that tells much about genuine Athenian devotion to the concept of "the freedom of the Greeks". These very people who in 344 piously demanded that the King honor their mutual treaty quite willingly broke it to further their own interests. Demosthenes thus accused his countrymen in effect of reverting to the imperialistic practices of their fifth-century ancestors. This situation gave most other Greeks ample reason to distrust the Athenians. For the moment, however, Demosthenes cared less for Greek opinion than Athenian endorsement of his proposals. The Athenians responded by continuing Diopeithes in office.¹⁰

The situation in the northeastern Aegean over the winter and into the spring of 341 constantly deteriorated. In Asia Minor Philip's ally Hermeias of Atarneus fell into the hands of the King's agents. Although the Persians and Athenians suspected him of being privy to Philip's plans, even under torture Hermeias revealed nothing, probably because he knew nothing. A mere glance at the map shows that Atarneus could never have served as a bridgehead for a Macedonian invasion of Asia Minor. Hermeias probably meant only to carve a minor principality for himself. Although Atarneus, as mentioned above (pp. 56–57) occupied a strong position, its resources permitted nothing more than local pre-eminence. His relations with Philip probably amounted solely to a desire to remain on good terms with his new neighbor. Although the incident with Hermeias ended as abruptly as it began, Philip watched askance as the Athenians courted the King. Yet Artaxerxes had as yet no reason to fear Philip and good reason not to provoke him. The affair of Hermeias may well have eased his mind on this point. For Philip, however, the episode appeared as another sign that Athens planned war at the soonest and most favorable opportunity. Lastly, the same ominous

¹⁰ Diopeithes: Ps.-Dem. 12.3–5; Dem. 8; Dion. Halik. *Amm.* 1.737–738. Develin, *AO*, 334; D.J. Mosley, *Envoys and Diplomacy in Ancient Greece* (Wiesbaden 1973) 97. Artaxerxes: Philochoros, *FGrH* 328 F157; Diod. 16.40.3–53.8.

trend showed itself on Euboia. There the Athenians concluded alliances with Chalkis and Eretria, two states that in 340 would create a new Euboian League. The Athenians took advantage of these developments to re-establish their position on the island at Philip's expense. In sum, the Peace of Philokrates was breathing its last.¹¹

These matters, as important as they were, paled when compared to the looming crisis at Kardia. Philip determined to defend his ally in the Chersonesos and his own rights in Thrace. All of his diplomatic efforts and his repeated appeals for arbitration had failed, and the Athenians had taken these occasions publicly to insult him. His patience exhausted, he declared war on Athens for having remorselessly broken the treaty. He sent reinforcements to defend Kardia from further Athenian attacks. He then solemnly and publicly declared that "having made the gods witnesses, I shall deal with you about these matters". Even if the Athenians did not yet realize it, war was upon them, a fact confirmed by their feeble and irrelevant response to his declaration. Pertinent, though often unappreciated, looms the real significance of Philip's pronouncement. He had declared war only on the Athenians and those of its allies who had participated in the Peace of Philokrates, those whose names actually appeared on the stele recording the treaty. The Athenians admitted as much, when they later destroyed it on the grounds that Philip had not kept this peace treaty with them. He had by no means declared war on the Greek states that were not partners to the Peace. It did not even include other Athenian allies, unless they chose to become involved.¹²

¹¹ Hermeias and Persia: Dem. 10.31–33 with schol.; Ps.-Dem. 12.6–7; Didymos in Dem. 5–6; Arist. *Econ.* 2.2.28; Diod. 16.52.5–8; Diog. Laert. 5.6; Polyain. 6.48. Buckler, *ICS* 19 (1994) 107–110. Likewise, the purported alliance between Philip and the King (Bengtson, *SdA* II².333) can be dismissed as mere propaganda. Euboia: Bengtson, *SdA* II².339–340, 342; see also 322; Diod. 16.74.1. Ellis, *Philip*, 162–166; 172–173; Wirth, *Philipp II.*, 118–119; Ruzicka, *Persian Dynasty*, 121–123; Atarneus: personal observations of 9 June 2002.

¹² Repeated efforts at arbitration: Ps.-Dem. 7.7–12, 18, 20–21, 42–43; Ps.-Dem. 12.1. The significance of Philip's declaration of war, a passage that has often been mistranslated, is discussed by Buckler, in Wallace and Harris, eds., *Transitions*, 87–89, 95. The scholiast to Ps.-Dem. 11 clearly understood that Philip had declared war on Athens. Athenian response: Ps.-Dem. 11, which addresses none of the problems.

B. COLLAPSE OF THE PEACE (341–339 BC)

Philip spent the summer of 341 defending Kardia, further securing Thrace, and planning his next moves. Despite his declaration of war, he perhaps still hoped that moderate heads would prevail in Athens. If so, all could avoid actual hostilities. The Athenians, however, remained in a fog. They knew nothing of his intentions, and some of them imagined the worst. Demosthenes publicly speculated whether he would take vengeance on the Athenian settlers in the Chersonesos or instead await the Etesian winds to march on Byzantion. He confidently averred that Philip even then marched against the city and that the onset of the winds hindered them from coming to its defense. Diopithes meanwhile conducted desultory operations around the Chersonesos, while expecting the arrival of a second Athenian force under Kallias sent to the Hellespont. By the end of 341 Philip drew his own conclusions that no hope of peaceful reconciliation remained. He must drive the Athenians from the Hellespont. Like others before him, he must strike at their most vulnerable point.¹³

The Athenians took the next step in the crisis that they had created by launching a deft diplomatic effort to build a coalition to thwart Philip. That demanded a brisk attempt to win the confidence and good will of Byzantion and its allies, many of whom remained ill-disposed towards Athens. To meet these challenges the Athenians sent embassies to the states most strategically situated along the principal lines of communication. The pattern is obvious; the chronology is not. Nor did the Athenians limit their efforts to the Hellespont. Starting from the south they sent Hypereides to Rhodes, Chios, and probably Kos, an old group of friends. The Athenians presented him with a difficult task. These loyal allies of Byzantion still harbored strong resentments of Athens, and he must persuade them to unite their efforts in a common cause the community of which they did not recognize. For them Philip's threat to Athens paled in comparison with their concern for the safety of an old friend. Yet they all agreed to rally to Byzantion's defense if necessary. The Athenians also sent embassies to Tenedos on the southwestern approach to the Hellespont

¹³ Diplomatic climate: Dem. 8.14–18, 28, 66; 19.52–53; Aischin. 3.95–99, mocks the huge and unrealized preparations that Demosthenes promised for Kallias' mission, but Philip perforce took these considerations seriously. Wüst, *Philipp II.*, 115–117; Wirth, *Philipp II.*, 121–122; Ellis, *Philip*, 173.

and to the Chersonesos itself. Still another arrived on Prokonnesos in the Propontis. The Athenians also sent Demosthenes and Hypereides to Perinthos, Selymbria, and Byzantion, where they were gladly received, despite previous differences. The Athenians added to these routine delegations one to Abydos, which was far more adventurous but perfectly rational. The obvious geographical significance of Abydos and its neighbor apart, the embassy landed in Asia Minor to seek Persian support against Philip. The Athenians obviously portrayed his presence as a threat not only to the Pontic Greeks but also to Persian-held Troas. They even sent Ephialtes to the King, who rewarded them with a subsidy to wage war against Philip. A private gift reportedly included 300 darics to Demosthenes. The King's attention demonstrates his wariness of this new and unwelcome Macedonian neighbor. Despite his many differences with the Athenians, whom he well knew, he realized that he could expect nothing from the Spartans and Thebans. He could depend only on the Athenians who at least shared a common peril at the hands of this newcomer. Even though certain details of these events stem from late authors, the picture that emerges from the kaleidoscope of details argues in favor of this assessment. At the very least, Athens, Perinthos, Byzantion, and the King braced themselves to repel any hostile advance by Philip.¹⁴

Athenian diplomacy elsewhere failed significantly. The Athenians sent Kallias as ambassador to certain Peloponnesian states, the Akarnanians, and various Euboian allies. Upon his return he reported that contributions from them would amount to more than 100 talents for the war against Philip. The Achaians and Megarians supposedly promised sixty talents and the allied states of Euboea an additional forty. Other Greeks similarly pledged solid assistance. Demosthenes confirmed the report that the Peloponnesians and Akarnanians would honor their words. The sums available would provide a force of 100 triremes, 10,000 infantry, and 1000 cavalry. Citizen troops would swell the ranks, and all concerned yielded command of them to Athens. Demosthenes had also called for a meeting of this grand coalition in about March 340. For all of Demosthenes' resolutions,

¹⁴ Dem. 9.71, which Blass and Dindorf do not consider an interpolation; 18.88–89, 244, 302; Hypereides fr. 161; 194; Arist. *Rhet.* 2.8.11; Diod. 16.77.2; Ps.-Plut. *Mor.* 847F–850A.

longer than the *Iliad* in Aischines' sardonic opinion, no congress convened, no money arrived, and no armaments assembled against Philip. Once again these vain Athenian hopes prove that most other Greeks saw in Philip no threat to themselves.¹⁵

In 340 Philip launched a truly audacious campaign to achieve several goals. He planned first to reduce inland Thrace. From the beginning of his reign he had entertained designs against this inconvenient neighbor, and by now he had vanquished a row of Thracian kings. The time had arrived for him to finish his work there. He assigned Antipatros, Parmenion, and his son Alexander the task of reducing the Thracian tribes in the valley of the Strymon River. Meanwhile, Philip himself with an army of 30,000 and his small fleet assailed the Greek cities on the eastern Thracian coast. He would thus make it impossible for them, even had they so desired, to interfere with Macedonian operations in the interior. He would also deprive the Thracians of their commercial avenues to the Pontos. If successful, Philip would find himself master of all Thrace and its remaining maritime outlets. The third part of this complex campaign involved his promise to deal with Athens at his leisure. The time had come. He knew that his operations in the Pontos would provoke Athens to the war that men like Demosthenes so ardently wanted. The Athenians could not idly watch him seize so many vital places along their grain route. Philip's plan showed daring because of its scope, complexity, and its reliance on combined maneuver. Yet it must have taxed Macedonian resources to the utmost. Nonetheless, his advantages, not shared by his enemies, included unity of command and central planning, a veteran force of combined arms, and splendid generals. He had little to fear that all of his enemies could successfully coalesce against him. At the very least he could reasonably expect to overwhelm Thrace.¹⁶

Philip's operations in the Pontos usually take pride of place in history owing largely to Greek interest in them. Yet the Macedonians found the reduction of Thrace of far more immediate importance. Actions there can unfortunately be glimpsed only from chance historical fragments. A reasonable, but unproveable, reconstruction takes

¹⁵ Dem. 9.71; Aischin. 3.95–101. Schaefer, *Demosthenes*, II².484–486; Wüst, *Philipp II.*, 118–119; Ellis, *Philip II.*, 169–170.

¹⁶ Wüst, *Philipp II.*, 127; Ellis, *Philip*, 173–174; Griffith, *HM* II.565–567; Archibald, *Odrysian Kingdom*, 235.

the march of forces from Macedonia along the line of the Via Egnatia to the valley of the Strymon River, whence Philip's lieutenants struck inland. Philip himself, the rest of the army, and the fleet meanwhile continued eastwards to Perinthos. Presumably under the tutelage of Antipatros and Parmenion, as he would later be at Chaironeia, Alexander put down a rebellion of the Maidoi, who lived on the upper Strymon. He held the area in submission by founding the military colony of Alexandropolis, the first of his many settlements. The two veteran marshalls continued north to war against the Tetrachoritai, also known as the Bessoi, a martial people on the Hebros River. They were best or more notoriously known as brigands even among fellow bandits. The two generals advanced farther northwards to subdue the Danthaletai on the headwaters of the Strymon. Turning eastwards they also seem to have attacked the Melinophagai, who lived on the coast of the Pontos at Salmydessos. These campaigns secured for Philip the region from the upper Strymon and Hebros Rivers to the Pontos. To the north the Triballoi on the Danube remained independent and difficult, but the subjection of the Melinophagoi put Philip north of Byzantion. These victories gave the Macedonians control of the interior, leaving the powerful Greek cities on the western Pontos as isolated outposts open only to the sea. They faced the dilemma either of seeking some accommodation with Philip or reconciling their differences with Athens. The latter of course proved the less disagreeable of the evils.¹⁷

On his immediate front Philip opened the campaigning-season by presenting Perinthos with an ultimatum: it could either render him aid against the Athenians, who had violated their treaty with him, or face the consequences. If the city preferred the latter course, it would itself become a target with no further formalities needed. Philip doubtless defended his position on the grounds that the Athenians had without provocation attacked his ally of Kardia and committed other hostile acts. One great uncertainty in this reconstruction of events stems from the nature of the pact with Perinthos, the terms

¹⁷ Tetrachoritai (Bessoi): Theopompos, *FGrH* 115 F217; Livy 44.7.5; Strabo 7.5.12; 7 fr. 47, 59; Polyain. 4.4.1; Steph. Byz. *s.v.* *Tetrachoritai*. Danthaletai: Theopompos, *FGrH* 115 F221; Strabo 7.5.12. E. Oberhummer, *RE* 4 (1901) 2101–2102. Melinophagoi: Theopompos, *FGrH* 115 F223. E. Oberhummer, *RE* 15 (1931) 523. Maidoi: Plut. *Alex.* 9.1; Justin 9.1.8; see also Thuc. 2.98. Hamilton, *Plutarch Alexander*, 22; Danov, *Allthrakien*, 90–134; Archibald, *Odrysian Kingdom*, 234–235.

of which are nowhere preserved. To judge by his treaty with Byzantion, however, Philip had made an ordinary defensive alliance with the city. If so, the pact was purely bilateral, which did not include a clause involving the allies of either party. The Byzantines claimed as much when they shortly found themselves in the same situation. Although Philip could point to Athenian treatment of Nikias and Amphilochos as hostile actions, the Perinthians apparently responded that these acts were irrelevant to their treaty. Since the Athenians had not attacked Macedonia, they need not defend him. For all that, treaty obligations, however perceived, played a lesser part than political reality. The Perinthians showed their apprehension about Philip's occupation of the Pontic coast. Fearing the nearby Philip more than the distant Athenians, they rejected Philip's call and instead took the Athenian side.¹⁸

So in 340 Philip struck at Perinthos with 30,000 infantry and his small fleet. He probably retraced his previous path around the Chersonesos. He had nothing to fear for the Athenians had not yet appreciated his declaration of war. They would not do so until he later attacked Byzantion (see below, pp. 483–484). For the moment the Athenians settlers in the Chersonesos had no ostensible or justifiable reason to resist him, despite whatever apprehensions they harbored. Without any overt provocation on his part, and themselves weak and scattered, they suffered him to pass unmolested. They may have solaced themselves by hoping that he intended merely to pursue his war in eastern Thrace. Passing them by in peace, Philip sailed on to Bisanthe, the choicest place on the coast and close enough to lend him assistance. The silence surrounding the fleet in the coming contest suggests that Philip dared not use it against the port of Perinthos. Moreover, the Perinthians subsequently and regularly received supplies by sea, which suggests that this route remained open. Perinthos itself enjoyed a strong position. It stood perched atop the steep, banked headland of a narrow peninsula. Abrupt hills dominated

¹⁸ Perinthos: Philochoros, *FGrH* 328 F54; Diod. 16.71.2, 74.2; Plut. *Dem.* 17.2; schol. Aischin. 2.81; Hesychios, *FGrH* 390 F1, 26–32. Byzantion: *Dem.* 18.87; Bengtson, *SdA* II².318; Hesychios, *FGrH* 390 F1, 32–35. Buckler, *ICS* 19 (1994) 108. Philip's Pontic acquisitions: Bisanthe: Hdt. 7.137; Xen. *Anab.* 7.2.38; 5.8; Strabo 7 fr. 55; Plut. *Alc.* 36.3; Nepos *Alc.* 7.4; and Mela 2.24 prove that Neon Teichos on the northeastern foot of Hieron Oros is meant and not the mountain itself. See E. Oberhummer, *RE* 3 (1897) 500–501; Archibald, *Odrysian Kingdom*, 121, F. 4.4.

virtually all three sides of an ample harbor. Only the westcentral part of the landward side lay exposed to attack, but the city standing on the southern peninsula shielded it from that direction. Itself well-walled, the city received further protection from a cross-wall built across the peninsula that barred the approach. The houses behind these walls rose like seats in an amphitheater, thus allowing the defenders the advantages of higher ground, even in retreat. Geography discouraged attack both from the interior on the west and from the sea on the east. Perinthos promised anything but an easy target.¹⁹

Launching a full-scale assault, Philip concentrated on the cross-wall that barred the peninsula. He added a novel feature to warfare by using spear-throwing siege artillery. Having suffered from Onomarchos' non-torsion machines in Thessaly (see p. 416), he had devoted wealth and attention to the further development of the catapult. Since his artillery shot only arrows, it could not damage the wall. He perforce relied mainly on traditional siege methods. He built tall towers from which his men could shoot or hurl missiles down upon the defenders. While sappers dug to undermine the wall, he ordered battering-rams to open gaps. He relentlessly continued to attack so as to wear down the defenders both in numbers and in stamina. Success was slow and the contest hard fought, but at last Philip breached the outer wall. The Perinthians quickly erected a second. Forced farther back, they blocked the streets and fought from closely packed and high houses. The defense showed stalwart resolve but so did the indefatigable attack. Losses mounted on both sides, but the gallant Perinthian defense bought time for others to send aid to the city.²⁰

Philip had also called upon the Byzantines to support him in his attack, an obvious provocation aimed at determining whether he could depend upon them in the coming struggles. They refused on

¹⁹ Hdt. 5.1; Diod. 16.76.1–3, 77.2; Plut. *Phok.* 14.3–8. K. Lehmann-Hartleben, *Die antiken Hafenlagen des Mittelmeeres* (Leipzig 1923) 275; Casson, *Macedonia Thrace and Illyria*, 93; E. Oberhummer, *RE* 19 (1937) 802–805; Danov, *Altthrakien*, 199; B. Isaac, *The Settlements in Thrace until the Macedonian Conquest* (Leiden 1986); Ellis, *Philip II*, 174–176; Cawkwell, *Philip*, 135–137; P.B. Kern, *Ancient Siege Warfare* (Bloomington 1999) 197–201.

²⁰ Philochoros, *FGrH* 328 F54; Theopompos, *FGrH* 115 F292; Diod. 16.74.2–76.3. Catapults: E.W. Marsden, *Greek and Roman Artillery* (Oxford 1969) 60, 100–101. Griffith, *HM* II.572–573.

the grounds that theirs was a purely defensive alliance. Nor did they find the Perinthians at fault. Having refused to honor Philip's call to arms, they instead came to their neighbor's defense. They devoted their best officers and troops, funds, and tools of war to Perinthos. Quite significantly, the King also intervened. As early as 342/1 Demosthenes had urged the Athenians to send embassies to the King to form a common front against Philip. He supported his policy by claiming that Artaxerxes trusted as his benefactors all those who were at war with Philip. This gave a far different message from the arrogant Athenian response to the King's message of 344. Even without Athenian appeals Artaxerxes felt alarm over the growth of Philip's power in his immediate neighborhood. He reacted by ordering his satraps of the coast to lend all possible aid to Perinthos. Arsites, satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, immediately dispatched a mercenary troop under the Athenian Apollodoros to carry out the order. Likewise, one Aristodemos of Pherai, who later commanded Greek mercenaries against Alexander, also served with the generals of the King against Philip. The duty must have seemed quite pleasant to a Pheraian. The King's action by no means violated the treaty of 386. Even though it had thereby renounced all claim to Greek territory in Europe, it had nonetheless guaranteed the autonomy of all Greek cities great and small with certain specific exceptions. For the first time in the fourth century the King now exercised his right to enforce this clause. If he acted in 340 and not earlier, these events provided him with a unique opportunity. He had never before enjoyed such a favorable occasion in which to use his military might to enforce his will in Greece without at the same time alarming the Greeks. Moreover, no one could stop him, nor many who wished to do so at a time when so many implored his help. The scene of action furthermore stood well removed from the mainstream of Greek politics. Even though Philip had never associated himself with any King's or Common Peace, the great and small cities nonetheless had, thus providing Artaxerxes with every right to intervene. In bald reality, however, the King acted more in fear of Philip gaining control of the Hellespont than he did in protecting his treaty rights. The memory of the Spartan Pausanias had perhaps not been completely forgotten.²¹

²¹ Philip's appeal to Byzantion: Dem. 9.35; 18.87-94; Diod. 16.74.2-75.2; Bengtson,

The Athenians responded cautiously to this new crisis. Not appreciating that Philip had already declared war on them, they still honored in their fashion the remnants of the Peace of Philokrates which they had done so much to destroy. Since nothing indicated that the Perinthians and Athenians had again become allies, the latter need not become involved. Therefore, they remained aloof from the quarrel. Philip's campaign nonetheless rekindled heated debate in the assembly, where the Athenians finally decided to send Chares with forty ships to Elaious, their purpose to defend the Chersonesos. Given the importance of Elaious, which commanded the entrance to the Hellespont with a harbor that could shelter 180 ships, the Athenians saw fit to grant it rights equal to those of its Athenian neighbors. Using the city as a base, he collected money from the allies for his enterprise, but was spurned by other cities, some of which refused him entry into their harbors. They saw no reason to support Athenian policy, especially in the face of the nearby Philip. He had shown no disposition to harm them, but the Athenians they knew well. Nonetheless, his very presence in the area made Philip's exit from Perinthos more hazardous.²²

While Chares occupied himself in more southerly waters, Philip continued his assault on Perinthos, even though it had received help from the Byzantines and troops in Persian service. His stoutest efforts notwithstanding, he failed to batter his way farther into the city in the face of valiant resistance. Against the besieged's advantages of regular maritime supply and topography itself he could achieve little. In a bold stroke he split his forces, one to continue the assault on Perinthos and the other to strike suddenly at Byzantion. He gave as his grievance against Byzantion that it had failed to honor its duties as allies in his war with Athens. The idea of surprise had nothing to recommend it unless success could fairly be predicted. He made a strategical mistake by dividing his forces. If his combined army

SdA II² 318–319. Athens and the King's response: Dem. 9.71; 10.32–34; Philochoros, *FGrH* 328 F157; Ps.-Dem. 11.5–6; for Anaximenes as the author of Ps.-Dem. 11, see A. Lesky, *A History of Greek Literature* (New York 1966) 604; Theopompos, *FGrH* 115 F222; Anaximenes, *FGrH* 72 F11b.5; Diod. 16.75.1–2; Strabo 16.3.5; Paus. 1.29.10; Arr. *Anab.* 2.14.5. Schaefer, *Demosthenes*, II² 502; Wirth, *Philipp II.*, 125.

²² *IG* II² 1628 lines 419–420; 1629 lines 940–941; Plut. *Phok.* 14.3–4; Ps.-Plut. *Mor.* 845F; Hesychios, *FGrH* 390 F1.28. Elaious: Hdt. 6.140; 7.22; Xen. *Hell.* 2.1.20; *IG* II² 228. E. Oberhummer, *RE* 5 (1905) 2227–2228; Casson, *Macedonia Thrace and Illyria*, 216–218; H.-J. Gehrke, *Phokion* (Munich 1976) 46.

could not take Perinthos, half of it could not confidently hope to seize the far stronger Byzantion. To add to his difficulties he could not easily conceal the movement of perhaps 15,000 troops along a stretch of coast at least ninety kilometers in length. He must pass the small town of Selymbria, the modern Silivri, and the enemy controlled the sealanes. Little recommended the stroke. For all that, he hoped to fall upon Byzantion unawares, especially now that its people had committed their armed might to the defense of their neighbors. With all possible speed he led his army first to Selymbria, some thirty kilometers east of Perinthos. Though an insignificant place, he beleaguered it in order to secure his line of march. He legally justified the attack by declaring that the city had not participated in the peace. Selymbria, like its neighbors Perinthos and Byzantion, seems also to have seceded from the Athenian League during the Social War. It certainly was not an Athenian ally in 340, but for Philip the time for legal niceties had passed. Although Selymbria seems not to have fallen immediately, a strong Macedonian detachment would have sufficed to block any serious opposition. Yet this impediment further reduced the possibility of surprise.²³

Philip pushed eastwards. If Perinthos stood resolute, Byzantion proved formidable. The city occupied one of the most forbidding sites in the Mediterranean. The Greek city spread over the eastern tip of the promontory immediately south of the Golden Horn on the European side of the Bosphoros. Its strategic position commanded a vital trade route that enabled it to control maritime traffic between the Aegean and the Black Seas. It lay exposed only to the European hinterland on the west, and that slight weakness gave Philip his only real hope. Only the barest sketch of Philip's assault of the city can be drawn. Surprise proved impossible, allowing the Byzantines quickly to shut the gates against him. The problem became a matter of siege and broader strategical thinking. Philip's siege machines made no

²³ Dem. 15.26; 18.77, 87; Diod. 16.76.3–4; Paus. 1.29.10; Arr. *Anab.* 2.14.5. Both schol., Dem. 18.76 (Dilts, p. 217 no. 140), which is essentially the same found in the spurious letter found in hypoth. to Ps.-Dem. 11 (Dilts, pp. 158–159), include Selymbria in these events. Although one would normally be suspicious of such later and dubious testimony, the position of Selymbria along Philip's line of march made it too important for Philip to ignore it. Wüst, *Philipp II.*, 136–140; Ellis, *Philip*, 178, 288 n. 99; Griffith, *HM* II.574. Although Denham, *The Aegean*, 90, dismisses Selymbria with the comment, "Nothing here of interest", its harbor at least provided protection from the north, an important factor when the Etesian winds blew.

dent in the stout walls of the city. He next tried to isolate it by attacking the Byzantine harbor of Bosporos and seizing the small city of Phosphorion in the Bosporos farther to the northeast. Since he had not, however, been able to gain control of Chalkedon on the Asian coast, he failed to close the ring around Byzantion. He endangered the city without being able to deliver a decisive blow against it. The sea remained an open highway. During the entire operation Philip attempted too much with too little.²⁴

Demosthenes, himself serving as an ambassador to Byzantion, responded by persuading the Athenians to defend the embattled city. Even though the Byzantines distrusted Athens, they now gladly welcomed its aid. In 340 the Athenians voted to send Chares, Kephisophon, and Phokion to the area. In addition to his reputation, Phokion enjoyed the friendship of Leon of Byzantion, previously a diplomatic agent of Philip. The Athenians charged their generals to protect the Hellespont and lift the siege of Byzantion. When they arrived, the Byzantines allowed Phokion to enter the city, while Chares with forty ships occupied the promontory of Propontis, located between Chalkedon and Chrysopolis. Additional aid, doubtless naval, reached the Byzantines from their traditional friends of the Coinage Alliance—Chios, Rhodes, and Kos—together with some other Greeks, notably those from nearby Tenedos. They all secured Byzantine defenses on the west. They had also momentarily thwarted Philip.²⁵

With the approaching autumn came the Athenian grain ships from the Black Sea. They also presented Philip with an ideal opportunity to strike a startling blow against Athens. The Athenians habitually anchored at Hieron on the Asian side of the Bosporos, northwest of Byzantion. Chares stood under orders to escort a large fleet of merchantmen, probably 230 in all, to the open waters of the Aegean. At precisely this point, he left his command to join a conference with

²⁴ Dem. 1.87; Philochoros, *FGrH* 328 F54; Theopompos, *FGrH* 115 FF217, 292; Hesychios, *FGrH* 390, F1, 26–28; Plut. *Phok.*, 14.3; Justin 9.1.1–3; Steph. Byz. *s.v. Bosporos*; Dionysios of Byzantion, C. Müller, *Geographie Graeci Minores* II (Paris 1855–1861) 50 F4; Polyb. 4.43–44; Dion. Halik. *Ann.* 1.11. Gehrke, *Phokion*, 46–49; C. Bearzot, *Focione tra storia e trasfigurazione ideale* (Milan 1985) 105–107.

²⁵ Dem. 8.14; 18.80, 88–92, 244; Philochoros, *FGrH* 328 F162; Leon, *FGrH* 132 T 1; *IG* II² 1628 lines 436–439; 1629 lines 957–960; *SIG*³ 256; Hesychios, *FGrH* 390 F1, 28; Diod. 16.77.2; Plut. *Phok.* 14.3–7; *Mor.* 188B–C; Ps.-Plut. *Mor.* 850F–851A. L.A. Tritle, *Phocion the Good* (London 1988) 52–53, 92–93; Sealey, *Demosthenes*, 188. Leon: Trampedach, *Platon*, 97–100.

the King's satraps. Having materially aided the preservation of Perinthos, the Persians had also earnestly defended Byzantion; but the season had advanced and the situation there remained uncertain. They felt it necessary to consult with the Athenians about future combined operations. Wisdom urged a meeting, but Chares now blundered. Although the topic demanded attention, Chares owed his first duty to protecting the grain fleet. At the very least he could have asked Phokion or Kephisophon to discuss general matters with the Persians. Instead, he went alone, leaving his own squadron and the grain fleet without their chief naval commander. Accepting this unexpected gift, Philip first sent his meager naval force against the Athenians, and their inaction prompted him to send his army overland onto Hieron. His move took them completely by surprise. Philip's men in all probability caught the crews ashore before seizing the unprotected ships. Philip proclaimed them all his prizes of war. He thereby honored his promise to bring the dispute with Athens to an issue. He further humiliated the Athenians by selling the cargoes for 700 talents. He next broke up the ships for their timber, which he used to build siege machines for his future attack on Byzantion. He also offered an olive branch to the Byzantines, Rhodians, and Chians by returning their captured warships as a token of good will while he and the Byzantines concluded peace. He used them instead as a ploy to lure them into complacency. The wounds of the Social War had never quite healed, so the possibility of a separate peace that would protect them and exclude Athens held a particular appeal. Meanwhile, prolonging the negotiations, Philip readied his fleet for a dash down the straits. The ruse took them all by surprise, and Philip soon found himself again before Byzantion. In the process he had seriously weakened the Athenians by depriving them of their own resources, while strengthening himself at their expense.²⁶

²⁶ Philochoros, *FGrH* 328 F162; Dem. 18.139; Front. 1.4.13a; Justin 9.1.5–6. Hieron: Ps.-Dem. 35.10; 50.17. Prizes of war: Philochoros καὶ ἐπικρινὼν τὰ πολέμια διέλυε, which further proves that Philip felt that the Athenians had already broken the peace. The number of grain ships taken has caused a small problem. Philochoros puts them at 230, Theopompos at 180, and Justin at 170. Both Griffith, *HM* II.575–577, and Ellis, *Philip*, 179, 288 n.101, conclude that Philip released fifty ships, thus reconciling the figures of Philochoros and Theopompos. Frontinus, whom neither cites in this connection, cannot support this ingenuous solution. Frontinus clearly indicates that he meant warships, for only they could block the straits: *tenenibus transitum non Byzantiorum tantum, sed Rhodiorum quoque et Chiorum navibus*. Philochoros,

News of the disaster naturally enraged the Athenians, and Demosthenes angrily demanded that they declare war on Philip, which they heartily did. They symbolized their decision by destroying the stele on which they had inscribed the Peace of Philokrates. Demosthenes finally had his war. The Athenians should have expected nothing else. Philip had warned that he would deal with them later, and later now became the present. Only now did the Athenians fully realize that fact. If the seizure of the grain fleet at Hieron provoked the hostilities, the Athenians simply observed the inglorious result of their provocation of Philip. That belonged to the past. They hurriedly manned their fleet and readied their army. Since they had already deployed large numbers of ships to the area, fleet preparation caused no problem. The theater of war being so far removed, it required essentially only an expeditionary force, which raised few difficulties for the mobilization of infantry. So much for a short, distant war, but a general and sustained conflict would present greater challenges than the Athenians envisioned. No one could reasonably expect them to be clairvoyant, but the enormity of Philip's achievements should have given them a clear idea of the task before them.²⁷

While the Athenians planned war, Philip pursued it. Even his new siege machines, probably the fruit of Polyeidos' ingenuity, brought Philip no closer to victory in his renewed attack on Byzantion. The natural strength of the city, its large population supported by various allies, and the weakness of his own forces all worked against him. Once again, instead of concentrating his forces against his immediate target, he detached some of his best troops to raid Athenian settlements in the Chersonesos. If these thrusts demonstrated that he could still move his units throughout the area, it also proved that he was no nearer to success at any one point. Philip made a last effort to seize Byzantion. In a scene reminiscent of Demosthenes' attack on Epipolai during the Syracusan campaign, Philip attacked the city on a particularly dark and rainy night. His stroke woke the

however, consistently refers to merchant ships τὰ ἐφ' ἱερῶν πλοῖα τῶν ἐμπόρων and the grain convoy (σιτοπομπία). Although Philochoros had the best opportunity to know the precise facts, the discrepancies cannot be reconciled. They all, however, testify to the wealth that Philip had garnered.

²⁷ Philochoros, *FGrH* 328 F55; Theopompos, *FGrH* 115 F292; Dem. 18.73, 139; Diod. 16.77.2. Wüst, *Philipp II.*, 132; Ellis, *Philip II.*, 179–180; Cawkwell, *Philip*, 140; Sealey, *Demosthenes*, 188–190.

local dogs, who raised the alarm, just as Juno's geese saved the Roman Capitol from the Gauls. The attempt failed, forcing Philip early in 339 to admit defeat. He had failed at Perinthos, presumably at Selymbria, and certainly at Byzantion. His siege machinery could not fell cities, and his infantry, inadequate in numbers, could not deliver a decisive blow against one city, much less three. Nonetheless, his campaign thus far was not totally a failure. He had at least forced the beleaguered onto the defensive, from which they were unlikely to shift. He had also seriously damaged the Athenian fleet, combatant and mercantile. Philip next confronted the challenge of extricating his expedition from the Propontis. He did so by ruse rather than force. He sent a message to Antipatros which he never expected to reach his lieutenant. In it he wrote that Thrace had revolted, and ordered Antipatros to follow him back to the area in order to rescue Macedonian garrisons endangered there. When the Athenians intercepted the message, as Philip had intended, they withdrew their fleet, easily allowing Philip to slip back into the Aegean.²⁸

If the message to Antipatros served as an artifice, the north indeed at the time suffered from turmoil that endangered Macedonian interests there. Trouble began when the Histrianoi in Scythia Minor (modern eastern Romania) went to war with Atheas, the king of the Scythians, who found himself hard pressed. The king sent a message to Philip through the good offices of the Pontic Apollonians with an unusual offer. In return for Macedonian military support Atheas offered to adopt Philip as his heir to the Scythian throne. The death of the Histrian king having unexpectedly relieved Atheas from danger, he reneged on his offer. When Philip asked him at least to defray some of his expenses, Atheas rebuffed him. So the matter stood until Philip raised the siege of Byzantion. An angry Philip thereupon determined to deal with Atheas, which he did by a devastating invasion of his realm. After a battle in which Philip

²⁸ Byzantion: Theopompos, *FGrH* 115 F217; Dem. 18.88, 93. Night attack: Hesybios, *FGrH* 390 F1, 32–35; see also Thuc. 7.43–44; Livy 5.47.1–4. Polyeidios: K. Ziegler, *RE* 21 (1952) 1658–1659; Marsden, *Greek and Roman Artillery*, 60, 148–149. Chersonesos: Dem. 18.80, 93, 139; Justin 9.1.7. Antipatros: Theopompos, *FGrH* 115 F217; Front. 1.4.13; Justin 9.2.1. Justin's statement (9.1.8) that Philip summoned Alexander to participate in these operations has sparked controversy: Schaefer, *Demosthenes*, II².445; Hamilton, *Alexander the Great*, 35; Ellis, *Philip*, 289 n. 15; A.B. Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire* (Cambridge 1988) 21. The many erroneous details in his statement belie its general accuracy.

defeated superior forces, he seized quantities of captives, cattle, and mares. On his return, however, the Thracian Triballoi demanded part of his spoil as the price of passage through their land. More than understandable greed may have prompted the Triballian levy. Macedonian advances to their south gave these Thracians ample reason to fear Philip and suspect that they could easily become Philip's next target. They perhaps used this occasion to resolve all doubts. Instead of acquiescing in their demand, Philip joined battle with them in which he suffered so serious a wound that his troops thought him dead. When the Macedonians panicked, thinking only of bringing their wounded king to safety, the confusion allowed the Triballoi to carry off all of the Macedonian booty.²⁹

Though balked in the Propontis and wounded in Thrace, Philip refused to bow to adversity. His prestige, both among his troops and throughout the larger Greek world, had indeed suffered a rude blow. Yet it would be all too easy to see Philip's ambitious campaign as a series of failures. These reverses had not weakened his general strategical position. True, Perinthos and Byzantion had steadfastly rebuffed him, but at the same time they now formed only an enclave. If they remained safe, Philip's solid blows had nonetheless knocked them out of the war. He still threatened the Athenian grain trade. While Lysandros and later Antalkidas had choked this line in the Hellespont, Philip now threatened it in the Pontos, where the Athenians would find it even harder to keep it open. Still more importantly, control of this remote area in the Pontos, together with Alexander's victory over the Maidoi, greatly increased the security of the northern Macedonian border. Lastly, during these events, neither had the Athenians and their allies devised any serious plans to carry the war against Philip. They quite literally allowed him time to recover physically and quietly to ponder future moves.

²⁹ Philochoros, *FGrH* 328 F54; Marsyas, *FGrH* 135/6 F17; Aischin. 3.128; Diod. 16.1.5; Trogus *Prologue* 9; Justin 9.2.10. P. Alexandrescu and W. Shuller, eds., *Histria* (Bucharest 1990); Archibald, *Odrysian Kingdom*, 237–239.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

THE TRIUMPH OF PHILIP (339–336 BC)

A. THE ROAD TO CHAIRONEIA (339–338 BC)

Philip's wound forced upon him a respite in Pella during which he planned further movements. Now fully committed to pursuing the war against Athens itself, he surveyed how best to proceed. The situation before him, though complex at first sight, became simpler on closer scrutiny. Athens and its feeble League stood largely isolated. Thebes, Thessaly and Lokris remained his friends, Phokis lay prostrate, while Megara and most of the Peloponnesos supported him against Athens. Although Sparta maintained its defiance, the ring of Messene, Megalopolis, Tegea, and Argos stood as warders of it. An unsettled Asia Minor at least posed no immediate threat to him. Nothing in fact distracted him from Athens. Probably though unbeknownst to him at the time, events in central Greece ere long gave him an excellent and perfectly justifiable opportunity again to intervene in Greek affairs. Another local quarrel at Delphi provided him with the occasion. Although some scholars have seen Philip's hand in these events, they overlook his physical plight at the time and the endemic wrangling among the major Amphiktyons. Not the culprit of the piece, Philip simply and effectively took full advantage of the opportunity offered him.

The Athenians had only themselves to blame for this crisis that ultimately led to their downfall. It started with the consecration of Apollo's new temple at Delphi, an occasion meant to be festive. The previous temple had suffered destruction in 373, and afterwards efforts to rebuild it began immediately. Greek cities had liberally contributed funds for the work that continued throughout the 360s, and even the turmoil of the Sacred War did not entirely stop it. From 346 to 344 panhellenic generosity poured into the effort until by 340 the naopoioi had nearly completed construction. In the summer of 339 before the consecration of the temple the Athenians dedicated gilded shields accompanied by an inscription proclaiming them the spoils of the Medes and Thebans taken at the battle of Plataia in 479.

The dedication before the proper and official consecration amply proves Athenian arrogance and impiety, a studied insult to the Thebans. It also served as a provocation. Athenian propaganda had already exasperated many Greeks who well remembered that their ancestors too had played their part in repulsing the Persians. The Amphiktyonic delegation from neighboring Amphissa immediately lodged a formal complaint against the Athenians. Having no love for their enemies of the recent Sacred War, they demanded that Athens be debarred from the shrine because of its consistent support of the temple-robbers. They logically asserted that those who had abetted the Phokian despoilation of the sanctuary of so many dedications from so many states had no right to make one of their own. They also resented one that demeaned the Thebans who had suffered so acutely to spare Apollo's wealth and dignity.¹

In the face of these grave and reasonable charges the presiding hieromnemon, Kottiphos of Pharsalos, offered the Athenians the opportunity to defend themselves. Aischines spoke for the Athenian delegation. Unable to refute the Amphissian condemnation, he retorted by changing the subject. His accusers had for some time violated the sacred plain and harbor of Kirrha. He accused the Amphissians themselves of sacrilege, and implicated the Thebans and Thessalians in the deed. Demosthenes later put the ultimate blame on Philip. From the sanctuary he pointed down the valley to the places in question, still visible today, and then demanded that on the morrow the officials inspect them. The Amphiktyons obliged, and on the next day they met with angry Amphissians who forcibly and ignominiously drove them away. This intolerable outrage prompted Kottiphos to condemn the Lokrians. He also convoked an extraordinary meet-

¹ Temple: Parian Marble, *FGrH* 239 line 71; Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.2; Rhodes-Osborne, *GHI* 45; *FdD* III.5. no. 5 line 2; no. 7 line 3; no. 19 col. IIB lines 10–11; nos. 19–20; no. 23; Aischin. 3.113. Roux, *L'Amphictionie*, 30–31; Lefèvre, *L'Amphictionie*, 80; Sánchez, *L'Amphictionie*, 159–163. Shields: Aischin. 3.116. Greek attitudes towards Athens: Theopompos, *FGrH* 115 F153; see also Tod, *GHI* I. no. 20; Hdt. 9.81; Thuc. 1.132; Kleidemos, *FGrH* 323 F222; Diod. 11.33.2; Paus. 5.23.1; 10.13.9. Amphissa: Aischin. 3.115–118; Dem. 18.140–144. The chronology also presents a fine point. Aischin. 3.115, states that in the archonship of Theophrastos (340–339), the Athenian envoys arrived at Delphi. That could only have occurred at the end of the archon-year and the beginning of the Delphian civil-year (see Roux, *L'Amphictionie*, 235). Both calendars began at the summer solstice, which in 339 took place on 27 June (Ginzler, *Chronologie* II.579). The beginning of the autumn-pylaia began a month later in Boukatios. Consequently, depending upon the observation of the new moon, these events occurred either as early as late June or as late as mid-August 339 BC.

ing of the Amphiktyons at Thermopylai to decide upon suitable punishment of the Amphiſſians. The dedication of the Athenians had placed them in the clutches of a crisis that they had unwittingly and witlessly provoked, one that presented the danger of sparking a major crisis. Aischines worsened matters when he accused the Thebans of having forced the Amphiſſians to lodge the charge against Athens. Yet the Athenians alone bore the responsibility for their ill-considered dedication, and the Thebans could not be held responsible for the Amphiſſian violation of sacred land. Nor did these Lokrians need foreign bidding to drive the Amphiktyons from land that they considered theirs. Even more significantly, the Thebans never defended Amphiſſian conduct. Although the Athenian dedication insulted them at a delicate time, they forbore any response. Nor can Philip reasonably be blamed for these events, as some Athenians thought. Then still in Scythia and before his struggle with the Triballoi, he knew nothing about this affair, nor could he have foreseen it, much less dictated its elaborate consequences. Added evidence against Philip's complicity comes from the conduct of the Thessalian Kottiphos, who was a close personal friend and political ally of the king. Philip had the power to admonish the Athenians for their hapless dedication and to punish the lawless Amphiſſians. Yet he did neither. Instead, Kottiphos, fully honoring Amphiktyonic law, called for the punishment of the Lokrians, not the Athenians, to which Thebes made no objection. Indeed, in the face of Athenian conceit and Amphiſſian lawlessness the Thebans, Thessalians, and eastern Lokrians acted with admirable restraint. Though successful in deflecting Amphiktyonic anger towards the Amphiſſians and away from Athens, Aischines and the others in the Athenian delegation had opened the way to another Sacred War.²

Kottiphos duly convened the special session at Thermopylai to decide the punishment of the Amphiſſians. The Thebans refused to attend for the obvious reasons that they harbored no desire to punish an old ally. Nor did they wish to become involved in another

² Amphiktyonic meeting: Aischin. 3.116–124; Dem. 18.147–151. For the scene and its oratorical license, see J.G. Frazer, *Pausanias and Other Greek Sketches* (London 1900) 378–379; personal observations of 2 October 1970, 1 June 1983. Kottiphos: Buckler, *SW*, 197–198. Philip in Scythia: Aischin. 3.128. Schaefer, *Demosthenes* II².532–540; A. Momigliano, *Filippo il Macedone* (Florence 1934) 155–157; P. Cloché, *Un Fondateur d'Empire* (St. Etienne 1955) 253; Ellis, *Philip II*, 187; Griffith, *HM* II.585–587; Wirth, *Philipp II.*, 129; Hammond, *Philip of Macedon*, 141–142.

Sacred War. Their action, or perhaps better inaction, alone took much of the force from any decision that the other Amphiktyons would take. In Athens too Demosthenes realized the peril of these impending events. He persuaded the Athenians to send their hieromnemones and pylagoroi to Thermopylai and Delphi only at the times of the regular meetings. Athens thus likewise boycotted the extraordinary session. The independent decisions of the Thebans and Athenians gave the first hint of a growing community of interest between the two powers. Despite this tacit opposition, the Amphiktyons at Thermopylai voted several measures to deal with the situation. After commissioning Kottiphos as commanding general, they conscripted military contingents to constitute his army. They also levied contributions to a common war chest and condemned the recalcitrant to pay a fine for their refusal to honor their decisions. They next fined the Amphissians, set a time and place for the payment, and banished those responsible for the recent outrage. They recalled from banishment others who demonstrated their loyalty to the Amphiktyony. Finally, they resolved that in the event of further defiance they would elect Philip as their commander-in-chief. Philip's old friend Kottiphos must surely have moved this motion, which made good sense. If Thebes and Athens refused to protect Apollo's estate, the Thessalians with the eager support of their Macedonian ally could readily fill the void. As in 346 they would again come to the rescue of the god.³

The resolutions ratified, Kottiphos found that many contingents refused to muster, while others lent feeble support. The hapless army marched from Anthele, their traditional meeting-place at Thermopylai along an easy route now commonly called the Isthmus Corridor, to Amphissa, where it met with humiliating failure. The Amphissians defied this poor threat by refusing to pay the fine, protecting those who faced banishment, and exiling those nominally re-instated by the Amphiktyons. In short, the whole episode ended in failure and embarrassment. Nor could the Amphiktyons either countenance this brazen defiance or leave it unpunished. The Amphissians had made fools of the Amphiktyons, as had the Phokians earlier. Apollo again

³ Aischin. 3.125–129; Dem. 18.151–152. Wüst, *Philipp II.*, 150; Ellis, *Philip II*, 186–188; Harris, *Aeschines*, 127–130; Sealey, *Demosthenes*, 191–193; Lefèvre, *L'Amphictionie*, 185, 200; Sánchez, *L'Amphictionie*, 228–235.

clearly needed a champion, and no one qualified better than Philip, to whom the pious again looked for succor. The Greeks had once again given him a legitimate reason to intervene in their affairs for a sacred cause. Given his previous experiences at Delphi, he was unlikely to show sympathy to those responsible for these sorry events. Nor were Athens and Thebes totally innocent. Although they had good reasons for distancing themselves from these events, their decision opened a road to Philip that they would never subsequently close.⁴

These circumstances left most of the situation reasonably clear to Philip. Upon his recovery and the Amphiktyonic vote at the spring-pylaia, he would assume the conduct of a Sacred War against Amphissa and its supporters. The Amphiktyons duly met at Anthele in the month of Bysios, roughly January or February 338 BC. As expected, they elected Philip as their leader. If the physical surroundings facilitated Philip's advance into central Greece, the weather did not. Although the season discouraged military operations, it did not seriously inconvenience the king. In grudging respect, even his bitter enemy Demosthenes admired his tenacity in braving adverse elements. Philip expected Athenian opposition, but the attitude of the Thebans caused him concern. At some point during these turbulent months the Thebans had seized Nikaia from Macedonian control. The point was delicate. As seen above (p. 427), the place owed its strategic importance to its position immediately east of Thermopylai, its harbor and its command of the approaches to the Kleisoura and Fontana passes. Philip had gained it in 346, but the abrupt Theban seizure of it appeared decidedly unneighborly. While it strengthened the defense of Boiotia, the move clearly indicated Theban suspicion of Philip's ambitions.⁵

The task before him demanded that Philip take control of the entire area around Thermopylai. Already in command of Echinus and Herakleia Trachinia, he next marched on Nikaia, thus literally paving the way to victory. As noted above (p. 454), after his victory in the Sacred War, he had built roads to facilitate efficient movements

⁴ Aischin. 3.128. Ellis, *Philip II*, 189. Anthele: Roux, *L'Amphictionie*, 37; Lefèvre, *L'Amphictionie*, 13–16. Isthmus Corridor: Kase *et al.*, *GICR*, 77, 105, 123; personal observations of 17 July 1996, 16–17 August 2000.

⁵ Aischin. 3.140; Dem. 18.143, 152; Didymos in *Dem.* 11.40–52. Bysios: Beloch, *GG* III².1.566; III².2.296–298; Roux, *L'Amphictionie*, 36–41; Lefèvre, *L'Amphictionie*, 14–151; Sánchez, *L'Amphictionie*, 235–243.

of large forces through the pass. Nikaia, far removed from Boiotia, fell easily to Philip, his possession of it also denying its harbor to the Athenian fleet. He had thereby regained complete control of the entire Thermopylai corridor, its accesses, and the roads leading inland from it. He could now enter central Greece at will from a variety of routes. Nikaia anchored his eastern flank along the coast; but in terms of large-scale movements inland, the easier and preferable route ran from Herakleia to Kytinion. This route also led to Delphi and the still disarmed Phokis. With these advantages Philip turned inland along the Isthmus Corridor to Amphissa. He expected resistance from the Amphissians, but substantial opposition from the Athenians may have surprised him. They had recruited 10,000 mercenaries, whom they put under Proxenos and Chares, and sent them to defend Amphissa. The Thebans probably granted them freedom of passage through Boiotia, which if so marked another sign of growing Theban suspicions of their Macedonian ally. They did not, however, participate in the ensuing action. Where in the vicinity of Amphissa the mercenaries took station is unknown. They quite possibly made their stand at nearby Moukichri, which protected the northern approach to the city. Refusing to assault such a strong position, Philip cleared it by a ruse, after which he reduced Amphissa, despite its formidable defenses. Although his enemies accused him of destroying the city, he contented himself with accepting its surrender and exiling some leading citizens. The Athenian mercenaries disappeared, presumably by fleeing northwards until they reached Kytinion, whence they could seek the refuge of Boiotia and ultimately Attika. Philip in the meantime settled Amphiktyonic affairs to his satisfaction. He perhaps even eased restrictions on the chastened and weakened Phokians, who could at least serve as some counter to the western Lokrians and the Thebans.⁶

⁶ Thermopylai corridor: Dem. 6.22; 9.34; 11.4; Aischin. 3.140; Didymos in Dem. 11.40–52. Roads there: *SIG*³ 200; 243D 42–45; 250D 43–45; Strabo 9.4.15–17; Arr. *Anab.* 7.9.4; see also Hdt. 7.176. Buckler, *BMCR* 30 November 2000; Szemler *et al.*, *Thermopylai*, 45–46. Campaign at Amphissa: Aischin. 3.146; Dem. 18.143; Philochoros, *FGrH* 328 F56; Dein. 1.74; Polyain. 4.2.8, but obviously confused: see 4.2.18 and Front. 1.4.13. See also Strabo 9.3.4, 4.7; Diod. 18.56.5; Plut. *Dem.* 18.1; Paus. 2.8.4; 7.14.4. Moukichri: Kase *et al.*, *CICR* 34–42. Amphissa and environs: personal observations of 17 July 1996. Although Ellis, *Philip II*, 193, on the basis of Polyainos, considers this Proxenos the Theban, Dem. 18.146 and Dein. 1.74, easily disprove him. See also Develin, *AO*, 340–341. Demosthenes (18.152) hints

His work at Delphi done, Philip returned to Kytinion, located on a low, isolated, and well-fortified hill that dominated the surrounding plain. To its south opens the wide Gravia pass that leads to Phokian Lilaia some fourteen kilometers away. Thence through the Kephisos Valley he enjoyed an easy march that offered no danger to a superior army accompanied by good cavalry. Philip had no real need to assault the various disarmed western Phokian cities along the way, since even hastily contrived defenses could easily be brushed aside. The Thebans and Athenians fully realized that Phokis had become too strategically valuable to be left a political vacuum. They shared the sense for the need of military co-operation, already reflected by the Theban permission of free Athenian passage through Boiotia. More needed to be done, especially with Philip at Kytinion. In a bold move, the Thebans and Athenians worked to rebuild some Phokian cities destroyed at the end of the Sacred War. Western Lokris lay beyond them, so they concentrated their efforts no farther than Ambrossos and Panopeus in the west. This disposition, which covered the major entries into Boiotia proves that they built their hopes on defense. They regathered scattered inhabitants and raised new walls. The Thebans repeated a policy that they had endorsed at Mantinea in 370 and initiated a year later at Messene. They saw especially to the walls of Ambrossos, Kleombrotos' key to the campaign of Leuktra. They did not, however, bother with Parapotamioi, whose populace lived distributed among other cities. Although the site, still unprepossessing today, overlooks an important pass, that at Panopeus to the south was far more valuable to the defenders. These arrangements tell a great deal more about the concrete, concerted, and ambitious efforts of the Thebans and Athenians than can be found in the speeches of Demosthenes and Aischines. For reasons still and perhaps forever unknown, the Thebans had developed a suspicion of Philip that grew into a fear. Whether right or not about the nature of his plans, in 339 they began to react to a perceived threat. In these uncertain circumstances, they could look for help only from Athens, their enemy for much of the fourth century.⁷

that Philip himself did not march onto Kirrha itself; but once he had disciplined Amphissa, he had no reason to do so.

⁷ Philip's route: Dem. 18.152; Philochoros, *FGH* 328 F56; personal observations of 17–23 August 2000. Atheno-Theban response: Dem. 18.143–148; Paus. 10.3.1,

This turn of events must have surprised Philip, who had always handsomely treated his Theban allies. Their new concord with Athens clearly indicated their distrust of him. His seizure of Echinos and Nikaia seemed relatively minor and inconsequential, but Theban refortification of eastern Phokis against him was not. The abrupt change of Theban policy remains puzzling. The anaemic Sacred War then in progress presented them with no threat, for they had assiduously avoided it. Nor had Philip made any hostile move directly against them. For reasons now not easily discerned, they considered Philip an immediate threat. The most obvious, and perhaps the true, explanation is that they felt him an uncomfortably close and powerful neighbor. Yet with the exception of the slight examples just mentioned he had done nothing to encourage that attitude. His subsequent attempt to placate them likewise indicates that he ardently desired their friendship, or failing that at least their co-operation. The Thebans may very well have brought upon themselves the worst that they feared. They may have attributed to him ambitions that he did not entertain. The sharply divided counsels within Thebes further indicate that uncertainty on these matters also reigned there. Lastly, stupidity may also have played its role in their deliberations, as it so often has in history. Even good, patriotic men can make mistakes.⁸

No uncertainty troubled Philip. He swiftly and unopposed marched through the Kephisos Valley onto Elateia, which commanded the main military route between eastern Phokis and western Boiotia. Not much today but the land itself hints at the strategical significance of the site. From the akropolis situated on a low hill the city spread below in the plain. In antiquity, however, walls protected the city,

3, 33.8, 36.3–4; 4.31.5. Although Kromayer, *AS* I.134–135; Wüst, *Philipp II.*, 158; Ellis, *Philip II.*, 193 assert that Parapotamioi served as the main line of Greek defense, nothing recommends this view. Parapotamioi, though scenic, presents no inconvenient obstacle to movement, while Panopeus boasts ample fortifications: McInerney, *Parnassos*, 293–296; personal observations of 22 August 2000. Both Parapotamioi (Strabo 9.3.16; Frazer, *Pausanias*, V.418–419) and Panopeus command passes between Phokis and Boiotia, with the latter debouching immediately onto Chaironeia (Strabo 9.3.14; Frazer, *Pausanias*, 216–219). If Polyainos' testimony (4.2.14) be accurate, Philoboios situated northnorthwest of Chaironeia serves as the best candidate for this pass: Plut. *Sulla* 16; Polyain. 5.16.1; personal observations of 10 July 1986. Ambrossos: McInerney, *Parnassos*, 313–315; personal observations of 4 May 1971.

⁸ Dem. 18.175. Cloché, *Thèbes de Béotie*, 193–194; Ellis, *Philip II.*, 190–191; Sealey, *Demosthenes*, 195–196.

which stood in sight of the pass formed by the Kephisos River from Phokis to Boiotia. There he halted his military campaign for the nonce and opened his diplomatic. As leader of the Amphiktyonic League he demanded that the Thebans join him. Though legal, the summons was patently specious, especially in view of Philip's success at Amphissa. To fulfill the resolution of the Amphiktyons he needed only to march on Kirrha, which lay open to him. The Thebans could argue that since Philip had ended the recent Sacred War, they had no reason at all to act. All Thebans, however, surely knew that their opposition to him had brought him to their threshold. When the Thebans refused his demand, Philip wrote to his Peloponnesian allies, again pursuing his typical policy of isolating an enemy before moving upon him. Their response was hardly enthusiastic. Messene, Elis, Arkadia, and Argos most notably remained aloof. With the exception of Elis they had no desire to bear arms against their old Theban friends. Even though most Greek states favored Philip, they would not fight for him. More importantly, however, the banner of a Sacred War had become so sullied that most Greeks politely ignored it. If, however, Philip did not raise the righteous crusade that he doubtless wanted, Greek indifference served him equally well.⁹

Philip's occupation of Elateia threw terror into the Athenians and defiance into Demosthenes. The Athenians responded much as had their forebears upon learning that they had lost the Peloponnesian War. Yet nothing could have better served Demosthenes' policy. Philip had presented him with a splendid opportunity to close the rift with Thebes. Rightly suspecting that Philip did not expect a rapprochement between the two rivals, Demosthenes literally rose to the occasion to urge just that. Sheer expediency dictated nothing else. He boldly proposed a very favorable alliance with Thebes that ensured a united front against Philip. In partial but keen defense of his motion he pointed out that Athens then enjoyed the support only of its weakest allies and the enmity of many Greek states. Thebes must be won over and Athenian resources put at its disposal. He recommended first that Athens recognize the Theban hegemony of Boiotia. He proposed that the Athenians bear two-thirds of the military

⁹ Elateia: Frazer, *Pausanias*, V.425–428; McNerney, *Parnassos*, 287; personal observations of 22 August 2000. Theban summons: Dem. 18.152–158, 168, 174–175. Peloponnesian response: Dem. 18.64, 156, 218, 237; see also Rhodes-Osborne, *GHI* 77; Diod. 16.84.1; Plut. *Dem.* 17.5; Justin 9.3.8.

expenses and the Thebans the rest. Both allies would share equally the naval command, the Athenians bearing all of the expenses. This clause entailed no hardship inasmuch as a fleet could not reach Philip at Elateia. The Thebans would command the combined army. This clause was hardly unusual, for the state in whose territory the allied army operated normally held the command of allied forces. He also urged his countrymen to muster all infantry and cavalry at Eleusis to bolster Theban resistance to the Macedonians. The last would not only prove Athenian dedication to the alliance but also deploy a force capable of quickly responding northwards against any move that Philip could make from Elateia.¹⁰

Having heeded Demosthenes' words, the Athenians sent an embassy of ten to offer the Thebans an alliance. Philip moved with equal speed. He sent the Macedonian Amyntas, probably a kinsman, and Klearchos; Daochos, the eminent Thessalian; and Thrasydaios to Thebes as his ambassadors. The composition of his delegation matched the significance of Philip's message. Daochos alone proved that if defiant the Thebans could no longer rely upon their Thessalian allies. The others indicated not only Macedonian reproach for their opposition but also that of the Amphiktyonic Council itself, should the Thebans defy them. Such was the situation that confronted the newly-arrived Athenian embassy. When the Thebans convened their assembly to consider the various proposals, they introduced the Macedonian embassy first. It basically presented the Thebans with three options. The ambassadors invited the Thebans to participate in the invasion or at least give Philip free passage. Philip would reward this co-operation by ample Athenian plunder at little risk to themselves. The situation promised to be even sunnier than that obtaining when in the final days of the Peloponnesian War the Thebans had freely sacked the neighborhood of Dekeleia. This time they need do nothing but receive the spoils. Refusal meant Philip's ire. The Thebans could at one vote resolve their differences with Philip and enrich themselves at the expense of an old enemy. The possibility echoed the situation after the Sacred War, when they and Philip had enriched

¹⁰ Dem. 18.168–179; see also Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.3–4. Need for a united front: Dem. 18.161–162, 177, 234. In general: Aischin. 3.142–150; Theopompos, *FGrH* 115 F328; Diod. 16.84.3–5; Plut. *Dem.* 18.1; *Phok.* 16.3; Justin 9.3.5; Bengtson, *SdA* II².345. Ellis, *Philip II*, 190–193; Wirth, *Philip II*, 129; Cawkwell, *Philip*, 142–144; Harris, *Aeschines*, 130–133; Sealey, *Demosthenes*, 194–196.

themselves in Phokis. The Athenian delegation could offer nothing so attractive as the Macedonian proposals. Demosthenes nonetheless stepped forward with far more modest proposals, which looked paltry by comparison. Yet in a move that surprised everyone, the Thebans accepted Demosthenes' offer of alliance. Nothing in the historical record logically explains the Theban decision. They had much to gain by following Philip and everything to lose, if they did not. The only obvious answer is that for whatever reasons they too had begun to fear Philip's ambitions.¹¹

Demosthenes had meant for the Athenian diplomatic effort begun at Thebes to embrace all of Greece. He hoped to create a new Hellenic League to oppose the new "barbarian" threat. To that end, as earlier, he persuaded the Athenians to send additional embassies abroad to sound the alarm against Philip. Only some eight states responded to the call, a far and feeble cry from the thirty-one that had united to repulse the Persians in the fifth century. Even the new union with Thebes prompted only the major state of Corinth to join the cause. The others included the Euboians, Achaians, Megarians, Leukadians, Kerkyraians, Argolid Aktaians, and Akarnanians. The states responding were those most closely and likely to be affected by the outcome of the looming conflict. Either Theban or Athenian allies, the principal among them ringed the Corinthian Gulf. Unlike the situation in 346, nothing would prompt the Spartans northwards; and in all fairness to them, the similar unwillingness of their immediate and hostile neighbors made such a response foolhardy and dangerous. As indicated above, other contributing factors led to the general Greek indifference to the situation. If the Athenians considered themselves the bulwark of Hellenic culture, most other Greeks did not. Rather, events of the fifth and fourth centuries had persuaded them of the opposite. Athens now seemed to them a closer and more sinister menace than Philip. Nor could the pious forget that for the second time in some twenty years Athens had supported the sacrilegious at Delphi. Philip, the northern ogre, however, had again stood forth as Pythian Apollo's champion. Moreover, Apollo's

¹¹ The Athenian embassy: Aischin. 3.145, 151; Dem. 18.178. The Macedonian: Marsyas, *FGrH* 135–136 F20; Theopompos, *FGrH* 115 F328; See also Dem. 18.178, 211–215; Diod. 16.84.3–85.1; Plut. *Dem.* 18; Justin 9.3.6. P. Cloché, *Démosthènes et la fin de la démocratie athénienne* (Paris 1937) 192–195; D.J. Mosley, *Historia* 20 (1971) 508–510; Sealey, *Demosthenes*, 196–197.

plundered sanctuary and tarnished image had become another sign of cynical politics. The Peloponnesians particularly could look instead to Zeus at Olympia for any guidance previously provided by Pythian Apollo. Most Greeks simply refused to exert themselves in an irrelevant war ostensibly for an unfortunate sanctuary.¹²

During the late winter months, as the principals drew their diplomatic lines, the Thebans and Athenians sparred with Philip in the Kephisos Valley, but with little result. These actions recall numerous skirmishes that the same two allies had launched against the Spartans in eastern Boiotia in the early 370s (see Ch. 7). Although they failed to dislodge Philip, they afforded the Greeks the opportunity to operate together and to become quite familiar with the immediate theater of war. They also served as good training for the approaching campaigning-season. By summer 338 those committed to the conflict put their forces in motion. Their numbers are, as so often in Greek military affairs, only approximations. Philip reputedly fielded 30,000 infantry and 2000 cavalry, while the allies had raised 15,000 footmen and 2000 horsemen. To them Thebes and Athens added their citizen-levies. According to rough calculations they may have confronted Philip with some 33,000 infantry and 3800 cavalry. The margin could not have been great. Nor could the Greeks match Philip and his veteran lieutenants in leadership. Gone for the Athenians were commanders like Chabrias, Iphikrates, and Timotheos, and instead they could only send Chares, Lysikles, and Stratokles, the first being the sorriest of the three. The Thebans, lacking an Epameinondas, Pelopidas, and Pammenes, were likewise embarrassed, their commanding general being the brave but otherwise undistinguished Theagenes. While Philip at Elateia awaited tardy allies, the Athenians marched in force to Thebes, where they received a gracious welcome.¹³


Ere long, probably in July or August at the latest, the allies marched onto Chaironeia. The plain of Chaironeia, onto which ran the high-

¹² Dem. 18.234, 237; Aischin. 3.97; Rhodes-Osborne, *GHI* 77; Plut. *Dem.* 17.5; Aelian *VH* 6.1; Bengtson, *SdA* II².343. Fifth-century Panhellenes: Meiggs-Lewis, *GHI* ² 27; Plut. *Them.* 20.3; Paus. 5.23.1–3. P. Londey, *Chiron* 20 (1990) 239–260; Freitag, *Der Golf von Korinth*, 87–88.

¹³ Initial skirmishes: Dem. 18.216. Troop strengths: Diod. 16.85.5; Plut. *Dem.* 17.3; Justin 9.3.9. Buckler, in Roesch and Argoud, eds., *La Béotie*, 239. Leaders: Aischin. 3.143; Diod. 16.85.2, 86.1; Plut. *Alex.* 12.5; *Mor.* 145E, on the last see also Stadter, *Plutarch's Historical Methods*, 112–115, and for the Athenians: Develin, *AO*, 342.

road from northern Greece, formed the threshold of Boiotia. In antiquity the plain extended from the foot of Mt. Parnassos in the west to Lake Kopais in the east, a distance of some eighteen kilometers. Its breadth, limited by stony hills on both its northern and southern sides, amounts to about four kilometers. Several streams water the plain, of which the Kephisos claims priority. Flowing from the northwest to the southeast along the foot of Mt. Akontion, the river formed in military terms the eastern border of the plain. The walled city of Chaironeia stood at the foot of the hills on its southern side. The citadel of Chaironeia commanded a strong position, one not easily vulnerable to the siege techniques of the time, and thus admirably suited to serve as the base of a large army. When Philip approached the place, then, he encountered a narrow plain that permitted little space in which to maneuver. Nor could he turn an enemy position that spanned its narrow eastern end. The field of this momentous battle is today peaceful, level farmland. In antiquity the three streams of Morious, Haimon, and Molos flowed across it to the Kephisos, but they did not influence events. The Kephisos, however, at that very time overflowed its banks to create impassable marshy ground. These factors narrowed the battlefield to some 3000 meters between the foothills of Chaironeia and the marshes. The Lion of Chaironeia, a monument erected directly after the battle and still prominent today, marks the western limit of the field. The polyandreion of the Macedonians, excavated only in the very early twentieth century, bounds the eastern.¹⁴

¹⁴ Date: Plut. *Cam.* 19.8, states that the battle of Chaironeia was fought on 7 Metageiton. The summer solstice occurred in 338 BC on 27 June (Ginzler, *Chronographie*, II.579), so that the Athenian year, if properly observed, began on the next new moon, that of 25 July. The scene: Arist. *Pol.* 5.2.12; Theophrastos *History of Plants* 4.11.3; Strabo 9.2.19, 37; 9.3.16; Plut. *Pel.* 16; *Dem.* 19; *Sulla* 16.12; 17.5–7; 19.10; Paus. 9.40.10, 41.7. F. Böhle, *RE* 7 (1912) 2218–2219; K. Fiehn, *RE* 16 (1933) 15, 308; Knauss, *Melioration*, 182. Macedonian polyandreion: Plut. *Alex.* 9.3. G. Soteriades, *AM* 28 (1903) 301–330; 30 (1905) 113–120. Although some, like Hammond, *HG*³ 570 n.1, still consider the Lion of Chaironeia the burial place of the Macedonians, very few today agree, nor did Paus. 9.40.7 in antiquity; see also Frazer, *Pausanias*, V.210; W.K. Pritchett, *AJA* 62 (1958) 307–311; Wallace, *Strabo*, 147–148. The discovery of the Macedonian polyandreion should have settled the matter long ago. Since Plutarch (*Dem.* 19.2; *Pel.* 18.7; see also Douris, *FGH* 76 F38) states that the Greek camp lay at the Herakleion near the Haimon, he helps to explain why the survivors buried the dead on the other side of the battlefield. They removed the remains from those of the nearby Macedonians to inter them near the sanctuary and the camp, at a place by the road along which many travellers could see the



11. The Battlefield of Chaironeia, 338 BC.

At dawn on a summer's day in 338 the two armies deployed along their narrow fronts. To the northwest Philip held the right of his line with picked men, obviously his most battle-tried veterans. He stood beside the rough foothills below the city. On the other side of the plain he stationed Alexander with his most experienced generals, presumably Parmenion and Antipatros. Even in Plutarch's day, the Chaironeians pointed to an old oak standing by the Kephisos, where Alexander had reportedly pitched his tent. Whether fancy or fact, Alexander nonetheless stood with his left flank planted on the verge of the marshes. Various allies held the center. Neither Philip's nor Alexander's positions allowed them either to use cavalry or to deploy laterally. Opposite them the Thebans deployed the Athenians on their left against Philip, while they confronted Alexander. Their allies, according to nationality, filled their center. The Theban decision still puzzles. Epameinondas always struck the enemy at the point of his greatest strength, which normally meant the right of the enemy line. This day, however, his successors followed a tradition that he rejected. On the Greek side also the field narrowed, and the infantry numbered too many to permit the deployment of cavalry. The battle would consist of a simple frontal clash with valor and endurance more valuable than maneuver. Alexander first attacked the Theban Sacred Band standing in the forefront of their line. The Sacred Band stood toe to toe with Alexander's Macedonians until most of the Greek unit was cut down. Pushing onwards, Alexander confronted the rest of the Theban line, which also stubbornly defied him. There too the corpses piled up, but the carnage withal, Alexander also broke this last organized Theban resistance, the survivors fleeing headlong before the victors. The Macedonians had simply out-fought a tough enemy.¹⁵

On the other side of the plain Philip shone as valiant as his son. Supposedly unwilling to allow Alexander the credit of victory, he led

monument. See also Kromayer, *AS* I.149–150; G.L. Cawkwell, *CQ* 39 (1989) 379; personal observations of 1 October 1970, 10 August 1980; 10 July 1986.

¹⁵ Diod. 16.86.1–4; Plut. *Alex.* 9.2–3, on which see J. Buckler, *ANRW* II.33.6 (1992) 4802–4804; *Pel.* 18.7. For arguments against the testimony of Polyainos 4.2.2, see P. Rahe, *AJA* 85 (1980) 84–87; J. Buckler, in A. Schachter, ed., *Teiresias* Sup. 3 (1990) 75–80; A. Georgiadou, *idem.* 81–82; R.E. Gaebel, *Cavalry Operations in the Ancient World* (Norman 2002) 154–155. For earlier bibliography see Droysen, *Kriegsaltertümer*, 113–114; Kromayer, *AS*, I.165–167; Delbrück, *Kriegskunst*, I.174; Frazer, *Pausanias*, V.210; W.W. Tarn, *Hellenistic Military and Naval Developments* (Cambridge 1930) 11–16.

his men against the Athenians, who stoutly resisted him. Although some have seen the Athenians as lax, weak, and undisciplined, they long stood their ground on this day. The hotly contested battle here, as on the eastern side of the field, resulted in heavy losses. After hard fighting, the Athenians too broke and fled. Among them could be seen Demosthenes, whose military defiance played truant to his political ardor. He threw away his shield and ran with the rest. The Athenians left some 1000 dead on the field and not fewer than 2000 fell captive. The Thebans and Athenians had suffered one of the most catastrophic defeats in their history. The flower of both armies was crushed that day. No one knows what happened in the center of the opposing lines, except that the Akarnanians distinguished themselves in the allied cause. The Macedonians likewise suffered heavy losses, but Philip's veterans had carried the day in one of the most fiercely contested battles of classical Greek history. On this field they established Macedon as the leading power in Greece. Megara, Corinth, Achaia, Elis, Euboeia, and the whole of the Argolid Akte shortly bowed to the results of battle by surrendering to Philip.¹⁶

Unlike many other victors, Philip knew how to win the peace after having won the war. At first he kept his intentions to himself. The Athenian survivors had taken refuge at Lebadeia, whence they sent heralds asking permission to retrieve the dead. Philip refused. News of the crushing defeat reached Athens from Oinoe and triggered a panic. The Athenians decreed that all women and children be brought into the city from the countryside and that the city be defended. For further defense they voted to liberate the slaves, including those from Laurion, and others on the countryside, to restore exiles, and henceforth to forbid slavery and exile. In their panic they also dragged Charidemos to the bema demanding that he be made general. The Areopagos and other cooler heads injected reason and calm by proposing that the moderate Phokion deal with the crisis. Upon his hurried return from the battlefield Demosthenes took ship ostensibly to collect money from the allies to sustain the cause. His presence,

¹⁶ Dem. 18.264; Diod. 16.86.4–6, 88.2; Dionysios Byz. *GGM* II.50 F41; Hesychios, *FGrH* 390 F1, 26–32; Athenaios *Mechanikos* 10 in C. Wescher, *Poliorcétique des Grecs* (Paris 1867); Polyain. 4.2.7; Justin 9.3.9. Akarnanians: Rhodes-Osborne, *GHI* 77; Demosthenes and his shield: Aischin. 3.159–161, 175–176, 187, 209, 246, 252–253; Plut. *Dem.* 20.2; Ps.-Plut. *Mor.* 845F. Buckler, in Worthington, ed., *Demosthenes*, 157 n. 50.

indeed an embarrassment, Phokion, who did not need him, considered his absence convenient. Although he sailed immediately, Demosthenes later claimed that he had proposed all of the measures for the defense of the city.¹⁷

B. PEACE AND THE LEAGUE OF CORINTH (338–337 BC)

On the night of the victory Philip, in his cups as the story goes, danced and mocked the long-flown Demosthenes. The Athenian orator Demades, then a prisoner, scolded the victor by observing that though the fates had given him the role of Agamemnon, he preferred that of Thersites. This exchange was perhaps not as philosophical or edifying as it appears. Like his moderate friend Phokion, Demades recognized an Agamemnon when he saw him. The captor and the captive obviously discussed the topics of peace and reconciliation between Macedonia and Athens. Philip then sent Demades back to Athens with his proposals, just as in 348 he had released Phrynon of Rhamnous for like purposes. Demades' message prompted Phokion, who gladly accepted Philip's gesture of friendship, to send Demades and Aischines to conclude a formal peace. Philip immediately released without ransom his 2000 Athenian prisoners, to whom he gave all needed clothing. He further promised to return the dead with honor and without a herald. The terms of the peace agreed, Philip dispatched Alexander, Antipatros, and Alkimachos as an honor guard for the fallen. He himself did not enter Attika. The Athenians gratefully received their dead, for whom they commissioned a moving epigram; and Demosthenes, safely returned from his duties, in proper time pronounced the funeral oration over them.¹⁸

¹⁷ Athenian aftermath: Hyper. FF 13.31; Lik. 16, 37, 42; Ps.-Plut. *Mor.* 894A; Plut. *Phok.* 16.3–4. Demosthenes: Aischin. 3.159, 227; Dein. 1.80; Dem. 18.248 yet see 18.285. Schaefer, *Demosthenes*, II².8–9; Gehrke, *Phokion*, 60–63; Bearzot, *Focione*, 118–119; Sealey, *Demosthenes*, 189–199.

¹⁸ Aftermath: Dem. 18.282, 285; *Epist.* 3.11–12; Aischin. 3.227; Polyb. 5.10.1–6; 9.28.4; Diod. 16.87–88.2; Plut. *Dem.* 20.3–5; *Mor.* 177E–F; Paus. 7.10.5; Justin 9.4.1–5. Athenian honors: Tod. *GHI* 176, 180; Hyper. FF20, 77; Theopompos, *FGrH* 115 F329; Diod. 16.87.3; 32.4.1–2; Plut. *Dem.* 21.2; Ps.-Dem. *Mor.* 845F; 849F; Paus. 1.9.4; Justin 9.4.5. Wüst, *Philipp II.*, 166–168; Ellis, *Philip II.*, 198–199; Sealey, *Demosthenes*, 198–199; Ryder, in Worthington, ed., *Ventures into Greek History*, 241–243.

The same three Macedonians also served on the embassy that concluded the actual peace treaty. Philip had fought the Athenians since 341 with much trouble, danger, expense, and personal discomfort, yet in the hour of victory his terms revealed a surprising leniency. In some respects they echo the King's Peace of 386. Although he dissolved the Athenian League, he allowed the Athenians to retain control of Lemnos, Skyros, and Imbros. He recognized their right to Delos and with apparent generosity Samos as well. Samos calls for some explanation. As seen earlier (p. 354), the Athenians had seized it in 365 contrary to the King's Peace and the pious Athenian declaration not to destroy the autonomy of the islanders. Purists could demand its full restoration to its lawful status, but the island enjoyed a strategical importance too significant to be left free. Better that it be held by a submissive and allied Athens than become prey to an ambitious satrap. Here may appear the first concrete sign of Philip's embryonic ambition to attack Persia. No liberation of Asia Minor could succeed without Samos and its close neighbor Ephesos, which dominated the central coast of Anatolia. Philip imposed no indemnity on Athens, not did he garrison it. Although some have attributed this lenience to his desire to command the Athenian fleet, neither he nor later Alexander ever used it. Its actual importance has received much more attention than it really deserves. Its operational quality had markedly declined since the Social War, and its days of glory lay shrouded in the mists of the past. For Macedonian purposes it served a more valuable function as a captive, aging in the harbor. Having destroyed Athens' maritime power, Philip had placed himself precisely in the place of Artaxerxes in 386. As an overt sign of friendship, submission, and reconciliation, the Athenians bestowed honorary citizenship on Philip, Antipatros, and Alkimachos. They presumably included Alexander in their respects. At least they erected statues in tribute to him and Philip as much through expediency as in friendship.¹⁹

Philip dealt otherwise with Thebes. He punished a recalcitrant ally and blunted a potential threat. He sold Theban prisoners into slavery, profitably ridding himself of dangerous enemies. He further

¹⁹ Peace terms: Diod. 16.87.3; 18.56.7; Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 61.5; 62.2; Ps.-Demades 9; Plut. *Alex.* 28.2; Paus. 1.25.3, 34.1; 7.10.5; Justin 9.4.5; Schmitt, *SdA* III.402. Athenian honors: Tod, *GHI* 180; Hyper. F20; Plut. *Dem.* 22.4; Paus. 1.10.4. Beloch, *GG* III².1.570–573; Ryder, *Koine Eirene*, 102–106; Griffith, *HM* II.606–609.

demanded that the Thebans pay to ransom their dead. He ensured the obedience of Thebes by installing a Macedonian garrison there. Although he did not dismantle the Boiotian Confederacy, as he had the Athenian League, he reduced Thebes' position within it to virtual impotence. He recalled the Plataians and gave the Thespians and Orchomenians still living in Boiotia full citizen rights, including membership in the Confederacy. They henceforth outnumbered the Thebans in federal affairs. In a similar vein he reduced Theban influence in the Amphiktyonic Council by filling its place with members from Tanagra and Orchomenos. He weakened the Confederacy itself by detaching Oropos from it. Although he may have made it nominally autonomous, the city actually fell immediately into Athenian hands. Just as he had eliminated Phokis as a center of power after the Sacred War, so he now did the same to Thebes and Boiotia. He also integrated Boiotia into his larger plan to isolate Athens. He looked to Euboia, upon which he strengthened his grip by installing a garrison in Chalkis. Not only did the island pose no further threat to him, but it also served as a further check on both Athens and Boiotia. Turning his attention westwards, Philip exiled some Akarnanians, a number of whom had found refuge in Athens. He more importantly installed a garrison in Ambrakia, which reduced Achaian influence in the area. The Aitolians, no friends of the Achaians, now served Macedonian interests there. All of central Greece in effect stood with Philip or in terror of him.²⁰

During the winter of 338/7 Philip, having dealt with central Greece, turned his full attention to the Peloponnesos. His treatment of Thebes demonstrated that he could be hard without being brutal and his lenient dealings with Athens displayed generosity. He had in effect given the Peloponnesians a choice of which Philip they preferred to meet. He had already reportedly rejected his generals' advice to garrison the Greek cities. Although he reputedly averred that he wished to be long remembered for his goodness rather than for any brief despotism, in reality he lacked the manpower militarily to hold all

²⁰ Thebes: Diod. 16.87.3; Paus. 9.1.8, 6.5; Justin 9.4.6–10. Boiotian Confederacy: Hyper. 5.18; Arr. *Anab.* 1.7.11. Restoration of Boiotian cities: Paus. 4.27.9–10; 9.1.8, 37.8; Arr. *Anab.* 1.8.8; Justin 11.3.8. Oropos: Hyper. 4.16–18; Ps.-Demades 9; schol. Dem. 18.99 (Dilts, 176); Diod. 18.56.7; Paus. 1.34.1. Amphiktyony: Ellis, *Philip II*, 132–133; Roux, *L'Amphictionie*, 166–167; Sánchez, *L'Amphictionie*, 23 n.63. Euboia: Hyper. 5.20; Dein. 1.44; Polyb. 38.3.3; Aelian *VH* 6.1. Western Greece: Rhodes-Osborne, *GHI* 77; Diod. 17.3.3, see also 15.75.2.

of Greece. Instead he must discipline the defeated and rally the loyalty of those states that had not joined him at Chaironeia. Above all, he must bring Sparta to heel. Diplomacy supported by a victorious army supplied the tools for these tasks. He needed to establish a balance of power in the area with Macedonia as the arbiter of that balance. He could allow no Peloponnesian state a position of significant independence. All eyes must look to him for stability and peace. A major part of that policy entailed further reduction of Spartan might but not to the point of eliminating it as a concern to its neighbors. Sparta, after all, could perhaps prove useful in dealings with Messene, Arkadia, and Argos. In response to this situation he made certain territorial adjustments with the defeated and dealt diplomatically with his hesitant allies. He may now have installed a Macedonian garrison in Corinth before embarking on any future operations necessary farther south. The garrison alone alarmed his enemies and won back the full support of his allies. It also provided a sure sign that he fully intended to enforce his peace settlement. Yet he further weakened Corinth by awarding Aigeiroussa to Megara. The city, located in Perachora, stood on the border between Corinth and Megara astride the track to Aigosthena. By putting it into Megarian hands he impeded communications between Corinth and Thebes. With Megara placated, he need expect no further opposition from that quarter. He otherwise treated Corinth as moderately as he had Athens. He had no need to deal further with Achaia. Although he allegedly dissolved its league, his dealings with Ambrakia and Akarnania made it unnecessary. Northeastern Peloponnesos presented a more pressing situation. Though pro-Macedonian, the Argives had in effect remained neutral, but their neighbors in the Akte had not. Yet the Argive Mnaseas displayed his loyalty to Philip and his opportunism by expelling the pro-Athenian citizens from Troizen, the most important city in the Akte and for generations an Athenian friend. Mnaseas' stroke both deprived Athens of an ally and enhanced the Argive position in the region. Circumstances in Elis were stormier. Civil discord arose among the leaders there with one group seeking military intervention from the Spartans. The Messenians, however, struck first to suppress them and to keep Elis in the Macedonian camp. The Eleians thereafter claimed that they had refused to support Philip at Chaironeia because they could not bring themselves to fight against other Greeks. Nonetheless, they asserted their willingness now to join him in an attack on Sparta. If the first reason

sounds self-serving, the second rings true. At any rate, they too professed to be staunch allies. The Messenians had already demonstrated their ultimate loyalty, and the southern Arkadians took the same position. In their defense these Peloponnesians could reasonably argue that with the Corinthians, Achaians, and those in the Akte barring the way north, they could better serve by confining the Spartans to Lakonia. The Messenians made just that point in deeds and the Arkadians in words. Genuine fear of Sparta weighed more heavily with them than Philip's distant quarrel with Thebes and Athens.²¹

Indeed only the problem of Sparta remained. In the course of various negotiations Philip had already intimated that he would solve it in 337. He opened direct contact with Sparta, which, if tradition be trusted, became more amusing than fruitful. According to anecdotes, he asked the Spartans whether they wished him to enter Lakonia as a friend or a foe. They answered "neither". Another reports that in answer to his question of whether they would receive him into their city, they similarly answered "no". If the anecdotes be spurious, the sentiment was not. The Spartans wanted no place in Philip's settlement, and accordingly provoked a military response. Consequently, at the beginning of the campaigning-season of 337 Philip moved his army onto Corinth, which he apparently used as his headquarters. Little is known of his subsequent operations except their results. His invasion of Lakonia in many ways mirrored that of Epameinondas. He and his Peloponnesian allies destroyed crops, trees, and homesteads. They attacked Sparta itself by raiding Messapeia, which lay west of the road from the city to Amyklai. Philip also sent a detachment to attack Gytheion. Thirty-three years had elapsed since Epameinondas' invasion, so the devastation wreaked havoc on the trees and vines that had meanwhile established themselves. Philip next dissected vital parts of Spartan-held territory. He gave the Argives Thyreatis on the northeastern approaches to Lakonia. His

²¹ Corinthian garrison: Polyb. 9.8.4; 38.3.3; Diod. 17.3.3; Plut. *Mor.* 177C–D; 221F; Aelian *VH* 6.1. Walbank, *HCP* III.68. Megara: Theopompos, *FGH* 115 F241; Strabo 9.1.10; Plut. *Mor.* 304F. G. Hirschfeld, *RE* 1 (1893) 951; Wiseman, *Ancient Corinth*, 26–27; personal observations of 11 October 1998. Achaia: Hyper. 5.18; Polyb. 2.40.5. Walbank, *HCP* I.229–230. Argos: Hyper. 3.31–32; Dem. 18.295; Polyb. 18.14.4. Although Diodoros (17.3.5) states that the Argives tried now to recover their independence, Polybios (9.28.7) proves otherwise. Messene: Paus. 4.28.4–6. Elis: Paus. 5.4.9. Southern Arkadians: Paus. 8.7.2. In general C. Roebuck, *CP* 43 (1948) 73–92.

generosity extended to the Arkadians to whom he assigned Karyai, situated on one of the most vital routes into Lakonia, and Eugeia, an otherwise unknown place. On Megalopolis he bestowed Belemina and Lykaia, which likewise commanded still another major road to Sparta. The status of the much-disputed Trikaranon remains unclear, but it probably remained Phleisian. With Arkadia now so well braced against Sparta, an isolated Phleious could do no real harm. The Messenians gained the area of Denthaliói and with it the temple of Artemis Limnatis. When Philip retired from the devastation, he left Lakonia a smouldering ruin with many of its choicest parts in enemy hands. He left the Spartans with little access to the outside world and far more vulnerable than before to external attack. He had in fact imprisoned Sparta. In sum, Philip now held effective control of all Greece south of the Vale of Tempe to the Peloponnesos. Those Greeks who remained hostile found themselves isolated and relatively harmless.²²

With Sparta reduced to virtual impotence, Philip promulgated his grand idea of a crusade against the Persian Empire, which consisted of two parts before the actual military operations themselves. He first moved to conclude a Common Peace, which hardly served as an innovation in Greek political thought. Philip's ability to enforce it and his intention to exclude the King from it made the difference in this instance. Although Agesilaos' ambition and stupidity had doomed the realization of the concept, Philip possessed the power and the desire to maintain a genuine peace. He held garrisons in Thebes, Chalkis, Ambrakia, and Corinth, the so-called fetters of Greece. Yet they could also serve as police stations to enforce his policy. Whether that peace would endure remained to be seen. No one can reasonably argue that Philip had made previous settlements

²² Since Chaironeia was fought in late summer 338, and Philip's disposition of political affairs in central Greece was extensive and time-consuming, his Peloponnesian campaign should be dated to 337, as Diodoros (16.89) suggests. This view receives further support from his extensive campaign against Sparta discussed here, in which territories in the east, north, and west were wrenched from it. Contra Beloch, *GG* III².2.299; Ellis, *Philip*, 201–204. Spartan response: Plut. *Mor.* 216B; 235A–B; 513A. Invasion of Lakonia: Polyb. 9.28.6–7, 33.8; Plut. *Mor.* 219F; Paus. 7.10.3. Messapeia: Theopompos, *FGrH* 115 F245. F. Bölte, *RE* 15 (1931) 1166–1168. Gytheion: Paus. 3.24.6. Thyreatis: Paus. 2.38.5. Karyai: Theopompos, *FGrH* 115 F238. Belemina: Theopompos, *FGrH* 115 F243. Lykaia: Theopompos, *FGrH* 115 F244; Livy 38.34.8; Paus. 8.27.3, 35.4. E. Meyer, *RE* 13 (1927) 2229–2231. Trikaranon: Theopompos, *FGrH* 115 F239. Denthaliói: Tacitus *Ann.* 4.43. A. Philippson, *RE* 5 (1903) 221.

with the Greeks that could be considered impartial or altruistic. He had instead weakened various traditional states—Thebes, Athens, and Sparta prominent among them—to achieve a general levelling. Unlike his predecessors, Philip had already settled old scores, not all of them of his making, and exercised actual control of the Greek peninsula from Paionia to Gytheion. He need not prostitute the peace to further a policy that he had already realized. He could now easily achieve a genuine and general peace that would appeal to the majority of the Greeks.²³

The campaign also gave Philip ample time to discuss his broader ideas with his leading allies, who realized that he would not simply go away. Having learned from Epameinondas' mistake in 370, he would hardly repeat it. Philip announced that an integral part of his peace would include a league of Greek states with Macedonia as its leader. He had every intention of consolidating his military, political, and diplomatic victories in a permanent, generally recognized institution. He planned to create a formal synod of allies in which the rights and duties of its members were clearly delineated and protected. Moreover, he expected and would enforce obedience to them. He would countenance no arrant or contentious allies, like the Mantineans during the Theban ascendancy. His notion must have appealed to the allies because it promised both stability and a guarantee that they could legally keep the lands already bestowed upon them. It would also bridle the ambition of Athens, while keeping Sparta, unlikely to join anyway, isolated. Philip's very participation as its hegemon promised stability.²⁴

In 337 Philip duly summoned a comprehensive Greek congress at Corinth. The site itself held its own significance because it was neither in Macedonia nor at the capital of any previously ascendant state. In that respect it was nearly neutral ground. The Spartans, of course, refused to comply. Although the Athenians demurred, Demades persuaded them to face reality. Athens, like Sparta, had seen better days, and the recent campaign in Lakonia demonstrated the cost of intractability. Philip proposed an unprecedented treaty that would embrace virtually all Greeks in a truly Common Peace. Its novelty lay in its exclusion of the King from it. Philip was the first to divorce

²³ Polyb. 18.11.5; Livy 32.37.4; Strabo 9.4.15; App. 9.8; Plut. *Flamin.* 10.1–2; Paus. 7.7.6. Roebuck, *CP* 43 (1948) 73–92; Buckler, *ICS* 19 (1994) 113–118.

²⁴ Buckler, *TH* 222–233; in Flensted-Jensen, *et al.*, *Polis and Politics*, 431–446.

the concept of a truly Greek Common Peace from the Persians' decree of a King's Peace. He in the process usurped the position of the King in Greek affairs. The Greeks and Macedonians would henceforth determine their own relations and the regulations governing them. Philip now in effect told the Persians that Greek peace was none of their business. This amounted in many respects to a Greek declaration of independence. Philip thus changed the concept of a Common Peace in a way that Sparta, Athens, and Thebes had never envisaged and Persia perhaps only dimly and apprehensively had anticipated.²⁵

At Corinth Philip presented the text and received the endorsement of what ostensibly appeared another ordinary general peace treaty. Philip's terms combined simplicity with comprehension. They proclaimed peace among all participants, forbidding the bearing of arms against any of them. It forbade aggression by land and sea against any city, fort, or harbor of any state that maintained the peace. It prohibited states from co-operating with aggressors. It guaranteed the security of the Macedonian kingdom, including the rule of Philip and his descendants. The pact contained a clause ensuring its members the right to hold their possessions, which by extension included freedom of the seas. It also protected the security of the constitutions then in existence among the Greek states. That concept likewise covered a large number of other internal matters. No member states would tolerate executions or banishment contrary to their laws, nor confiscations of land, cancellation of debt, or emancipation of slaves for the purposes of revolution. The pact enjoined the states not to arm or allow exiles to force their return on law-abiding member states. The treaty forbade any violation of the peace or collaboration with others who so designed it. If anyone broke the peace, all committed themselves to render assistance to the violated party according to the decision of the common council and its hegemon. No state, in such an event, could legally refuse to come to the assistance of the offended party. This treaty exhibits several original features and variations of previous concepts.²⁶

²⁵ Diod. 16.89.1–3; Plut. *Phok.* 16.5; Justin 9.5.1.

²⁶ *IG* II² 236; 329; Ps.-Dem. 17.15.19; Dem. 18.201; Polyb. 9.33.7; Diod. 16.89.1; 17.4.1; *POxy* I.12; Plut. *Mor.* 240A. Schmitt, *SdA* III.403 = Rhodes-Osborne, *GHI* 76. E. Frolov, in E. Ch. Welskopf, ed., *Hellenische Poleis*, I (Berlin 1974) 435–459; Jehne, *Koine Eirene*, 166–180; Beck, *Polis und Koinon*, 184–185.

The components of this singular pact deserve some individual notice. In establishing a Common Peace Philip did nothing novel, but he better defined the concept than ever before. Although many today take the expression "Common Peace" as a technical term, that did not obtain in the fourth century. It was instead a well-known political notion. Philip gave it an institutional foundation, which even Artaxerxes had not. The original King's Peace served as the expression of his will, to be implemented according to his desire. Philip, however, gave all members certain rights, protections, duties, powers, and responsibilities for its enforcement. If the prohibition of aggression could hardly claim any novelty, the clause ensuring the security of existing constitutions certainly could. No state could henceforth use the internal political troubles of another as an excuse to intimidate it, intrude upon its communal wishes, or destroy its autonomy. This treaty left no place for an Agesilaos. Macedonia also received protection under this rubric, which enjoyed the same rights, protection, and responsibilities as the Greeks. Unlike the so-called Peace of Pelopidas, Philip's settlement contained no unrealistic and unenforceable disarmament clause. The members instead pledged their armed forces to the service of the peace. All participants swore not only to uphold the treaty but also to take all due military and naval action against any that violated it. This was a duty, not an option, and Philip stood ready to see it enforced. Philip next married the concept of the Common Peace to that of a general alliance. The treaty clearly recognized Philip as its hegemon; and whereas a hegemon routinely led an alliance, neither the King nor any Greek state had effectively functioned as such of a Common Peace. The pact that created the League of Corinth most closely resembles the Athenian League, which also came into being within the framework of a general peace. Numerous treaties had adjured their members to come to the defense of their fellow allies. This requirement had likewise already appeared in vague terms as an aspect of the original King's Peace, but Philip's document now stated it in specific terms. The features of peace, security, military leadership, and mutual defense Philip, not his predecessors, combined in a specific text.

As noticed, Philip included as a vital piece of his design a synedrion of allies that met at Corinth. From these two facts come the modern names "League of Corinth" and "Hellenic League" for this entire settlement. Philip tried in part to avoid the image of a conqueror by appearing at Corinth just like the others. Each member selected

its deputies according to its own constitution. They enjoyed proportional representation according to the military levies that they were expected to contribute to the combined armed forces. The existence of a synedrion meant the right of the allies to meet, but whether their sessions were regular or for particular issues lies beyond proof. Every wronged party had the right to submit to the synedrion complaints about local injustices and infractions of the peace. Instead of appealing to an ascendant Sparta, Athens, or Thebes, the aggrieved could lay its case before all of its fellow members. This clause enabled states unconnected with such disputes to adjudicate them without particular interest. This agreement thus empowered the synedrion to decide upon the merits of the cases before it, render a decision, decree its verdict, and order its enforcement. Philip in effect created a permanent congress of Greek states. Unlike the temporary union created before the Persian invasion of 480, or even the Delian League which was intended to endure until the destruction of the Persian Empire, this agreement was to exist for all subsequent contingencies. Yet for all the legal niceties, the will of Philip ultimately prevailed. Nonetheless, as will be seen, he had every good reason to see that this League of Corinth functioned successfully. The desired effects of these stipulations are apparent. Philip sought stability within each member-state and concord among them all. He wanted general order and the end of domestic violence. He tried to prohibit the use of slaves and exiles by one state to overturn the government of a neighbor. He tried to eliminate situations that had led to the dire plight of Phleious in 381–379, Olynthos at about the same time, and the desire to liberate the Kadmeia in 379. Even if Philip's intentions be seen as conservative, they were at the same time realistic. He sought to eliminate, or at least reduce, the many political and social tensions that plagued the Greek cities. In terms of political stability Philip had learned more from the leading powers than had the Greeks themselves.²⁷

²⁷ Corinth was not necessarily or officially meant to serve as the permanent seat of the League, even though Alexander later used it as such (Diod. 17.4.9; Justin 11.2.5). Yet as seen from Schmitt, *SdA* 446 lines 60–75, the allies in this later treaty met where the competitors of the games received their crowns. For this purpose the sites of the Nemean and Isthmian games lay at hand, and Olympia and Delphi were not too far afield. For all practical purposes, Corinth was the most convenient place of assembly.

Philip's precise official place in this organization remains the subject of some debate and uncertainty. His executive role, however, raises no doubts. When the synedrion decided to take measures against a recalcitrant state, Philip took command to enforce them. He mustered the Macedonian army and the Greek levies, which he led against the transgressor. The Greeks elected him for life, and Alexander later insisted upon the same office by right of inheritance. Philip's precise position with regard to the synedrion has, however, caused some controversy. Some scholars have argued that Macedonia was not a member state and that therefore Philip had no part in the synedrion. They envision a situation similar to that of Athens in its fourth-century League. Just as the Athenian allies met and voted separately there, so in their view did the Greeks in the League of Corinth. Athens had a separate voice, but formally led its allies in all diplomatic and military matters. Much commends this interpretation, but questions persist. The Greeks recognized Macedonia as an equal party, vowed to defend it and to ensure the succession of its monarchy. They had in short concluded treaty obligations with Philip in no significant way different from their own. Instead of looking to the fourth-century Athenian League, one can reasonably suggest that Philip preferred the example of Athens in the Delian League. In that instance Athens served at once as hegemon and member of the synod. Moreover, Philip surely possessed the right to appeal to the synedrion whenever he felt himself the victim of injustice. As hegemon he must as surely have demanded a voice in any synodic decision affecting the executive branch. He may indeed have routinely used this position to act as the president of the synedrion. These considerations withal, they do not demand the conclusion that Macedonia alone of the participants in this league was excluded from the synedrion. Now more than ever before the destinies of Greece and Macedonia were thrown intimately together, which makes it all the more difficult to conclude that the Macedonians were left without a voice about their own future. Yet when all is said, the evidence does not permit a definite answer, leaving the question as nugatory as intriguing. For all that, the evidence, imperfect and perhaps ultimately intractable, points to a Macedonian vote in the synedrion.²⁸

²⁸ Alexander's claim: Diod. 17.4.9; Plut. *Alex.* 14.1; Arr. 1.9.9–10. Some schol-

C. THE CRUSADE AGAINST PERSIA AND THE MURDER OF PHILIP (337–336 BC)

Philip presently promulgated a grand idea that had never graced any Common Peace. He proposed a panhellenic crusade against the Persian Empire. Here was a peace treaty designed to wage war against the author of the original covenant. He justified this proposal by stating that Macedonia and Greece alike should seek revenge for past Persian aggression. The barbarians had wontenly invaded them both, warred against them, destroyed temples and other sacred places. These facts are as true as their relevance was specious. All parties had formally and legally settled their past differences by the King's Peace of 386. As seen above, the King had largely honored that treaty. Tigranes' seizure of Samos proved an exception, but could be rationalized as the act of an overly zealous satrap. The affair of Hermeias remained irrelevant. Artaxerxes had intervened in the defense of Perinthos and Byzantion, which could be justified by the clause of the King's Peace enabling the King to intervene in Europe to uphold the treaty. In short, Philip's proposal and Greek endorsement of it amounted to unwarranted acts of aggression. Yet even aggression normally needs some rationalization. Those in Corinth found it in the timeworn concept of the freedom of the Greeks in Asia Minor. Although some consider Isokrates responsible for winning Philip to this policy, the Athenian orator, who never gave a speech, likewise never had an original political idea in his geriatric life. Rather the concept reached back as far as the Ionian Revolt, when in 499 the Milesian Aristagoras had urged it upon the Spartan Kleomenes. The associated ideas of revenge against the Persians and

ars have looked to Alexander's assumption of Philip's rights and powers to interpret this settlement. All evidence indicates that the son simply renewed his father's arrangements with some particular exceptions of detail: Ps.-Dem. 17.4–7. Alexander doubtless lacked the time, inclination, and need fundamentally to recast Philip's treaty. Others have relied upon the efforts of Demetrios and Antigonos in 302 to resuscitate the Hellenic League (see Schmitt, *SdA* III.446). Plut. *Demet.* 25.4 states only that Demetrios aspired to the position of hegemon. The clauses of his treaty deal largely with various administrative details. In broader terms the document recognized the hegemony of the two kings, required the Greeks to send deputies to the synedrion and military contingents to the army. Furthermore, the inscription bearing the document proves that these measures were in effect only for the duration of the "common war". Thus, this document, drafted under conditions different from those of Philip's treaty, cannot necessarily illuminate or enhance knowledge of the terms of its predecessor.

the freedom of the Greeks had similarly inspired the establishment of the Delian League. Gorgias later resurrected the idea in an oration pronounced at Olympia in 392. In 388 Lysias again used the Olympic festival as the rostrum to advocate a general Greek war against the King. To these historical examples and oratorical exhortations recent events added their own instruction. The exploits of Xenophon's Ten Thousand had revived the notion that the Greeks could translate this hope into a fact. Some claimed that these adventurers who had marched through the upper satrapies and had crossed the whole of Asia, as they envisioned it, had also proven that Lydia and Phrygia would readily fall to Greek arms. Few of these enthusiasts seem to have understood that although the Ten Thousand marched through these regions, they never conquered and held any parcel of land. Rather the Persians concentrated on hurrying them along their way. The Spartans had proclaimed the freedom of the Greeks as one of their missions, whereupon they sent commanders from Thibron to Agesilaos to realize it. Agesilaos' campaign in 396, though abortive, served as fatuous evidence that he had encountered no serious opposition. Only disturbances in Greece demanded his recall. As seen, even at the height of his success, Agesilaos ventured no farther eastwards than Sardeis, the high-water mark of the Ionian Revolt. Surprisingly enough Jason of Pherai took up the cause, and this tyrant combined the practical with the oratorical. Jason was an admirer of Gorgias and a guest-friend of Isokrates, the two major rhetorical proponents of the crusade. Whatever Jason's real intentions, an assassin prevented their realization. So, by Philip's day the slogan calling for a grand retaliatory invasion of the Persian Empire to free the eastern Greeks had become hoary and a bit shopworn.²⁹

²⁹ The King and the Peace: Polyb. 3.6.13; Diod. 16.89.2–3; Justin 9.5.4–6; *FGrH* 255.5. Isokrates: The view here echoes in part that of G. Clemenceau, *Demosthenes*, Eng. trans. (Boston 1926) 80 on the significance of Isokrates 5: "The puerile suggestion of a rhetorician . . . [who] took the trouble to write to Philip a laborious letter like a student exercise". For some kinder views, see Mathieu, *Les Idées politique d'Isocrate*, 212–217; Mikkola, *Isokrates*, 235–243; D. Grieser-Schmitz, *Die Seebundpolitik Athens in der Publizistik des Isokrates* (Bonn 1999) 198–221. Aristagoras: Hdt. 5.49. Delian League: Thuc. 1.96; Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 23.5; Diod. 11.44.6; 47. Gorgias: Philostratos *Lives of the Sophists* 1.9.4–5; Arist. *Rhet.* 3.14.2. Momigliano, *Filippo*, 183–184. Lysias: Lysias 33.5–6; Diod. 14.109.3. Ten Thousand: Polyb. 3.6.10; Isok. 4.145–149; 5.90–92. Thibron *et al.*: Xen. *Hell.* 3.1.3, and Ch. 2 above; Agesilaos: Polyb. 3.6.11; see also Hdt. 5.50, 99–102. Jason: Xen. *Hell.* 6.1.12; Isok. 5.119; *Epist.* 6.1; Paus. 6.17.9.

Philip, however, considered the campaign a serious goal that he intended to realize. Not only did he marshal the forces of Greece but he also sent a Macedonian vanguard to Asia Minor. His precise aims still remain a mystery that perhaps will never be solved. He surely revealed them to his senior officers, but no record of them has survived. Simply put, the question becomes how far did he intend to march. Only a vague indication comes from the purported answer that he received from the priestess at Delphi. Philip asked the Pythia whether he would defeat the King of the Persians. She supposedly replied: "The bull is crowned, he comes to the end, and there is the slayer". Her reply was as usual ambiguous and in all probability more anecdotal than factual. Yet the question itself does not necessarily entail the overthrow of the entire Persian Empire. In order to liberate the Greeks of Asia Minor he must obviously defeat the King. Plausible speculation suggests that he planned only to dominate the Aegean basin. Isokrates supplies the scant evidence to support this view. He repeatedly urged Philip to liberate the Greek cities along the coast of Asia Minor. Moreover, he used well-known expressions to indicate that Asia for the Greeks principally meant the area from Sinope to Cilicia or Sinope to Knidos. The Athenians also hopefully opined that Lydia and Phrygia could fall to him. No other contemporary envisaged an invasion far beyond the Aegean coast, and even Isokrates could only dream of conquering the entire Persian Empire, the precise extent of which remained imperfectly known to most Greeks. In reality, exceedingly rare was the Greek who knew where Persepolis could be found.³⁰

The few places mentioned give at least some idea of how the Greeks defined the Asia best known to them. Sinope is of course the well-known city on the southern shore of the Black Sea, Knidos the famous coastal city north of Rhodes, and Cilicia the eastern half of the southern coast of Anatolia. All of these places lay on the sea. Inland from them all stand mountains that discourage military penetration. With the two exceptions already mentioned, the Greeks had focussed their attention on the shoreline of Asia Minor. Hard

³⁰ The Pythia: Diod. 16.91.2; Paus. 8.7.6. Asia: Isok. 4.162–163; 4.120–123. S. Ruzicka, *AJAH* 10 (1985 [1992]) 84–91; Buckler, *ICS* 19 (1994) 118–119. Perhaps the most nihilistic view ever presented comes from Clemenceau, *Demosthenes*, 14–15, who claims that Philip waged war against Persia "for ends that he never took the trouble to determine".

experience had warned them of the danger of trying to penetrate far inland. Although the great river valleys offered access inland, they did so only to far scattered parts of the east. They could not readily serve as effective avenues of invasion. A further consideration in support of this view comes from Philip's lack of bases in Anatolia from which to push inland. Through Athens, not wholly reliable, he tentatively commanded Samos and across from it Ephesos and neighboring Smyrna. Yet Miletos lay beyond him, and he could not venture eastwards until he had mastered the Levant and Egypt. These factors, when combined with the scanty testimony of contemporary sources, lead to the conclusion that at least from the outset Philip intended to confine his ambitions to the Aegean rim. Control of it, together with his mastery of the Greek mainland, would give him an empire greater than that of Athens in the fifth century and stronger than that of Sparta in the early fourth.

Philip returned to Pella in 337 for a winter filled with preparations for the full invasion of Persia, diplomatic intrigue, and romance. He had already sent an advanced force of 10,000 troops under Parmenion, Attalos, and Amyntas son of Lynkos to establish a bridge-head in the Troad. That meant that he had successfully gained the passage of the Hellespont between Sestos and Abydos, so he had secured his route. Although his force saw some local fighting, it favorably established itself and prepared for the next campaigning-season. The entire designated expeditionary force may have numbered some 32,000 infantry and 5100 cavalry; but since it never marched under Philip, the effort to establish its precise strength is pointless. Diplomacy arrived in the form of a proposal by Pixodoros, the satrap of Karia. Well aware of Philip's intentions and desiring to become a dynast like Mausolos and Hermeias rather than simply a satrap, he offered to marry his daughter to a son of Philip. The arrangement would suit both men quite well. Already lodged in northwestern Anatolia, Philip found the southwest offered to him. Pixodoros could hand him Miletos and Tralleis. The move would isolate Ephesos, the seat of so many Greek expeditions in this area, from the Persians. They would all doubtless become willing Graeco-Macedonian allies. Pixodoros in return presumably expected his own Karian principality. Philip responded by offering his son Arrhidaaios as the groom. Thus he would have sealed a very convenient marriage alliance. In this instance ambition spoiled the bargain. Fearful of being excluded from the succession to the throne, the young and impetuous Alexander offered

to marry the lady himself. A furious Philip berated his son and exiled his friends, but the harm was done. Pixodoros withdrew his offer. Alexander had thereby destroyed a fine opportunity to give Philip easy access to a vital part of Asia Minor.³¹

Romance of some sort entered the scene, when Philip announced his intention to marry Kleopatra, the niece of his marshal Attalos. Only a slight military action in Illyria temporarily interrupted the festivities. The match was supposedly an affair of the heart; but if so, it also appears quite politically convenient. A veteran and able general, Attalos already served afield in Asia Minor. His nephew Amyntas had married Kynna, Philip's daughter by his Illyrian wife Andata. Two daughters of Parmenion, whose names have not survived, had married Attalos and Koinos, other senior officers. In short, all three commanding generals then in Asia Minor would at the end of Philip's marriage to Kleopatra become members of his family. Perhaps as significantly Attalos embodied the common feature of all these marriage-alliances: his niece married Philip. His nephew married Kynna, and he had married a daughter of Parmenion. It was all very cosy, but nothing suggests that Alexander enjoyed the presence of these legal kinsmen. Although Alexander held the regency, Attalos could be seen as the power behind the throne, with Parmenion and Amyntas as his able lieutenants. These arrangements strongly suggest that Philip did not intend for Alexander to play a commanding role in the war with Persia. He preferred to rely upon his veteran marshals, now attached to him by domestic bonds, to assume the conduct of operations. This arrangement did not necessarily

³¹ Philip's forces: Diod. 16.91.2; 17.7.8–10, 17.3–4; Plut. *Mor.* 327E; Trogus *Prologue* 9; Justin 9.5.8; 11.6.2. Polyainos (5.44.4) claims that Parmenion and Attalos penetrated as far south as Magnesia, but whether he means the city on the Hermos or that on the Meander cannot be determined. The anecdote also records their repulse. The skirmish appears to have been an inconsiderable affair, which makes it difficult to understand why E. Badian, ed., *Ancient Society and Institutions* (Oxford 1966) 41; Cawkwell, *Philip*, 177; and Hammond, *Philip*, 168, apply Rhodes-Osborne, *GHI* 83–84; *SIG*³ 284; Ps.-Dem. 17.7; Arr. 1.17.7, all to this year. This evidence dates rather to Alexander's reign; see Ellis, *Philip II*, 306 nn. 49–52. These scholars, with the exception of Ellis, assume that Philip's military success was necessary to procure any honors bestowed upon the king. Yet nothing connects Polyainos' minor event with them. Nor do these documents explain why, had Philip's general penetrated so far south as to reach either of these cities, Alexander needed to launch his invasion from the Troad: Arr. 1.11.3–8. Pixodoros: Plut. *Alex.* 10. J. Miller, *RE* 20 (1950) 1894; Hamilton, *Plutarch, Alexander*, 25–28; Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire*, 22.

exclude Alexander from any responsibility. After all, he still remained a member of the family, and his duty as regent entailed major responsibilities. For all that, this network of personal relations among senior officers strongly suggests that Philip did not yet find Alexander acceptable for independent command in Asia.³²

Under these clouded and sullen conditions Kleopatra and Philip celebrated their nuptials. The event proved memorable. At the betrothal festivities Attalos proposed a toast calling for the blessings of the gods for a legitimate successor to the kingdom. In righteous anger Alexander confronted Attalos, demanding whether the man was branding him a bastard. All etiquette now irrelevant, Alexander threw his cup at Attalos. Himself enraged and drunk, Philip drew his sword against his son, but fell headlong across a couch. Alexander thereupon mocked him by sneering that a man who could not even cross from couch to couch could hardly cross from Europe to Asia. Having said too much, Alexander took refuge in Illyria, while Olympias fled to Epeiros. The young Alexander clearly felt safer with his father's enemies than with his friends. Although Demaratos of Corinth prevailed upon Philip to recall Alexander, nothing suggests that the breach between them ever mended. Yet at the same time had Philip truly lacked confidence in Alexander, he would not have recalled him from his self-imposed exile. Things became more complicated, and not necessarily merrier, when Kleopatra, his last wife, bore Philip a son shortly before his death. For the moment, then, things proceeded as normally as they ever did at Philip's court.³³

In these cheerful circumstances, Philip in 336 presided over another wedding, that of his daughter Kleopatra to King Alexandros of Epeiros. The political element again shines, but the connection among the principals is convoluted. Alexandros was Olympias' brother. Yet Philip betrothed him to Kleopatra, daughter of Olympias and therefore his own niece. The consequences were several. Olympias remained

³² Illyria: Diod. 16.93.6; Plut. *Mor.* 327C. Marriage alliances: Kleopatra: F. Stählin, *RE* 11 (1921) 734–735. Kynna: M. Fluss, *RE* Sup. 6 (1935) 209–211. Amyntas: J. Kaerst, *RE* 1 (1894) 2007. Parmenion: H. Berve, *RE* 18 (1949) 1559. A. Tronson, *JHS* 104 (1984) 116–126; Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire*, 27–28.

³³ Kleopatra's son: Diod. 17.2.3. Wedding festivities: Plut. *Alex.* 9.6–14. These events happened in quick succession, and Hamilton (*Plutarch, Alexander*, 27–28) points out that Plutarch's very organization of this chapter is more topical than chronological. Ellis, *Philip II*, 211–217; G.L. Cawkwell, in M.B. Hatzopoulos and L.S. Loukopoulos, eds., *Philip of Macedon* (London 1981) 166–175.

in Epeiros, where she could no longer annoy her husband. Philip did not bother to divorce her, but instead left his new son-in-law to deal with her. Alexandros in turn strengthened his hold on Epeiros, while enjoying the intimate support of the king of Macedonia and the hegemon of Greece. The headstrong Alexander thus saw his mother isolated in Epeiros, his friends exiled, and his uncle about to marry his sister. Though still honored at Pella, Alexander found himself in a position that could easily be interpreted as internal exile or at the very least political confinement. On the morning of the nuptial festivities, spectators assembled in the theater to enjoy the games intended officially to celebrate the wedding. Philip appeared wearing a white mantle accompanied only by his son Alexander and Alexandros of Epeiros, his now son-in-law. He walked without a bodyguard to show the world that he needed none. Thirteen finely-wrought statues adorned the royal procession. Twelve of them represented the great gods and the thirteenth Philip, who now shone as worthy of divine company. Philip directed his companions to proceed him, accompanied by the praise and applause of the audience. At this moment of public glory Pausanias, a member of his own bodyguard, rushed forward to plunge a knife into his ribs. Philip died immediately, enabling Pausanias to use the ensuing confusion to run for the horses that he had stationed outside the theater. Alexander's own bodyguard, however, killed Pausanias on the spot. The Macedonians immediately proclaimed Alexander as their king, which spared them all yet another struggle for the throne. They entombed Philip among his ancestors. After his victory at Chaironeia, Philip reportedly asked the oracle at Delphi about his destiny. The answer supposedly given at the time had come true: "For the vanquished tears, for the victor death".³⁴

Philip's assassination probably embodies the most intriguing murder mystery of the classical period. All there at Pella that morning could identify Pausanias as the culprit, but the question remains whether he acted alone or in collusion with others. Speculation began

³⁴ Alexander's position: Diod. 16.91.4; 17.2.3–4. Philip's assassination: Diod. 16.91.2–94.3–95.4; 17.2.1; *FGrH* 148 F1; Plut. *Alex.* 10.5; Trogus *Prologue* 9; Arr. 1.25.1; Curtius 7.1.6; Val. Max. 8.14; Justin 9.6.2–4. The oracle: Plut. *Dem.* 19.1. While it is certainly possible that the tomb at Vergina is Philip's, certainty is not. The chronological difficulties and the number of aristocrats who could legitimately claim royal blood ensure uncertainty. Personal observations of 11 July 1996, and in general M. Andronicos, *Vergina* (Athens 1994) 226–231.

as the corpse grew cold. According to what can reasonably be called the official version, Pausanias acted solely from feelings of personal revenge. As the sordid story goes, Pausanias, once beloved of Philip, lost his place to a rival, whom he accused of being a hermaphrodite. The rival, also named Pausanias, subsequently distinguished himself by saving Philip's life at the cost of his own. Unable to bear Philip's snub and his rival's valiant death, Pausanias complained bitterly to Attalos, Alexander, and to Philip himself. Attalos listened, invited the unhappy man to dinner, got him drunk, and turned him over to his muleteers who raped him. The violation was both sexual and social. Pausanias openly accused Attalos of the crime before Philip, who from expediency tried to smooth over the outrage. Philip needed Attalos far more than he did Pausanias. According to the accepted tale, Pausanias nursed his grudge quietly for years. All of this supposedly happened long before 336, when Pausanias was still a very young man. During this time he reputedly bore the brunt of public ridicule without immediately avenging himself or leaving the corps of bodyguards. Yet at the wedding he stepped forward to kill Philip. None of this makes much sense, and the unlikely story suggests that no one in authority wanted the truth to become known. The official version fails to explain why Pausanias waited so long to kill Philip, who in fact tried to ease the situation by promoting Pausanias and granting him honors. Nor does it explain why Pausanias chose that precise moment to strike. Above all, it fails to explain why the assassin did not kill Attalos, the principal villain of the piece.³⁵

Even in antiquity suspicions arose that Olympias and Alexander had sponsored the deed. Olympias, vile though she was, had no credible opportunity to put Pausanias to the task. Nor could she protect him afterwards. Alexander could. Only Alexander could have persuaded Pausanias that upon Philip's death the new king could spirit him away to some safe place in which he could thereafter shield him. Alexander had the opportunity and the tool. The birth of Kleopatra's son also gave him a motive. Philip was forty-six at

³⁵ Diod. 16.93.8–9; Justin 9.6.5–7. One could argue that Pausanias acted alone publicly to draw attention to his disgrace and the lack of justice from Philip, or that he craved notoriety (Diod. 16.94.1), but neither motive will explain the timing. E. Badian, *Phoenix* 17 (1963) 244–250; R. Fears, *Athenaeum* 53 (1975) 111–135; Cawkwell, *Philip*, 179–181.

the time of his death. Alexander allegedly rued the possibility that his father would leave him nothing worthy to achieve. The fear was no less reasonable because of its vanity. Himself twenty years old at the time, Alexander could possibly live his life as prince regent, only to watch his half-brother ascend the throne upon his majority. The history of the current English monarchy suggests an analogy, but happily a bloodless one. Intriguing also is the fact that in the following years Alexander rid himself of everyone known to have been connected with the crime. Furthermore, with Philip dead Alexander could rid himself of his arch-enemy Attalos, which he promptly did. None of these considerations ironically enough amount to proof in a just court of law. However collectively persuasive, they remain circumstantial. If others than Pausanias were responsible for Philip's murder, they covered their tracks most successfully. Philip was dead and with him the end of the history of classical Greece.³⁶

³⁶ Diod. 17.2.3–6, 5.1–2; Plut. *Alex.* 5.4–5; 11.1; 14; *Dem.* 23.2; Justin 9.8.1; 11.1.9, 5.1–2. Hamilton, *Plutarch, Alexander*, 14.

EPILOGUE

Although the eve of the fourth century began with a general longing for peace, the years ahead held little of it. The victors threw down the walls of Athens only to see them soon re-erected. In return for Persian help against Athens the Spartans had sworn away the freedom of the Greeks of Asia immediately to find that all Greeks felt that they had betrayed Hellenism. If the Athenians of the fifth century had exploited their Greek cousins in Anatolia, they had at least kept them in the realm of greater Greek politics. The Spartans after the Peloponnesian War finally came to grips with the stark reality that neither they nor any other Greek state could realistically ignore the vast power of Persia. Their response echoed down the century. They soon renounced their bargain with their Persian paymasters and sent a succession of commanders to maintain control of the Ionian littoral. They thus set a pattern for the following years, while adding their own ingredient. Men like Agesilaos strove not so much to liberate the Greeks as to include them in a new Spartan empire, one for which neither Spartan institutions nor mentality could adequately deal. Spartan alienation of their own war-time allies gave the first alarm of trouble. Within ten years of peace the Spartan failure of leadership led to a broad war along new lines. Instead of the fifth-century bipolarity of Sparta and Athens, states that had served as their allies built new alignments that would change kaleidoscopically for the rest of the century. The remainder of the fourth century saw the various Greek states failing to reach any semblance of a balance of power and even worse any political principle upon which to base that concept.

Although the Spartans, having reneged on their treaty with Persia, tried from 399 to liberate the Greeks of Asia, Antalkidas finally realized Sparta's inability to maintain control of the eastern Aegean. As the price of renewed Persian support, which at least offered the possibility of a Spartan empire on the mainland, the Spartans and the rest of the Greeks bowed to the King's Peace of 386. No one now disputed the King's right to Anatolia, but at the same time he disavowed any designs on Greece. Artaxerxes with this treaty officially ended the Persian Wars. His treaty formally introduced several new

factors into Greek politics. First and above all he decreed that all states in Greece, with some few exceptions, would enjoy autonomy and their own possessions. This command applied to all Greek states, even those that had not warred against him. Should any defy his will, he reserved the right to intervene, which he actually did only once against Philip. In effect, he treated Greece like a frontier area in the sense that the Greeks could do as they pleased so long as they did not annoy him. He himself kept Asia Minor. The King's Peace made resonating echoes throughout the century because it added new factors to the political scene. The clause demanding the autonomy of all cities meant that no Greek state had the right to create an empire. That declaring a general peace led immediately to the concept that a Common Peace shared by all should be the ordinary manner of Greek political life. Autonomy and peace represented noble ideals, but the King failed by not providing any mechanism or organization to enforce them. In 386 everyone knew that the Spartans would assume the task, but no one knew whether the King would control the Spartans. Subsequent events proved that he remained content to allow the Greeks to wear themselves down with their interminable bickering. His very renewal of his peace so frequently testifies to its failure. Yet it served him well by keeping the Greeks of the west from his door.

During these same years the Greeks witnessed the revived stirrings of the pursuit of hegemony, the bane of the fourth century. Its appearance could hardly be called a new phenomenon, but that of the fourth century differed from its fifth-century predecessor by not being limited to the two imperial states of Sparta and Athens. The defeat of the latter in the Peloponnesian War opened the way for the Spartans to make themselves the supreme and unchallenged leaders of the Greeks. The victors immediately began to deal with recalcitrant or seemingly unruly states, even those that had recently served as their allies. They quickly alienated Corinth and Thebes and gave Athens little reason to trust their good intentions. Agesilaos exemplified this imperial trend by his debasement of the King's Peace to nothing more than an instrument for the extension of Spartan power. Against the spirit and letter of the treaty he used the pact to settle old scores that the peace had meant to resolve. In the process he created new animosities. Mantinea, Phleious, and Thebes felt his sting. Nor could the Athenians plead innocence of hegemonial desire. Although they at first acted in proper accord with the

King's Peace, as when they created in 377 their League, they too during subsequent years began to build a sphere of influence in the waters of the Adriatic, typified by their dealings with Kerkyra and other states there. Later in the 360s and 350s they re-created, albeit temporarily, their old empire in the northern Aegean. In the peace treaties of 375 and the first of 371 the Spartans and Athenians struck a balance of power reminiscent of the fifth century, but after Leuktra the Athenians tried to grasp the hegemony of Greece by seizing Sparta's role as president of the King's Peace. Epameinondas thought otherwise; and after the destruction of Sparta as a major power, Thebes strove briefly and vainly to preside as hegemon. The goal eluded them, and the result of their failure could be seen in the aftermath of Mantinea in 362. The somber Xenophon recognized the consequences and the significance of the battle, when he opined:

The battle having ended, the opposite happened of what all men expected. For nearly all of Greece having come together and taken stations opposite each other, everyone supposed that if battle were joined, those who won would rule, and the defeated would suffer subjection. But the god so made it that both sides erected a trophy as though victorious, and neither hindered the other from raising his own. Both sides gave up the dead as though victorious and both took up their fallen as though defeated. Each side thought itself victorious. Yet neither appeared to have more land or city or rule than before the battle took place. More confusion and disorder reigned in Greece after the battle than before.¹

As usual, Philip proved the ultimate victor at Chaironeia by his combination of armed victory over a small knot of states and his diplomatic accords with many more others. The Roman Justin succinctly and precisely evaluated the entire historical course of the fourth century:

The states of Greece, while each one wished to rule alone, all squandered sovereignty. Indeed, hastening without moderation to destroy one another in mutual ruin, they did not realize, until they were all crushed, that every one of them lost in the end.²

All of fourth-century Greece fell heavily under the influence of these three ideas of hegemony, autonomy, and peace. The Greeks never

¹ Xen. *Hell.* 7.5.26.

² Justin, 8.1.1–2.

realized any of them, for they proved incompatible. When they created their League in 377, the Athenians realistically confronted this situation. They hearkened back to the old Delian League, but with the striking differences of expressing every overt intention of honoring the King's Peace and guaranteeing the autonomy of the new members. They eschewed any general claim to hegemony, and even established an independent synod of allies whose vote technically equalled their own in all joint decisions. The new League also differed from its predecessor in that all participants abandoned their goal of liberating the Greeks of Asia Minor. They at last bowed to reality. Yet dreams of empire lingered, and from 374 the Athenians admitted no new members to their League. Every subsequent alliance remained between Athens and the other party. They in effect maintained a League established and comported under the principles enunciated in the King's Peace, while establishing an empire outside it.

The Thebans perhaps came the closest to realizing these intractable concepts. Having established a Confederacy that balanced local rights and foreign obligations, they realized their desire of federalism, a hallmark of their history. They fostered it as a means of combining autonomy with security, a feature common to all modern federal states. They did not look beyond the polis in the sense of replacing it, but sought to find a place in which it could function according to its own lights within a larger political body. If, unlike Sparta and Athens, the Thebans made no attempt to create an empire, they nonetheless failed to find any political principle that would successfully unite the various Greek states. Like their predecessors, they too embraced the concept of the King's Peace, but by 365 the idea had foundered, as did their naval program. Nor did they find anything to replace it. They preferred to deal with federations and alliances without ever attempting to create an organization of Greek states. The period of the Theban ascendancy marks the last time that the traditional politics of the polis tried to resolve old political problems.

History abounds in ironies, and Philip of Macedonia presents one of them. He embraced all of the ideals that had circulated throughout Greece since the Peloponnesian War and added that of monarchy. Originally provoked by the Athenians, who sought to deny him his throne, he quickly became embroiled in Greek politics. If he defended his realm by conquest, he also established Macedonia as the leading power in the Balkans. Because of his exploits the Greeks

came to terms with the political concept of monarchy as a feasible form of government, one capable of competing with the polis but not necessarily incompatible with it. The Greeks refused to accept it until Rome eventually forced it upon them, but henceforth monarchy played a vital part in Greek politics and history. Yet at the same time Philip fully understood all of the major political concepts of the period from polis and ethnos to federalism. He demonstrated his grasp of these diverse factors after his victory at Chaironeia when he established a Common Peace among this congeries of states and his monarchy. He divorced the concept of that peace from the original King's Peace. While making it entirely Graeco-Macedonian, he kept many of the essential concepts of the original treaty. He ensured the very notion of peace as the normal way of life, while endorsing the autonomy of most Greek states. Erstwhile imperial powers like Sparta and Athens did not welcome the new situation, but for the many small states Philip brought security from more powerful neighbors. Philip, unlike the Thebans, also attempted to preserve this situation by his creation of the League of Corinth. He institutionalized the concepts of Common Peace, autonomy, and legal resolution of disputes. Moreover, he established himself as the legal guardian and protector of those rights. Lastly, he returned to the century-old desire to liberate the Greeks of Asia. Autonomy, Common Peace, hegemony, and the liberty of the Greeks—no one else in fourth century did more than Philip to realize them all. Although he failed to leave Europe, he bequeathed them all to his son. Ultimately, of course, only the Romans brought them to fruition.

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All essential bibliographical information can be found in the footnotes at the first citation of the work. The bibliography below conforms to the simple rule that only titles that receive frequent citation are included in an effort to prevent it from becoming unwieldy. The bibliography is divided into the two sections containing in the first the abbreviated titles of standard collections of sources and the most frequently cited secondary works. The second contains notice of pertinent modern contributions to various topics. Most references to the ancient sources come from standard editions such as the Bibliotheca Teubneriana, the Oxford Classical Texts, and the Loeb Classical Library. Inscriptions prove more difficult, but references derive primarily from the major collections of the *Inscriptiones Graecae*, W. Dittenberger, *Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecorum*, and *Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum*. Journals are abbreviated according to the guidelines found in the *American Journal of Archaeology*'s "Notes for Contributors and Abbreviations".

ABBREVIATED TITLES

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1. HARBOR OF EPHESES. In the middle ground beyond the line of walls in the foreground once stood the harbor of Ephesos, now filled by the alluvium of the Kaystros river. The modern coastline can be seen to the left on the horizon.



2. ENTRANCE TO THE HELLESPONT. Seen from the Mehmetcik Aniti, the monument erected to honor the Turkish dead of the Gallipoli campaign of 1915, the promontory marking the territory of Abydos juts to the sea on the left. That on the right indicates the territory of Sestos.



3. KEBREN. Remains of one of the several walls of the city, which was very strongly fortified by a series of such walls along steadily ascending slopes.



4. SARDEIS. The likeliest site of the battle of 395 BC, the view looking northwards from the Paktolos river.



5. HALIARTOS. The battlefield of 395 BC as viewed southwards from the akropolis of Haliartos to Lysandros' camp on the hills opposite and with the field of battle between.



6. NEMEA RIVER. The battlefield spreads below the heights above the Rema Rachiani. The view looks northwards across the Corinthian Gulf.



7. KORONEIA. A view of the line of battle with the akropolis of Koroneia in the background. The scene is viewed from the northeast.



8. HERAION. View of the largely excavated remains of the Heraion with the Corinthian Gulf and the Peloponnesos in the background. Here Agesilaos received Theban ambassadors and learned of the destruction of the Spartan *mora* near Lechaion.



9. LECHAION FROM AGHIOS YERASIMOS. This point marks the place where the final stage of the destruction of the Spartan *mora* occurred in 390 BC. Lechaion lies in the background to the right.




10. LEUKTRA. A wide-angle view of the battlefield as seen from the site of the Spartan camp. In the lower right corner is the Boiotian trophy, and in the background are the hills upon which the Boiotians encamped.



11. SPARTA. A panoramic view of the city of Sparta, as seen from the Menelaion. In the foreground is the line of the Eurotas, behind it the modern city of Sparta and Mt. Taygetos.



12. MESSENE. Line of towers and walls of Epameinondas' fortifications as seen on the western side.



13. MANTINEIA. A view of the gap between Mytika on the left and Kapnistra on the right, where the Spartans and their allies made their stand. This view is taken from Merkovouni, at the foot of which Epameinondas drew up his phalanx for the attack.



14. DELPHI. At the left along the ridge run the remains of Philomelos' fortifications erected in 356 BC. The first battle of the Sacred War took place on the rolling land on the right.



15. ARGOLAS. In the center rises the mediaeval city of Mendenitsa, built upon the remains of the ancient Argolas. On the surrounding small plains occurred the earliest struggles of the Sacred War.



16. OLYNTHOS. View of the akropolis and promontory of Olynthos with a glimpse of the surrounding countryside that extended far inland to the right.



17. AMPHIPOLIS. General view of the city as seen from the east.



18. THERMOPYLAI. View of the corridor of Thermopylai from the east with the National Highway at the right. Most of the flat land at the base of the hills was submerged at the time of the events of 346 BC. Only the high ground along the line of hills to the left was dry and thus serviceable for the movements of armies (by courtesy of Ares Publishers, Inc.).



19. BATTLEFIELD OF CHAIRONEIA. The battlefield as viewed from the theater of Chaironeia. The conflict extended along the valley of Kephisos River to a point near the foot of Mt. Akontion in the background.



20. THE LION OF CHAIRONEIA. This monument marks the grave of the Sacred Band, a special unit of Theban soldiers who died to the last man at the battle of Chaironeia fighting to preserve the freedom of Greece.